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Model  checking  is  an  increasingly  popular  technique  for  the  formal  verification  of 
concurrent  systems.  The  application  of  model  checking  is  limited  due  to  the  state- 
space  explosion  problem  -  as  the  number  of  components  represented  by  a  model  in- 
creases,  the  worst  case  size  of  the  associated  state-space  grows  exponentially.  As 
such,  models  of  realistic  systems  are  often  too  large  to  feasibly  check.  Over  the  last 
15  years,  symmetry  reduction  techniques  for  model  checking  have  been  developed 
and,  in  a  restricted  setting,  have  been  shown  to  be  effective  in  reducing  the  state- 
space  explosion  problem.  Current  techniques  can  handle  limited  kinds  of  symme- 
try,  e.  g.  full  symmetry  between  identical  components  in  a  concurrent  system.  They 
avoid  the  problem  of  automatic  symmetry  detection  by  requiring  the  user  to  spec- 
ify  the  presence  of  symmetry  in  a  model  (explicitly,  or  by  annotating  the  associated 
specification  using  additional  language  keywords),  or  by  restricting  the  input  lan- 
guage  of  a  model  checker  so  that  only  symmetric  systems  can  be  specified.  Addi- 
tionally,  computing  unique  representatives  for  each  symmetric  equivalence  class  is 
easy  for  these  limited  kinds  of  symmetry. 
We  present  a  theoretical  framework  for  symmetry  reduction  which  can  be 
applied  to  explicit  state  model  checking.  The  framework  includes  techniques  for 
autonzatic  symmetry  detection  using  computational  group  theory,  which  can  be  ap- 
plied  with  no  additional  user  input.  These  techniques  detect  structural  symmetries 
induced  by  the  topology  of  a  concurrent  system,  so  our  framework  includes  exact 
and  approximate  techniques  to  efficiently  exploit  arbitrary  symmetry  groups  which 
may  arise  in  this  way.  These  techniques  are  also  based  on  computational  group 
theoretic  methods. 
We  prove  that  our  framework  is  logically  sound,  and  demonstrate  its  gen- 
eral  applicability  to  explicit  state  model  checking.  By  providing  a  new  symmetry 
reduction  package  for  the  SPIN  model  checker,  we  show  that  our  framework  can  be 
feasibly  implemented  as  part  of  a  system  which  is  widely  used  in  both  industry  and 
academia.  Through  a  study  of  SPIN  users,  we  assess  the  usability  of  our  automatic 
symmetry  detection  techniques  in  practice. 3 
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Introduction 
Over  the  last  25  years,  temporal  logic  model  checking  [32,26,130,134,145]  has 
become  one  of  the  most  popular  techniques  for  formal  verification  of  concurrent 
hardware  and  software  systems.  Given  a  finite-state  model  which  captures  the  es- 
sential  behaviour  of  a  concurrent  system,  and  a  temporal  logic  property  which  de- 
scribes  some  requirement  of  the  system,  a  model  checking  algorithm  determines 
whether  or  not  the  property  holds  in  the  initial  state  (or  states)  of  the  model.  Fur- 
thermore,  if  the  property  does  not  hold,  the  model  checker  outputs  a  counter-example 
-a  behaviour  of  the  model  which  violates  the  given  property.  Model  checkers  can 
therefore  be  used  to  automatically  find  subtle  defects  in  complex  concurrent  sys- 
tem  designs,  or  to  prove  the  absence  of  certain  defects,  increasing  confidence  in  the 
system.  n-ie  fact  that  model  checking  is,  in  principle,  a  fully  automated  technique 
makes  it  more  appealing  to  designers  than  other  formal  methods  such  as  develop- 
ment  by  specification  and  refinement,  or  mechanical  theorem  proving. 
Although  model  checking  has  proved  successful  in  both  industry  and 
academia,  the  technique  is  hindered  by  the  state-space  explosion  problem.  This  is 
where,  in  the  worst  case,  the  number  of  reachable  states  of  a  model  grows  expo- 
nentially  with  the  number  of  components  of  the  system  being  modelled.  Consider 
a  system  comprised  of  it  identical  components,  each  of  which  occupies  one  of  k 
local  states,  for  some  n,  k>0.  A  state  of  a  model  of  this  system  can  be  viewed  as 
a  tuple  (11,12f 
... 
In),,  where  li  E  11,2,...,  k},  (I  <i<  n).  Thus  there  are  V  po- 
tential  states  in  the  model.  Although  in  practice  it  is  unusual  for  every  state  to  be 
reachable,  it  is  typical  for  the  number  of  reachable  states  to  approach  this  upper 
limit.  This  means  that  memory  and  time  constraints  often  prohibit  model  checking 
properties  of  systems  with  many  components. 
A  lot  of  model  checking  research  concentrates  on  approaches  to  reduce  the 
state-space  explosion  problem.  Techniques  such  as  symbolic  model  checking  [18, 
128],  partial-order  reduction  [67,1371,  abstraction  [301  and  symmetry  reduction  [14, 
27,31,55,103]  have  been  successfully  used  in  the  verification  of  large  systems. 
Symmetry  reduction  is  applicable  when  a  system  contains  replicated  com- 
ponents.  Such  replication,  or  symmetry,  can  result  in  portions  of  the  state-space  of 1.1:  CONTRIBUTION  AND  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  THESIS  14 
a  model  of  the  system  being  equivalent  up  to  rearrangement  of  component  identi- 
fiers.  If  symmetry  is  known  to  be  present  in  a  specification  then  model  checking 
of  certain  properties  can  be  performed  over  a  quotient  model,  which  is  generally 
smaller  than  the  unreduced  model.  The  quotient  model  is  usually  constructed  by 
converting  each  state  encountered  during  search  to  a  unique  representative  of  its 
symmetric  equivalence  class.  There  are  two  main  problems  which  must  be  over- 
come  for  a  symmetry  reduction  technique  to  be  useful:  it  must  be  possible  to  derive 
symmetries  of  a  model  from  its  associated  high-level  specification,  and  an  efficient 
method  of  computing  equivalence  class  representatives  must  be  available. 
Existing  techniques  for  exploiting  symmetry  in  model  checking  assume  that 
symmetries  of  a  model  are  either  known  a  priori  [311,  coded  into  the  model  through 
the  use  of  special  keywords  [14,1031,  or  guaranteed  to  exist  by  restricting  the  in- 
put  language  so  that  there  is  full  symmetry  between  multiple  instances  of  a  pa- 
rameterised  component  [1661.  The  first  two  approaches  are  potentially  prone  to 
error,  and  compromise  the  automation  of  model  checking,  which  is  one  of  its  main 
strengths  as  a  verification  technique.  With  the  third  approach,  the  specification  lan- 
guage  is  designed  to  suit  one  particular  state-space  reduction  technique,  which  may 
restrict  the  style  of  specifications,  and  typically  only  full  symmetry  between  identi- 
cal  components  can  be  captured  in  this  way.  Ideally,  a  model  checking  tool  should 
be  able  to  detect  symmetry  automatically  from  a  high  level  system  description. 
The  problem  of  computing  equivalence  class  representatives  is  usually 
avoided  by  only  providing  support  for  full  symmetry,  since  in  this  special  case  rep- 
resentatives  can  be  efficiently  computed  using  techniques  based  on  sorting.  How- 
ever,  many  other  kinds  of  symmetry  commonly  occur  in  models  of  concurrent  sys- 
tems  with  a  regular  structure.  For  example,  cyclic/dihedral  groups  are  typically 
associated  with  systems  which  have  uni/bi-directional  ring  structures,  and  wreath 
product  groups  occur  when  dealing  with  tree  topologies.  Efficient  strategies  for 
representative  computation  have  been  proposed  for  symmetry  groups  which  are 
known  to  have  certain  structural  properties  [271.  However,  an  autontated  solution  to 
the  problem  of  classifying  the  structure  of  any  group  so  that  an  appropriate  strategy 
can  be  chosen  is  required. 
1.1  Contribution  and  Structure  of  the  Thesis 
We  provide  a  review  of  model  checking  and  symmetry  reduction  literature  in 
Chapters  2  and  3  respectively.  In  Chapter  4  we  present  a  selection  of  examples 
for  which  symmetry  detection  and/or  reduction  using  existing  techniques  is  ei- 
ther  difficult,  or  impossible.  The  rest  of  the  thesis  is  divided  into  two  parts,  which 
respectively  addresses  research  problems  in  automatic  symmetry  detection,  and 
efficient  exploitation  of  symmetry. 1.2:  THESIS  WEBSITE  AND  SOURCE  FORGE  15 
Chapters  5-8  are  concerned  with  techniques  for  automatic  symmetry  detec- 
tion.  Examples  from  Chapter  4  are  used  in  Chapter  5  to  highlight  a  correspondence 
between  symmetries  of  the  communication  structure  and  symmetries  of  the  model 
associated  with  a  specification.  We  develop  automated  symmetry  detection  tech- 
niques  for  message  passing  specification  languages  in  Chapter  7,  using  a  small  lan- 
guage  which  captures  the  essential  features  of  the  widely  used  Promela  language. 
The  approach  involves  computing  the  symmetry  group  of  the  static  cliannel  diagram 
of  a  specification  (a  graphical  representation  of  potential  communication  in  the  un- 
derlying  model),  and  using  a  computational  group  theoretic  algorithm  to  compute 
a  subgroup  of  these  symmetries  which  induces  automorphisms  of  the  underlying 
model.  In  Chapter  8  we  describe  SymmExtractor,  an  implementation  of  these  tech- 
niques  for  Promela,  using  the  computational  group  theoretic  package  GAP.  We  eval- 
uate  the  usability  of  SymmExtractor  using  a  set  of  Promela  specifications  written 
as  solutions  to  two  student  assessed  exercises. 
The  problem  of  efficiently  exploiting  symmetries  during  model  checking  is 
addressed  in  Chapters  9-  11.  In  Chapter  9  we  extend  existing  results  on  efficiently 
computing  equivalence  class  representatives  for  certain  kinds  of  symmetry  group 
under  a  simple  model  of  computation,  and  present  a  computational  group  theoretic 
approach  to  classifying  an  arbitrary  symmetry  group  so  that  an  appropriate  sym- 
metry  reduction  strategy  can  be  chosen.  Given  a  set  of  group  generators,  the  classi- 
fication  algorithm  analyses  the  structure  of  the  group,  identifying  it  as  a  wreath  or 
disjoint  product  of  subgroups  (which  are  in  turn  analysed),  or  as  a  basic  symmetry 
group.  For  certain  kinds  of  basic  symmetry  groups,  exact,  efficient  symmetry  reduc- 
tion  strategies  are  available.  Otherwise  we  propose  an  approximate  strategy  based 
on  local  search.  This  strategy  does  not  provide  optimal  reduction,  but  is  sound,  as 
well  as  being  fast  in  practice.  For  symmetry  groups  which  decompose  as  a  product 
of  basic  groups,  a  composite  symmetry  reduction  strategy  is  selected.  In  Chapter  10 
we  then  consider  a  more  realistic  model  of  computation,  and  show  that  exact  sym- 
metry  reduction  strategies  under  the  simple  model  of  computation  are  no  longer 
guaranteed  to  provide  optimal  reduction.  We  show  how  to  extend  these  strategies 
to  achieve  optimality,  at  the  expense  of  polynomial  time.  In  Chapter  11  we  describe 
TopSPiN,  a  symmetry  reduction  package  for  the  SPIN  model  checker,  which  incor- 
porates  our  (detection  and  reduction)  techniques.  We  show  significant  reductions 
in  verification  time  and  space  requirements  for  model  checking  safety  properties 
for  a  variety  of  examples. 
1.2  Thesis  Website  and  Source  Forge 
The  results  in  this  thesis  are  illustrated  using  a  variety  of  specifications  of  various 
concurrent  systems.  Some  of  these  are  given  in  Appendix  A,  but  all  are  available 
online  at  the  following  URL: 1.3:  NOTATION  FOR  EQUALITY  AND  ASSIGNMENT  16 
http:  //www.  dcs.  gla.  ac.  uk/people/personal/ally/thesis/ 
Release  distributions  of  the  three  software  tools  presented  in  the  thesis,  SPIN-tO- 
GRAPE,  SymmExtractor  and  TopSPiN,  can  also  be  downloaded  from  the  above  URL. 
The  tools  are  open  source  and  their  source  code  can  be  downloaded  from  Source 
Forge: 
https:  //sourceforge.  net/projects/symmetryglasgow/ 
1.3  Notation  for  Equality  and  Assignment 
Throughout  the  thesis  we  make  extensive  use  of  the  rromela  specification  lan- 
guage.  Promela  follows  the  C  convention  of  using  ==  to  denote  the  boolean  equal- 
ity  operator  and  =  assignment.  For  example,  x=  =5  is  a  boolean  expression  which 
evaluates  to  true  iff  x  has  the  value  5.  On  the  other  hand,  x=  5  is  a  statement  which 
assigns  x  to  the  value  5. 
When  writing  mathematical  equations  and  presenting  algorithms,  we  prefer 
to  use  =  to  denote  the  equality  operator,  and  :=  to  denote  assignment  (the  approach 
used  by  languages  such  as  Ada  and  Pascal).  Therefore  the  meaning  of  ==  and  :=  is 
unambiguous,  but  the  meaning  of  =  depends  on  whether  it  occurs  in  a  Promela.  (or 
rromela-Lite)  code  fragment.  The  SMC  language,  discussed  in  Section  3.3.3,  uses 
and  ==  in  the  same  way  as  rromela. 
1.4  Acknowledgment  of  Published  Work 
Much  of  the  original  material  in  this  thesis  has  been  published  by  the  author  in  a 
selection  of  co-authored  papers. 
The  survey  of  symmetry  reduction  techniques  presented  in  Chapter  3  ap- 
pears  in  [132];  the  SPIN-to-GRAPE  tool  of  Chapter  4  was  first  presented  in  [49].  The 
automatic  symmetry  detection  techniques  of  Chapter  7  are  published  (in  a  prelimi- 
nary  form)  in  [48]  and  [42],  in  which  the  SymmExtractor  tool  is  also  introduced.  The 
type  reconstruction  algorithm  used  by  SymmExtractor  (see  Section  8.2)  was  devel- 
oped  as  part  of  the  ETCH  type  checker  [411.  Chapters  9  and  10  introduce  strategies 
for  symmetry  reduction  which  have  been  published  in  [44]  and  [46]  respectively, 
while  the  TopSPIN  symmetry  reduction  package  is  described  in  [43]. 
However,  the  content  of  this  thesis  is  the  work  of  the  author,  incorporating 
supervisory  suggestions. 
Published  work  not  included  in  the  thesis 
We  have  published  three  papers  related  to  symmetry  reduction  in  model  checking, 
the  content  of  which  are  not  included  here.  The  topics  covered  by  these  papers  are: 1.4:  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF  PUBLISHED  WORK  17 
a  symmetry  reduction  technique  specific  to  featured  networks  [131],  an  approach 
to  symmetry  reduction  for  probabilistic,  symbolic  model  checking  [451,  and  a  com- 
parison  of  techniques  for  exploiting  symmetry  in  model  checking  and  constraint 
programming  [471. 
While  these  papers  address  interesting  problems  related  to  the  role  of  sym- 
metry  reduction  in  formal  verification,  they  do  not  fit  into  the  suite  of  automatic, 
general  techniques  for  exploiting  symmetry  which  we  present  here. Chapter  2 
Model  Checking  and  the  State  Space  Explosion  Problem 
In  this  chapter  we  formally  present  temporal  logic  model  checking,  introducing  the 
Kripke  structure  formalism  used  to  model  a  concurrent  system,  together  with  the 
logic  CTL*  and  its  commonly  used  sub-logics,  CTL  and  LTL.  We  give  an  overview 
of  some  standard  model  checking  algorithms  and  tools.  In  particular,  we  describe 
the  Promela  specification  language  and  its  bespoke  model  checker,  SPIN,  Which  are 
referred  to  frequently  in  Chapters  4-11.  The  chapter  concludes  with  a  discussion  of 
techniques  which  have  been  developed  to  combat  the  state-space  explosion  prob- 
lem. 
We  begin  by  describing  the  use  of  model  checking  in  the  development  of 
reliable  concurrent  systems. 
2.1  The  Model  Checking  Process 
Verification  of  a  concurrent  system  design  by  temporal  logic  model  checking  tradi- 
tionally  involves  first  specifying  the  behaviour  of  the  system  at  an  appropriate  level 
of  abstraction.  The  specification  P  is  described  using  a  high  level  formalism  (often 
similar  to  a  programming  language),  the  semantics  of  which  are  an  associatedfinite 
state  model,  M(P).  A  requirement  of  the  system  is  specified  as  a  temporal  logic 
property,  (P. 
A  software  tool  called  a  model  checker  then  exhaustively  searches  the  finite 
state  model  M(P),  checking  whether  0  holds  at  each  initial  state.  If  0  does  not 
hold  at  some  initial  state,  an  error  trace  or  counter-example  is  reported.  Manual  ex- 
amination  of  this  counter-example  by  the  system  designer  can  reveal  that  P  does 
not  adequately  specify  the  behaviour  of  the  system,  that  0  does  not  accurately  de- 
scribe  the  given  requirement,  or  that  there  is  an  error  (bug)  in  the  design.  In  this 
case,  either  P,  0,  or  the  system  design  (and  thus  also  P  and  possibly  0)  must  be 
modified,  and  re-checked.  This  process  is  repeated  until  the  model  checker  reports 
that  0  holds  in  every  initial  state  of  M  (P),  in  which  case  we  say  M  (P)  satisfies 
written  M  (P)  [=-  0.  The  model  checking  process  is  illustrated  by  Figure  2.1. 2.1:  THE  MODEL  CHECKING  PROCESS 
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Figure  2.1:  The  model  checking  process. 
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Figure  2.2:  Traditional  and  modern  approaches  to  model  checking  in  the  development 
of  systerns  (adapted  fron-i  11561). 
Assuming  that  the  specification  and  temporal  properties  have  been  con- 
structed  with  care.,  successful  verification  by  model  checking  increases  confidence 
in  the  system  design,  which  can  then  be  refined  towards  an  implementation.  Piis 
traditional  approach  is  illustrated  in  the  left  hand  side  of  Figure  2.2. 
In  practice,  software  is  often  developed  rapidly,  without  much  initial  testing 
or  verification.  In  this  case  there  is  a  need  to  apply  model  checking  techniques  to 
the  source  code  of  an  existing  system,  in  an  attempt  to  correct  logical  design  flaws. 
Semi-automatic  abstraction  techniques  are  used  to  extract  a  specification  and  logi- 
cal  properties  from  source  code  so  that  the  model  checking  process  can  be  applied. 
This  modern  approach  is  illustrated  on  the  right  hand  side  of  Figure  2.2. 2.2:  KRIPKE  STRUCTURES  AND  TEMPORAL  LOGIC  20 
2.2  Kripke  Structures  and  Temporal  Logic 
As  discussed  above,  the  model  checking  problem  involves  determining  whether  or 
not  a  finite  state  model  describing  the  behaviour  of  a  concurrent  system  satisfies 
a  temporal  logic  formula  specifying  a  desired  safety  or  liveness  property  of  the 
system.  A  Kripke  structure  is  the  common  formalism  for  representing  a  finite  state 
model,  and  temporal  logic  formulas  are  usually  expressed  in  (a  sub-logic  of)  CTL*, 
or  the  y-calculus. 
Let  V=  jV1iV2i 
...  i  Vk}  be  a  finite  set  of  system  variables,  where  each  vi 
ranges  over  a  finite  non-empty  set  Di  of  possible  values.  Then  D=D,  x  D2  X 
...  x  Dk  is  the  set  of  all  possible  system  states.  A  Kripke  structure  is  defined  in 
terms  of  D  as  follows: 
Definition  1A  Kripke  structure  M  over  D is  a  tuple.  M  =  (S,  So,  R)  where: 
1.  S=D  is  a  non-empty,  finite  set  of  states 
2.  So  gS  is  a  set  of  initial  states 
3.  RCSxS  is  a  transition  relation 
A  path  in  M  from  a  state  sES  is  an  infinite  sequence  of  states  7r  =  SO,  S1,  S2.... 
where  so  =  s,  such  that  for  all  i>0,  (si-1,  si)  E  R.  For  states  s  and  t,  it  is  common 
to  denote  the  transition  (s,  t)  by  s-t.  A  state  sES  is  reacizable  if  there  is  a  path 
SO,  S,,...,  S,...  in  M  where  so  E  So.  A  transition  (s,  t)  ER  is  reachable  if  s  is  a 
reachable  state. 
We  usually  deal  with  Kripke  structures  which  have  a  single  initial  state  so  E 
S,  in  which  case  we  write  M=  (S,  so,  R).  1 
Figure  2.3  shows  the  reachable  part  of  a  Kripke  structure  for  a  model  of  two 
process  mutual  exclusion.  The  model  consists  of  two  processes,  each  with  three 
local  states  N,  T  and  C.  Each  process  has  a  single  state  variable,  sti  say  (i  E  11,2}). 
Here  V=  IStli  St2}  and  D,  =  D2  =  IN,  T,  C}.  'Il-ie  values  N,  T  and  C  denote  that 
a  process  is  in  the  neutral,  trying  or  critical  state  respectively.  For  AE  IN,  T,  C}  we 
abbreviate  the  proposition  stj  =A  by  Ai.  Only  if  process  i  is  in  the  trying  state  (i.  e. 
Tj  holds)  and  process  j  34  i  is  not  in  the  critical  state  (i.  e.  -Cj  holds)  can  process  i  can 
move  into  the  critical  state.  Thus  in  the  model  it  is  not  possible  for  both  processes  to 
be  in  the  critical  state.  That  is,  the  mutual  exclusion  property  holds.  Note  that  there 
is  a  single  initial  state  (indicated  by  an  incoming  edge  with  no  predecessor  state  in 
Figure  2.3).  In  the  initial  state  both  processes  are  in  the  neutral  state. 
1.  Following  the  convention  of  e.  g.  [30,55,57,591,  Definition  1  does  not  include  a  labelling  functior-L 
Such  a  structure  is  sometimes  referred  to  simply  as  a  transition  system  130].  We  could  equivalently  de- 
fine  states  as  being  labelled  with  atomic  propositions  of  the  form  (vi  =  di)  (where  di  E  Dj)  [321. 
However,  the  above  notation  in  which  states  are  valuations  of  variables  (and  thus  are  implicitly  la- 
belled)  is  convenient  for  presentation  of  our  results,  and  is  close  to  the  representation  of  states  used 
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Figure  2.3:  Kripke  structure  for  two-process  mutual  exclusion. 
2.2.1  CTL* 
To  express  properties  of  Kripke  structures  we  introduce  the  branching  time  tem- 
poral  logic  CTL*.  Me  set  of  CTL*  state  and  path  formulas  are  defined  inductively 
over  a  finite  set  of  propositions  over  system  variables.  The  quantifiers  A  and  E  are 
used  to  denote  for  all  paths,  and  for  some  path  respectively  (where  FO  =  -A-0). 
In  addition,  X,  U,  F  and  G  represent  the  standard  next-time,  strong  until  (see  e.  g. 
[921),  eventually  and  always  operators  (where  EO  =  trueUO,  and  Go  =  -F-0  re- 
spectively).  Note  that  we  use  p  =ý-  q  to  denote  -p  Vq  irt  the  standard  way.  Let  V 
and  Di,  (1  <i<  k)  be  as  above.  Then: 
"  true,  false,  (vi  =  di)  and  (vi  34  di)  (for  all  vi  E  V,  di  E  Di)  are  state  formulas 
"  if  0  and  ip  are  state  formulas,  then  so  are  -,  0,0  A  ýp  and  4)  V  ip 
"  if  0  is  a  path  formula,  then  AO  and  EO  are  state  formulas 
"  any  state  formula  0  is  also  a  path  formula 
"  if  0  and  ip  are  path  formulas,  then  so  are  -0,0  A  ip  and  0V  ýP,  X0,  OMP,  FO 
and  Go. 
Given  (path  or  state)  formulas  0  and  1P,  T  is  a  sub-formula  of  0,  written  ip  9  0, 
if  either  ýP  =  0,  zP  is  an  operand  to  one  of  the  operators  appearing  in  0,  or  zP  is 
bound  to  a  quantifier  appearing  in  ýp.  The  sub-formula  ip  is  propositional  if  it  is  a 
state  formula  which  does  not  include  A  or  E.  A  maximal  propositional  sub-formula 
of  0  is  a  propositional  sub-formula  ip  such  that  if  C  0,  where  0'  is  also  a 
propositional  sub-formula,  then  ip  =  ip'. 
The  logic  CTL*  is  the  set  of  all  state  formulas.  For  a  Kripke  structure  M,  if 
the  CTL*  formula  0  holds  at  a  state  sES  then  we  write  M,  s  J--  0  (or  simply 2.2:  KRIPKE  STRUCTURES  AND  TEMPORAL  LOGIC  22 
s  ý=  0  when  the  identity  of  the  model  is  clear  from  the  context).  Otherwise  we 
write  M,  s  V=  s.  The  relation  ý=  is  defined  inductively  below.  Note  that  for  a  path 
7r  =  so,  sj,  ...  we  definefirst  (7r)  =  so  and,  for  all  i>0,7ri  is  the  suffix  of  7r  starting 
from  state  si. 
"s  true,  and  s  K-  false 
"s  (vi  =  di)  if  and  only  if  s=  (el,  e2,  ...  iek)  and  ej  =  di  (1  <i<  k) 
"s  (vi  3A  di)  if  and  only  if  s=  (el,  e2,  ...  iek)  and  ej  34  di  (1  <i<  k) 
"s  --,  o  if  and  only  if  s  V=  0 
"s0A  ip  if  and  only  if  s  and  s 
"s0VV  if  and  only  if  s  or  s  ý= 
"s  A0  if  and  only  if  7r  0  for  every  path  7r  starting  at  s 
"s  EP  if  and  only  if  7r  0  for  some  path  7r  starting  at  s 
"  7r  0,  for  any  state  formula  0,  if  and  only  iffirst(7r)  ý=  0 
"  7r  -,  0  if  and  only  if  7r  K0 
"  7r  0A  ýp  if  and  only  if  7r  0  and  7r  ý=  ip 
" 
7r  0V  ip  if  and  only  if  7r  0  or  7r  ý=  ip 
"  7r  OUip  if  and  only  if,  for  some  i>0,7ri  ý=  ip  and  7rj  ý--  0  for  all  0j<i 
"  7r  X0  if  and  only  if  7ri  0 
"  7r  F0  if  and  only  if  7ri  0,  for  some  i>0 
"  7r  Go  if  and  only  if  7ri  0,  for  all  i>0. 
Model  checking  involves  determining  the  satisfaction  of  a  temporal  logic  for- 
mula  by  a  Kripke  structure.  The  model  checking  problem  can  be  specified  globally  or 
locally  as  follows  [1341: 
Global  model  checking  problem  -  Given  a  Kripke  structure  M  and  a  CTL*  for- 
mula  determine  the  set  of  states  in  M  that  satisfy  0  (i.  e.  determine  fSES 
. 
A4,  s  0}). 
Local  model  checking  problem  -  Given  a  Kripke  structure  A4,  a  CTL*  formula 
and  a  state  s  in  M,  determine  whether  s  satisfies  0  (i.  e.  M,  s  J--  0). 
Recall  the  set  So  of  initial  states  of  a  Kripke  structure  M.  In  practice  we  are 
typically  interested  in  whether  the  initial  states  of  a  model  satisfy  a  given  property, 
so  we  say  that  the  model  M  satisfies  the  CTL*  property  0,  denoted  M  if 
M,  s  ý--  4)  for  all  s  (=-  So. 
Returning  to  the  mutual  exclusion  example  of  Figure  2.3,  we  can  express  the 
mutual  exclusion  property  formally  in  CTL*  as  follows: 
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The  Kripke  structure  clearly  satisfies  this  property  as  (C,  C)  is  not  a  reachable  state. 
Property  1  is  a  safety  property  -  it  asserts  that  something  (bad)  never  happens.  A 
liveizess  property  on  the  other  hand  expresses  that  eventually  something  (good) 
must  happen  during  an  execution.  For  example,  Property  2  below  states  that  hav- 
ing  reached  its  trybig  region  a  process  will  eventually  progress  to  its  critical  section 
(the  progress  property): 
ProPerty  2  AG  (Ti  =* 
To  see  that  the  Kripke  structure  does  not  satisfy  this  property,  consider  the  infinite 
path  starting  at  (N,  N),  followed  repeatedlyby  the  cycle  (T,  N),  (T,  T),  (T,  C),  (T,  N). 
Process  1  waits  in  the  trying  region  forever  along  this  infinite  path,  violating 
Property  2.  Thus  this  path  is  a  counter-example  which  proves  that  M,  (NjNj)  ýL 
Property  2. 
We  now  define  two  sub-logics  of  CTL*  which  are  commonly  used  in  apph- 
cations  of  model  checking. 
CTL 
The  logic  CTL  (Computation  Tree  Logic)  is  the  sub-logic  of  CTL*  in  which  the  tem- 
poral  operators  X,  U,  F  and  G  must  be  immediately  preceded  by  a  path  quantifier. 
For  example  the  so-called  reset  property,  AG(EF  Restart),  which  asserts  that  from 
any  state  it  is  possible  to  get  to  the  Restart  state,  is  a  CTL  property.  Efficient  model 
checking  algorithms  exist  for  this  sub-logic  (see  Section  2.3.1),  which  is  expressive 
enough  for  the  needs  of  most  hardware  verification  problems,  and  thus  is  used 
almost  exclusively  in  this  area. 
LTL 
The  logic  LTL  (Linear  Temporal  Logic)  is  obtained  by  restricting  the  set  of  CTL*  for- 
mulas  to  those  of  the  form  A0,  where  0  does  not  contain  A  or  E.  It  cannot  express 
e.  g.  the  reset  property  (see  above).  On  the  other  hand,  the  property  A(FG  Leader), 
which  states  that  eventually  the  proposition  Leader  will  hold  forever,  can  be  ex- 
pressed  in  LTL  but  not  CTL.  Although  the  model  checking  problem  for  LTL  is 
NP-hard  [32],  LTL  model  checking  can  be  performed  on-the-fly  using  an  automata- 
theoretic  approach  (see  Section  2.3.2)  which  can  be  very  efficient  in  practice.  LTL  is 
applied  almost  exclusively  in  software  verification. 
Figure  2.4  illustrates  the  relationship  between  CTL,  LTL  and  CTL*.  Ex- 
ample  properties  (adapted  from  [321)  in  CTL  n  LTL,  CTL  \  LTL,  LTL  \  CTL  and 
CTL*  \  (CTL  U  LTL)  are  shown.  For  a  debate  on  the  relative  benefits  of  CTL  vs.  LTL 
see  [92]. 2.3:  MODEL  CHECKING  ALGORITHMS  24 
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Figure  2.4:  Relationship  between  the  temporal  logic  CTL*  and  its  sub-logics  CTL  and 
LTL,  with  example  properties. 
2.2.2  y-calculus 
It  is  worth  noting  that  properties  of  transition  systems  can  also  be  expressed  in  the 
propositional  p-calculus  [1111.  This  powerful  language  is  obtained  by  extending 
Hennessy-Milner  logic  (a  simple  modal  logic)  [79]  with  fixpoint  operators.  Tlie  y- 
calculus  is  of  interest  to  researchers  in  formal  verification  as  many  temporal  logics 
(e.  g.  CTL*)  can  be  encoded  into  it. 
Although  symmetry  reduction  teclu-dques  have  been  shown  to  be  compati- 
ble  with  y-calculus  model  checking  [55],  we  restrict  our  attention  to  CTL*  and  its 
sub-logics,  which  are  expressive  enough  to  describe  most  properties  of  interest,  and 
are  supported  by  widely  used  model  checkers  such  as  SPIN  and  SMV. 
2.3  Model  Checking  Algorithms 
We  now  describe  standard  explicit-state  model  checking  algorithms  for  CTL  and 
LTL,  and  indicate  how  they  can  be  combined  for  CTL*  model  checking. 
2.3.1  CTL  model  checking 
The  model  checking  algorithm  for  CTL  [28,145]  works  by  successively  marking 
states  which  satisfy  sub-formulas  of  the  formula  to  be  checked,  starting  with  propo- 
sitional  sub-formulas  which  are  trivial  to  check.  The  particular  form  of  the  algo- 
rithm  used  depends  on  the  formula.  For  illustration,  we  give  here  an  example  of 
how  the  algorithm  proceeds  to  check  formula  0,  where  0  is  A  (01  U02)  - 
For  a  state  s,  s  ý=  0  if  and  only  if  either  s  satisfies  02  or  s  has  at  least  one  suc- 
cessor,  s  satisfies  01  and  all  successors  of  s  satisfy  0.  Initially  all  states  are  marked  to 
indicate  whether  they  satisfy  01  and/or  02-  States  which  satisfy  (p2  Can  immediately 
be  marked  as  satisfying  0.  Each  state  is  also  marked  with  a  number  (0  say),  denot- 
ing  how  many  successors  have  yet  to  be  marked  as  satisfying  0.  Initially  for  each 
state  s,  nb  is  set  to  0  if  s  ý=  0,  or  to  the  number  of  successors  of  s  otherwise.  In  the 
latter  case,  each  time  a  successor  of  s  is  marked  as  satisfying  0,  nb  is  decremented 2.3:  MODEL  CHECKING  ALGORITHMS  25 
by  one.  When  nb  =0  for  s,  clearly  s  ý--  0.  When  no  states  can  be  remarked,  the 
algorithm  terminates.  If,  at  this  point,  all  initial  states  are  marked  as  satisfying 
then  M  ý=  0. 
The  algorithm  for  determining  whether  a  CTL  formula  0  holds  in  a  state  s  of 
M  is  linear  in  the  size  of  the  formula  and  the  Kripke  structure  -  the  complexity  is 
0  (10  1-  (I  SI+IR  1)),  where  10  1  is  the  length  of  0  [28].  An  extension  of  the  algorithm 
which  only  considers  fair  computations  (see  Section  3.6.2)  is  presented  in  [281. 
2.3.2  Automata-theoretic  LTL  model  checking 
The  model  checking  problem  for  LTL  can  be  restated  as:  "given  M  and  0,  does  there 
exist  a  path  of  M  that  does  not  satisfy  0?  "  One  approach  to  LTL  model  checking  is 
the  tableau  approach  described  in  [134].  However,  we  concentrate  here  on  the  more 
efficient  automata-theoretic  approach  [119,176]. 
Definition  2  Afinite  state  automatm  (FSA)A  is  a  tupleA  =  (S,  so,  L,  TF)  where. 
1.  S  is  a  non-empty,  finite  set  of  states 
Z  so  ES  is  an  initial  state 
3.  L  is  a  finite  set  of  labels 
4.  TCSxLxS  is  a  set  of  transitions 
5.  FCS  is  a  set  of  final  states. 
A  run  of  A  is  an  ordered,  possibly  infinite,  sequence  of  transitions 
(SOi  10t  SI)i  (Sli  Ili  S2)i 
where,  for  all  i>0,  Si  E  S,  1i  EL  and,  (Si,  1j,  Si+j)  E  T.  An  accepting  run  of  A  is  a 
finite  run  in  which  the  final  transition  (Sn 
-1, 
In-1,  SO  has  the  property  that  Sn  E  F. 
In  order  to  reason  about  infinite  runs  of  an  automaton,  alternative  notions 
of  acceptance,  e.  g.  BUchi  acceptance,  are  required.  We  say  that  an  infinite  run  (of 
an  FSA)  is  an  accepting  co-run  (i.  e.  it  satisfies  Biichi  acceptance)  if  and  only  if  some 
state  in  F  is  visited  infinitely  often  in  the  run.  A  Bfichi  automaton  is  an  FSA  defined 
over  infinite  runs  (together  with  the  associated  notion  of  BUchi  acceptance). 
Every  LTL  formula  can  be  represented  as  a  Bdchi  automaton  (see  for  exam- 
ple  [177],  and  references  therein).  In  order  to  verify  an  LTL  property  AO,  a  model 
checker  must  show  that  all  paths  of  a  model  M  satisfy  0  (alternatively,  find  a 
counter-example,  namely  a  path  which  does  not  satisfy  0).  To  do  this,  an  automaton 
A  representing  the  reachable  states  of  M  is  constructed,  together  with  an  automa- 
ton  &0  which  accepts  all  paths  for  which  -0  holds.  The  asynchronous  product  of 
the  two  automata,  A'  is  constructed.  (In  practice  A'  is  usually  constructed  implic- 
itly,  by  letting  A  and  B-0  take  alternate  steps).  Any  accepting  run  of  A'  signifies 
an  error.  If  there  are  no  accepting  runs,  M  ý=  (P.  Generally  to  prove  LTL  properties, 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  26 
a  depth-first  search  is  used.  As  the  search  progresses,  all  states  visited  are  stored 
(in  a  reduced  form)  in  a  hash  array  (or  heap),  and  states  along  the  current  path  are 
pushed  on  to  the  stack. 
If  the  property  0  to  be  verified  is  a  safety  property,  say  AG  1P,  where 
ip  does  not  contain  the  until  operator  U,  then  a  depth-first  search  of  A'  is  used.  If 
a  state  is  encountered  at  which  T  is  false,  then  0  is  false  and  the  current  path  (the 
current  contents  of  the  stack)  provides  a  counter-example.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
0  is  a  liveness  property,  then  determining  the  truth,  or  otherwise,  of  0  relies  on 
the  ability  to  detect  the  presence  of  infinite  accepting  runs  in  A'.  This  is  achieved 
either  by  using  the  classic  approach  of  Tarjan  [172]  in  wl-dch  the  strongly  connected 
components  are  constructed  and  analysed  separately  for  acceptance  runs,  or  via  a 
nested  depth-first  search  [351.  A  nested  depth-first  search  is  more  efficient  than  the 
classic  approach  in  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  produce  all  acceptance  runs,  just  a 
single  acceptance  cycle  (if  one  exists).  Suppose,  for  example  0  is  A(GF  p),  for  some 
proposition  p.  From  any  state  s  reached  during  an  initial  search  at  which  -p  holds, 
a  second  search  is  initiated  to  check  for  paths  leading  back  to  s,  during  which  p 
remains  false.  If  no  such  path  exists,  the  original  search  resumes  from  s. 
The  complexity  of  LTL  model  checking  is  exponential  in  the  length  of  the  for- 
mula  to  be  checked:  0((ISI  +  JRJ)  -2cý(101)).  This  is  because  the  worst  case  automa- 
ton  generated  from  an  LTL  formula  0  may  have  2101  states.  Although  in  the  worst 
case  this  means  that  LTL  model  checking  is  much  harder  than  CTL  model  checking, 
in  most  practical  cases  there  is  little  performance  difference  [92,  Appendix  B1. 
2.3.3  Model  checking  for  CTL* 
Model  checking  for  CTL*  was  first  introduced  in  [28].  A  method  for  checking  CTL* 
properties  [541  involves  the  use  of  an  LTL  model  checker  on  the  sub-formulas  of 
the  property  to  be  checked.  T'l-te  complexity  of  CTL*  model  checking  is  the  same 
as  for  LTL  model  checking.  However,  due  to  the  automata-theoretic  approach  for 
LTL  model  checking  and  the  efficient  CTL  model  checking  algorithm,  most  model 
checkers  are  used  to  verify  either  CTL  or  LTL  properties,  but  not  both. 
2.4  Promela  and  SPIN 
Clearly  it  would  be  impractical  to  model  complex  concurrent  systems  directly  as 
Kripke  structures.  In  practice,  a  system  is  described  using  a  high-level  specifica- 
tion  formalism  which  has  Kripke  structure  semantics.  A  model  checking  tool  takes 
as  input  a  specification  of  a  concurrent  system,  together  with  a  property  in  some 
temporal  logic.  Using  algorithms  such  as  those  outlined  in  Section  2.3,  together 
with  appropriate  state-space  reduction  techniques  (see  Section  2.6),  the  tool  checks 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  27 
whether  or  not  the  associated  model  satisfies  the  property,  providing  a  counter- 
example  if  the  result  is  negative.  Certain  properties  (such  as  absence  of  deadlock, 
or  basic  safety  properties  which  can  be  expressed  using  specification-level  asser- 
tions)  can  be  checked  without  a  temporal  property. 
Me  model  checker  SPIN  (simple  Promela  interpreter)  allows  LTL  reasoning 
about  specifications  written  in  Promela  (process  meta  language).  SPIN  has  been 
widely  used  in  industry  and  academia  for  reasoning  about  communications  pro- 
tocols.  In  this  section  we  give  an  overview  of  Promela  and  SPIN,  which  are  used  for 
implementation  and  examples  throughout  Chapters  4-11.  For  an  excellent  Promela 
language  reference,  see  [65].  Full  details  Of  SPIN  and  Promela  can  be  found  in  the 
SPIN  reference  manual  [921.  In  Section  2.5  we  briefly  describe  a  selection  of  other 
model  checking  tools. 
2.4.1  Promela 
Promela  is  an  imperative  style  specification  language  geared  towards  the  descrip- 
tion  of  network  protocols.  In  general,  a  Promela  specification  consists  of  a  series 
of  global  variables,  channel  declarations  and  process  type  (proctype)  declarations, 
together  with  an  initialisation  process.  Desired  logical  properties  of  a  specification 
are  either  presented  using  assertions  embedded  in  the  body  of  a  proctype,  or  via  a 
never  claim  -a  special  additional  process  which  can  be  used  for  the  verification  of 
LTL  properties.  2 
Each  proctype  in  a  Promela  specification  can  be  viewed  as  a  finite  automa- 
ton  (see  Section  2.3.2),  and  the  model  associated  with  this  specification  is  the  asyn- 
chronous  product  of  the  automata  for  all  proctype  instantiations.  This  global  au- 
tomaton  can  be  viewed  as  a  Kripke  structure,  so  we  talk  about  the  Kripke  structure, 
rather  than  the  automaton,  associated  with  a  Promela  specification. 
Variables  and  channels 
Promela.  includes  flie  following  primitive  data  types:  bit,  byte,  short  and  hit  (numeric 
types);  pid  (a  type  for  storing  process  identifier  values),  and  bool  (for  boolean  val- 
ues).  Names  for  messages  in  a  protocol  can  be  defined  using  a  single  enumeration, 
called  mtype.  For  example,  the  declaration: 
mtype  =  frequest,  ack,  grant,  denyl 
defines  four  distinct  message  names  for  use  in  a  protocol.  User-defined  record  types 
can  be  constructed  using  the  typede  f  keyword.  The  declaration 
typedef  message  I  pid  sender;  pid  receiver;  mtype  body; 
bit  encrypted  I 
defines  a  record  type,  message,  with  four  fields:  sender  and  receiver  (which  have  type 
pid),  body  (an  enumeration),  and  encrypted  (a  bit).  Single-dimensional  arrays  can  be 
2.  Temporal  properties  can  also  be  expressed  using  progress  and  accept  labels  in  the  body  of  a  proc- 
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declared  using  C-like  syntax.  For  example: 
message  A[51 
defines  an  array  of  length  five,  with  element  type  message.  Two-dimensional  ar- 
rays  can  be  declared  indirectly  using  an  array  whose  elements  are  instances  of  a 
record  type  which  includes  an  array  type  as  one  of  its  fields. 
To  facilitate  the  specification  of  protocols,  Promela  includes  a  chan  data 
type  to  describe  both  synchronous  and  buffered  channels.  A  channel  declaration 
can  have  one  of  three  forms.  A  declaration  chan  (name)  =  fxl  of  {(type),, 
(type)2, 
.... 
(type)k}  (x  >  0,  k>  0)  defines  a  new  channel  (referred  to  by  (narne)). 
Each  message  to  be  sent  on  this  channel  must  be  a  tuple  of  values,  where  the 
value  at  position  i  has  type  (type)  i  (1  <i<  k).  We  refer  to  the  elements  of 
this  tuple  as  message  fields.  If  x>0  then  the  declaration  defines  a  buffered,  first- 
in  first-out  channel  of  length  x.  'If  x=0  then  communication  on  the  channel 
is  synchronous.  The  component  of  the  channel  declaration  of  the  form  Cxi  of 
I  (type)  1,  (tYPe)  2,  .... 
(type)k}  is  called  a  channel  initialiser.  A  channel  declara- 
tionchan  (name),  =  (nalne)2,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  define  anew  channel. 
Rather  it  defines  a  new  channel  reference,  (name),,  which  refers  to  the  channel  re- 
ferred  to  by  (name)2  (the  name  associated  with  a  previous  channel  declaration). 
Finally,  a  declaration  chan  (name)  defines  a  channel  reference  which  is  initially 
null.  A  useful  feature  of  Promela  is  that,  like  the  7r-calculus  [159],  it  supports  the 
declaration  of  first-class  channels:  the  type  chan  may  be  given  as  a  message  field 
type  in  a  channel  initialiser,  so  that  channel  references  can  be  passed  on  the  channel. 
This  allows  for  specifications  with  dynamic  communication  structures. 
We  say  that  a  channel  variable  is  globally  instantiated  if  it  is  declared  in  global 
scope  (outwith  any  proctype  definition),  and  has  a  channel  initialiser. 
A  (non-channel)  global  variable  declaration  may  be  prefixed  by  the  hidden 
keyword.  TI-ds  indicates  to  SPIN  that  the  variable  is  a  "scratch"  variable,  used  only 
for  intermediate  computation  within  atomic  or  d-  step  blocks  (see  below).  Ac- 
cordingly,  to  save  memory,  SPIN  does  not  include  the  values  of  hidden  variables  in 
the  data  structure  used  to  represent  a  state  of  the  model  associated  with  a  specifi- 
cation.  It  is  the  responsibility  of  the  user  to  ensure  that  hidden  variables  are  used 
correctly;  SPIN  cannot  check  this  automatically.  It  is  particularly  convenient  to  de- 
clare  global  constant  data  structures  (e.  g.  fixed  lookup  tables)  as  hidden,  so  that 
they  are  not  duplicated  in  every  state  of  the  global  state-space. 
Processes  and  statements 
A  Promela  proctype  is  a  parameterised  process  definition.  A  proctype  consists  of  a 
name,  an  optional  list  of  parameters  and  local  variable  declarations,  and  an  ordered 
list  of  statements.  Each  proctype  includes  a  built-in,  read-only  variable  called  _Pid, 
wWch  records  the  identifier  of  a  process  (a  non-negative  integer).  In  addition,  each 
proctype  includes  an  implicit  program  coutiter  variable,  which  stores  the  current 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  29 
position  of  execution  within  the  proctype  body.  This  variable  cannot  be  explicitly 
referred  to.  However,  particular  positions  in  the  proctype  body  can  be  marked  us- 
ing  labels,  which  can  then  be  used  for  control  flow  via  goto  statements  (as  in  the 
C  language). 
A  specification  usually  includes  a  designated  init  process  which  is  auto- 
matically  instantiated  at  the  start  of  verification,  and  which  may  instantiate  further 
processes  via  run  statementS.  3  A  run  statement  consists  of  a  proctype  name,  and 
a  list  of  actual  parameters  for  the  proctype.  Execution  of  a  run  statement  causes 
an  instance  of  the  given  proctype  to  be  added  to  the  pool  of  running  processes. 
The  init  process  is  assigned  _pid  value  0  by  SPIN,  and  processes  identifiers  are 
thereafter  assigned  in  order  of  instantiation. 
The  simple  statements  in  a  proctype  fall  into  three  categories:  expressions, 
updates,  and  communication  statements.  An  expression  is  a  boolean  expression  over 
local  and  global  variables,  using  the  standard  equality  operators  ==  and  I  =,  re- 
lational  operators  <,  <=,  >  and  >=,  and  logical  operators  &&,  II  and  !.  Boolean 
expressions  may  also  test  the  state  of  a  buffered  channel  c  using  the  len  opera- 
tor  (which  returns  the  length  of  c);  theoperators  full,  empty,  nf  ull  and  nempty 
which  determine  whether  c  is  full,  empty,  not  full  or  not  empty  respectively,  4,  or  via 
a  channel  poll  expression  (see  [92]  for  details).  Upon  reaching  an  expression  state- 
ment,  a  process  may  not  continue  execution  until  the  expression  evaluates  to  true. 
When  ffids  is  the  case,  execution  of  the  statement  has  no  side-effe  cts.  The  Promela 
keywork  skip  can  be  used  in  place  of  the  expression  statement  true.  An  update 
is  a  statement  of  the  form  ývariable)  =  (expr).  Such  a  statement  is  always  executable 
(as  long  as  the  expression  does  not  involve  division  by  zero  or  an  out-of-bounds 
array  access),  and  updates  the  value  of  the  given  variable  with  the  result  of  the 
expression. 
A  conimunication  statement  involves  sending  on  or  receiving  from  a  channel. 
A  send  statement  has  the  form  (chan)  I  (expressions),  where  (chan)  is  a  channel  vari- 
able  and  (expressions)  is  a  comma-separated  list  of  expressions.  The  type  of  each 
expression  must  match  the  type  of  the  corresponding  message  field  of  the  chan- 
nel  to  which  the  variable  refers.  A  statement  of  this  form  is  executable  either  if  the 
channel  is  buffered  and  not  full,  or  if  the  channel  is  synchronous  and  there  is  an- 
other  process  ready  to  receive  on  the  channel.  Sending  on  a  buffered  channel  has 
the  effect  of  adding  a  message  to  the  buffer,  and  sending  on  a  synchronous  channel 
causes  the  list  of  expression  values  to  be  written  to  a  corresponding  list  of  variables 
offered  by  the  receiving  process.  A  receive  statement  has  the  form  (chan)  ?  (variables), 
where  (chan)  is  as  before,  and  (variables)  is  a  comma-separated  list  of  distinct  vari- 
ables.  A  receive  statement  is  executable  either  if  the  channel  is  buffered  and  not 
3.  Processes  may  also  be  instantiated  using  the  active  keyword-  see  [92]  for  details. 
4.  The  provision  of  both  full  and  nfull  (similarly  empty  and  nempty)  is  necessary  since,  for 
reasons  described  in  [921,  it  is  illegal  to  write  If  ul  I  (c). 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  30 
empty,  or  if  the  channel  is  synchronous  and  there  is  another  process  ready  to  send 
a  message  on  the  channel.  Receiving  on  a  buffered  channel  causes  the  given  list  of 
variables  to  be  assigned  to  the  associated  field  values  of  the  next  message  on  the 
buffer,  which  is  also  removed  from  the  buffer.  Receiving  on  a  synchronous  channel 
causes  the  list  of  variables  to  be  overwritten  by  the  (evaluated)  list  of  expressions 
offered  by  the  associated  sender  process. 
Our  description  of  communication  statements  has  not  covered  various  fea- 
tures,  including:  non-destructive  channel  reading;  sorted-send  and  random-receive 
operations;  the  eval  operator,  and  the  built-in,  write-only  '_'  variable.  These  fea- 
tures  are  fully  documented  in  the  reference  manual  [921. 
Control  flow 
The  most  basic  control  flow  operator  in  Promela  is  ';  ',  which  denotes  sequence  (as 
in  most  imperative  languages).  Following  languages  such  as  Pascal,  ';  '  is  intended 
as  a  statement  separator  rather  than  a  statement  terminator,  so  strictly  should  not  ap- 
pear  at  the  end  of  a  list  of  statements.  However,  the  SPIN  implementation  relaxes 
this  condition,  and  a  terminating  semi-colon  is  optional.  Any  occurrence  of;  '  can 
be  equivalently  replaced  with  the  alternative  separator  '-  >'.  However,  '-  >'  is  usu- 
ally  used  to  express  a  compound  statement  of  the  form  guard  ->  update. 
To  describe  a  system  at  an  appropriate  level  of  abstraction  it  is  often  conve- 
nient  to  specify  that  a  particular  sequence  of  statements  should  be  executed  as  a 
single  update.  This  can  achieved  using  a  d-step  (deterministic  step)  or  atomic 
block.  A  d_step  block  consists  of  one  or  more  non-blocking,  deterministic  state- 
ments  to  be  executed  as  a  single  transition.  Examples  of  blocking  statements  in- 
clude  channel  operations,  expression  statements,  and  run  statements  (wl-dch  may 
block  due  to  an  upper  limit  of  256  running  processes  imposed  by  SPIN).  In  addition, 
it  is  not  legal  for  a  goto  or  break  statement  (described  below)  to  potentially  cause 
a  jump  out  of  a  d_step  block.  An  atomic  block  is  similar,  but  it  is  permissible 
for  statements  witl-dn  an  atomic  block  to  involve  non-deterministic  choice,  poten- 
tially  block  execution  of  the  process,  or  cause  a  jump  out  of  the  block.  The  use  of 
d_step  over  atomic,  when  applicable,  results  in  more  efficient  use  of  memory 
during  verification. 
Repetitive  choice  can  be  specified  using  a  compound  statement  of  the  form 
do  (options)  od.  The  (options)  part  of  this  construct  is  a  list  of  Promela  fragments, 
separated  by  the  ::  token.  A  process  executes  a  do.  .  od  statement  by  repeatedly 
executing  one  of  the  options,  if  any  are  executable.  A  break  or  goto  statement 
may  be  used  to  jump  out  of  a  do.  .  od  loop.  Non-repetitive  choice  can  be  specified 
similarly  using  an  if  ..  fi  construct.  Examples  of  do.  .  od  and  if  ..  fi  are  pro- 
vided  in  Figure  2.5.  The  if  ..  fi  example  shows  that  the  guards  which  determine 
executability  of  each  option  need  not  be  mutually  exclusive:  if  the  guard  (x==4) 
evaluates  to  true  then  either  of  the  statement  sequences  which  start  with  this  guard 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  31 
if 
linkI5  ... 
do 
(X--4)  goto  finish  (counter<N) 
(X==4)  (counter==N)  break 
else  ->  skip  od 
fi; 
finish: 
Figure  2.5:  Condition,  repetition  and  goto  statements  in  Promela. 
mtype  =  IN,  T,  C) 
mtype  st[61-N 
proctype  usero 
do 
d  step  stl_pid)==N  ->  st[_pid]=T 
d7Step  i3t[_pid]==T  && 
(st[I)I=C  &&  E3t[211=C  &&  st[331=C  &&  st[431=C  &&  st[S)I=C) 
st[-Pid]=C 
d_step  (  st[_pidl=.  C  ->  stl_pid]=N 
od 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
Figure  2.6:  Promela  specification  of  mutual  exclusion  with  5  processes. 
can  be  executed.  The  e1se  keyword  can  be  used  to  assert  that  a  particular  option 
should  only  be  chosen  if  no  other  options  are  executable.  The  if  ..  fi  example 
also  illustrates  the  way  flow  of  control  can  be  organised  using  traditional  goto 
statements  and  labels. 
Example 
We  illustrate  some  of  the  features  of  Promela  using  the  simple  specification  shown 
in  Figure  2.6,  which  is  a  five-process  version  of  the  mutual  exclusion  protocol  de- 
scribed  in  Section  2.2.  The  specification  consists  of:  an  enumerated  type  definition 
for  the  symbolic  constants  N,  T  and  C;  a  global  array  st  which  is  used  to  hold  the 
state  of  each  process;  a  user  proctype,  and  an  init  process  which  instantiates  a 
number  of  user  processes. 
The  body  of  the  user  proctype  is  a  single  do.  .  od  statement.  Each  op- 
tion  in  tl-ds  loop  is  a  d-step  block  which  is  in  turn  comprised  of  a  guard  (e.  g. 
st  [_pid]  ==N)  followed  by  an  update  (e.  g.  st  [_pid]  =T).  Each  block  is  exe- 
cutable  at  a  given  state  if  its  associated  guard  evaluates  to  true.  A  user  process 
proceeds  by  repeatedly  executing  one  of  the  d_s  t  ep  blocks,  if  any  are  executable. 
In  this  example,  the  options  within  the  do.  .  od  statement  are  mutually  exclusive. 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  32 
never  ( 
TO  init: 
if 
(I(stll]==C)  &&  stll].  =T)  ->  90to  accept-S4 
(1)  ->  goto  TO-init 
fi; 
accept_S4t 
if 
::  (I(et[ll==C))  ->  goto  accept-84 
fi; 
Figure  2.7:  Example  never  claim  for  the  LTL  property  AG  (Tj  =:  ý-  (FC,  )). 
so 
true 
Figure  2.8:  Bilchi  automaton  representing  the  formula  --,  AG  (Tj  =*  (FC1)). 
The  init  process  instantiates  five  user  processes  via  a  sequence  of  run  state- 
ments.  n-te  run  statements  are  contained  within  an  atomic  block,  to  indicate  that 
they  should  be  executed  as  an  indivisible  block. 
Note  that  a  Promela  array  with  length  I>0  is  indexed  using  integers  in 
the  range  0...  (1  -  1).  However,  in  the  mutual  exclusion  example,  the  five  user  pro- 
cesses  have 
_pid  variables  with  values  in  the  range  1-5.  Therefore  the  array  st  is 
declared  with  length  6,  and  position  0  of  the  array  is  unused. 
Figure  2.6  does  not  illustrate  the  declaration  and  use  of  channels.  Appen- 
dices  A.  2  and  A.  3  contain  Promela  specifications  which  include  buffered  and  syn- 
chronous  channel  declarations  respectively. 
2.4.2  Reasoning  about  Promela  specifications 
As  mentioned  above,  simple  logical  properties  of  a  Promela  specification  can  be 
expressed  using  assert  statements  embedded  in  the  body  of  proctypes,  and  more 
complex  LTL  properties  can  be  expressed  using  a  never  claini  process.  The  never 
claim  corresponding  to  an  LTL  property  0  is  a  fragment  of  Promela  code  equiv- 
alent  to  a  BiIchi  automaton  representing  the  formula  -0  (see  Section  2.3.2).  Fig- 
ure  2.7  shows  the  never  claim  used  to  verify  the  progress  property  (Property  2, 
Section  2.2.1),  for  the  simple  mutual  exclusion  example.  The  propositions  Tj  and 
C,  in  the  property  are  represented  by  propositions  st  [  13  ==T  and  st  [  11  ==C  re- 
spectively  in  the  never  claim.  Figure  2.8  shows  the  associated  Michi  automaton 
for  -iAG(Tl  =ý-  (FC,  )).  States  so  and  sl  of  the  automaton  correspond  to  the  labels 
TO-init  and  accept_S4  of  Figure  2.7  respectively.  A  never  claim  can  include  an 2.4:  PROMELA  AND  SPIN  33 
Promela  Generate  verifier  Compile  and 
spec.  using  SPIN  execute 
+  LTL  or  counter-example 
property 
0 
Figure  2.9:  The  SPIN  verification  process. 
expression  of  the  form  nattie  Ul  Wabel  to  refer  that  the  program  counter  of  process  i, 
an  instantiation  of  proctype  iianie,  is  at  the  position  of  the  specified  label. 
Given  a  Promela  specification  (optionally  including  an  associated  never 
claim),  SPIN  generates  aC  program,  pan.  c.  This  program  is  called  the  verýfier  gen- 
crated  by  SPIN.  It  includes  data  structures  to  represent  states  of  the  model  asso- 
ciated  with  the  input  specification,  and  search  algorithms  for  exploration  of  the 
state-space.  The  LTL  model  checking  algorithm  is  based  on  the  approach  described 
in  Section  2.3.2.  Routines  to  implement  various  state-space  reduction  techniques 
(some  of  which  are  discussed  in  Section  2.6)  are  also  incorporated  in  pan.  c.  As  well 
as  checking  properties  of  a  specification  expressed  using  assertions  and  a  never 
claim,  SPIN  can  be  used  to  search  for  deadlock  states  (from  which  no  transitions  orig- 
inate). 
In  order  to  obtain  a  verification  result,  pan.  c  must  be  compiled  and  ex- 
ecuted.  Figure  2.9  illustrates  the  process  of  LTL  property  verification  using  SPIN. 
Note  that  a  conclusive  verification  result  will  only  be  obtained  if  memory  permits. 
When  checking  a  large  state-space,  the  verifier  may  terminate  having  exhausted 
available  memory  without  finding  an  error. 
2.4.3  Features  Of  SPIN 
A  variety  of  built-in  state-space  reduction  techniques  are  provided  by  SPIN.  TTIC 
model  checker  also  supports  simulation  of  Promela  specifications  though  a  user 
interface. 
SPIN  uses  on-the-fly  verificationand  partial-order  reduction  techniques  (dis- 
cussed  in  Section  2.6.3)  to  reduce  the  number  of  states  which  need  to  be  explored 
during  model  checking.  Additionally,  the  tool  provides  data-flow  optimisation  to 
identify  points  in  the  specification  where  variables  become  dead,  and  techniques  for 
statement  merging,  both  of  which  help  reduce  verification  complexity. 
To  reduce  the  per-state  storage  requirement,  SPIN  provides  three  state  com- 
pression  options  (see  Section  2.6.2),  and  automatically  eliminates  write-only  vari- 
ables  from  the  state-vector. 
Support  for  sophisticated  simulation  of  Promela  specifications  is  provided 
via  the  XSPIN  user  interface.  Execution  of  a  specification  may  be  simulated  ran- 
domly  or  interactively,  or  may  be  guided  by  a  counter-example  generated  by  a  veri- 
fication  attempt.  The  interface  allows  a  user  to  step  through  a  simulation  run,  track- 2.5:  OTHER  MODEL  CHECKERS  34 
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Figure  2.10:  Simulation  of  a  Promela  specification  using  rneýsage  sequence  charts. 
ing  the  values  of  global  and  local  variables  and  channels.  In  interactive  mode,  non- 
deterministic  choices  are  resolved  by  the  user.  Channel-based  communication  be- 
tween  processes  may  also  be  graphically  illustrated  using  message  sequence  charts 
(MSCs).  An  MSC  represents  each  process  by  a  vertical  tirite-line  with  a  top  box  in- 
dicating  the  name  of  the  process.  Messages  between  processes  are  represented  by 
diagonal  arrows  between  time-lines,  and  indicate  a  partially  ordered  set  of  com- 
munication  events.  MSCs  support  visualisation  of  complex  communications  proto- 
cols,  and  can  be  a  useful  aid  when  understanding  counter-examples  produced  by  a 
model  checker  [138]. 
Figure  2.10  shows  a  screen-shot  of  the  XSPIN  interface.  A  Promela  specifica- 
tion  is  loaded  into  the  top-left  pane.  The  bottom-left  pane  shows  the  status  of  the 
current  simulation  run,  and  the  right-hand  pane  shows  an  MSC  for  the  simulation. 
A  user  can  also  choose  to  display  the  current  values  of  global  and  local  variables  in 
a  separate  window. 
2.5  Other  model  checkers 
We  broadly  classify  model  checkers  into  three  categories:  stajidard  checkers,  which 
check  logical  properties  of  high  level  specifications;  real  tittielprobabilis  tic  checkers, 
which  allow  performance  evaluation,  and  direct  model  checkers,  which  aim  to  ver- 
ify  source  code. 2.5:  OTHER  MODEL  CHECKERS  35 
2.5.1  Standard  model  checkers 
The  explicit-state  model  checker  Muro  [40]  uses  a  language  based  on  a  collection 
of  guarded  commands  (condition/action  rules),  which  are  executed  repeatedly  in 
an  infinite  loop.  The  imperative-style  language  incorporates  new  data  types,  in- 
cluding  multiset  (for  describing  a  bounded  set  of  values  whose  order  is  irrelevant 
to  the  behaviour  of  the  description)  and  scalarset  (for  describing  a  subrange  whose 
elements  can  be  freely  permuted;  see  Section  3.3.2).  The  verifier  performs  a  depth- 
or  breadth-first  search  over  the  state-space  to  check  for  absence  of  deadlock,  or  sat- 
isfaction  of  safety  properties  expressed  using  assert  statements,  or  ffivariatits.  More 
complex  temporal  properties  cannot  be  verified. 
TI-ie  tool  COSPAN  [1131  uses  an  automata-theoretic  approach  to  model 
checking.  The  system  to  be  verified  is  modelled  as  a  collection  of  coordinating  pro- 
cesses  described  in  the  S/R  (selection/resolution)  modelling  language.  The  verifier 
supports  both  on-the-fly  explicit-state  search  and  symbolic  search  using  binary  de- 
cision  diagrams  (BDDs  -  see  Section  2.6.2). 
The  most  successful  BDD-based  symbolic  model  checker  (see  Section  2.6.2) 
is  the  CTL  model  checker  SMV  [1281.  Systems  are  described  using  the  SMV  lan- 
guage,  which  has  a  precise  semantics  relating  input  specifications  to  their  expres- 
sions  as  boolean  formulas.  SMV  supports  synchronous  and  asynchronous  commu- 
nication,  and  provides  for  modular  descriptions  of  re-usable  components.  NuSMV 
[251  is  a  re-implemented  and  extended  version  of  SMV  which  includes  a  textual 
interaction  shell  and  graphical  user  interface,  as  well  as  techniques  for  model  par- 
titioning  and  LTL  model  checking. 
An  enhanced  version  of  SMV,  RuleBase  [81  is  an  industry-oriented  tool  for 
the  verification  of  hardware  designs.  In  an  effort  to  make  the  specification  of  CTL 
properties  easier  for  the  non-expert,  RuleBase  supports  its  own  language,  Sugar,  as 
well  as  standard  hardware  description  languages  such  as  VHDL  and  Verilog. 
In  Sections  3.9.1  and  3.9.2  we  discuss  the  implementation  of  symmetry  re- 
duction  techniques  in  standard  model  checking  tools. 
2.5.2  Real  time  and  probabilistic  model  checkers 
When  modelling  certain  critical  systems,  it  is  essential  to  include  some  notion  of 
time.  If  time  is  considered  to  increase  in  discrete  steps  (discrete-time),  then  exist- 
ing  model  checkers  can  be  readily  extended  [3].  Tlie  most  widely  used  dense  real- 
time  model  checker  (in  which  time  is  viewed  as  increasing  continuously)  is  UPPAAL 
[116].  Models  are  expressed  as  timed  automata  and  properties  defined  in  UPPAAL 
logic,  a  subset  of  timed  computation  tree  logic  (TCTL).  UPPAAL  uses  a  combination 
of  on-the-fly  and  symbolic  techniques  so  as  to  reduce  the  verification  problem  to 
that  of  manipulating  and  solving  constraints.  Another  real-time  model  checker  is 
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process  description  formalisms.  A  real-time  extension  to  COSPAN  [4]  allows  real- 
time  constraints  to  be  expressed  by  associating  lower  and  upper  bounds  on  the 
time  spent  by  a  process  in  a  local  state. 
The  probabilistic  symbolic  model  checker  PRISM  [83,114,1531  allows  rea- 
soning  about  models  of  probabilistic  systems.  The  tool  supports  discrete-  and 
continuous-time  Markov  chains,  as  well  as  Markov  decision  processes,  which  al- 
low  both  probabilistic  and  non-deterministic  behaviour.  Properties  are  written  in 
terms  of  probabilistic  computation  tree  logic  (PCTL),  or  continuous  stochastic  logic 
(CSL).  Models  can  also  be  specified  using  PEPA  (performance  evaluation  process 
algebra)  [821  and  converted  to  PRISM. 
We  discuss  symmetry  reduction  implementations  for  real  time  and  proba- 
bilistic  model  checking  tools  in  Section  3.9.3. 
2.5.3  Direct  model  checking  tools 
Finite  state  model  checking  traditionally  requires  the  manual  construction  of  a 
model,  via  a  specification  language,  which  is  then  converted  into  a  Kripke  struc- 
ture  for  model  checking.  Recently  there  has  been  much  interest  in  applying 
model  checking  directly  to  program  source  code  written  in  languages  such  as  Java 
[161]  and  C  [1081.  Early  approaches  to  model  checking  Java  software,  e.  g.  Java 
PathFinder  [77],  involved  the  direct  translation  of  Java  code  into  Promela,  and  sub- 
sequent  verification  using  SPIN.  Thus  these  approaches  were  restricted  to  programs 
containing  features  supported  by  both  Java  and  Promela  (this  is  not  the  case  for 
floating  point  numbers,  for  example). 
The  BANDERA  tool  [34]  avoids  direct  translation  by  instead  extracting  an  ab- 
stracted  finite-state  model  from  Java  source  code.  This  model  is  then  translated  into 
a  suitable  modelling  language  (Promela  or  SMV)  and  model  checked  accordingly.  A 
second-generation  Java  PathFinder  tool  [179]  makes  extensive  use  of  the  BANDERA 
abstraction  techniques,  and  works  directly  with  Java  bytecode. 
The  dSPIN  tool  [381  is  an  extension  of  SPIN  which  has  been  designed  for  mod- 
elling  and  verifying  object-oriented  software  (in  particular  Java  programs).  In  addi- 
tion  to  the  usual  features  available  with  SPIN,  the  dSPIN  tool  allows  for  the  dynamic 
creation  of  heap  objects. 
The  Bogor  model  checking  framework  [148]  is  used  to  check  sequential  and 
concurrent  Java  programs.  Behavioural  aspects  of  a  program  to  be  verified  are  first 
specified  in  JML  (Java  modelling  language),  which,  together  with  the  original  Java 
program,  is  then  translated  into  a  lower-level  specification  for  verification.  Bogor 
exploits  the  canonical  heap  representation  of  dSPIN  and  is  implemented  as  a  plug-in 
for  the  Eclipse  [33]  integrated  development  environment. 
Various  tools  address  the  problem  of  direct  model  checking  of  C  code.  For 
example,  BLAST  (Berkeley  lazy  abstraction  software  verification  tool)  [801  uses 
counter-example  guided  abstraction  refinement  (see  Section  2.6.3)  for  proving  the 2.6:  TACKLING  THE  STATE-SPACE  EXPLOSION  PROBLEM  37 
correctness  of  software.  Microsoft's  SDV  (static  driver  verifier)  tool  uses  the  SLAM 
[5]  analysis  engine  to  analyse  the  source  code  of  Windows  device  drivers.  SDV  in- 
volves  a  similar  abstraction,  verification  and  refinement  loop  to  that  of  BLAST. 
The  VeriSoft  model  checker  [68]  is  used  to  verify  concurrent  processes  ex- 
ecuting  C  code.  Systematic  search  of  the  state-space  allows  the  user  to  check  for 
deadlock,  assertion  violations  and  livelocks.  A  stateless  search  is  used,  whereby  only 
states  along  the  current  path  are  stored,  together  with  as  many  states  as  possible  in 
the  remaining  available  memory  As  a  result  it  is  theoretically  possible  to  verify 
systems  of  any  size.  However,  the  same  path  may  be  explored  many  times,  and  so 
search  can  be  very  slow. 
Recent  versions  of  the  SPIN  tool  allow  C  code  to  be  embedded  into  Promela 
specifications.  This  feature  allows  Promela  specifications  to  be  automatically  ex- 
tracted  from  C  code  [911. 
Symmetry  reduction  techniques  have  been  used  in  various  direct  model 
checkers,  as  we  discuss  in  Section  3.9.4. 
2.6  Tackling  the  State-space  Explosion  Problem 
As  noted  in  Chapter  1,  the  major  problem  which  limits  the  application  of  model 
checking  is  that  of  state-space  explosion  -  as  the  number  of  components  in  a  specifi- 
cation  of  a  concurrent  system  increases,  the  associated  model  suffers  combinatorial 
growth,  quickly  becoming  too  large  to  feasibly  check.  Since  its  conception,  much  re- 
search  in  model  checking  has  concentrated  on  combatting  the  state-space  explosion 
problem,  and  a  variety  of  techniques  have  been  proposed. 
We  identify  three  approaches  to  tackling  the  problem.  The  first  approach 
involves  (usually  manual)  conversion  of  a  specification  into  a  more  efficient  speci- 
fication  which  captures  the  same  essential  behaviour,  but  has  a  smaller  associated 
model.  Techniques  such  as  design  abstraction  and  source  code  or  communication 
structure  optimisation  follow  this  approach,  and  are  discussed  in  Section  2.6.1.  The 
second  approach  relies  on  a  compact  representation  of  states.  The  most  success- 
ful  technique  of  this  kind  is  sYmbolic  model  checking;  while  state  compression  and 
supertrace  verification  have  also  proved  useful  in  practice.  These  are  discussed  in 
Section  2.6.2.  The  final  approach,  discussed  in  Section  2.6.3,  involves  reducing  the 
number  of  states  which  must  be  checked  to  verify  a  property,  without  specification- 
level  modification.  Techniques  include  on-the-fly  model  checking,  partial-order  re- 
duction,  symmetry  reduction,  abstraction  and  compositional  reasoning. 
2.6.1  Specification-level  abstraction 
The  following  reduction  techniques  are  applied  at  the  source  code  level  before  veri- 
fication.  They  can  therefore  be  used  in  conjunction  with  other  state-space  reduction 
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Design  abstraction 
As  discussed  in  Section  2.1  and  illustrated  by  Figure  2.2,  traditional  model  checking 
involves  manual  construction  of  an  abstract  high  level  specification  which  captures 
the  behaviour  of  the  system  under  verification.  The  size  of  the  state-space  asso- 
ciated  with  a  specification  depends  crucially  on  the  level  of  this  abstraction.  For 
example,  a  data-oriented  abstraction  of  a  communications  protocol  which  distin- 
guishes  the  contents  of  individual  packets  will  give  rise  to  a  much  larger  state- 
space  than  a  control-oriented  abstraction  where  packet  contents  are  not  specified. 
Thus  good  desigit  abstractim  is  one  of  the  key  techniques  for  developing  specifica- 
tions  which  have  tractable  associated  state-spaces.  According  to  Holzmann  [92]: 
Choosing  the  right  level  of  abstraction  can  mean  the  difference  be- 
tween  a  tractable  model  with  provable  properties  and  an  intractable 
model  that  is  only  amenable  to  simulation,  testing,  or  manual  review. 
An  ideal  design  abstraction  results  in  the  construction  of  the  smallest  suf- 
ficient  (associated)  model  wl-dch  still  allows  verification  to  be  performed  [92].  De- 
sign  abstraction  is  usually  a  manual  process.  However,  teclu-dques  based  on  pro- 
gram  slicing  [174]  can  be  used  to  automatically  remove  fragments  of  a  specification 
which  cannot  affect  the  temporal  property  to  be  verified  [92].  n-ds  process  is  ar- 
guably  a  form  of  design  abstraction. 
Source  code  optimisation 
Common  modelling  pitfalls  can  lead  to  unnecessary  state-space  explosion.  For  ex- 
ample,  neglecting  to  reset  a  counter  variable  at  the  end  of  a  loop  can  result  in  many 
states  which  are  identical  except  for  the  counter  value.  Assuming  that  the  counter 
has  no  further  use  after  the  loop  and  will  be  reset  if  the  loop  is  executed  again,  this 
duplication  is  redundant  and  could  easily  be  avoided. 
When  working  with  large  models  it  may  also  be  possible  to  reduce  the  size 
of  the  state-vector  (the  portion  of  memory  required  to  represent  a  state)  through 
careful  use  of  advanced  specification  language  features.  For  detailed  source  code 
optimisation  strategies  for  Promela,  see  [92,154,1551.  Certain  modelling  pitfalls 
can  be  compensated  for  by  using  automatic  data-flow  optimisation  techniques  (tra- 
ditionally  used  by  optimising  compilers). 
The  distinction  between  design  abstraction  and  source  code  optimisation  is 
that  changing  the  level  of  design  abstraction  may  allow  the  elimination  of  data 
(variables)  from  a  specification.  Source  code  optimisation  on  the  other  hand  in- 
volves  appropriate  management  of  data  so  that,  at  a  given  level  of  abstraction,  the 
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Communication  structure  optimisation 
The  choice  of  communication  structure  for  a  specification  can  significantly  affect 
the  size  of  the  state-space  of  the  underlying  model,  when  buffered  channels  are 
used.  For  example,  modelling  communication  between  two  processes  using  two 
dedicated  channels,  rather  than  a  single  shared  channel,  increases  the  number  of 
messages  which  may  potentially  be  in  transit  so  may  result  in  a  larger  state-space. 
While  a  complex  communication  structure  may  be  necessary  to  faithfully  model  a 
given  system,  the  truth  of  a  particular  temporal  property  may  not  be  affected  by  the 
choice  of  communication  structure.  In  some  cases  it  is  possible  to  check  a  property 
over  a  smaller  model  with  a  simpler  communication  structure  if  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  behaviour  of  the  original  model  relevant  to  the  property  can  be  emulated  by  the 
reduced  model  [157,1581.  A  similar  approach  is  suggested  in  [891. 
2.6.2  Compact  state-space  representation 
Symbolic  model  checking 
Symbolic  model  checking  [181  is  a  method  by  which  states  and  transitions  of  a 
model  are  represented  symbolically  (as  opposed  to  explicitly)  in  order  to  save  space. 
A  particular  symbolic  approach,  BDD-based  encoding,  has  proved  especially  suc- 
cessful  for  the  verification  of  CTL  properties  for  very  large  systems  [128]. 
A  binary  decision  tree  is  a  structure  that  is  used  to  represent  a  boolean  for- 
mula.  Any  assignment  of  truth  values  to  the  variables  of  the  formula  corresponds 
to  a  path  down  the  tree  from  the  root  node  to  a  terminal  node,  which  is  labelled 
either  true  or  false.  The  value  of  this  label  determines  the  value  of  the  function  for 
this  assignment  of  variables.  A  binary  decision  diagram  (BDD)  is  obtained  from  a 
binary  decision  tree  by  merging  isomorphic  subtrees  and  identical  terminals.  Any 
set  of  states  can  be  encoded  as  a  BDD.  Indeed,  if  S  is  a  set  of  states  encoded  as  a 
set  of  boolean  tuples  (on  a  set  X),  then  for  any  fixed  ordering  of  the  elements  of  X, 
there  is  a  unique  BDD  representing  S  [17]. 
An  ordered  binary  decision  diagram  (OBDD)  is  a  BDD  which  has  a  total  or- 
dering  applied  to  the  variables  labelling  the  vertices  of  the  diagram.  The  size  of 
the  OBDD  can  vary  greatly  depending  on  the  ordering  used.  Heuristics  have  been 
developed  to  find  efficient  orderings  for  a  given  formula  (when  such  an  ordering 
exists).  Determining  whether  a  given  ordering  is  more  efficient  than  another  order- 
ing  is  NP-complete  [11]. 
For  a  Kripke  structure,  both  the  set  of  states  and  the  set  of  transitions  can 
be  represented  by  BDDs.  All  possible  states  are  encoded,  as  opposed  to  all  reach- 
able  states.  As  the  superfluous  states  are  unreachable,  they  do  not  affect  the  result 
of  model  checking.  Indeed,  their  presence  may  lead  to  a  simplification  of  certain 
BDDs.  In  addition,  it  is  possible  to  first  compute  the  reachable  states,  R  say,  and 
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State  compression 
Tlie  SPIN  model  checker  provides  two  lossless  compression  techniques  -  they  guar- 
antee  exhaustive  search  if  memory  permits.  These  techniques  reduce  the  amount  of 
memory  required  to  store  each  state  of  a  model,  and  thus  allow  larger  state-spaces 
to  be  explored. 
The  first  compression  technique  is  known  as  collapse  compression  [86].  This 
method  works  by  storing  separate  state  components  for  each  process  in  the  system, 
and  a  separate  component  for  the  global  data  objects  of  the  system  (channels  and 
global  variables).  A  global  state  is  then  composed  from  these  state  components 
using  a  small,  unique  index  for  each. 
The  collapse  method  of  compression  can  provide  significant  reduction  in 
state-space  storage  requirements,  and  is  fast.  However,  for  models  with  large  state- 
spaces,  SPIN  provides  a  heavy-weight  compression  scheme  using  a  minimised  au- 
tomaton  representation  of  the  state-space,  somewhat  similar  to  a  BDD  [901.  As  the 
state-space  of  a  model  is  searched,  the  model  checker  builds  an  automaton  which 
recognises  states  wl-dch  have  been  previously  seen.  Thus  on  reaching  a  state,  if  the 
state  is  recognised  by  the  automaton  then  the  state  has  already  been  encountered, 
and  search  can  backtrack.  Otherwise  the  automaton  is  modified  to  recognise  this 
new  state  in  the  future.  The  automaton  is  typically  much  smaller  than  the  full  state- 
space  of  the  model,  and  in  some  cases  memory  requirements  of  the  verifier  are 
exponentially  smaller  than  for  standard  search.  However,  the  minimised  automa- 
ton  approach  is  considerably  slower  than  search  without  compression,  or  search 
using  collapse  compression. 
For  maximum  lossless  compression  the  two  state  compression  techniques 
can  be  combined. 
Supertrace  verification 
The  compression  techniques  discussed  above  are  both  lossless,  that  is  they  guaran- 
tee  exhaustive  search  if  memory  permits.  In  many  applications  of  model  checking, 
finding  errors  is  the  main  focus  of  verification  rather  than  proving  absence  of  errors. 
For  such  applications  SPIN  provides  a  lossy  compression  technique  called  supertrace 
verification  [87]  (also  known  as  bitstate  hashing).  Tl-iis  technique  is  useful  for  explo- 
ration  of  large  state-spaces,  but  does  not  guarantee  full  state-space  coverage,  as  we 
discuss  below. 
During  search  (without  the  supertrace  technique),  SPIN  uses  a  hash  table  to 
store  the  state-space.  When  a  state  is  encountered,  a  hash  table  lookup  determines 
whether  the  state  has  been  seen  before;  if  it  has  not  then  it  is  added  to  a  linked-list  of 
states  at  its  hash  table  slot.  Supertrace  verification  is  based  on  the  observation  that 
if  the  number  of  hash  table  slots  greatly  exceeds  the  number  of  reachable  states 
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slot.  In  this  case,  each  slot  of  the  hash  table  could  be  represented  by  a  single  bit  -  if 
a  state  is  hashed  to  a  slot  in  the  table  which  is  set  to  one  then  it  can  be  assumed  that 
this  state  has  been  seen  before.  This  method  vastly  reduces  the  memory  required  to 
store  states,  and  also  leads  to  efficient  hash  table  operations  since  linked-lists  need 
no  longer  be  searched. 
Although  the  probability  of  hash  collision  is  low,  when  such  collisions  hap- 
pen  the  model  checking  algorithm  will  erroneously  assume  that  a  state  has  been 
visited  before.  Thus  supertrace  mode  does  not  guarantee  100%  coverage  of  the 
state-space,  but  can  often  provide  good  coverage  of  a  state-space  much  larger  than 
could  be  explored  using  standard  search.  A  variant  of  supertrace  mode,  also  imple- 
mented  in  SPIN  is  the  hash-compact  method  [184]. 
2.6.3  Reducing  state-space  size 
Symmetry  reduction 
Symmetry  reduction  for  model  checking  is  the  main  topic  of  this  thesis.  In  Chap- 
ter  3  we  provide  a  detailed  summary  of  symmetry  reduction  theory,  and  a  thorough 
survey  of  existing  techniques  and  tools. 
On-the-fly  model  checking 
It  is  not  always  necessary  to  build  the  entire  state-space  in  order  to  determine 
whether  or  not  a  specification  satisfies  a  given  property. 
If  the  property  to  be  checked  isfalse,  only  part  of  the  state-space  needs  to  be 
constructed,  up  to  the  point  at  which  an  error  state  (safety  property)  or  a  violating 
cycle  (liveness  property)  is  discovered.  However,  if  there  are  no  errors,  the  entire 
reachable  part  of  the  state-space  must  be  constructed.  This  means  that  although 
debugging  can  be  performed  relatively  easily,  property  verification  very  quickly 
becomes  prohibitive. 
On-the-fly  methods  are  most  suitable  for  explicit-state  model  checking  al- 
gorithms  based  depth-first  search,  and  have  been  developed  to  check  LTL,  CTL 
and  CTL*  properties  [10,176,178].  SPIN  is  an  example  of  an  on-the-fly  LTL  model 
checker.  Approaches  for  combining  on-the-fly  techniques  with  symbolic  model 
checking  are  restricted  to  the  checking  of  safety  properties  [9]. 
Partial-order  reduction 
The  explosion  of  states  and  transitions  in  a  model  results  from  the  interleaving  of 
actions  of  distinct  processes  in  all  possible  orders.  In  general,  the  consideration  of 
such  interleavings  is  crucial:  bugs  in  concurrent  systems  often  arise  due  to  unex- 
pected  ordering  of  actions.  However,  if  a  set  of  transitions  are  entirely  independent 
and  are  ffivisible  with  respect  to  the  property  being  verified,  the  order  in  which  they 
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invisible  with  respect  to  a  property  0  if  the  truth  of  0  is  unaffected  by  the  transi- 
tion.  )  Partial-order  reduction  [53,67,137]  exploits  tl-ds  fact,  and  considers  only  one 
representative  ordering  for  any  set  of  concurrently  enabled,  independent,  invisible 
transitions. 
Partial-order  reduction  methods  rely  on  determining  a  suitable  subset  of 
transitions  to  be  considered  at  every  state.  As  a  result,  rather  than  exploring  a  struc- 
ture  M  an  equivalent  (usually  smaller)  structure  M'  is  explored,  with  fewer  transi- 
tions  and  fewer  states.  The  equivalence  in  this  case  is  O-stutter  equivalence  (where 
0  is  the  property  to  be  checked).  If  we  regard  states  as  being  labelled  with  propo- 
sitions  (as  discussed  in  Footnote  1,  page  20)  then  for  two  paths  7rl  and  7r2,  let  7rf 
and  7rO  be  the  paths  obtained  from  7ri  and  7r2  by  restricting  the  set  of  labels  to  the  2 
propositions  contained  in  0.  Then  7rf  and  7rO  are  said  to  be  O-stutter  equivalent  if 
12 
they  can  both  be  reduced  to  a  common  path  7r  by  repeated  application  of  the  stut- 
tering  operator.  (The  stuttering  operator  replaces  two  successive  occurrences  of  a 
state  s  in  a  path  by  a  single  occurrence.  ) 
Note  that  partial-order  reduction  can  only  be  used  to  check  properties  which 
are  closed  under  stuttering.  All  LTL  properties  which  to  not  use  the  next-time  (X) 
operator  are  closed  under  stuttering. 
For  some  systems,  where  all  actions  are  dependent  on  one  another,  partial- 
order  reduction  cannot  offer  any  improvement  in  verification  space  or  time.  In 
many  realistic  cases  however,  partial-order  reduction  can  be  extremely  effective. 
For  example,  for  some  systems  the  growth  of  the  state-space  as  the  number  of 
processes  increases  is  reduced  from  exponential  to  polynomial  when  partial-order 
methods  are  used.  In  others  the  global  state-space  may  increase  with  the  growth  of 
a  parameter  whereas  the  size  of  the  reduced  state-space  remains  unchanged  [66]. 
Data  abstraction 
In  Section  2.6.1  we  discussed  the  use  of  design  abstraction  for  modelling  a  system 
at  an  appropriate  level  of  detail  so  that  property  verification  is  tractable.  We  now 
discuss  the  more  precise,  formal  notion  of  data  abstraction.  Data  abstraction  reduces 
the  number  of  states  in  a  model  by  restricting  the  set  of  values  which  variables  may 
take.  The  resulting  reduced  Kripke  structure  Q  is  an  abstraction  of  the  original 
structure  M:  every  execution  in  M  has  a  corresponding  execution  in.  Q.  This  idea 
has  been  formalised  by  various  authors  (e.  g.  [30,36,112]).  We  now  summarise  the 
approach  presented  in  [301. 
Recall  that  a  Kripke  structure  is  defined  over  a  set  of  variables  V 
JV1 
1  V21  ---.  -  Vk},  and  that  Di  denotes  the  domain  of  possible  values  for  vi  (1  <i<  k). 
Formally,  for  each  1<i<k,  let  hi  :  Di  --+  Di  be  a  surjection.  The  surjection  hi  maps 
values  of  variable  vi  onto  an  abstract  domain  bi.  Let  f) 
=  51  X  b2X 
"'  X  5k.  Then 
h:  D  --+ 
5  defined  by  h((di,  d21 
...  p 
dk))  =  (hi  (di),  h2  (d2)i 
-, 
hk  (dk))  is  a  surjec- 
tion  mapping  a  state  SES  (=  D)  to  an  abstract  state'  ?EA  This  surjection  can  be 2.6:  TACKLING  THE  STATE-SPACE  EXPLOSION  PROBLEM  43 
Figure  2.11:  Mutual  exclusion  model  reduced  via  abstraction. 
used  to  define  a  minimal  abstract  Kripke  structure,  each  state  of  which  is  the  image 
of  a  set  of  concrete  states  under  h. 
Definition3  Q  is  the  abstract  Kripke  structure  over  f)  given  by. 
0  9=f5 
go  jh(s)  :SE  So} 
R  J(h(s),  h(t))  :  (s,  t)  E  R}. 
The  abstract  Kripke  structure  M  may  be  significantly  smaller  than  M.  If  0  is  Q 
a  CTL*  formula  overQ  then  a  corresponding  formula  C(O)  can  be  interpreted  over 
M.  The  formula  C(O)  is  obtained  by  replacing  every  state  sub-formula  (vi  =  Wi) 
with  the  disjunction  VJ(vi  =  di)  :  h(di)  =  iýi},  and  (vi  34  Wi)  with  -,  C(vi  =  ji). 
The  sub-logic  of  CTL*  consisting  of  formulas  which  do  not  use  the  path 
quantifier  E  is  denoted  ACTL*.  Most  temporal  properties  of  interest  in  verification 
problems  can  be  expressed  in  ACTL*  (or  even  ACTL,  the  corresponding  restriction 
of  CTL).  n-te  next  theorem  shows  that  certain  ACTL*  properties  of  A4  can  be  proved 
by  checking.  Q. 
Theorem  I  Leto  be  an  ACTL*  fon-nula  over  M.  Then.  Q  M  ý=  C  Q 
With  certain  additional  conditions  on  h,  this  result  can  be  extended  to  apply  to 
CTL*. 
We  illustrate  the  abstraction  approach  using  the  mutual  exclusion  example. 
Recall  from  Section  2.2  that  Di  =  IN,  T,  C}  for  iE  11,2}.  Let  bi  =  IN,  C},  and 
define  hi  (N)  =  N,  hi  (T)  =N  and  hi  (C)  =C  for  iE  11,2}.  T1-ds  abstraction  maps 
both  the  neutral  and  trying  regions  onto  a  single  neutral  region.  Figure  2.11  shows 
the  abstract  Kripke  structure.  A4  corresponding  to  the  Kripke  structure  of  Figure  2.3 
under  this  abstraction. 
Let  0=  AG(-(Cl  A  C2))  (0  is  Property  1  of  Section  2.2.1).  Clearly  0E 
ACTL*,  and  C(O)  =0  (since  our  abstraction  does  not  affect  the  critical  region). 2.6:  TACKLING  THE  STATE-SPACE  EXPLOSION  PROBLEM  44 
Thus  0  can  be  checked  over  Q.  Note  that  Q  satisfies  the  CTL*  formula  1P  = 
EG  (NI  A  N2)  -  there  is  a  path  where  the  transition  (N,  N)  --+  (N,  N)  is  repeated 
forever.  This  formula  is  not  in  ACTL*,  so  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  formula 
C(ip)  =  EG((Ni  V  Ti)  A  (N2  V  T2))  is  satisfied  by  M  (it  is  easy  to  check  that  it 
is  not). 
Note  that  Theorem  1  does  not  state  that  we  can  disprove  properties  of  A4  by 
model  checking  Q.  Indeed,  given  a  counter-example  for  a  property  0  in  )R,  there 
may  be  no  corresponding  counter-example  for  C(0)  in  M.  For  example,  Q  ýý- 
AF(Ci  V  C2),  which  states  that  the  critical  section  will  eventually  be  reached  by 
one  of  the  processes.  Again  this  is  shown  via  the  path  where  (N,  N)  --+  (N,  N)  is 
repeated  forever.  It  is  easy  to  check  that  there  is  no  corresponding  counter  example 
in  M. 
Abstraction  techniques  have  been  used  in  conjunction  with  symbolic  model 
checking  to  verify  designs  of  industrial  complexity.  However,  the  user  is  required 
to  manually  specify  the  abstraction  functions.  This  requires  significant  insight  into 
the  verification  problem,  compromising  the  automation  of  model  checking. 
Recently  there  has  been  progress  towards  automating  the  use  of  abstraction 
as  a  state-space  reduction  technique.  Counter-example  guided  abstraction  refine- 
ment  (CEGAR)  [29]  is  an  iterative  process  where  a  reduced  model  is  derived  from 
a  high  level  specification  using  coarse  (even  arbitrary)  abstraction  functions.  An 
ACTL*  property  0  is  checked  over  this  abstract  model.  If  0  holds  then  the  truth  of 
C(0)  for  the  unreduced  model  is  established,  otherwise  a  counter-example  in  the 
abstract  model  is  reported.  An  algorithm  is  used  to  check  whether  a  corresponding 
concrete  counter-example  exists  in  the  original  model.  If  so,  then  the  falsity  of  C(0) 
has  been  established.  Otherwise  the  counter-example  is  refuted,  and  information 
obtained  from  this  counter-example  analysis  used  to  refte  the  abstract  model,  re- 
sulting  in  a  larger  (but  still  abstract)  state-space  which  will  not  admit  the  spurious 
counter-example.  In  practice,  the  refinement  will  prohibit  a  whole  class  of  spurious 
counter-examples.  This  process  is  repeated  until  a  result  is  obtained,  or  the  abstract 
model  cannot  be  refined  any  further  without  exceeding  resources.  The  CEGAR  pro- 
cess  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2.12  (adapted  from  [163]).  CEGAR  is  at  the  heart  of  the 
SLAM  and  BLAST  software  model  checkers  [5,801. 
Compositional  vezification 
A  concurrent  distributed  system  is  usually  comprised  of  a  number  of  components 
executing  in  parallel.  It  may  be  possible  to  verify  that  a  property  holds  for  a  model 
of  the  system  by  checking  components  of  the  system  individually  using  an  assume- 
gitarantee  proof  strategy  [142].  With  this  verification  strategy,  the  typical  syntax  of  a 
property  is:  (O)M  (ýp),  where  0  and  ip  are  temporal  formulas.  This  property  states 
that  if  M  is  a  model  such  that  M  ý=  0  then  it  must  be  the  case  that  M  ý--  ip.  The 
parallel  composition  of  components  MI  and  M2  can  then  be  checked  using  the 2.6:  TACKLING  THE  STATE-SPACE  EXPLOSION  PROBLEM  45 
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Figure  2.12:  The  CEGAR  process. 
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Figure  2.13:  Proof  strategy  for  compositional  verification. 
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inference  rule  of  Figure  2.13  [32,73]. 
Practical  compositional  verification  involves  first  decomposing  a  system 
into  components  MIiM  21  ---, 
Mn  (n  >  0),  and  finding  an  environment  assump- 
tion  Ai  for  each  component  Mi.  Each  environment  assumption  must  capture 
enough  of  the  behaviour  Of  M  11  A421 
...  P 
Mn  so  that  proving  Mi  11  Ai  ý=  0  for 
each  i  is  sufficient  to  show  that  Mi  11  M2  11  ...  11  Mn  ý=  0.  The  challenge  in  au- 
tomating  these  techniques  is  the  derivation  of  adequate  environment  assumptions. 
n-ds  can  be  achieved  using  methods  for  regular  language  learning  [1361. 
Summary 
Model  checking  is  an  automated  technique  which  can  be  used  to  reason  about  tem- 
poral  properties  of  finite  state  concurrent  systems  by  constructing  a  model  repre- 
senting  all  system  states.  One  of  the  major  problems  associated  with  model  check- 
ing  is  state-space  explosion.  The  main  approaches  to  overcoming  state-space  ex- 
plosion  involve  construction  of  an  efficient  high  level  specification  (using  design 
abstraction  and  source  code  or  communication  structure  optimisation),  a  reduction 
in  state  representation  size  (e.  g.  symbolic  representation  and  state  compression), 
or  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  states  or  paths  explored  (e.  g.  symmetry  reduction, 
partial-order  reduction  and  data  abstraction). 
, "Extract  information  forN, 
refinement  from  refutation 
of  counter-example  / 
No 
'  Does  corresponding-%, 
concrete  counter-example 
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We  have  provided  a  formal  definition  of  CTL*  model  checking,  outlined 
basic  model  checking  algorithms  for  CTL  and  LTL,  and  surveyed  a  selection  of 
model  checking  tools  and  state-space  reduction  techniques.  In  particular,  we  have 
provided  a  detailed  overview  of  the  SPIN  model  checker  and  its  input  language, 
Promela. Chapter  3 
Symmetry  Reduction 
Concurrent  systems  often  contain  many  replicated  components  and,  as  a  conse- 
quence,  model  checking  may  involve  making  a  redundant  search  over  equivalent 
areas  of  the  state-space.  For  example,  consider  the  Kripke  structure  shown  in  Fig- 
ure  2.3,  associated  with  the  Promela  mutual  exclusion  specification  of  Figure  2.6 
(restricted  to  two  processes).  Though  simple,  this  example  clearly  demonstrates  the 
existence  of  symmetry  within  a  Kripke  structure.  In  terms  of  the  mutual  exclusion 
property  AG  (-  (Cl  A  C2))  (Property  1),  any  pair  of  states  (A,  B)  and  (B,  A),  where 
A  and  B  belong  to  IN,  T,  C},  are  equivalent  (state  (A,  B)  will  satisfy  the  mutual  ex- 
clusion  property  if  and  only  if  (B,  A)  does).  Most  symmetry  reduction  techniques 
exploit  this  type  of  symmetry  by  restricting  state-space  search  to  equivalence  class 
representatives,  and  often  result  in  significant  savings  in  memory  and  verification 
time  [14,31,55,1031. 
The  earliest  use  of  symmetry  reduction  in  automatic  verification  was  in  the 
context  of  high-level  (coloured)  Petri  nets  [95]  where  reduction  by  equivalent  mark- 
ings  was  used  to  construct  finite  reachability  trees.  These  ideas  were  later  extended 
for  deadlock  detection  and  the  checking  of  liveness  properties  in  place/  transition 
nets  [170]. 
3.1  Group  Theory 
Symmetries  of  a  Kripke  structure  (see  Section  3.2)  form  a  group,  thus  our  descrip- 
tion  of  symmetry  reduction  techniques  in  this  chapter,  and  the  symmetry  reduction 
techniques  which  we  develop  throughout  the  thesis,  require  some  definitions  and 
results  from  group  theory.  For  more  details,  see  e.  g.  [22,81,150]. 
3.1.1  Groups,  subgroups  and  homornorphisms 
Definition  4A  group  is  a  non-empty  set  G  together  with  a  binary  operation  o 
GxG  --+  G  which  satisfies: 
o  For  all  a,  0,  -y  E  G,  it  o  (p  oy)  =  (it  o  p)  0y 3.1:  GROUP  THEORY  48 
o  There  is  an  element  id  EG  such  that,  for  all  aEG,  a=  id  oa=ao  id.  The 
element  id  is  called  the  ideiitity  of  G 
For  all  aEG  there  is  an  element  AEG  such  that  aooa=  id.  The 
element  A  is  called  the  inverse  of  a,  denoted  tt-1. 
In  practice,  the  binary  operation  o  is  usually  composition  of  mappings,  so  we  omit 
it,  writing  ap  for  aoP. 
Let  G  be  a  group  and  let  H  C-  G.  If  ap  EH  for  all  a,  PEH  (i.  e.  H  is  closed 
under  the  binary  operation)  then  H  is  also  a  group,  and  we  say  that  H  is  a  subgroup 
of  G,  denoted  H<G.  If  H  C:  G  then  H  is  a  proper  subgroup  of  G,  denoted  H<G. 
Definition  5  Let  XCG.  7hen  (X)  denotes  the  smallest  subgroup  of  G  which  con- 
tains  X,  and  is  called  the  subgroup  generated  by  X.  If  itli  a21  ...  j,  ak  EG  then  we  use 
(ttli  UZ  ...  I  elk)  to  denote  Q&1 
i  IX2f  ...  tak})- 
For  any  group  G,  if  XCG  has  the  property  that  G=  (X)  then  X  is  called 
a  set  of  generators  for  G.  It  can  be  shown  that  if  G  is  a  finite  group,  there  exists  a 
generating  set  X  for  G  with  JXJ  :S  1092  JGJ.  As  a  result,  it  is  often  convenient  to 
work  with  a  small  generating  set  for  a  large  group. 
Definition  6  Let  H  be  a  subgroup  of  G,  and  let  aEG.  Then  the  set  Hit  E 
H}  is  a  (right)  coset  of  H  in  G. 
A  similar  definition  can  be  given  for  left  cosets  of  H  in  G.  We  will  henceforth  use 
coset  to  mean  right  coset.  It  can  be  shown  that  the  set  of  cosets  of  H  in  G  is  a  partition 
of  G.  A  set  of  coset  represeWatives  for  H  in  G  is  a  subset  of  G  wl-dch  consists  of  exactly 
one  element  from  each  coset  of  H  in  G. 
Definition  7  Let  a,  AEG.  7lie  element  A-lap  EG  is  called  the  conjugate  of  a  by  0, 
and  is  denoted  &P.  Let  H<G,  and  suppose  that  for  all  aEH  and  AEG,  aP  EH 
(i.  e.  H  is  closed  under  conjugation).  Then  H  is  a  normal  subgroup  of  G,  and  we 
write  H<G. 
A  mapping  between  two  groups  which  preserves  products  of  elements  is 
called  a  homomorphism: 
Definition  8  Let  (Gi,  o),  (G2,  *)  be  groups.  A  homomorphism  from  Gi  to  G2  is  a  map- 
ping  0:  Gj  --+  G2  wlVdi  satisfies,  for  all  CG  0E  G1, 
0(a  0  0)  =  0(a)  *  O(P). 3.1:  GROUP  THEORY  49 
If  0  is  injective  then  0  is  a  monomorphism  from  G,  to  G2-  If  0  is  bijective  then  0  is 
an  isonwrphism  from  Gj  to  G2,  and  GI  and  G2  are  said  to  be  isomorphic,  denoted 
Gi  Sd  G2- 
Isomorphic  groups  are  algebraically  indistinguishable,  and  in  some  sense 
can  be  thought  of  as  equal  -  they  differ  only  in  that  their  elements  may  be  labelled 
differently  [811.  However,  two  isomorphic  groups  may  have  distinct  actions  on  a 
set  (see  Section  3.1.3),  so  for  the  purposes  of  this  work  it  is  important  to  regard 
groups  which  are  isomorphic  but  whose  elements  are  not  presented  in  the  same 
form,  as  distinct. 
The  following  standard  theorem  shows  that  if  there  is  a  monomorphism 
from  a  group  Gi  to  a  group  G2  then  G1  is  isomorphic  to  a  subgroup  of  G2: 
Theorem  2  Let  G1,  G2  be  groups  and  0:  Gj  -*  G2  a  monomoiphism.  Then  Gj 
O(Gi)  !ý  G2.,  where  O(Gi)  =  10(ci)  :aE  Gl}. 
3.1.2  Permutation  groups 
Let  X  be  a  non-empty  set.  A  permutation  of  X  is  a  bijection  a:  X  -+  X.  The  set 
of  all  permutations  of  X  forms  a  group  under  composition  of  mappings,  denoted 
Sym(X).  Given  a  group  H<  Sym(X),  we  use  moved(H)  to  denote  the  subset  of 
X  wl-dch  is  affected  by  H:  MOved(H)  =  Ix  EX:  &(x)  34  x  for  some  XE  H}. 
For  aE  Sym(X)  we  use  moved(a)  to  denote  the  set  moved(fx}).  The  degree  of  a 
permutation  group  G  is  defined  to  be  Imoved(G)  1,  with  the  exception  that  the  trivial 
group  lid}  is  said  tohave  degreeone  (even  though  Imoved(lid})l  =  0). 
If  X  is  finite  then  it  can  be  shown  that  I  Sym  (X)  I=IXJ!,  and  an  element  of 
Sym(X)  can  be  conveniently  expressed  using  disjoint  cycleform.  Let  aE  Sym(X).  If 
a=  id  then  we  write  id  for  a  as  usual.  Otherwise,  we  can  write  a  as  a  product  of 
cycles  as  follows: 
et  =  (a,,,  al,  2  ...  a,,,,  )  (a2,1  a2,2 
... 
a2A2) 
...  (atj  at,  2  at,,,  ) 
where  t>0,2  <  si  :5  IXI  (1  <i<  t),  aq  EX  (1  :!  ý  i<t,  1<j  :5  si),  and  the  aij 
are  all  distinct.  In  this  form,  for  xEX,  if  x=  aq  for  some  i  and  j  then  a  (x)  =  aq, 
where  j'  =j+1  if  j<  si  and  j'  =1  if  j=  si;  otherwise  a  (x)  =  x. 
Definition  9  Let  X  be  a  non-empty  set,  G  : ý,  Sym(X),  xEX,  YCX,  and  Xa 
partition  of  X. 
The  stabiliser  of  x  in  G  is  the  setstabc;  (x)  =  ja  EG:  a(x)  =  x}. 
The  poititwise  stabiliser  of  Y  in  G  is  the  set  stab*G  , 
(Y)  =fit  EG:  it(x) 
xVx  E  Y}=  nXEY  stabG  (x). 
*  Fora  E  G,  definea(Y)  =  ja(x)  :xE  Y}  9  X.  The  setwise  stabiliser  of  Y  in  G 3.1:  GROUP  THEORY  50 
is  the  set  stabG  (Y)  =  ja  EG:  a  (Y)  =  Y}. 
The  partition  stabiliser  of  X  in  G  is  the  set  stabc;  (X)  =  Ict  EG:  ci  (Y) 
YVY  E  X}=  nyE  x  stabG  (Y). 
It  is  straightforward  to  show  that  stabG  (X),  stab*  (Y),  stabG  (Y)  and  stabG  (X)  are  all  G 
subgroups  of  G. 
Definition  10  Let  G  :5  Sym(X)  where  X  is  a  non-emply'  set.  The  group  G  induces 
an  equivalence  relation  =-=G  on  X  thus:  x  _=r,  y  t*  x=  a(y)  for  some  aEG. 
The  equivalence  class  under  -=G  of  an  element  xEX,  denoted  [XIG.,  is  called  the 
orbit  of  x  under  G.  The  group  G  is  transitive  if  there  is  a  single  orbit,  X.  When  not 
referring  to  a  specific  orbit  representative,  we  typically  denote  an  orbit  11,  and  say 
that  QCX  is  non-trivial  if  Inj  >  1.  When  considering  actions  of  G  on  two  distinct 
sets  X  and  Y,  it  is  sometimes  convenient  to  write  [x]C,  for  the  orbit  of  xEX  under 
G,  and  orbG  (y)  for  the  orbit  of  yEY  under  G. 
Two  important  classes  of  permutation  groups  are  symmetric  groups  and 
cyclic  groups: 
Definition  11  For  n>0,  the  group  Syni(II,  2,  -  -,  tz})  is  called  the  sYmmetric  group 
of  degree  n,  denoted  Sn.  From  the  above,  we  ha  ve  I  Sn  ifl.  Sn  is  often  referred  to  as 
thefull  symmetry  group. 
Definition  12  The  cyclic  group  of  degree  n,  denoted  C,  is  the  subgroup  Of  Sn  gener- 
a  ted  by  the  cycle  (12 
...  n). 
3.1.3  Group  actions  on  sets 
Fundamental  to  most  applications  of  symmetry  reduction  in  model  checking  is  the 
idea  that  a  group  of  permutations  of  a  given  set  induces  a  group  of  permutations 
on  another  (usually  larger)  set.  For  example,  a  group  of  process  identifier  permuta- 
tions  naturally  induces  a  group  of  permutations  of  the  set  of  states  associated  with 
a  specification.  We  describe  this  idea  formally  using  group  actions.  The  following 
definition  and  theorem  are  adapted  from  [150]. 
Definition  13  We  say  that  a  group  G  acts  on  the  non-empty  set  X  if  to  each  aEG 
and  xEX  there  corresponds  a  unique  elementa(x)  EX  and  that,  forall  xEX  and 
«,  ß  E  G, 
(aß)  (x)  =a  (ß  (x» 
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Theorem  3  Let  G  act  on  X.  Then  to  each  aEG  there  coiTesponds  an  element  p,,  E 
Syni(X)  defined  by  p,,  :x  ý--*  &(x),  and  the  map  p:  G  --*  Sym(X)  defined  by 
p:  a  ý-*  p,,  is  a  homomorphism. 
We  call  the  homomorpl-dsm  p  the  permutation  representation  of  G  corresponding  to 
the  group  action. 
3.1.4  Products  of  groups 
Certain  groups  can  be  described  as  products  of  their  subgroups.  Four  important 
kinds  of  product  are  direct,  disjoint,  wreath  and  semi-direct  products,  which  we 
introduce  in  Definitions  14,15,16-17  and  18  respectively. 
Let  G  be  a  group,  and  H1,  H2,...,  Hk  subgroups  of  G  (1  <i<k,  k>  1).  If 
G=  HIH2 
... 
Hk  =  Jttla2 
...  14  :  ai  E  Hi  (1  <_  i<  k)}  then  G  is  the  product  of  the 
Hi. 
Definition  14  Let  G  be  a  group,  and  let  Hi,  H2,...,  Hk  be  subgroups  of  G.  Then  G 
is  the  (internal)  directproduct  of  the  Hi,  written  G=  Hi  x  H2  x  ...  x  Hk,  if  Hj:!  ý  G 
(1  :!  ý,  i  <-  k),  G  is  theproduct  of  the  Hi,  and  Hi  n  Hj  =  lid}  for  all  i  ?ýj  (1  <  ij  :5  k). 
Definifion15  Let  G  :5  Sym(X),  where  X  is  a  non-emptyset.  Suppose  that  G  is  the 
product  of  subgroups  H1,  H2,...,  Hk,  and  that  moved(Hi)  n  moved(Hj)  =0  for  all 
1<i  34  j<k.  Then  G  is  denoted  H1  *  H2  9  ...  *  Hk,  and  called  the  disjoint  product 
of  the  Hi,  and  the  Hi  a  disjointproduct  decomposition  for  G.  The  disjointproduct  is 
said  to  be  non-trivial  if  G  34  Hi  34  lid}  for  all  1<i<k. 
Note  that  if  G  has  two  disjoint  product  decompositions  such  that  the  con- 
stituent  subgroups  of  the  second  product  are  all  subgroups  of  constituent  sub- 
groups  of  the  first,  then  we  say  that  the  second  decomposition  is  finer  than  the 
first. 
It  is  easy  to  show  that  if  G  is  the  disjoint  product  of  H1,  H2,...,  Hk  then  G  is 
the  direct  product  of  these  subgroups,  thus  disjoint  products  are  a  special  case  of 
direct  products  for  permutation  groups  with  a  specific  action. 
The  following  definition  of  the  wreath  product  of  two  permutation  groups, 
which  we  call  the  outer  wreath  product,  is  adapted  from  a  definition  given  in  [106] 
and  allows  us  to  construct  a  new  permutation  group  from  two  arbitrary  permuta- 
tion  groups. 
Definition  16  Let  H:  5  S.  and  K<  Sd  for  some  m,  d  >  0.  Let  X=  11,2,...,  md}, 
and  let  JXI,  X2,...,  Xd}  be  a  partition  of  X  into  equal-sized  subsets,  with  jXjj  =m 3.1:  GROUP  THEORY  52 
and  Xi  =  (1  <i<  d).  We  define  an 
action  for  K,  and  d  distinct  actions  for  H,  on  X. 
For  0EK  and  xEX,  suppose  xE  Xi  for  some  1<i<d,  so  that  x 
(i  -  1)m  +t  for  some  1<t<m.  Define  P(x)  =  (P(i)  -  1)m  +  t.  Let  o,  be  the 
permutation  representation  corresponding  to  this  action  of  K  on  X. 
For  aEH,  xEX  and  1<i<d,  suppose  xE  Xj  for  some  1<d,  so 
that  x=U-  1)m  +t  for  some  1 
-< 
t  <-  m.  Define  a(x)  =x  if  i  34  j  and  a(x)  = 
0-  1)m  +  a(t)  otherwise.  Leto-i  be  thepermutation  representation  corresponding 
to  this  action  of  H  on  X. 
The  outer  wreath  product  of  H  and  K  is  the  group  HIK<  Sym(X)  defined  as 
follows:  HIK=  10(P)Lrl  (al)V2(a2) 
...  tTd(Czd)  :AEK,  Ui  EH  (1  <i<  d)}. 
Note  that  in  the  above  definition,  each  of  the  o-i  permutes  a  different  set  of 
the  partition  and  a  permutes  the  partition. 
The  next  definition,  which  we  call  the  inner  wreath  product,  allows  us  to 
identify  an  existing  group  as  a  wreath  product  of  subgroups.  It  is  similar  to, 
but  more  general  than  Definition  16:  the  requirement  that  X  must  be  the  set 
11,2,...,  md}  partitioned  into  contiguous  subsets  is  lifted. 
Definition  17  Let  H  :5S,,  and  K  <-  Sd  for  some  m,  d>0.  Let  X  be  a  set  with 
IXI  =  md,  and  IX1,  X2,...,  Xd}  a  partition  of  X  into  equal-sized  subsets,  where 
jXjj  =m  and  Xi  has  theform  Xi  =  jXiliXi,  2i  ...  J,  xi,  m} 
for  some  xij  EX  (1  <i<d, 
<j<  ni).  We  define  an  action  for  K,  and  d  distinct  actions  for  H,  on  X. 
For  AEK  and  xEX,  suppose  xE  Xi  for  some  1  <-  i  <-  d,  so  that  x=  xi,  t 
for  some  1<t<m.  Define  fi(x)  =  xp(j),  t.  Let  o,  be  thepermutation  representation 
corresponding  to  this  action  of  K  on  X. 
For  aEH,  xEX  and  1  <-  i  <_  d,  suppose  xE  Xj  for  some  1<j  !ýd,  so  that 
x=  xj,  t  for  some  1<t<m.  Define  a(x)  =x  if  i0j  and  a  (x)  =  xi,,  (t)  otherwise. 
Let  oj  be  thepermutation  representation  corresponding  to  this  action  of  H  on  X. 
If  G=  jk7(A)LT1(CQ)LT2(Ct2) 
...  LTd(CZd)  :0EK,  ai  EH  (1  <i<  d)}  then  G  is 
the  intier  wreath  product  of  H  and  K,  also  denoted  HIK. 
For  neatness,  we  do  not  use  notation  to  distinguish  inner  and  outer  wreath 
products,  and  explicitly  state  the  type  of  product  referred  to  when  necessary.  Note 
that  we  can  unambiguously  refer  to  the  outer  wreath  product  of  two  permutation 
groups,  but  must  specify  the  partition  X=  JXI,  X2,...,  Xd}  when  reasoning  about 
an  inner  wreath  product.  We  refer  to  the  triple  (H,  K,  X)  as  a  wreath  product  de- 
compositioit  for  G,  and  say  that  the  decomposition  is  iion-trivial  if  both  H  and  K  are 
non-trivial. 
It  is  clear  that  any  inner  wreath  product  HIK  (with  associated  partition)  is 
identical,  up  to  renaming  of  points,  to  the  outer  wreath  product  HýK.  The  order  of 3.1:  GROUP  THEORY  53 
HIK  depends  on  the  orders  of  H  and  K,  and  the  degree  of  K: 
Theorem  4  If  G  is  an  inner  or  outer  wrea  th  product  HIK  then  IGI=IH  Id  X  IKI, 
where  d  is  the  degree  of  K. 
Definitions  16  and  17  describe  wreath  products  with  the  imprimitive  actioit 
[22].  There  are  other  definitions  of  wreath  products  with  other  kinds  of  action,  and 
it  is  important  to  note  that  the  results  on  wreath  products  which  we  present  in 
Section  9.4  are  specific  to  the  imprimitive  action. 
Direct  products  and  wreath  products  are  both  generalised  by  serni-direct 
products: 
Definition  18  Let  G  be  a  group,  Na  normal  subgroup  of  G  and  Ha  subgroup  of 
G.  Suppose  G=  NH  and  NnH=  lid}.  Then  G  is  a  semi-direct  product  of  N  and  H, 
denoted  NxH. 
3.1.5  Graphs  and  automorphisms 
An  widirected1directed  graph  (referred  to  as  a  graphldigraph)  is  a  pair  (V,  E)  where 
V  is  a  set  of  vertices  and  Ea  set  of  edges  -  unordered  /ordered  pairs  of  vertices. 
An  edge  of  a  graph  is  written  as  a  set  I  u,  v}  whereas  a  digraph  edge  is  written  as  a 
pair  (u,  v)  (U,  VE  V).  A  hypergraph  is  a  pair  (V,  E)  where  V  is  a  set  of  vertices  and 
EC  2V  a  set  of  hyper-edges. 
A  digraph  (V,  E)  is  bipartite  if  V=V,  U  V2,  where  V1  CV  and  V2  CV  are 
disjoint  non-empty  sets  and,  for  (U,  V)  E  E,  uEV,  and  vE  V2,  or  uE  V2  and  vE  V1. 
A  colourbig  of  (di/hyper)graph  (V,  E)  is  a  mapping  C:  V  --+  K,  where  K  is  a 
finite  set  of  colours.  A  coloured  (di/hyper)graph  is  a  triple  (V,  E,  C)  such  that  (V,  E) 
is  a  (di/hyper)graph  and  Ca  colouring  of  (V,  E). 
If  IF  =  (V,  E)  is  graph/hypergraph  and  aa  permutation  of  V,  then  for  any 
e=  JV1 
1  V21  ...  f  Vn,  }  E  E,  a  acts  on  e  thus: 
ci(e)  =  j&(vj),  a(v2),...,  a(v  )}. 
The  action  of  a  on  the  edges  of  a  digraph  is  defined  similarly,  and  the  ordering  must 
be  preserved  in  this  case. 
Definition  19  Let  F=  (V,  E,  C)  be  a  coloured  (dilhyper)graph  and  aa  pennu  ta- 
tion  of  V.  Then  a  is  an  automorphism  of  F  if  the  following  conditions  are  satisfied: 
For  aU  eEE,  a(e)  EE 
For  all  vEV,  C(v)  =  C(a  (v)). 
An  automorphism  of  an  un-coloured  (di/hyper)graph  is  a  permutation  of  V  which 3.2:  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  USING  QUOTIENT  STRUCTURES  54 
satisfies  the  first  condition  in  the  above  definition.  The  set  of  all  automorphisms 
of  a  (di/hyper)graph  IF  forms  a  group  under  composition  of  mappings,  denoted 
Aut(r). 
3.1.6  GAP  and  GRAPE 
GAP  (groups,  algorithms  and  programming)  [63]  is  a  computational  algebra  system 
which  provides  data  structures  and  algorithms  for  working  with  a  variety  of  alge- 
braic  structures.  In  particular,  GAP  includes  a  large  library  of  permutation  group 
algorithms.  Given  generators  (specified  in  disjoint  cycle  form)  for  a  permutation 
group  G  acting  on  the  set  J1,2,...,  n},  GAP  functions  can  be  used  to  compute, 
for  example,  subgroups  of  G  with  particular  properties  (such  as  point-  and  set- 
stabilisers);  the  orbits  of  G  on  11,2,...,  n};  coset  representatives  for  a  subgroup  H 
of  G,  and  homomorphisms  from  G  to  another  group.  The  fundamental  permutation 
group  algorithms  which  GAP  uses  are  described  in  [  19,162]. 
On  its  own,  GAP  provides  little  support  for  graph-theorefic  computation. 
GRAPE  (graph  algorithms  using  permutation  groups)  [168]  consists  of  a  set  of  func- 
tions  which  can  be  imported  into  GAP,  including  a  function  to  compute  the  auto- 
morphism.  group  of  a  directed,  coloured  graph.  This  function  interfaces  with  the 
naut  (no  automorphisms,  yes)  program  [126],  which  uses  the  most  efficient  algo-  Y 
rithm  currently  known  for  finding  the  automorphism  group  of  a  graph  [125]. 
For  further  details  of  the  techniques  used  by  GRAPE  and  nauty  see  [169].  In 
subsequent  chapters  we  make  use  of  the  following  functions: 
AutGroupGraph  (IF  [,  C]):  GRAPE  function  which  returns  generators  for  the 
automorphism  group  of  the  directed  graph  IF  (see  Definition  19).  The  op- 
tional  argument  C  allows  a  colouring  on  the  vertices  of  F  to  be  specified,  in 
which  case  generators  for  the  subgroup  of  automorphisms  which  preserve 
this  colouring  will  be  computed 
isomorphismGroups  (G,  H):  GAP  function  which  computes  an  isomor- 
phism  between  the  groups  G  and  H  if  they  are  isomorphic  (see  Definition  8), 
and  returnsfail  otherwise 
I  somorphi  c  Subgroups  (G,  H):  GAP  function  which  computes  all  mono- 
morphisms  (see  Definition  8)  from  H  into  G  up  to  conjugacy  of  the  image 
groups.  (Subgroups  H  and  K  of  G  conjugate  if  H=  &-'Ka  for  some  aEG.  ) 
3.2  Symmetry  Reduction  Using  Quotient  Structures 
Definition  20  Let  M  (S,  So,  R)  be  a  Kripke  structure.  An  automorphism  of  M  is 
a  permutation  a:  SS  which  preserves  the  transition  relation  and  set  of  initial 
states.  That  is  cc  satisfies  the  following  conditions: 3-2:  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  USING  QUOTIENT  STRUCTURES  55 
I.  For  all  s,  tES,  (s,  t)  ER  =ý.  (it  (s),  it  (t))  ER 
Z  it  (SO)  =  SO. 
The  set  of  all  automorphisms  of  a  Kripke  structure  M  forms  a  group  under  com- 
position  of  mappings,  denoted  Aut(M). 
In  a  model  of  a  concurrent  system  with  many  replicated  processes,  Kripke 
structure  automorphisms  may  involve  the  permutation  of  process  identifiers  or 
data  values  throughout  all  states  of  the  model.  On  the  other  hand,  a  model  may  in- 
clude  a  data  structure  which  has  geometrical  symmetry  [881,  in  which  case  Kripke 
structure  automorphisms  involve  applying  the  geometrical  symmetries  through- 
out  all  states  of  the  model.  In  each  of  these  cases  there  is  group  G  which  permutes  a 
(typically  small)  set  of  process  identifiers,  data  values  or  nodes  of  a  data  structure, 
and  an  action  of  G  on  S  (see  Definition  13).  Let  p  be  the  permutation  representa- 
tion  corresponding  to  this  action  (see  Theorem  3).  The  group  of  automorphisms 
of  M  hiduced  by  G  is  p(G),  the  image  of  G  under  the  permutation  representation. 
Given  it  E  G,  rather  than  referring  to  the  automorphism  p.  of  M  we  sometimes 
say  simply  that  it  is  an  automorphism  of  M. 
Given  a  subgroup  G  of  Aut(M),  the  orbits  of  S  under  G  (see  Definition  10) 
can  be  used  to  construct  a  quotietit  Kripke  structure  MC;  as  follows: 
Definition2l  The  quotient  Mpk-c  structure  MG  of  M  with  respect  to  G  is  a  tuple 
M  c;  (Sc;,  SG,  RG)  where. 
SG  =  (rCPG  (S)  S6  S)  (where  rePG  (S)  is  a  unique  represen  ta  tive  Of  [S]  G) 
0  "  SG  ý  (rMG(S)  S  r=  SO) 
"  RG  =  ((nVG(S)*rePG(t)):  (Slt)  iE  R). 
If  G  is  non-trivial  then  the  quotient  structure  Mc;  is  smaller  than  M.  For  any 
SES,  the  size  of  [s1c;  is  bounded  by  JGJ,  and  so  the  theoretical  minimum  Size  Of  SG 
is  ISIIJGI.  Since  for  highly  symmetric  systems  we  may  have  IGI  =  W,  where  it  is 
the  number  of  components,  symmetry  reduction  potentially  offers  a  considerable 
reduction  in  memory  requirements. 
To  give  an  example  of  a  quotient  structure,  for  the  mutual  exclusion  example 
shown  in  Figure  2.3,  observe  that  swapping  the  process  indices  I  and  2  throughout 
all  states  is  an  automorphism  of  the  structure.  If  a  denotes  this  automorphisin  then 
for  this  example  Aut(M)  =  (it,  id},  where  id  is  the  identity  mapping.  Choosing 
a  unique  representative  from  each  orbit  we  obtain  the  quotient  Kripkc  structure 
MA,,  #(M)  illustrated  by  Figure  3.1. 
It  can  be,  shown  131,551  (see  Theorem  5  below)  that  a  model  and  its  quotient 
model  sa  tisfy  the  same  srintetric  CTV  formulas.  A  CTL*  formula  0  is  symmetric,  or 
invariant,  with  respect  to  a  group  G  if  for  every  maximal  propositional  sub-formula 
f  appearing  in  4)  (see  Section  2.2.1),  and  for  every  it  E  G,  M,  s  ý=  f  4*  M,  a  (s)  H  f. 3.2:  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  USING  QUOTTENT  SMUCrURES  56 
rigure  3.1:  Quotient  Kripke  structure  for  two-process  mutual  exclusion. 
Theorem  5  If  M  and  MG  denote  a  model  and  its  quotient  model  with  respect  to 
a  group  G  wspvctively,  then  M,  s  ý=  0  4*  Mc;,  repG(s)  1--  0,  for  every  synunctric 
CTL*  formula  0. 
Theorem  5  is  proved  by  establishing  a  correspondence  between  the  paths  of  M  and 
MG,  and  using  induction  on  the  structure  of  CTL*  formulas  131,551.  An  analogous 
result  holds  for  symmetric  jw-calculus  formulas  [551. 
Since,  by  Condition  2  of  Definition  20,  the  initial  states  of  M  are  preserved 
by  G,  we  have  the  following  corollary: 
Corollary  1  Mith  the  same  conditions  as  Theorem  5,  M  ý=  0  4*  Mc;  ý=  0. 
Corollary  I  is  similar  to  Theorem  I  (see  Section  2.6.3)  which  shows  that  properties 
of  a  Kripke  structure  can  be  inferred  by  proving  properties  of  a  structure  which 
has  lxvn  reduced  by  data  abstraction.  There  are  two  key  differences.  Theorem  I 
is  restricted  to  ACTV  formulas,  while  Corollary  I  applies  to  any  C7L*  formula 
which  is  symmetric.  Tn  addition,  unlike  Theorem  1,  Corollary  I  can  be  used  to  find 
errors  as  well  as  prove  properties  since,  in  this  case,  the  implication  is  two-way. 
Consider  the  two-process  mutual  exclusion  property  AG(-(Cl  A  C2))  (Property  I 
of  Section  2.2.1).  Let  us  call  this  property  01.  Clearly  01  is  symmetric  with  respect  to 
the  automorphism  group  G=  fit,  id),  where  it  is  defined  as  above.  Thus  the  Kripke 
structure  M  (represented  by  Figure  2.3)  satisfies  4),  if  and  only  if  the  quotient  struc- 
ture  MC;  (represented  by  Figure  3.1)  does.  Therefore,  to  check  the  mutual  exclusion 
property,  it  is  sufficient  to  check  the  quotient  model  only.  Note  that  Mc  also  sat- 3.2:  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  USING  QUOTTENT  STRUCrURES  57 
Algorithm  I  Algorithm  to  construct  a  quotient  Kripke  structure. 
SG  :=  (rcpG(s)  :s  r=  So) 
unexplored:  =  (rtpG(s)  :sE  So) 
RG:  =O 
while  utiexplored  j4  0  do 
remove  a  state  s  from  unexplorcd 
foraII  successor  sta  tes  t  of  sdo 
add  s  --*  repG(t)  to  RG 
if  repr  , 
(t)  ý  SG  then 
add  rqG(t)  to  SG 
add  repG(t)  to  utiexplored 
end  if 
end  for 
end  while 
isfies  the  property  9ý2  defined  as  AG(-C2).  However,  as  0  is  not  symmetric  with 
respect  to  the  automorphism  group,  we  cannot  infer  the  truth  (or  other"ViSe)  of  02 
for  M.  (Indeed,  clearly  MK  9ý2.  )  The  progn-ss  property  AG(Tj  =*  (FCI))  (Prop- 
erty  2  of  Section  2.2.1)  is  also  not  symmetric  -  it  refers  to  process  I  in  an  asymmetric 
way.  Consider  Property  3  lxlow,  a  weaker  version  of  the  progress  property. 
Property  3  AG  ((TI  V  T2)  =ý-  (F(Cl  V  C2))). 
This  asserts  that  if  some  process  is  in  the  trying  region  then  eventually  sonte  (but 
not  necessarily  the  same)  process  will  reach  the  critical  section.  This  property  is 
symmetric  with  respect  to  Aut(M),  and  it  is  easy  to  check  that  it  holds  for  both  M 
and  MC;. 
Algorithm  I  (adapted  from  155,103]),  shows  how  a  quotient  structure  can  be 
constructed  incrementally  if  symmetries  of  the  Kripke  structure  can  be  identified 
before  search.  The  successors  of  a  given  state  are  determined  by  the  transition  rules 
of  a  high  level  specifiQ-ktion.  Note  fluit  to  determine  a  unique  element  rVPC;  , 
(s)  for 
each  orbit  lslc;,  we  require  a  canonicalisation  function.  We  discuss  the  problem  of 
constructing  such  a  canonical  isation,  function  in  Section  3.4.  Using  Algorithm  1  it 
may  be  possible  to  build  the  quotient  structure  even  though  the  original  structure 
is  intractably  large. 
An  approach  that  is  suggested  for  symmetry  reduction  during  automata- 
based  model  checking  involves  the  construction  of  an  annotated  quotient  structure 
(AQS)  155,164).  In  this  case  there  is  a  labelled  edge  between  representative  states 
n7ir.  (s)  and  n-pc;  (t)  for  every  edge  that  exists  (in  M)  from  repc,  (s)  to  an  element 
of  ItIG.  If  (rt7)G(s),  t')  were  such  an  edge  (in  M)  then  the  edge  (in  the  annotated 
quotient  structure)  would  be  labelled  with  a  permutation  it  such  that  it  (repG(t))  = 
t'.  Not  only  is  it  possible  to  unuind  the  original  structure  M  from  the  (annotated) 3.3:  IDENTIFYING  SYMMETRY  58 
quotient  structure,  but  it  is  also  possible  to  check  properties  expressed  in  bidexed 
CTL*  -  an  extension  to  CTL*  in  which  properties  include  the  indexed  quantifiersfor 
all  processes  orfor  some  process.  In  addition,  properties  to  be  checked  are  not  required 
to  be  symmetric  with  respect  to  the  group  G.  We  discuss  the  use  of  AQSs  to  verify 
properties  under  fairness  assumptions  in  Section  3.6.2. 
3.3  Identifying  Symmetry 
The  first  step  which  must  be  accomplished  by  any  method  which  exploits  symme- 
try  is  the  identification  of  symmetries  in  a  model.  Let  M  be  a  Kripke  structure.  An 
obvious  approach  to  solving  this  problem  would  be  to  construct  M,  and  then  to 
find  a  symmetry  group  G  of  M  using  a  standard  algorithm  (e.  g.  nauty  [1251).  These 
symmetries  could  be  used  to  reduce  M  to  a  quotient  model,  M  C;. 
This  approach  is  flawed  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  finding  automorphisms  of  a 
Kripke  structure  is  equivalent  to  checking  for  state-space  isomorphism,  which  for 
large  state-spaces  is  a  hard  problem  (no  polynomial  time  algorithm  is  known  [125]). 
Secondly,  if  enough  resources  were  available  to  construct  M  then  symmetry  reduc- 
tion  would  be  unlikely  to  be  of  much  benefit.  Indeed,  the  power  of  reduction  tech- 
niques  is  that  they  allow  a  reduced  model  to  be  checked  even  when  the  unreduced 
model  is  intractable. 
Thus  the  problem  is  to  find  symmetries  of  M  without  building  M  explic- 
itly.  We  now  discuss  four  approaches  to  symmetry  identification:  explicit  specifica- 
tion  of  symmetry  group  generators,  specification  of  symmetries  via  a  purpose-built 
scalarset  data  type,  restriction  of  the  specification  language  to  guarantee  symme- 
try  between  components,  and  inference  of  symmetry  by  communication  structure 
analysis. 
3.3.1  Manual  specification  of  a  symmetry  group 
The  problem  of  symmetry  detection  can  be  avoided  altogether  by  requiring  the  user 
to  manually  specify  generators  for  a  symmetry  group  [27,69,1351.  Uds  approach 
requires  expert  user  knowledge  of  symmetry  reduction  theory,  and  is  prone  to  er- 
ror.  Nevertheless,  if  used  with  care  then  providing  the  option  to  specify  symme- 
try  manually  allows  symmetry  reduction  to  be  applied  when  the  user  can  identify 
symmetries  in  a  specification  which  are  not  recognised  by  an  automated  approach. 
3.3.2  Scalarsets 
A  popular  approach  to  symmetry  detection  involves  annotation  of  the  system  de- 
scription  via  a  purpose-built  data  type  [103].  The  data  type  is  called  a  scalarset, 
and  acts  as  documentation  that  certain  symmetries  are  present  in  a  specification 
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Definition  22  A  scalarset  is  an  integer  sub-range  with  restricted  operations  as  fol- 
lows: 
1.  An  array  with  a  scalarset  index  type  can  only  be  indexed  by  a  scalarset  vari- 
able  of  exactly  the  same  type 
2.  A  term  of  scalarset  type  must  be  a  variable  reference.  (A  scalarset  may  not 
appear  as  an  operand  to  +  or  any  other  operator  in  a  term) 
3.  Scalarset  variables  may  only  be  compared  using  =,  and  in  such  cases,  must 
be  of  exactly  the  same  type 
4.  For  all  assignments  d  :=t,  if  d  is  a  scalarset  variable,  t  must  be  a  term  of 
exactly  the  same  scalarset  type 
5.  If  a  scalarset  variable  is  used  as  an  index  of  a  for  statement,  the  body  of  the 
statement  is  restricted  so  that  the  result  of  the  execution  is  independent  of 
the  order  of  the  iterations. 
The  restrictions  are  sufficient  to  ensure  that  consistent  permutation  of 
scalarset  variables  in  all  states  corresponds  to  an  automorphism  of  the  state-space. 
Furthermore,  violations  of  the  restrictions  can  be  detected  in  polynomial  time  [1031. 
As  the  above  conditions  refer  to  general  language  features,  they  can  clearly  be 
adapted  to  apply  to  other  specification  formalisms. 
Given  a  specificationP  containing  a  scalarset  S  which  represents  the  integer 
sub-range  10,  n-  1}  (for  some  it  >  0),  any  permutation  of  10,  it  -  1} 
naturally  induces  a  permutation  of  the  associated  state-space.  This  is  best  illus- 
trated  by  an  example.  Let  x  and  y  be  variables  of  P  with  scalarset  and  non  scalarset 
type  respectively,  and  A  an  array  with  scalarset  index  type  and  element  type.  Let 
t  be  a  state  of  the  model  associated  with  P,  and  let  t.  x,  t.  y  and  t.  A[i]  denote  the 
values  of  x,  y  and  element  i  of  A  (0  <i<  it  -  1)  at  state  t  respectively.  Let  as  be 
any  permutation  of  10,  n-  1}.  Then  as  is  defined  to  act  on  state  t  such  that: 
as(t).  x  =  as(t.  x);  as(t).  y  =  t.  y,  and  as(t).  A[i]  =  as(t.  A[asl(i)]).  For  a  precise, 
recursive  definition  of  this  action,  and  a  proof  of  the  following  theorem,  see  [1031. 
Theorem6  Given  a  specification  containing  a  scalarset  S,  everypermutation  as  on 
the  states  of  the  state-space  M  derived  from  the  specification  is  an  automorphism 
of  M. 
Corollary  2  If  a  specification  P  has  scalarsets  S1,  S2,...,  Sk  (k  >  0),  there  are  sym- 
metries  in  the  state  graph  A4  and  we  can  use  the  symmetryý-reduced  state  graph 
M  r,  to  perform  verification,  where  G  is  the  group  of  all  permutations  of  the  states 
with  respect  to  S1,  S2,  ---i 
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atomic  f 
j=0; 
do  J==A  break 
J<A  body;  J++ 
od. 
Figure  3.2:  Synthesising  af  or  loop  with  scalarset  index  variable  in  Promela. 
If  I  Si  I  is  the  size  of  scalarset  Si  (1  <i<  k),  then  the  symmetry  group  G  has 
order  JS111  x  JS21!  X***X  jSkj! 
- 
To  illustrate  the  need  for  Condition  5  of  Definition  22,  let  S  be  a  scalarset 
type  with  range  10,  n-  1}.  Consider  a  loop  with  counter  variable  j  of  type  S, 
and  let  k  be  a  global  variable  of  the  same  scalarset  type.  Including  an  assignment 
k:  =  j  at  the  end  of  the  loop  body  means  that  the  final  value  of  k  will  be  n-1.  TTds, 
distinguishes  the  value  n-1  from  the  other  values  in  the  range  of  S,  thus  the  range 
cannot  be  safely  permuted. 
An  example  of  the  use  of  scalarsets  with  Muro  is  in  the  verification  of  the 
Needham-Shroeder  public  key  protocol  [133].  The  protocol  involves  a  set  of  Ini- 
tiator  processes  and  a  set  of  Receptor  processes.  Each  Initiator  process  is  identified 
by  the  variable  Initiatorid  which  is  used  to  index  an  array  storing  the  state  of  each 
Initiator  process.  The  Initiatorid  variable  is  also  used  as  an  index  within  a  for  loop 
containing  the  rules  determining  the  behaviour  of  each  Initiator  process.  As  the 
Initiator  processes  behave  symmetrically,  by  declaring  the  Initiatorid  variable  with 
a  scalarset  type,  symmetry  reduction  can  be  automatically  performed.  Similarly,  a 
scalarset  type  can  be  used  to  identify  symmetry  between  the  Receptor  processes. 
Scalarsets  have  been  used  to  implement  symmetry  reduction  teclu-dques  for 
the  SPIN  model  checker  via  the  SymmSpin  tool  [14]  (see  Section  3.9.1).  Unlike  Muro, 
the  Promela  language  does  not  include  af  or  construct.  However,  af  or  loop  which 
uses  a  scalarset  index  variable  can  be  synthesised  using  the  Promela.  do.  .  od  con- 
struct  within  an  atomic  block,  as  shown  in  Figure  3.2.  In  the  figure,  j  is  a  scalarset 
variable  which  has  range  10,  A-  1}  for  some  A>0.  The  loop  body  con- 
sists  of  a  sequence  of  statements  between  the  condition  j  <A  and  the  increment 
j  ++,  which  must  satisfy  Condition  5  of  Definition  22.  In  particular,  this  condition 
implies  that  the  body  must  not  include  any  potentially  blocking  statements  (e.  g. 
send/receive  statements).  Although  the  assignment  i=0  violates  Condition  4  of 
Definition  22,  since  the  loop  is  enclosed  in  an  atomic  block  the  value  of  j  is  not 
visible  until  after  execution  of  the  loop.  At  this  point  j  is  assigned  to  A,  which 
SymmSpin  uses  as  a  default  value  for  a  scalarset  variable  within  this  range.  Thus 
symmetry  between  scalarset  values  is  not  broken  by  the  assignment  j=0. 
Figure  3.3  illustrates  how  scalarsets  can  be  used  to  specify  symmetry  in  the 
Promela.  mutual  exclusion  example  of  Figure  2.6.1  In  this  specification,  a  constant 
1.  Note  that  in  order  to  avoid  modification  of  the  Promela,  parser,  SymmSpin  requires  information 
about  scalarsets  to  be  supplied  in  a  separate  file  1141  (see  Section  3.9.1).  For  simplicity  and  readability, 3.3:  IDENTIFYING  SYMMETRY  61 
mtype  (N,  T,  C) 
const  A=5; 
scalar  PID(A]; 
mtype  st[PIDI  =N 
proctype  user(PID  i) 
PID  j=A; 
bool  critical-empty  false; 
do  d  step  E3t[il-=N  st[i]=T 
d7step  st[il==T 
critical_empty  -  true; 
j=0, 
do  j<A  -> 
critical-eMPty  =  critical-eMpty  &&  st(jll=C; 
j++ 
else  ->  break; 
od; 
j=A; 
if  critical-eMPty  ->  st[i]=C 
else  ->  skip; 
fi, 
critical_empty  =  false; 
d_step  st[i]==C  ->  st[i]=N 
od 
init  ( 
PID  i  A; 
atomic 
i=0; 
do  i<A  run  user(i);  i++ 
else  break; 
od 
Figure  3.3:  Identifying  symmetry  in  a  mutual  exclusion  example  using  scalarsets. 
A  is  defined  to  represent  the  number  of  user  processes  in  the  specification,  and  a 
scalarset  of  size  A  named  PID  is  introduced  via  the  declaration  scalar  PID[Al. 
Since  A  is  set  to  5,  the  P  ID  type  is  a  scalarset  with  range  10,1,2,3,4}.  Rather  than 
using  the  built  in 
_pid 
constant,  the  user  proctype  now  takes  a  parameter  i,  which 
has  type  PID.  Tlie  array  st  of  mtype  values  is  indexed  by  the  PID  type,  indicated 
by  the  occurrence  of  PID  in  the  declaration  of  st. 
It  is  necessary  to  modify  the  syntax  of  the  original  Promela  specification 
to  satisfy  the  conditions  of  Definition  22.  In  particular,  the  boolean  expression 
of  Figure  2.6  (with  re-indexing)  (st  [01!  =C  &&  st  [  11  i  =C  &&  st  [21  1  =C  && 
st  [31  1  =C  &&  st  [41  1  =C)  does  not  obey  Condition  1-  literal  values  cannot  be 
used  to  index  an  array  of  scalarset  type.  The  modified  specification  computes  the 
expression  using  a  do. 
.  od  loop  (as  described  above),  storing  the  result  in  a  boolean 
variable,  critical-empty.  Only  if  this  variable  holds  the  value  trite  can  the  pro- 
cess  enter  the  critical  state.  Note  that  re-modelling  the  mutual  exclusion  protocol 
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this  way  changes  the  semantics  of  the  underlying  model  slightly.  We  discuss  this  in 
Section  4.2. 
The  use  of  scalarsets  described  above  exploits  component  symmetry  (sym- 
metry  between  the  processes  themselves).  The  scalarset  approach  can  also  be  used 
to  exploit  data  symmetry.  A  scalarset  that  is  used  to  denote  data  symmetry  is  referred 
to  as  a  data  scalarset. 
Definition  23  A  scalarset  S  is  a  data  scalarset  in  a  specification  P  if  S  is  not  used  as 
an  array  index  or  for  statement  index. 
If  a  protocol  uses  a  data  scalarset,  then  it  is  said  to  be  data  independent  [1831. 
In  this  case,  symmetry  reduction  can  be  used  to  reduce  an  infinite  state-space  (in 
which  data  is  unbounded)  to  a  finite  state-space  (with  bounded  data)  thus: 
Theorem7  If  Pisa  specification,  S  thename  of  a  data  scalarsetin  P  and  P,  and  P2 
are  specifications  identical  to  P  except  that  S  is  declared  to  be  of  size  Nj  in  Pi  and 
N2  in  P2,  then  there  exists  NS  >0  such  that  the  symmetry-reduced  state  graphs  of 
P,  and  P2  are  isomorphic  whenever  Ni  ý!  Ns  and  N2  ý:  Ns. 
However  this  application  of  scalarsets  is  seldom  required  as  data  abstrac- 
tion  (see  Section  2.6.3)  can  be  used  to  eliminate  redundant  data  values  [30].  Data 
symmetry  reduction  will  be  discussed  again  in  Section  3.8. 
The  original  scalarset  approach  [1031  only  considered  the  verification  of  sim- 
ple  safety  properties  of  the  form  AG  (--,  error).  However,  scalarsets  have  been  suc- 
cessfully  used  to  exploit  symmetry  during  the  verification  of  more  general  LTL  for- 
mulas  [14].  A  major  drawback  to  scalarsets  is  that  they  only  allow  the  specification 
of  total  (or  full)  symmetries  (where  all  processes  of  a  given  type  are  interchange- 
able),  so  could  be  applied  to  a  system  of  processes  connected  as  a  clique,  say,  but 
not,  for  example,  as  a  ring  or  tree.  An  alternative  data  type,  called  circularset  [101] 
and  additional  extensions  to  the  scalarset  data  type  [49]  have  been  proposed  to  han- 
dle  systems  with  ring  structures  and  more  general  systems  respectively.  However, 
these  alternatives  share  with  the  scalarset  approach  the  problem  that  the  user  must 
identify  symmetry  in  the  model  and  select  an  appropriate  data  type  to  specify  the 
presence  of  this  symmetry.  This  means  that  symmetry  reduction  using  scalarsets  is 
not  a  "push  button"  reduction  technique. 
We  say  that  symmetries  of  a  model  are  specified  using  scalarsets,  since  given  a 
specification  with  scalarset  annotations  it  is  trivial  to  determine  a  symmetry  group 
for  the  underlying  model. 3.3:  IDENTIFYING  SYMMETRY  63 
Program 
Module  user  =  5; 
st[user)  =  0; 
u  of  user:  ( 
st[u)  0  ->  st[u]  =  1; 
st[u]  1&  ALL(v  of  user.  -  stlvl  !=  2)  ->  st[u]  =  2; 
st  [u]  ==  2  ->  st  Cul  =  0, 
Figure  3.4:  An  SMC  specification  of  mutual  exclusion  with  five  processes. 
3.3.3  Input  language  restriction 
The  problem  of  detecting  structural  symmetry  between  components  can  be  made 
trivial  by  restricting  the  input  specification  language  in  such  a  way  that  fun  sym- 
metry  is  guaranteed  between  processes  which  have  the  same  type. 
This  is  the  approach  to  symmetry  detection  used  by  the  SMC  (symmetry- 
based  model  checker)  tool  [166]  (see  Section  3.9.1).  Figure  3.4  shows  the  mutual 
exclusion  example  with  five  processes,  expressed  in  the  SMC  language.  The  values 
0,1  and  2  are  used  to  represent  the  local  states  N,  T  and  C  respectively.  Note  that  the 
boolean  expression  to  check  that  the  critical  section  is  empty  is  expressed  succinctly 
as  ALL  (v  of  user:  st  Cv]  !=  2).  This  expression  preserves  the  semantics  of 
the  original  Promela  specification. 
The  model  associated  with  an  SMC  specification  with  m  module  types 
and  ki  instantiations  of  module  type  i  (1  <i<  m)  is  guaranteed  to  have 
k1!  x  k2!  X  ...  x  k,!  component  symmetries.  The  corresponding  group  of  symme- 
tries  is  the  disjoint  product  (see  Section  3.1.4)  of  groups  Sk,  (1  <i<  ni),  each  of 
which  permutes  one  set  of  module  indices.  The  modules  of  SMC  are  essentially 
analogous  to  the  scalarsets  of  Muro  [166],  and  index  variables  (variables  wl-dch  take 
module  indices  as  values)  must  satisfy  similar  conditions  to  those  of  Definition  22. 
Only  full  symmetry  between  components  of  the  same  type  can  be  identified  using 
the  SMC  language. 
We  say  that  symmetries  of  a  model  are  specified  using  a  restricted  input  lan- 
guage  since,  by  declaring  multiple  instances  of  a  given  module  type,  the  user  indi- 
cates  the  presence  of  symmetry  and  it  is  then  trivial  to  determine  the  corresponding 
group  of  permutations. 
Capturing  symmetry  by  input  language  restriction  is  crucial  to  the  ap- 
proach  of  exploiting  symmetry  using  generic  representatives  [45,57,58,601  (see  Sec- 
tion  3.5.2). 
3.3.4  Communication  structure  analysis 
Let  I=  11,2,. 
..  '  n}  be  a  set  of  process  identifiers,  for  some  n>0.  For  simple 
concurrent  specifications  consisting  of  a  finite  number  of  isomorphic  (identical  up 3.3:  IDENTIFYING  SYMMETRY  64 
to  renaming)  processes  executing  in  parallel  and  communicating  via  shared  vari- 
ables,  a  subgroup  of  the  automorphism  group  of  M  can  be  determined  from  the 
comniunicatioit  relatioii  of  the  specification  155].  The  comniunicatioti  relatioit  CR  of  the 
specification  P  =11iz17  pi  is  defined  as  the  undirected  graph  CR  =  (1,  E),  where 
Iij}  EE  iff  processes  pi  and  pi  share  a  variable  (ij  E  11). 
Theorem  8  If  M  is  the  Kripke  structure  associated  with  P=II  jEj7pi  where  all  pi 
are  normal  and  isomorphic  (see  [55])  then  Aut(CR)  !ý  Aut(M). 
The  group  Aut(CR)  may  be  automatically  computed  since  CR  is  typically  small 
compared  to  M,  or  may  simply  be  known  in  advance. 
Theorem  8  applies  to  systems  in  which  all  variables  are  shared  between  at 
most  two  processes,  and  all  processes  are  of  the  same  type.  This  result  is  gener- 
alised  [27]  to  remove  this  restriction  via  the  introduction  of  the  coloured  hypergraph 
HG(?  )  of  a  shared  variable  specification  P  (see  Section  3.1.5).  The  node  set  of  the 
hypergraph  HG(P)  is  11  and  there  is  a  hyper  edge  wC  17  if  the  specification  P  has 
a  variable  shared  by  all  process  pi,  iEw.  Each  node  is  assigned  a  colour,  so  that 
two  processes  pi  and  pj  are  isomorphic  iff  nodes  i  and  j  have  the  same  colour  in  the 
coloured  hypergraph.  Two  processes  are  isomorphic  in  this  case  if  they  are  of  the 
same  process  type,  and  have  equivalent  sets  of  transitions. 
Theorem  9  If  M  is  the  Kripke  structure  associated  with  a  specification?  = 
then  Aut(HG(P))  :ý  Aut(M). 
In  Chapter  7  we  prove  a  similar  result  for  a  richer  specification  language 
(Theorem  13)  which  shows  that  Kripke  structure  automorphisms  can  be  derived 
by  computing  automorphisms  of  the  static  channel  diagram  of  a  specification,  which 
assumes  a  message  passing  model  of  computation.  In  the  context  of  hardware  veri- 
fication,  a  related  approach  [1241  uses  GAP  for  identifying  symmetries  in  structural 
descriptions  of  digital  circuits. 
3.3.5  A  note  on  the  complexity  of  automatic  symmetry  detection 
As  noted  at  the  start  of  Section  3.3,  for  symmetry  reduction  to  be  useful  it  must  be 
possible  to  determine  symmetries  of  the  model  M  associated  with  a  specification 
without  actually  constructing  M.  Ideally  we  would  like  an  automatic  symmetry 
detection  technique  to  compute  all  symmetries  of  M  by  static  analysis  of  a  specifi- 
cation  P  without  placing  restrictions  on  the  form  of  P.  However,  in  order  to  avoid 
complexity  equivalent  to  that  of  checking  a  safety  property  of  the  form  AG  p  (for 
some  proposition  p)  it  is  iiecessary  to  restrict  the  form  of  specifications,  or  to  reject 
certain  potential  symmetries  which  cannot  be  efficiently  checked  as  belonging  to 
Aut(M).  We  illustrate  why  tl-ds  is  the  case  using  a  simple  Promela  example. 3.4:  EXPLOMNG  SYMMETRY  65 
breaksym. 
if 
_pid=-l 
&&  <expr> 
special  =1 
else  ->  skip 
fi; 
Figure  3.5:  Promela  example  to  illustrate  the  general  complexity  of  automatic  symme- 
try  detection. 
Let  P  be  a  Promela  specification  consisting  of  it  instantiations  of  a  user  proc- 
type,  for  some  ii  >  1.  Suppose  that  each  user  has  a  local  variable,  special,  which  is 
set  to  0  on  declaration.  We  use  speciali  to  denote  the  local  variable  special  of  process 
i.  Suppose  that  the  body  of  every  user  process  contains  the  conditional  statement 
shown  in  Figure  3.5,  where  (expr)  is  an  arbitrary  boolean  expression  (which  may 
refer  to  global  variables  and  channels  of  the  specification).  Suppose  the  statement 
special  =1  is  the  only  assignment  to  special  (after  declaration),  that  appears 
in  the  definition  of  a  user,  and  _pid==l 
the  only  guard  which  treats  process  identi- 
fiers  asymmetrically.  Clearly  this  statement  cannot  be  executed  by  a  user  with  _pid 
not  equal  to  1.  Assume  that  the  rest  of  the  specification  does  not  differentiate  indi- 
vidual  processes  in  any  way. 
If  it  is  impossible  for  user  1  to  reach  breaksym  with  (expr)  evaluating  to 
true,  then  clearly  any  permutation  of  process  identifiers  will  induce  an  automor- 
phism  on  the  associated  model  M.  Otherwise,  user  1  will  be  able  to  execute  the 
statement  special  =  1,  leading  to  a  state  s  with  s  [--  (special,  =  1).  By  the 
above  discussion  it  is  clear  that,  for  any  i>1  and  any  reachable  state  t  in  M, 
t  ý&  (speciali  =  1).  'Ilierefore  any  process  permutation  a  for  which  a(l)  34  1  can- 
not  induce  an  automorphism  on.  M.  If  a  is  such  a  permutation  then  determining 
whether  a  induces  an  automorphism  of  M  is  equivalent  to  checking  the  temporal 
property  AG  (-,  (user[1]@breaksym  A  (expr))). 
Thus  an  effective  symmetry  detection  technique  for  Promela.  must  either  re- 
strict  the  use  of  the  specification  language  so  that  this  asymmetric  use  of  process 
identifiers  is  not  allowed,  or  conservatively  assume  that  certain  process  permu- 
tations  do  not  induce  automorphisms  of  M.  In  Chapters  7  and  8  we  develop  an 
efficient  automatic  symmetry  detection  technique  for  Promela  which  aims  to  place 
as  few  restrictions  as  possible  on  the  form  of  a  specification,  and  to  detect  a  large 
subgroup  of  Aut(M)  in  practice. 
3.4  Exploiting  Symmetry  with  a  Simple  Model  of  Computation 
The  crux  of  exploiting  symmetry  when  model  checking  is  that  during  search,  when 
a  state  t  is  reached,  it  is  necessary  to  test  whether  a  state  u  has  already  been  reached 
such  that  t  =-G  u  (i.  e.  t=  a(u)  for  some  et  E  G).  This  is  known  as  the  orbit  problem 3.4:  EXPLOITING  SYMMETRY  66 
[31],  and  is  central  to  all  model  checking  methods  that  exploit  symmetry.  Tech- 
niques  must  be  used  to  either  solve  the  orbit  problem  efficiently,  or  to  find  some 
kind  of  approximate  solution. 
On  encountering  a  state  t,  Algorithm  1  (Section  3.2)  checks  whether  there  is 
some  aEG  such  that  it  (t)  E  SG  by  checking  whether  repG  (t)  E  SG,  where  rep  is  a 
function  which  computes  a  unique  representative  of  [t)  G.  Since  the  algorithm  only 
stores  representative  states,  if  some  state  u  with  u  : -:  G  t  has  been  encountered  then 
rePG(u)  E  SG-  Since  rePG(U)  =  rePG(t)  (which  follows  from  [u]G  =  NO,  the  test 
rePG  (t)  E  SG  returns  true,  and  search  can  backtrack. 
For  simple  concurrent  systems  it  is  common  to  reason  about  states  us- 
ing  a  single  integer  variable  for  each  component,  representing  the  valuation  of 
the  local  variables  of  the  component  [27,57,591  (we  justify  this  formally  in  Sec- 
tion  9.1).  Using  the  notation  preceding  Definition  1  (Section  2.2),  we  have  a  set 
V=  JV1,  V21  ---,  Vn}  of  variables,  where  for  each  i  the  domain  Di  of  vi  is  a  finite  set 
LCZ.  A  state  s  is  then  a  vector  in  Ln.  An  element  it  E  Sn  acts  naturally  on  a  state 
2  S  =--  (XI 
#  X21  ...  i  Xn)  E  Ln  as  follows:  a  (s)  =  (Xa-I  (1)i  XLY-I  (2),  ...  iXet-I(n))  . 
Let  <  denote  the  usual  lexicographic  ordering  on  vectors  in  L":  for  S,  tE  Ln 
where  s=  (Xi 
i  x2i  ---,  Xn),  t=  (Y1,  Y2,  ---,  Yn),  S<t  if  s=t  or  there  is  some 
1<i<n  such  that  xj  =  yj  for  each  1<j<i,  and  xi  <  yi.  When  attempting 
to  exploit  symmetry  with  this  model  of  computation,  it  is  convenient  to  use  the 
lexicograpl-dcally  least  element  in  the  orbit  as  a  representative. 
Definition  24  The  constructive  orbit  problem  (COP)  [27,106]  Given  a  group  G 
S,,  and  a  state  sE  L",  find  the  lexicographically  least  element  in  the  orbit  of  s. 
In  other  words,  the  COP  is  the  problem  of  computing  min<  [SIG- 
Theorem  10  [27,106]  The  COP  is  NP-hard. 
Despite  this  discouraging  result,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  COP  can  be 
solved  efficiently  for  certain  classes  of  symmetry  group.  Furthermore,  it  may  be 
possible  to  efficiently  compute  an  approximate  solution  to  the  COP,  resulting  in  a 
quotient  model  which  uses  multiple  representatives  from  each  orbit. 
3.4.1  "Easy"  classes  of  groups 
For  the  following  classes  of  automorphism  group  G  (acting  on  a  model  of  a  system 
of  it  processes),  the  COP  can  be  solved  in  polynomial  time  [27,1061: 
G  has  order  polynomial  in  n,  for  example  a  cyclic  or  dihedral  group,  or  the 
group  associated  with  an  nxn  torus 
2.  This  action  makes  sense  provided  the  local  state  of  a  component  does  not  include  variables  which 
take  component  identifiers  as  values.  In  Chapter  10  we  consider  this  more  complex  case. 3.4:  EXPLOITING  SYMMETRY  67 
*G  is  the  symmetric  group  S,, 
"G  is  a  disjoint  product  or  wreath  product  of  groups  for  which  the  COP  is 
polynomial  time  solvable 
"G  is  generated  by  transpositions. 
Note  that,  when  G  is  the  symmetric  group  S,,,  the  lexicographically  least  (lex4east) 
element  of  the  orbit  of  a  state  can  be  obtained  by  sorting  the  state-vector.  When  G 
has  order  polynomial  in  it  the  COP  can  be  solved  by  enumerating  the  orbit  of  a 
state.  In  the  other  cases,  the  lex-least  element  is  found  by  sorting  segments  of  the 
state-vector  individually.  This  is  discussed  further  in  Chapter  9. 
3.4.2  Multiple  representatives 
Requiring  that  every  element  of  a  given  orbit  [s]  G  is  mapped  to  the  same  represen- 
tative  of  [SIG  ensures  that  symmetry  reduction  is  optimal  in  terms  of  space  require- 
ments.  However,  if  unique  representatives  cannot  be  efficiently  computed  then  the 
time  requirements  for  model  checking  with  symmetry  may  be  prohibitive. 
Suppose  we  relax  the  uniqueness  condition  so  that,  for  an  orbit  [SIG,  any 
state  in  [SIG  is  mapped  to  one  of  a  small  set  of  representatives: 
rePG(ISIG)  =  frePG(t)  :tE  [SIG}  9  ISIG- 
This  ensures  that  a  quotient  structure  includes  at  least  one  state  from  each  orbit  [SI  Gý, 
and  symmetry  reduction  is  sound  (i.  e.  Theorem  5  still  holds).  Provided  the  sets  of 
representatives  are  sufficiently  small  compared  to  the  orbits  themselves,  symmetry 
reduction  can  still  be  effective. 
Clearly  we  can  no  longer  select  the  minimal  element  of  [S]  G  as  repG  (s).  How- 
ever,  we  can  often  compute  representatives  of  individual  states  very  efficiently  by 
choosing  repG(S)  =f  (s)  where  f:  S  --+  S  is  a  normalisationfunction  which  maps  all 
states  to  states  no  larger  than  themselves.  A  good  normalisation  function  is  one  for 
which,  for  all  s,  f  (s)  is  "almost"  the  minimum  state  in  [SIG 
-  Using  a  normalisation 
function  in  this  way  provides  an  approximate  solution  to  the  COP. 
Symmetry  reduction  options  which  use  multiple  orbit  representatives  are 
provided  by  Muro  and  SymmSpin,  as  discussed  in  the  next  section.  We  propose  a 
general  approximate  solution  to  the  COP  based  on  local  search  in  Chapter  9. 
3.4.3  Using  orbit  representatives  in  practice 
The  scalarset  method  [103]  assumes  the  existence  of  a  canonicalisation  function  (in 
which  states  are  replaced  by  a  uttique  equivalence  class  representative)  or  a  nor- 
malisation  function  (in  which  a  subset  of  states  are  used  as  multiple  representative 
states).  For  symmetry  reduction  in  Muro  a  suitable  canonicalisation  function  [1021 
applies  all  permutations  to  a  state  s  and  returns  the  lexicographically  smallest  im- 
age.  An  approach  using  a  normalisation  function  is  also  suggested,  in  which  the 3.5:  SYMMETRY  AND  SYMBOLIC  REPRESENTATION  68 
state-vector  is  split  into  two  parts.  For  a  given  state,  a  permutation  a  is  selected  that 
produces  the  lexicographically  smallest  image  of  the  first  (most  significant)  part  of 
the  associated  state-vector.  The  representative  state  chosen  is  the  concatenation  of 
the  image  of  the  two  parts  of  the  state  vector  (under  a). 
The  use  of  normalisation  and  canonicalisation  functions  with  scalarsets  is 
extended  1141  using  heuristics  to  choose  the  order  in  which  variables  are  posi- 
tioned  in  the  state-vector.  This  ordering  determines,  for  example,  which  variables 
are  most  significant  and  appear  in  the  first  (leftmost)  part  of  the  split  state-vector. 
One  approach,  the  sorted  strategy,  involves  the  identification  of  an  array  indexed  by 
a  scalarset  type  (the  main  array)  and  placing  it  in  the  leftmost  position  of  the  state- 
vector.  In  another  approach,  the  segmented  strategy,  the  lexicographically  smallest 
image  of  the  second  part  of  the  state-vector,  with  respect  to  all  of  the  permutations 
that  canonicalise  the  first  part,  is  used  in  the  representative  state.  There  is  trade  off 
between  reduction  in  memory  requirements  and  faster  verification  for  the  sorted 
and  segmented  strategies.  The  segmented  strategy  yields  canonical  representatives, 
but  is  more  computationally  expensive  than  the  sorted  strategy.  On  the  other  hand, 
use  of  the  sorted  strategy  may  result  in  several  states  from  the  same  equivalence 
class  being  explored.  In  Chapter  9  we  generalise  the  segmented  strategy  to  apply  to 
arbitrary  symmetry  groups. 
Two  other  approaches,  pc-sorted  and  pc-segmented,  are  suggested  for  sys- 
tems  in  which  no  suitable  main  array  exists  but  the  process  identities  are  of  type 
scalarset.  In  this  case  a  main  array  is  constructed,  containing  the  program  counters. 
A  prototype  implementation  of  this  approach  is  implemented  in  the  SymmSpin 
package  [14],  which  we  discuss  in  Section  3.9.1. 
A  canonicalisation  function  is  suggested,  again  within  the  context  Of  SPIN 
[135],  for  systems  with  any  (user-specified)  symmetry.  Though  less  restrictive  than 
the  scalar-set  approach  (full  symmetry  is  not  required  and  more  general  operations 
on  permutable  variables  are  permitted),  a  canonicalisation  function  must  be  con- 
structed  manually  by  the  modeller  for  every  individual  model,  thereby  limiting 
the  applicability  of  the  method. 
3.5  Combining  Symmetry  Reduction  with  Symbolic  Representation 
If  BDI)s  are  used  to  represent  the  state-space  of  a  model  then  exploiting  symmetry 
using  the  approach  described  in  Section  3.2  becomes  more  complex,  as  the  orbit  re- 
lation  of  a  symmetry  group  must  be  represented  as  a  BDD.  The  orbit  relation  of  a 
group  G  is  the  set  of  pairs  I  (s,  t)  :  S,  tES,  S  =-  G  t}  -  It  can  be  shown  that  the  min- 
imum  size  of  a  BDD  representing  the  orbit  relation  induced  by  a  transitive  group 
(see  Definition  10,  Section  3.1.2)  is  exponential  in  the  minimum  of  the  number  of 
components  in  a  system  and  the  number  of  states  in  one  component  [31].  The  result 3.5:  SYMMETRY  AND  SYMBOLIC  REPRESENTATION  69 
is  extended  to  the  class  of  separable  groups,  which  subsumes  the  class  of  transitive 
groups  [106].  Since  transitive  groups  occur  commonly  in  models  of  concurrent  sys- 
tems,  the  combination  of  standard  symmetry  reduction  techniques  with  symbolic 
model  checking  is  limited.  We  now  discuss  some  methods  which  avoid  the  con- 
struction  of  the  orbit  relation  for  symbolic  model  checking. 
3.5.1  Multiple  representatives  and  symbolic  model  checking 
By  using  multiple  representatives  from  each  orbit,  the  problem  of  computing  the 
orbit  relation  can  be  avoided  to  some  extent  [27,311.  The  idea  is  similar  to  the  idea 
of  using  multiple  representatives  discussed  in  Section  3.4.2,  but  depends  on  a  spe- 
cific  subset  of  automorphisms.  If  G  is  a  set  of  Kripke  structure  automorphisms,  a 
subset  C  of  G  is  chosen  which  is  closed  under  inverses  and  contains  the  identity 
element.  The  set  of  representatives  Rep  is  selected  so  that  each  orbit  has  at  least  one 
element  in  Rep  and,  for  every  SES,  there  is  some  aEC  such  that  a  (s)  E  Rep.  The 
size  of  Rep  (and  consequently  the  size  of  the  resulting  quotient  model)  depends  crit- 
ically  on  the  choice  of  C,  which  must  be  chosen  carefully  according  to  the  structure 
of  the  system  being  verified  [27].  The  state-space  of  the  quotient  model  is  not  re- 
duced  (with  respect  to  the  original  model)  as  much  as  with  unique  representatives. 
However,  the  use  of  multiple  representatives  reduces  the  size  of  the  BDDs  required 
to  store  the  state-space,  and  thus  are  more  effective  when  symbolic  representation 
of  states  is  used. 
In  practice,  BDDs  reduced  through  multiple  representatives  may  still  be  in- 
tractably  large.  Approaches  using  generic  representatives  or  computing  represen- 
tatives  dynamically,  which  we  discuss  in  Sections  3.5.2  and  3.5.3  respectively,  have 
been  shown  to  outperform  the  multiple  representatives  approach  [58,59]. 
3.5.2  Generic  representatives 
For  symbolic  model  checking  of  fully  symmetric  systems  using  BDDs,  a  method 
which  uses  generic  representatives  avoids  both  the  orbit  problem  and  construction 
of  the  orbit  relation  [57].  This  method  involves  translating  the  specification  for  a 
model  into  a  reduced  specification,  which  can  be  explored  using  standard  symbolic 
model  checking  algorithms.  The  idea  of  generic  representatives  is  best  explained 
using  an  example.  For  a  basic  model  of  mutual  exclusion  with  three  processes,  the 
states  (N,  N,  T),  (T,  N,  N)  and  (N,  T,  N)  are  all  equivalent.  This  is  because  there  are 
two  processes  in  the  neutral  local  state  and  one  in  the  trying  local  state  in  each  of  the 
three  global  states.  The  generic  representative  of  these  states  is  (2N  1T).  A  generic 
representative  indicates  how  many  processes  are  in  each  local  state,  but  does  not  re- 
fer  to  individual  processes.  Thus  the  reduced  specification  abstracts  from  processes 
to  counters,  with  one  counter  for  each  local  state  indicating  the  number  of  processes 
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Figure  3.6:  Symmetry-reduced  model  for  two-process  mutual  exclusion  using  generic 
representatives. 
byte  no 
- 
N.  5; 
byte  no 
- 
T=O; 
byte  no7  C=O, 
init 
do 
::  d  step  I  no 
- 
N>O  ->  no  N--;  no 
- 
T++ 
::  d7step  f  no  T>O  &&  n:  ==O  ->  noý  0ý-c 
_T--; 
noý_C++ 
d7step  (  no7C>O  ->  no-C--;  noý_N++ 
od 
Figure  3.7:  Generic  form  of  five-process  mutual  exclusion. 
The  translation  rules  defined  for  fully  symmetric  specifications  (where  sym- 
metry  is  guaranteed  by  input  language  restriction)  ensure  that  the  state-space  of  the 
translated  specification  is  isomorphic  to  the  quotient  structure  associated  with  the 
original  specification.  Figure  3.6  shows  the  Kripke  structure  for  two-process  mu- 
tual  exclusion  using  generic  representatives.  Notice  that  the  structure  is  identical  to 
the  quotient  structure  of  Figure  3.1,  except  for  the  change  of  variables. 
Figure  3.7  shows  the  translated  version  of  the  five-process  mutual  exclusion 
specification  of  Figure  2.6.  The  associated  Kripke  structure,  shown  in  Figure  3.8, 
has  11  states,  whereas  the  original  specification  has  a  state-space  of  size  112. 
TI-te  generic  representatives  approach  is  extended  [581  to  include  systems 
with  global  shared  variables.  The  translation  of  a  specification  into  reduced  form 
is  polynomial  in  the  length  of  the  specification  and  the  approach  compares  well 
to  those  using  unique  or  multiple  representatives.  However,  benefits  of  this  ap- 
proach  can  be  negated  due  to  the  local  state  explosio?  z  problem,  where  the  number 
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5N  4N  IT  3N  2T  2N  3T  IN  4T  )-ý  5T 
4NlC  )--o.  (3NITlC)---m.  (2N2TlC)---P.  (IN3TlC)-ý  4NIC 
Figure  3.8:  Kripke  structure  associated  with  the  specification  of  Figure  3.7. 
Since  the  reduced  specification  requires  one  counter  per  local  state,  BDD  repre- 
sentations  which  require  bits  to  be  reserved  for  each  counter  become  infeasible. 
Techniques  have  been  proposed  to  limit  local  state  explosion  based  on  live  vari- 
able  analysis  (similar  to  the  data  flow  optimisations  provided  by  SPIN  [92])  and  local 
reacliability  analysis  [601.  The  generic  representatives  approach  is  also  limited  as  it 
only  applies  to  fully  symmetric  systems  which  are  simple  enough  to  be  amenable 
to  counter  abstraction  [591. 
The  generic  representatives  approach  has  been  applied  to  provide  symmetry 
reduction  for  probabilistic  symbolic  model  checking  [45]  (see  Section  3.9.3). 
3.5.3  Dynamic  computation  of  representatives 
Another  approach  to  combining  symmetry  reduction  techniques  with  symbolic 
representation  (for  CTL  model  checking)  involves  determining  orbit  representa- 
tives  dynamically  during  fixpoint  iterations  [59].  Instead  of  building  the  orbit  re- 
lation  for  a  model,  this  approach  works  by  computing  transition  images  with  re- 
spect  to  the  unreduced  structure,  then  mapping  the  new  states  to  their  respective 
representatives.  This  approach  is  not  restricted  to  fully  symmetric  systems,  and  can 
handle  data  symmetry  (see  Section  3.8)  as  well  as  process  symmetry.  A  potential 
bottleneck  here  is  the  operation  of  swapping  bits  in  the  BDD  representation  of  the 
model,  which  must  be  performed  repeatedly  during  representative  computation. 
The  complexity  of  such  swaps  depends  exponentially  on  the  distance,  in  the  BDD 
variable  ordering,  between  the  variables  to  be  swapped.  To  avoid  this  problem, 
permutations  are  expressed  as  a  product  of  transpositions  of  adjacent  elements.  Ex- 
perimental  results  show  that  this  approach  outperforms  the  use  of  multiple  and 
generic  representatives  (see  Sections  3.5.1  and  3.5.2  respectively)  when  applied  to  a 
queueing  lock  algorithm  and  a  buggy  version  of  a  cache  coherence  protocol. 
3.5.4  Under-approximation 
Model  checking  algorithms  that  use  depth-first  search  (DFS)  can  be  adapted  so 
that  the  first  element  of  an  orbit  encountered  during  the  search  is  chosen  as  the  or- 
bit  representative  [166].  However,  this  approach  is  not  suitable  for  symbolic  model 
checking  techniques  as  DFS  is  very  inefficient  in  the  context  of  BDD  state  represen- 
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On-the-fly  orbit  representative  selection  is  possible  during  symbolic  reacha- 
bility  analysis  by  combining  symmetry  reduction  with  a  technique  known  as  under- 
approxiniation  [7],  where  only  a  subset  of  reachable  states  is  considered  at  each  step 
of  symbolic  verification.  This  approach  to  symmetry  reduction  can  be  used  forfal- 
sificatioti  of  temporal  properties,  but  cannot  generally  provide  verification. 
3.6  Combining  Symmetry  Reduction  with  Other  Techniques 
Basic  symmetry  reduction  does  not  take  into  account  the  more  sophisticated  tech- 
niques  associated  with  model  checking.  In  this  section  we  discuss  the  combination 
of  symmetry  and  partial-order  reduction,  and  the  modification  of  symmetry  reduc- 
tion  techniques  to  successfully  handle  fairness. 
3.6.1  Symmetry  and  partial-order  reduction 
Partial  order  reduction  (see  Section  2.6.3)  and  symmetry  reduction  are  orthogonal 
reduction  techniques.  They  can  therefore  be  successfully  used  in  conjunction,  re- 
sulting  in  larger  savings  in  memory  and  verification  time. 
The  combination  of  the  two  techniques  was  first  suggested  in  the  context  of 
Petri  nets  [1751.  This  approach  applies  to  the  stubborn  sets  method  of  partial-order 
reduction  and  is  restricted  to  deadlock  detection. 
The  idea  of  combining  two  reductions  simultaneously  is  extended  to  veri- 
fication  of  next-time  free  LTL  properties  by  model  checking  [53].  Indeed,  an  algo- 
rithm  is  given  for  combining  partial-order  reduction  and  any  bisimulation  preserv- 
ing  equivalence.  When  the  equivalence  is  the  orbit  relation  the  algorithm  proceeds 
as  follows:  from  any  state  s  an  ample  set  of  transitions  is  calculated.  The  orbit  repre- 
sentatives  of  any  states  reachable  via  these  transitions  are  then  explored.  A  similar 
algorithm,  combining  the  persistent  sets  method  of  partial-order  reduction  with 
symmetry  reduction  is  used  within  the  stateless  search  technique  implemented  in 
VeriSoft  [69]  (see  Section  3.9.4). 
3.6.2  Exploiting  symmetry  under  fairness  assumptions 
Fairness  is  vital  for  proving  liveness,  properties,  as  it  reflects  the  basic  requirement 
that  processes  are  executing  at  an  indefinite  but  positive  speed  [56].  Two  important 
kinds  of  fairness  are  weak  fairness  and  strong  fairness.  Given  a  Kripke  structure  M, 
an  infinite  path  7r  of  M  is  stronglyfair  if  each  process  that  is  enabled  infinitely  often 
executes  infinitely  often.  A  path  7r  is  weaklyfair  if  any  process  that  is  continuously 
enabled  executes  infinitely  often. 
Fairness  is  generally  incompatible  with  basic  symmetry  reduction  meth- 
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structure  cannot  be  tracked  in  the  usual  way.  For  example,  consider  the  transi- 
tion  (C,  T)  --+  (N,  T)  in  the  two-process  mutual  exclusion  Kripke  structure  (Fig- 
ure  2.3)  which  results  from  process  1  leaving  the  critical  section.  The  transition  is 
represented  in  the  quotient  Kripke  structure  (Figure  3.1)  by  (C,  T)  --+  (T,  N).  The 
quotient  transition  indicates  that  one  of  the  processes  leaves  the  critical  section,  but 
there  is  no  information  as  to  which  process  this  is. 
This  fundamental  problem  is  overcome  when  the  automata  theoretic  ap- 
proach  using  annotated  quotient  structures  is  used,  in  the  context  of  fair  indexed 
CTL*  properties  [56,164].  An  annotated  quotient  structure  MG  is  used  together 
with  an  automaton  A  which  accepts  only  fair  computations.  An  efficient  algorithm, 
based  on  finding  maximal  strongly  connected  components  (MSCCs)  [172]  (see  Sec- 
tion  2.3.2)  is  presented  for  model-checking  fair  indexed  CTL*  formulas  under  the 
assumption  of  strong  and  (by  implication)  weak  fairness.  Correctness  results  (in- 
cluding  liveness  properties)  are  verified  for  a  resource  controller  example  using  a 
prototype  (fair)  model  checker.  Comparison  with  an  unreduced  model  indicates  an 
exponential  reduction  in  the  number  of  stored  states. 
This  approach  to  symmetry  reduced  model  checking  has  been  extended  to 
the  on-the-fly  case  [74]  in  which  MG  xA  is  checked  during  construction.  The  ap- 
proach  also  exploits  state  symmetries  [55].  A  state  symmetry  of  a  state  s  is  a  permuta- 
tion  aE  Aut(M)  on  process  indices  such  that  a  (s)  =  s.  If  processes  i  and  j  have  the 
same  local  state  in  global  state  s,  and  if  a  (i)  =  j,  then  only  the  transitions  made  from 
state  s  by  process  i  need  to  be  considered,  saving  space  and  computation  time.  The 
resulting  algorithm  is  exploited  in  SMC  [166],  which  we  discuss  in  Section  3.9.1. 
A  parallel  approach  to  model  checking  with  symmetry  reduction  and  weak 
fairness  [131  combines  the  weak  fairness  algorithm  implemented  in  SPIN  [921  (based 
on  the  Choeka  flag  algorithm  [24])  with  a  symmetry  reduction  algorithm  [12]  based 
on  the  nested  depth  first  search  (NDFS)  approach  to  model  checking  [931.  As  well 
as  exploiting  the  usual  advantages  over  the  MSCC  algorithms,  the  NDFS  approach 
is  compatible  with  approximate  verification  techniques,  such  as  the  hash-compact 
method  and  supertrace  verification  (see  section  2.6.2). 
3.7  Exploiting  Symmetry  in  Less  Symmetric  Systems 
Many  systems  which  occur  commonly  in  practice  are  comprised  of  several  simi- 
lar,  but  not  all  identical  processes.  An  example  is  the  readers-writers  problem  [571, 
where  m  reader  processes  and  n  writer  processes  access  a  shared  resource,  for  some 
m'?  z  >  0. 
A  writer  always  has  priority  over  a  reader  when  both  are  trying  to  access 
the  shared  resource.  If  M  is  a  model  of  this  system,  then  M  is  not  fully  symmet- 
ric.  In  fact  Aut(M)  is  SJU.., 
m)  *  S{nt+1, 
m+2_,  m+nj 
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-  readers  can  be  permuted,  writers  can  be  permuted,  but  readers  cannot  be  inter- 
changed  with  writerS.  3  However,  the  state  graph  is  symmetric  in  every  sense  except 
for  transitions  from  a  state  where  two  processes  are  attempting  to  access  the  shared 
resource. 
It  is  possible  to  exploit  tl-ds  kind  of  almost  symmetry  during  model  checking. 
Indeed,  by  defining  different  classes  of  symmetry,  such  as  near  or  rougli  symmetry 
[57],  or  virtual  symmetry  [52],  it  is  still  possible  to  infer  temporal  logic  properties 
of  the  system  by  model  checking  a  suitable  quotient  graph  using  the  entire  group 
S,,  +n  as  the  automorphism  group. 
3.7.1  Near  and  rough  symmetry 
Suppose  M  is  a  model  of  a  system,  and  I  the  set  of  process  identifiers  associated 
with  M.  Then  a  permutation  Ci  E  Sym(T)  is  said  to  be  a  near  automorphism  of  M 
if,  for  every  transition  s  --+  t  of  M,  either  a  (s)  --+  a  (t)  is  a  transition  of  A4  or  s  is 
totally  symmetric  with  respect  to  Aut(M).  (That  is,  s  is  invariant  under  Aut(M).  ) 
The  model  M  is  said  to  be  nearly  synimetric  if  it  has  a  suitable  group  of  near  auto- 
morphisms  G,,. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  Gr  is  a  subgroup  of  Sym(T),  then.  A4  is  roughly  sym- 
metric  with  respect  to  Gr  if  for  every  pair  of  states  s  and  s'  where  s  =-G,  s',  any 
transition  from  s  is  matched  by  a  transition  from  s'  provided  the  associated  local 
transition  (from  s')  would  involve  a  process  with  the  highest  priority.  If  A4  is  a 
nearly  (roughly)  symmetric  model  with  respect  to  group  Gn  (Gr)  then,  despite  the 
lack  of  complete  symmetry,  it  can  be  shown  that  symmetry  reduction  with  respect 
to  Gn  (G,  )  preserves  all  symmetric  CTL*  properties  [571. 
3.7.2  Virtual  symmetry 
Both  near  and  rough  symmetry  are  subsumed  by  the  notions  of  virtual  and  stroiig 
virtual  symmetry  [52].  As  well  as  systems  with  static  priorities  (which  can  already 
be  described  via  rough  symmetry)  virtual  symmetry  applies  to  systems  where  re- 
sources  are  asymmetrically  shared  according  to  dynamic  priorities. 
The  symmetrisation  RG  of  a  transition  relation  R  by  a  group  G  is  defined  by: 
RG  =  ja(s)  --+  cz(t)  :  tt  EG  and  s  --+  tE  R}. 
Intuitively,  symmetrising  a  transition  relation  can  be  thought  of  as  the  process  of 
adding  transitions  wl-dch  are  missing  due  to  asymmetry  in  the  system. 
A  structure  M  is  said  to  be  virtually  symmetric  with  respect  to  a  group  G, 
acting  on  S  if  for  any  s  --+  tE  RG.,  there  exists  Ci  E  G,  such  that  s  -+  LY(t)  E  R.  In 
addition,  if  for  any  s  --+  t  (=-  RG,,,  there  exists  a  in  Fix(s,  G,  )  (the  largest  subgroup 
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of  G,  which  fixes  s)  such  that  s-  a(t)  E  R,  then  M  is  said  to  be  strongly  virtually 
symnietric  with  respect  to  G,.  If  a  Kripke  structure  M  is  (strongly)  virtually  sym- 
metric  with  respect  to  a  group  G,,  model  checking  of  symmetric  properties  can  be 
performed  over  MQ,  152].  A  procedure  is  given  to  identify  the  case  where  a  Kripke 
structure  is  strongly  virtually  symmetric  with  respect  to  a  group  G,.  This  procedure 
involves  local  counting  of  transitions  which  are  present  in  RG,,  but  absent  in  R.  Vir- 
tual  symmetry  has  been  successfully  combined  with  the  generic  representatives 
approach  (see  Section  3.5-2)  for  the  case  where  processes  are  fully  interchangeable 
with  respect  to  virtual  symmetry  [182].  This  allows  symmetry-reduced  symbolic 
model  checking  of  partially  symmetric  systems,  using  the  NuSMV  model  checker 
[25]  (see  Section  2.5). 
3.7.3  Automata  theoretic  approaches 
A  method  involving  the  symmetry  reduction  of  models  with  little  or  no  symmetry 
uses  guarded  annotated  quotient  structures  (GQSs)  [164,165].  These  structures  ex- 
tend  the  annotated  quotient  structures  [55,56,74]  discussed  in  Section  3.2.  Suppose 
M  is  the  Kripke  structure  of  a  system,  and  M'  DM  is  obtained  from  M  by  adding 
transitions  (in  a  similar  manner  to  the  process  of  symmetrisation  described  above), 
so  that  M'  has  more  symmetry  than  M.  A  guarded  annotated  quotient  structure 
for  M  can  be  viewed  as  an  annotated  quotient  structure  for  M',  with  edges  la- 
belled  to  indicate  wl-dch  processes  can  make  the  transition  (in  M).  Thus  the  original 
edges  of  M  can  be  recovered  from  the  representation  of  M'.  A  temporal  property 
0  can  be  checked  over  the  guarded  annotated  quotient  structure  by  unwinding 
the  structure,  even  if  0  is  not  symmetric  with  respect  to  the  automorphisms  used 
for  reduction.  This  approach  potentially  allows  large  factors  of  reduction  to  be  ob- 
tained  since  a  larger  group  of  automorphisms  is  used  than  would  be  possible  using 
standard  quotient  structure  reduction.  Indeed,  experimental  results,  using  the  SMC 
model  checker  11661,  show  how  the  GQS  method  is  applied  effectively  to  a  system 
of  prioritised  processes. 
A  recent  extension  to  the  GQS  approach  [1671  involves  (symmetry  reduced) 
model  checking  of  exte?  ided  CTL  (CCTL)  properties  (which  involve  an  additional 
construct,  COUNT,  for  specifying  the  number  of  components  in  a  given  state).  TI-ds 
extended  logic  is  more  expressive  than  indexed  CTL  (see  Section  3.2). 
Properties  are  again  not  restricted  to  being  fully  symmetric  in  an  alternative 
automata  theoretic  approach  [21,  but  must  be  partially  symmetric.  For  example,  con- 
sider  the  following  property:  "if  some  process  is  waiting  for  a  resource  then  it  will 
get  it,  provided  none  of  the  processes  with  higher  identity  will  require  the  resource 
in  the  future".  To  check  the  satisfaction  of  a  formula  0  for  a  model  M,  with  set  of 
states  S,  a  set  of  equivalence  relations  are  first  computed  between  states  of  B,  the 
Bdchi  automaton  representing  0.  If  G  is  a  symmetry  group  of  M,  one  equivalence 
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respect  to  aEG  if  and  only  if  the  predecessors  and  successors  of  b,  are  mapped 
to  the  predecessors  of  b2  and  the  successors  Of  b2  respectively  (and  vice  versa).  The 
quotient  graph  is  then  constructed  by  applying  the  equivalence  relations  to  the 
pairs  of  states  (s,  b)  ESxB.  The  approach  is  extended  [75]  to  partially  symmetric 
models  by  representing  the  model  itself  as  the  synchronised  product  of  a  symmet- 
ric  model  and  an  asymmetric  Bilchi  automaton.  The  method  is  illustrated  using 
well-formed  Petri  nets. 
3.8  Exploiting  Data  Symmetry 
Most  of  the  symmetry  reduction  methods  described  in  this  paper  relate  to  struc- 
tural  symmetry.  However,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.3,  another  form  of  symmetry, 
namely  data  symmetry,  can  be  exploited  to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  model 
checking.  In  Section  3.3  we  discussed  the  application  of  scalarsets  to  exploit  data 
symmetries. 
As  software  specifications  often  involve  large  data  structures  with  vast  num- 
bers  of  potential  values,  it  may  be  impossible  to  check  that  properties  hold  for  every 
feasible  assignment  of  values  to  the  data  set.  That  is,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  check 
the  properties  for  every  interpretation  of  the  model.  It  is  therefore  desirable  to  only 
check  representative  models  for  each  equivalence  class  of  interpretations.  This  use 
of  data  equivalence  is  exploited  for  software  analysis  using  the  Nitpick  specifica- 
tion  tool  [1041. 
3.9  Implementations  of  Symmetry  Reduction 
In  this  section  we  list  the  major  tools  for  which  symmetry  reduction  has  been  im- 
plemented.  This  is  not  intended  as  an  exhaustive  exposition,  but  as  a  selective  il- 
lustration. 
3.9.1  Explicit  state  methods 
Muro 
TI-ic  Muro  specification  language  is  the  first  language  to  have  been  augmented  with 
the  scalarset  data  type  (see  Section  3.3).  As  a  result,  the  Muro  verification  system 
[40]  is  the  first  to  implement  symmetry  reduction  using  scalarsets  [1031  and  has 
inspired  many  of  the  other  implementations  discussed  in  this  section. 
An  automorphism  group  for  the  state-space  is  determined  statically  from 
the  Muro  specification  and  consists  of  all  permutations  of  scalarset  values.  The 
lexicographically  smallest  member  of  each  orbit  is  used  as  the  orbit  representative 3.9:  IMPLEMENTATIONS  OF  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  77 
and  a  suitable  canonicalisation  function  (see  Section  3.4.3)  is  used  to  map  every 
state  to  its  orbit  representative. 
Murp  has  been  used  to  verify  a  number  of  highly  symmetric  algorithms, 
for  example  PetersoWs  n-process  mutual  exclusion  algorithm  [140]  (see  Section  4.3) 
and  a  lock  implementation  for  the  Stanford  DASH  multiprocessor  [1171. 
A  prototype  extension  of  Muro  includes  two  alternative  classes  of  algorithm 
for  representative  computation  [107].  The  first  class  of  algorithms  transforms  each 
state  encountered  during  search  to  a  characteristic  graph,  and  derives  a  canonical 
state  representative  from  the  canonical  form  of  this  graph.  The  nauty  graph  isomor- 
phism  tool  [125]  is  used  to  perform  canonicalisation  operations.  The  other  class  of 
algorithms  uses  ordered  partitions  on  states,  and  during  canonicalisation  considers 
only  permutations  which  are  compatible  with  the  partitioning  of  a  given  state.  This 
approach  mimics  the  partitioning  approach  commonly  usedby  graph  isomorphism 
algorithms  [1251. 
smc 
The  Symmetry  based  Model  Checker  (SMC)  [164,166]  is  an  explicit  state  model 
checker  which  has  been  specifically  designed  for  the  verification  of  highly  symmet- 
ric  systems.  Exploiting  both  process  symmetry  and  state  symmetry,  in  addition  to 
proving  safety  properties,  SMC  is  the  only  model  checker  that  can  be  used  to  effec- 
tively  verify  liveness  properties  under  both  strong  and  weak  fairness  assumptions. 
Symmetry  is  detected  via  input  language  restriction  (see  Section  3.3.3).  Variables  in 
the  simple  SMC  language  are  either  global  variables  accessed  identically  by  pro- 
cesses  of  the  same  type,  or  arrays  indexed  by  process  identifiers  (index  variables) 
and  manipulated  via  universal  or  existential  quantification  (see  the  ALL  statement 
of  Figure  3.4). 
Model  checking  is  performed  using  a  technique  [74]  involving  annotated 
quotient  structures  (AQSs)  (see  Sections  3.2  and  3.6.2).  The  AQS  can  be  constructed 
either  in  advance  or  on-the-fly.  For  on-the-fly  construction,  it  is  also  possible  to  store 
the  edges  of  the  AQS  during  construction.  If  the  edges  are  not  stored  considerable 
space  savings  can  be  made.  However,  verification  time  is  increased  dramatically. 
The  AQS  is  constructed  incrementally,  and  the  first  state  of  an  orbit  encoun- 
tered  during  search  is  used  as  the  representative  for  that  orbit.  State  symmetries  of 
a  state  s  are  detected  by  partitioning  the  processes  within  each  module  type  into 
equivalence  classes.  A  leader  process  is  chosen  from  each  equivalence  class,  and 
only  transitions  from  s  made  by  one  of  the  leader  processes  are  explored. 
Reached  states  are  stored  in  a  hash  table,  and  a  hashing  function  is  used 
which  always  hashes  equivalent  states  to  the  same  location,  and  desirably  hashes  in- 
equivalent  states  to  different  locations.  For  a  state  s,  the  hashing  function  returns 
Checksum(s)  mod  b,  where  b  is  the  hash-table  size.  The  checksurn  for  a  state  is  com- 
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at  a  position  in  the  hash-table,  a  check  is  made  to  see  if  the  state  is  equivalent  to 
any  other  state  in  that  position  in  the  table.  Two  states  with  differing  checksums 
cannot  be  equivalent,  so  SMC  performs  the  pre-test  of  comparing  checksums  be- 
fore  checking  the  equivalence  of  two  states.  In  many  cases  this  quickly  shows  the 
inequivalence  of  states. 
To  check  whether  two  states  with  equal  checksums  are  equivalent,  a  poly- 
nomial  time  bounded,  randomised  algorithm  is  used  which  runs  in  quadratic  time. 
This  algorithm  sometimes  falsely  reports  that  two  equivalent  states  are  not  equiva- 
lent,  which  may  result  in  the  construction  of  a  larger-than-optimal  AQS  (but  is  not 
unsafe  -  see  Section  3.4.2). 
SMC  has  been  used  to  check  the  correctness  of  the  link  layer  part  of  the  IEEE 
standard  1394  Firezvire  protocol  [971,  and  also  a  resource  controller  example.  The 
resource  controller  example  shows  that  exploiting  state  symmetry  can  speed  up 
verification  considerably  when  the  number  of  processes  is  high.  Recent  extensions 
of  SMC  [165,167]  enable  partially  symmetric  systems  with  priorities  to  be  verified 
over  a  GQS,  and  properties  to  be  expressed  in  CCTL  (see  Section  3.7.3). 
SymmSpin 
Symmetric  SPIN  (SymmSpin)  [14]  is  a  symmetry  reduction  package  for  the  SPIN 
model  checker  [921.  To  allow  process  symmetry  of  a  system  to  be  specified,  the 
scalarset  data  type  [1031  is  used.  As  noted  in  Section  3.3.2,  to  avoid  modifying 
the  Promela  parser,  rather  than  directly  extending  the  Promela  language  with  the 
scalarset  data  type,  all  of  the  symmetry  information  is  provided  (by  the  user)  in  a 
separate  file.  This  is  referred  to  as  the  system  description  file,  and  identifies  which 
variables  have  scalarset  type. 
SymmSpin  uses  a  script  [84]  to  modify  the  verifier  generated  by  SPIN  for  a 
given  specification  (see  Section  2.4.2),  adding  symmetry  reduction  via  a  represen- 
tative  function  which,  for  a  given  state,  computes  an  orbit  representative  for  the 
state.  For  a  given  orbit  the  representative  is  the  least  element  with  respect  to  a 
specified  canonicalisation  function  or  one  of  the  minimal  elements  computed  via 
a  normalisation  function  (see  Section  3.4.3).  During  search  SymmSpin  stores  the 
original  states  on  the  stack  and  representative  states  on  the  heap  (see  Section  2.3.2). 
This  means  that  counter-example  traces  generated  by  SymmSpin  correspond  to 
real  counter-example  traces  through  the  model,  rather  than  the  representatives  of  a 
counter-example  trace. 
Experiments  using  SymmSpin  show  that  for  certain  models  the  factor  of  re- 
duction  gained  is  close  to  the  theoretical  limit  [14].  These  experiments  also  show 
that  the  combination  of  symmetry  and  partial-order  reduction  can  be  effective.  A 
prototype  extension  of  SymmSpin  for  symmetry  reduced  model  checking  under 
weak  fairness  [13]  has  also  been  developed,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.6.2. 
In  Chapter  11  we  present  a  symmetry  reduction  package  which  follows  the 3.9:  IMPLEMENTATIONS  OF  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  79 
SymmSpin  approach  of  adding  symmetry  reduction  algorithms  to  the  verifier  gen- 
erated  by  SPIN. 
Other  SPIN-based  implementations 
An  extension  to  SPIN  is  proposed  [391  to  allow  symmetry  reduction  of  models  of 
systems  of  replicated  processes.  The  specification  language  Promela  is  augmented 
with  two  additional  keywords,  ref  and  public  which  identify  reference  variables  and 
local  variables  with  public  scope  respectively.  These  variables  may  hold  the  ad- 
dresses  of  other  processes  for  communication  purposes  or  represent  process  ids. 
Orbit  representatives  are  computed  by  a  process  called  pseudo  sorting  in  which  the 
parts  of  the  state-vector  corresponding  to  the  individual  processes  are  sorted  lexi- 
cographically.  As  the  original  state-vector  ordering  depends  on  the  order  in  which 
variables  are  declared,  the  efficiency  of  the  sorting  algorithm  depends  on  the  initial 
declaration  ordering. 
3.9.2  Symbolic  methods 
SMV 
As  a  symbolic  model  checker,  SMV  [128]  does  not  lend  itself  to  symmetry  reduction 
of  the  state-space.  This  is  because  the  symbolic  representation  of  the  orbit  relation 
as  a  BDD  is  prohibitively  large  (see  Section  3.4).  However,  symmetry  reduction  on 
the  cases  associated  with  a  property  to  be  proved  for  a  system  is  achieved  via  the  use 
of  scalarsets  [127].  In  order  to  exploit  abstraction  techniques  available  with  SMV,  a 
method  called  temporal  case  splitting  is  used  to  break  a  given  property  down  into 
a  parameterised  set  of  assertions.  This  addresses  state  explosion,  but  may  result 
in  an  unwanted  side-effect,  namely  case  explosion.  Declaring  variables  as  scalarsets 
enables  SMV  to  sort  the  assertions  into  equivalence  classes.  Specifically,  if  we  have 
two  assertions  01  and  ý2  where  02  is  obtained  from  01  by  some  permutation  of 
scalarset  values,  then  01  holds  if  and  only  if  02  holds.  Thus  for  a  given  param- 
eterised  set  of  assertions,  it  is  only  necessary  to  check  a  representative  subset  of 
assertions.  This  representative  subset  is  chosen  in  such  a  way  that  every  assertion 
in  the  original  parameterised  set  can  be  mapped  to  a  representative  assertion  via 
permutation  of  scalarset  values. 
symm 
One  purpose-built  symbolic  model  checker  that  exploits  symmetry  reduction  meth- 
ods  for  the  verification  of  CTL  specifications  is  Symm  [27].  Symm  uses  a  simple  input 
language  based  on  a  shared  variable  model  of  computation  and  allows  the  user  to 
give  symmetries  of  the  system  to  be  verified. 
To  avoid  computing  the  orbit  relation,  symmetry  reduction  is  implemented 
using  the  multiple  orbit  represeWatives  approach  (see  Section  3.5.1).  Symm  has  been 3.9:  IMPLEMENTATIONS  OF  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  80 
used  to  verify  the  IEEE  Futurebus  arbiter  protocol  1961  which  controls  a  number 
of  prioritised  components  competing  for  a  resource.  Each  individual  process  is  de- 
scribed  via  a  module.  Modules  with  the  same  priority  can  be  permuted. 
Other  symbolic  implementations 
The  RuleBase  model  checker  [8]  has  been  experimentally  extended  with  symme- 
try  reduction  techniques  for  under-approxiniation  171  (see  Section  3.5.4).  Generators 
for  a  symmetry  group  of  the  verified  system  are  supplied  by  the  user.  The  gener- 
ators  which  are  genuine  symmetries  of  the  system,  and  under  which  the  checked 
property  is  invariant,  are  retained  by  the  model  checker  for  exploitation  during 
search.  Experimental  results  show  that  RuleBase  performs  significantly  better  for 
the  checking  of  liveness  properties  when  symmetry  reduction  is  applied.  However, 
no  improvement  in  performance  has  been  shown  for  safety  properties. 
An  experimental  model  checking  system,  UTOOL  [60],  has  been  developed 
for  the  investigation  of  techniques  to  combine  symmetry  reduction  with  symbolic 
representation.  This  toot  uses  the  input  language  of  Muro  and  performs  symbolic 
verification,  exploiting  symmetry  wherever  possible.  UTOOL  avoids  constructing 
the  orbit  relation  through  the  use  of  generic  representatives,  or  through  dynamic 
representative  computation  (see  Sections  3.5.2  and  3.5.3  respectively).  Though  less 
efficient,  for  the  purposes  of  comparison  UTOOL  also  implements  symmetry  re- 
duction  using  pre-computed  multiple  representatives  (see  Section  3.5.1). 
3.9.3  Real-time  and  probabilistic  methods 
UPPAAL 
The  real  time  model  checking  tool  UPPAAL  has  been  extended  to  exploit  symmetry 
[78],  using  scalarsets  [103].  As  the  main  purpose  Of  UPPAAL  is  to  perform  reachabil- 
ity  analysis,  symmetry  reduction  using  scalarsets  is  an  obvious  choice:  the  original 
scalarset  theory  was  developed  in  the  context  of  reachability  analysis  rather  than 
the  checking  of  temporal  logic  properties.  However,  the  soundness  of  symmetry  re- 
duction  does  not  follow  directly,  since  the  UPPAAL  language  is  very  different  from 
that  of  Muro.  Hence  soundness  is  proved  separately  for  UrrAAL. 
The  implementation  of  symmetry  reduction  in  UPPAAL  involves  the  devel- 
opment  of  an  efficient  algorithm  for  the  computation  of  a  canonical  representative 
for  a  state.  This  is  particularly  challenging  since  UPPAAL  represents  sets  of  clock 
valuations  symbolically  using  a  difference  bounded  matrix  (DBM). 
The  scalarsets  for  a  given  model  define  a  set  of  state  swaps  for  the  model. 
Each  state  swap  is  an  automorphism  of  the  model,  and  the  set  of  all  state  swaps 
can  be  used  to  compute  a  canonical  state  representative.  In  order  to  simplify  the 
computation  of  representatives,  two  assumptions  are  made.  The  first  is  that  an  ar- 
ray  indexed  by  scalarsets  does  not  contain  elements  of  scalarset  type.  The  second 3.9:  IMPLEMENTATIONS  OF  SYMMETRY  REDUCTION  81 
is  that  a  timed  automaton  in  a  UPPAAL  model  may  only  reset  its  clock  to  the  value 
zero.  TI-ds  assumption  ensures  that  individual  clocks  can  always  be  ordered  using 
the  order  in  which  they  were  reset;  this  is  called  the  diagonal  property  and  leads  to  a 
total  ordering  on  states.  Note  that  the  diagonal  property  is  important  as,  for  a  given 
total  ordering,  minimisation  using  state  swaps  of  a  general  DBM  is  at  least  as  hard 
as  testing  isomorphism  for  strongly  regular  graphs  [78].  A  state  is  minimised  using 
the  state  swaps  defined  by  scalarsets  in  the  model,  together  with  this  total  ordering. 
This  minimised  state  is  a  canonical  representative  for  the  original  state. 
Experimental  results  for  Fischer's  mutual  exclusion  protocol  show  that  ex- 
ponential  savings  can  be  gained  by  exploiting  symmetry.  Further  experiments  for 
an  audio/video  protocol  and  for  a  distributed  agreement  algorithm  are  also  en- 
couraging.  Since  symmetry  reduction  in  UPPAAL  makes  use  of  scalarsets,  only  total 
symmetries  can  be  exploited. 
RED 
Another  (symbolic)  real  time  model  checker  to  support  symmetry  reduction  is  RED 
[181].  The  symmetry  reduction  algorithm  uses  relations  between  pointers  to  define 
an  ordering  among  processes.  This  ordering  is  then  used  to  compute  a  represen- 
tative  by  sorting  the  associated  orbits.  Every  permutation  is  constructed  via  suc- 
cessive  composition  of  transpositions.  This  can  lead  to  an  over  approximation  of 
the  reachable  state-space  (the  "anomaly  of  image  false  reachability").  For  this  rea- 
son  using  RED  with  symmetry  reduction  is  only  useful  for  checking  that  a  state  is 
not  reachable.  The  performance  of  RED  (with  symmetry  reduction)  is  compared  to 
that  of  Muro  [40]  (with  symmetry  reduction)  and  SMC  [166]  for  three  benchmark 
systems  [1811.  Since  it  manages  to  successfully  combine  symbolic  techniques  with 
symmetry  reduction,  as  the  number  of  processes  increases,  RED  dramatically  out- 
performs  the  other  model  checkers. 
PRISM 
As  with  standard  symbolic  model  checking,  a  symmetry  reduction  technique  for 
probabilistic  symbolic  model  checking  must  avoid  construction  of  the  orbit  re- 
lation  (see  Section  35).  PRIsm-symm,  a  prototype  extension  to  the  PRISM  model 
checker,  uses  an  approach  based  on  dynamic  representative  computation  [591  (see 
Section  3.5.3)  to  build  symmetry-reduced  probabilistic  models  [115].  This  approach 
requires  initial  construction  of  the  unreduced  model  as  a  multi-terminal  BDD 
(MTBDD)  which  is  then  reduced  using  an  algorithm  based  on  bubble  sort. 
Although  this  approach  cannot  handle  models  with  intractably  large  MTBDD 
representations,  it  is  useful  in  the  case  where  it  is  possible  to  build  but  not  verify 
properties  of  an  unreduced  model.  This  situation  occurs  due  to  the  additional  space 
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checking  algorithms.  Experimental  results  for  four  case  studies  [115  ]  show  that  this 
symmetry  reduction  technique  can  speed  up  model  checking  and  facilitate  verifi- 
cation  of  larger  systems.  Surprisingly,  in  certain  cases  the  MTBDD  for  the  quotient 
model  is  larger  than  the  MTBDD  for  the  unreduced  model,  due  to  loss  of  regularity 
as  a  result  of  permuting  rows  of  the  probabilistic  transition  matrix. 
An  alternative  approach  to  exploiting  symmetry  in  probabilistic  model 
checking  uses  generic  representatives  (see  Section  3.5.2)  [451.  A  fully  symmetric 
PRISM  specification  is  automatically  translated  into  generic  form  using  the  GRIP 
(generic  representatives  in  PRISM)  tool.  The  resulting  specification  can  then  be  di- 
rectly  checked  using  PRISM.  This  method  avoids  constructing  an  MTBDD  for  the 
original  model,  so  can  be  applied  to  larger  examples  than  the  techniques  of  [1151. 
3.9.4  Direct  model  checking 
dSPIN 
An  on-the-fly  state-space  exploration  algorithm  exploiting  both  process  and  heap 
object  symmetry  in  Java  programs  has  been  implemented  in  the  dSPIN  model 
checking  tool  [99].  For  dynamic  systems  modelled  using  dSPIN,  the  number  of  state 
components  may  grow  along  an  execution  path.  Therefore,  rather  than  applying 
symmetry  reduction  with  respect  to  a  fixed  permutation  group,  a  family  of  groups 
is  considered.  A  suitable  group  is  selected  at  each  execution  step.  Orbit  representa- 
tives  are  calculated  using  a  similar  set  of  heuristics  to  those  used  by  SymmSpin. 
Bogor 
A  symmetry  reduction  technique  has  been  developed  for  the  Bogor  model  check- 
ing  framework  [148],  which  is  used  to  model  check  Java  programs.  The  symmetry 
reduction  methods  used  in  Bogor  [1491  are  based  on  those  implemented  in  dSPIN, 
but  use  more  efficient  heuristics  [1001  for  state-vector  sorting. 
States  contain  both  thread  and  heap  information  and  these  different  parts  of 
the  state  (the  thread  and  the  heap  state)  are  sorted  separately.  Threads  are  sorted  by 
comparing  associated  program  counters  which  does  not  always  produce  a  unique 
ordering,  but  heap  states  can  be  sorted  in  a  canonical  way.  For  every  heap  state  s, 
there  is  an  associated  set  of  memory  locations,  11,,  12,,,.  ..  '  1,,,,  say  It  is  possible  to 
sort  the  indices  of  the  memory  locations  (for  a  given  s)  by  ordering  the  traces  asso- 
ciated  with  each  pair  (s,  1j,,  ),  1  :5i<r.  The  trace  for  pair  (s,  1j,,  )  is  the  smallest  of 
all  of  the  incoming  chains  (pairs  of  thread  identifiers  and  variable  sequences)  which 
can  themselves  be  ordered  in  a  natural  way.  The  sorting  of  the  location  indices  pro- 
duces  a  strictly  ordered  list  of  integers.  If  G  is  a  symmetry  group  acting  on  the  heap 
elements,  then  the  ordered  list  associated  with  state  s  is  identical  to  the  correspond- 
ing  list  for  any  s'  in  the  same  orbit  of  G  as  s.  Thus  the  index  sorting  function  is  a 
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VeiiSoft 
The  VeriSoft  model  checker  [681  verifies  C  code  directly  via  a  stateless  search.  As 
such,  the  symmetry  reduction  methods  implemented  in  VeriSoft  [691  rely  on  equiv- 
alences  between  sequences  of  transitiotis  rather  than  between  states. 
In  order  for  equivalent  transitions  to  be  identified,  labels  are  added  to  tran- 
sitions,  so  the  model  is  a  labelled  transition  system.  Two  transitions  are  equivalent 
with  respect  to  a  given  symmetry  group  G  if  their  respective  labels  are  equivalent 
with  respect  to  G.  This  concept  can  be  easily  extended  to  sequences  of  transitions. 
Symmetry  reduction  is  used  to  prune  transitions  on-the-fly.  If,  for  some  state  s  and 
aEG,  transitions  a  and  a  (a)  are  enabled  at  s  and  a  fixes  s,  then  only  one  of  a  or 
a  (a)  need  be  explored.  This  is  similar  to  the  notion  of  state  symmetry  described  in 
Section  3.6.2.  Given  that  s  is  not  stored  explicitly,  it  is  not  straightforward  to  check 
that  a  fixes  s.  However,  assuming  that  a  fixes  the  initial  state  so,  if  w  is  the  sequence 
of  transitions  leading  from  so  to  s,  then  it  can  be  shown  that  a  (s)  =s  if  and  only  if  w 
and  a  (w)  are  equivalent  with  respect  to  a  partial-ordering  of  transitions.  Thus,  by 
combining  symmetry  reduction  with  partial  order  reduction  techniques  (see  Sec- 
tion  2.6.3)  the  problem  of  checking  that  a  (s)  =s  is  overcome. 
Other  direct  model  checking  implementations 
A  limited  form  of  symmetry  reduction  is  applied  [118]  within  the  second  gener- 
ation  Java  PathFinder  tool  UPF2)  [179]  (see  Section  2.5)  which  model  checks  Java 
bytecode  directly.  Like  dSPIN,  JPF2  is  capable  of  handling  dynamic  structures  (al- 
though,  unlike  dSPIN,  data  is  not  allocated  dynamically).  States  are  composed  of  a 
static  area,  a  dynamic  area  and  a  thread  area,  each  of  which  is  represented  as  an 
array.  Two  states  are  considered  to  be  equivalent  if  a  permutation  applied  to  the 
static  and  dynamic  area  arrays  of  the  first  state  gives  the  corresponding  arrays  of 
the  second.  A  canonicalisation  function  is  used  which  imposes  a  simple  ordering 
(calculated  during  model  checking)  on  the  static  and  dynamic  areas  of  the  states. 
Summary 
Symmetry  reduction  techniques  involve  avoiding  the  exploration  of  areas  of  the 
state-space  which  are  symmetrically  equivalent  to  those  already  visited.  We  have 
given  an  overview  of  symmetry  reduction  techniques  for  model  checking  and  how 
they  relate  to  other  reduction  approaches.  We  have  also  surveyed  implementations 
of  these  techniques,  both  for  existing  model  checkers  (e.  g.  SPIN  and  Muro)  and 
purpose-built  checkers  (e.  g.  SMQ.  This  survey  identifies  three  clear  areas  for  re- 
search,  which  we  address  in  the  remainder  of  the  thesis. 
The  identification  of  symmetries  involves  finding  symmetries  of  a  model 
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tical  components  can  be  achieved  by  annotating  a  specification  with  the  scalarset 
data  type,  or  by  appropriately  restricting  the  input  language.  On  the  other  hand, 
with  a  shared  variable  model  of  computation,  component  symmetries  may  be  de- 
rived  via  analysis  of  the  communication  structure  of  a  high  level  specification.  In 
Chapters  7  and  8  we  develop  fully  automatic  techniques  for  the  detection  of  ar- 
bitrary  component  symmetries  under  a  message  passing  model  of  computation, 
based  on  communication  structure  analysis. 
The  crux  of  exploiting  symmetry  in  explicit  state  model  checking  is  the  (con- 
structive)  orbit  problem:  it  must  be  solved  efficiently,  or  a  good  approximate  so- 
lution  must  be  available.  In  Chapters  9-  11  we  present  exact  and  approximate 
strategies  for  solving  the  COP  for  an  arbitrary  group  of  component  symmetries. Chapter  4 
Analysing  Symmetry  in  Simple  Concurrent  Systems 
In  this  chapter  we  introduce  a  software  tool,  SPIN-to-GRAPE,  which  we  have  de- 
veloped  to  allow  comprehensive  analysis  of  small  state-spaces  using  the  computa- 
tional  graph  theoretic  package  GRAPE  (see  Section  3.1.6).  We  apply  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to 
five  example  specifications,  in  each  case  highlighting  the  disadvantages  of  specify- 
ing  symmetry  using  scalarsets  (with  SymmSpin)  or  via  input  language  restriction 
(with  the  SMC  language).  For  the  first  three  examples  we  emphasise  the  manual 
effort  which  may  be  required  at  the  specification  level  to  specify  symmetry.  The 
subsequent  examples  exhibit  fairly  complex  symmetry  groups  which  are  beyond 
the  scope  of  these  techniques.  We  also  use  the  examples  to  illustrate  the  change  in 
symmetry  resulting  from  modifications  to  the  specifications. 
These  examples  motivate  the  development  of  autoniatic  symmetry  detection 
techniques  in  Chapters  7  and  8,  which  can  handle  arbitrary  types  of  structural  sym- 
metry  and  do  not  require  annotation  at  the  specification  level  by  the  user. 
4.1  SPIN-to-GRAPE 
The  SPIN-to-GRAPE  tool  uses  SPIN  to  construct  the  state-space  associated  with  a 
Promela  specification  and  produces  a  directed  graph  representation  which  can  be 
input  to  the  graph  theoretic  package  GRAPE.  GRAPE  can  then  be  used  to  compute 
the  automorphism.  group  of  the  state-space.  We  briefly  describe  the  algorithm  used 
by  SPIN-to-GRAPE. 
Among  the  options  which  SPIN  provides  for  running  verifications  on  Promela 
specifications  is  the  verbose  compile-time  directive.  TI-ds  option  writes  every  step  of 
a  verification  run  to  standard  output.  Running  a  verification  to  search  for  invalid 
end-states  on  a  deadlock-free  specification  with  the  verbose  option,  and  no  partial- 
order  reduction  (or  other  options  which  change  the  structure  of  the  state-space), 
results  in  a  textual  description  of  the  Kripke  structure  associated  with  the  specifica- 
tion.  In  order  to  manipulate  the  Kripke  structure  as  a  directed  graph  using  GRAPE 
we  have  designed  a  tool,  SPIN-to-GRAPE,  which  takes  relevant  verbose  output  and 4.1:  SPIN-to-GRAPE  86 
7:  Down  -  program  non-accepting  [pids 
New  state  3 
Pr:  5  Tr:  5 
Pr:  5  Tr:  6 
Pr:  5  Tr:  7 
7:  BV  save 
7:  proc  5  exec  7,10  to  10,  D  STEP 
8:  Down  -  program  non-accepting  [pids 
Stack  state  1 
8:  Up  -  program 
sy-restor 
5-01 
non-accepting  Ctauýol 
5-01 
8:  proc  5  reverses  7,10  to  10,  D-STEP  Cabit=O,  adepth=O,  tau=0,0] 
Pr:  4  Tr  *5 
7:  ev  save 
7:  proc  4  exec  5,10  to  10,  D-  STEP 
8:  Down  -  program  non-accepting  [pids 
New  state  4 
Pr:  5  Tr:  5 
Pr:  5  Tr:  6 
Pr:  5  Tr:  7 
8:  ev  save 
8:  proc  5  exec  7,10  to  10,  D-  STEP 
9:  Down  -  program  non-accepting  Epids 
New  state  5 
non-accepting  (tau=Ol 
5-01 
non-accepting  Etau=Ol 
5-01 
Figure  4.1:  Example  of  verbose  output  produced  by  SPIN. 
produces  a  description  of  a  graph  for  GRAPE.  Figure  4.1  shows  a  fragment  of  verbose 
output  corresponding  to  the  mutual  exclusion  specification  of  Figure  2.6. 
The  SPIN-to-GRAPE  tool  is  a  PERL  [180]  program  based  on  Algorithm  2, 
which  traces  the  steps  taken  by  SPIN  when  performing  the  state-space  search.  The 
algorithm  uses  a  separate  stack  for  each  process  in  the  model.  Every  time  a  line 
in  the  input  file  (created  from  the  verbose  output)  indicates  that  a  process  has  ex- 
ecuted  a  statement  (for  example  the  line  7:  proc  5  exec  7  ... 
in  Figure  4.1), 
the  current  state  number  is  pushed  on  to  the  stack  for  that  process.  When  a  line  of 
input  indicates  that  a  process  has  reversed  (when  search  backtracks,  e.  g.  the  line 
8:  proc  5  reverses  7  ... 
in  Figure  4.1),  a  value  is  popped  from  the  stack  of 
that  process,  and  the  current  state  number  is  set  to  this  value.  Every  time  a  line  of 
input  is  found  which  specifies  that  a  new  or  old  state  has  been  reached  (indicated 
by  New  state  x  or  Stack  state  x  respectively,  where  x  is  a  state  number),  a 
line  of  GRAPE  code  is  generated  specifying  that  a  transition  should  be  added  to  the 
graph.  The  file  produced  as  output  from  SPIN-to-GRAPE  can  be  loaded  into  GAP,  and 
the  AutGroupGraph  ()  function  of  GRAPE  used  to  find  the  automorphism  group 
of  the  state-graph.  Note  that  the  graph  representation  produced  by  SPIN-to-GRAPE 
does  iiot  include  information  about  the  values  of  variables  at  each  state:  each  node 
of  the  graph  is  represented  by  an  integer. 
Though  SPIN-to-GRAPE  is  useful  for  working  with  Promela  specifications 
that  exhibit  small  state-spaces,  the  complexity  of  the  nauty  algorithm  means  that 
it  is  not  generally  feasible  to  analyse  models  with  more  than  around  15,000  states 
(though  the  performance  of  nauty  in  practice  depends  intimately  on  the  structure 
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Algorithm  2  Algorithm  used  by  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to  construct  the  state-space  of  a 
model  from  a  SPIN  output  file 
open  input  and  output  files 
current:  =  1 
for  each  line  in  input  file  do 
if  line  signifies  new  state  s  then 
output  edge  current  --+  s 
current  :=s 
else  if  line  signifies  old  state  s  then 
output  edge  current  --+  s 
else  if  line  indicates  process  p  executes  then 
push  current  on  stack  for  p 
else  if  line  indicates  process  p  reverses  then 
current  :=  pop  from  stack  for  p 
end  if 
end  for 
close  input  and  output  files 
To  accompany  SPIN-to-GRAPE  we  have  written  a  GAP  function  for  com- 
puting  quotient  state-spaces  -  QuotientKripke  (IF,  G).  This  function  takes  a  di- 
rected  graph  F  representing  a  Kripke  structure  M,  together  with  a  subgroup  G  of 
Aut(M),  and  returns  a  directed  graph  representing  the  quotient  Kripke  structure 
MG.  As  discussed  in  Section  3.2,  the  theoretical  minimum  size  of  ISGI  (the  number 
of  states  in  the  quotient  structure)  is  IS111GI  (where  ISI  is  the  number  of  states  in  the 
original  structure).  The  QuotientKripke  ()  function  allows  us  to  determine,  for 
small  models,  the  factor  of  reduction  available  by  exploiting  symmetry  in  practice. 
4.2  Simple  Mutual  Exclusion  Example 
Recall  the  simple  mutual  exclusion  example,  used  for  illustration  in  Chapters  2 
and  3.  The  Promela.  specification  for  mutual  exclusion  with  five  processes  is  shown 
in  Figure  2.6.  A  modified  specification,  annotated  with  scalarsets  for  use  with 
SymmSpin,  is  given  in  Figure  3.3  and  discussed  in  Section  3.3.2.  A  version  of  the 
specification  in  the  SMC  language  is  given  in  Figure  3.4  and  discussed  in  Sec- 
tion  3.3.3. 
4.2.1  Comparing  the  original  specification  with  the  SymmSpin  version 
In  the  initial  specification  (Figure  2.6),  a  process  in  its  trying  state  is  either  blocked 
(if  some  process  is  in  the  critical  state),  or  can  move  to  the  critical  state.  In  the  mod- 
ified  specification  (Figure  3.3),  a  trying  process  can  always  make  a  transition  to 
check  if  the  critical  section  is  free,  moving  to  the  critical  state  if  it  is,  remaining 
in  the  trying  state  otherwise.  Figure  4.2  shows  the  model  for  the  modified  mutual 4.2:  SIMPLE  MUTUAL  EXCLUSION  EXAMPLE  88 
Figure  4.2:  Mutual  exclusion  Kripke  structure  associated  with  the  SymmSpin  specifi- 
cation. 
exclusion  protocol  when  restricted  to  two  processes.  '  The  semantic  difference  is 
illustrated  by  the  self-loop  transitions  in  Figure  4.2  which  are  not  present  in  Fig- 
ure  2.3,  the  Kripke  structure  for  the  original  specification.  The  re-modelling  of  the 
protocol  has  resulted  in  a  more  abstract  underlying  model  which  sittiu  lates  the  orig- 
inal  (it  adds  behaviour).  To  verify  that  the  symmetry  reduction  process  preserves 
this  behaviour,  observe  the  self-loop  transition  in  Figure  4.3,  the  quotient  Kripke 
structure  for  the  modified  protocol  under  symmetry.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  this 
semantic  difference  could  be  avoided  when  using  scalarsets  to  specify  symmetry. 
The  SymmSpin  specification  is  also  more  complex  than  the  original.  There 
are  several  additional  variables:  for  each  user  process  there  is  a  flag  to  test  whether 
the  critical  section  is  empty,  a  loop  counter  and  an  id  parameter.  The  init  process 
also  uses  a  loop  counter.  This  added  complexity  makes  the  specification  more  diffi- 
cult  to  understand  and  increases  the  size  of  the  state-vector  for  the  associated  model 
from  36  to  56  bytes.  Through  careful  use  of  hidden  variables  (see  Section  2.4.1)  it  is 
possible  to  reduce  the  state-vector  to  the  original  size,  but  this  requires  significant 
additional  manual  effort  and  expert  knowledge  of  Promela.  Furthermore,  hidden 
variables  can  easily  be  misused,  as  SPIN  does  not  check  for  cases  where  a  hidden 
variable  actually  contains  relevant  state  information  192]. 
1.  The  local  variables  i,  j  and  critical_entpty  are  not  included  in  the  figure  as  i  is  a  constant  process 
identifier,  and  j  and  critical-empty  are  or-dy  manipulated  widdn  a  d-st  ep  block,  being  reset  to  default 
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Figure  4.3:  Quotient  structure  associated  with  the  SymmSpin  specification. 
4.2.2  SMC  specification 
The  SMC  language  is  well  suited  to  specifying  this  example  (see  Figure  3.4).  The 
condition  wbdch  guards  the  transition  of  a  process  to  the  critical  state  is  expressed 
using  the  ALL  quantifier,  which  asserts  that  a  boolean  expression  must  hold  for 
every  process  of  a  given  module  type. 
4.3  Peterson's  Mutual  Exclusion  Protocol 
Although  useful  for  illustration,  the  mutual  exclusion  example  discussed  above  is 
very  abstract,  and  does  not  specify  how  exclusive  access  to  the  critical  section  by 
contending  processes  is  guaranteed.  We  now  discuss  a  more  realistic  protocol. 
In  Peterson's  ii-process  mutual  exclusion  protocol  [1401,  entry  to  the  critical 
section  is  gained  by  a  single  process  via  a  series  of  n-1  competitions.  For  each 
competition  there  is  at  least  one  loser,  thus  the  mutual  exclusion  condition  is  satis- 
fied  since  at  most  one  process  can  win  the  final  competition. 
TI-ds  protocol  is  used  as  an  example  for  symmetry-reduced  verification  with 
the  SymmSpin  tool  [141.  We  discuss  the  Symm.  Spin  specification,  then  present  an 
alternative,  semantically  equivalent  Promela  specification  which  uses  a  smaller 
state-vector  and  is  easier  to  understand.  Though  still  symmetric,  scalarsets  cannot 
be  used  to  directly  specify  symmetry  in  this  enhanced  specification.  However,  an 
equivalent  SMC  specification  can  be  written. 
We  then  present  a  more  realistic  specification  of  the  protocol,  and  Use  SPIN- 
to-GRAPE  to  verify  that  the  underlying  model  of  this  specification  is  symmetric.  We 4.3:  PETERSON'S  MUTUAL  EXCLUSION  PROTOCOL  90 
show  that  neither  scalarsets  nor  the  SMC  language  can  specity  the  inherent  (full) 
symmetry  for  this  example. 
4.3.1  SymmSpin  specification 
We  have  obtained  the  Promela  specification  and  accompanying  system  description 
file  which  were  used  for  experiments  with  SymmSpin  (personal  communication,  D. 
Bosnacki,  2003).  Adapted  versions  of  these  files  are  given  in  Appendix  A.  1.12  The 
SymmSpin  specification  is  based  on  a  presentation  of  the  algorithm  in  [123]. 
The  system  description  file  defines  aP  ID  scalarset  type  of  size  3.  SymmSpin 
regards  global  declarations  as  being  part  of  a  virtual  proctype  called  :  system:. 
For  this  example  the  :  sys  t  em:  proctype  includes  two  declarations  which  involve 
scalarsets.  Theflag  array  is  indexed  by  variables  of  type  PID,  and  its  elements  are 
bytes.  This  array  is  used  to  track  the  status  of  each  process  in  the  competition.  Spec- 
ifying  that  the  index  type  of  this  array  is  PID  indicates  that  the  position  of  its  el- 
ements  (but  not  their  values)  should  be  affected  by  any  permutation  of  the  PID 
range.  Additionally  there  is  a  global  array  tum  which  is  indexed  by  the  byte  type, 
and  contains  PID  values.  Thus  a  PID  permutation  should  affect  the  values  of  el- 
ements  of  this,  array,  but  not  alter  their  positions.  The  system  description  file  also 
states  that  the  user  proctype  has  two  local  PID  variables. 
Using  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to  compute  the  symmetry  group  G  of  the  state-space 
associated  with  this  specification  confirms  that  this  use  of  scalarsets  identifies  all 
symmetries  of  the  model.  The  symmetry  group  here  is  isomorpl-dC  to  S31  the  sym- 
metric  group  on  three  points  (see  Definition  11).  Furthermore,  GRAPE  can  be  used 
to  show  that  the  quotient  state-space  constructed  by  SymmSpin  is  identical  to  that 
computed  using  the  QuotientKripke  ()  function. 
4.3.2  A  simpler,  equivalent  specification 
If  we  do  not  use  scalarsets  to  annotate  the  Peterson  specification,  and  therefore  are 
not  concerned  with  the  restrictions  of  Definition  22  (see  Section  3.3.2),  we  can  write 
a  simpler  Promela  specification  of  the  protocol,  as  shown  in  Appendix  A.  1.2. 
In  this  specification  the  user  proctype  uses  the  built-in 
_pid 
variable  (see 
Section  2.4.1)  rather  than  being  parameterised  with  an  identifier.  Although  this 
means  the  flag  array  must  be  declared  with  size  4  rather  than  3  (since  values  of  the 
_pid 
variable  start  at  1)  and  so  one  value  of  this  array  is  wasted,  use  of  the  built-in 
identifier  instead  of  a  parameter  reduces  the  state-vector  size  by  one  byte  for  each 
process.  Entry  to  the  critical  section  is  now  guarded  by  a  single  boolean  expression 
rather  than  a  loop.  This  is  easier  to  read,  and  avoids  the  inclusion  of  loop  counter 
variables  in  the  state-vector.  The  init  process  is  also  simplified.  Consequently,  the 
2.  We  have  applied  some  source  code  optimisation  techniques  (see  Section  2.6.1)  in  order  to  compare 
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simpler  specification  uses  a  32  byte  state-vector,  whereas  the  original  state-vector 
requires  44  bytes.  We  were  not  able  to  obtain  a  reduction  in  the  state-vector  for  the 
original  specification  using  hidden  variables. 
To  check  that  the  original  and  simplified  specifications  have  the  same  un- 
derlying  model  we  used  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to  generate  both  state  spaces  as  directed 
graphs,  and  GRAPE  to  confirm  that  these  graphs  are  isomorphic.  For  this  compar- 
ison  we  disabled  the  data-flow  and  statement  merging  optimisations  provided  by 
SPIN  (see  Section  2.4.3),  in  which  case  both  models  have  11,318  states. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  applying  data-flow  optimisation  and  statement 
merging  to  the  original  specification  results  in  a  reduction  to  6,143  states,  whereas 
applying  them  to  the  simplified  specification  results  in  a  model  of  just  2,636  states. 
Thus  the  simplification  simultaneously  reduces  the  state-vector  size,  and  increases 
the  factor  of  reduction  obtained  using  the  SPIN  optimisations  before  symmetry  re- 
duction  is  even  applied.  Using  SPIN-to-GRAPE  we  find  that  the  quotient  structure 
associated  with  the  simplified  specification  (with  optimisations)  has  494  states. 
4.3.3  SMC  specification 
An  SMC  specification  of  the  protocol  is  given  as  Appendix  A.  M.  The  specification 
is  designed  to  be  semantically  equivalent  to  the  Promela  examples,  and  SMC  ver- 
ifies  that  the  associated  model  also  has  11,318  states.  As  in  our  enhanced  Promela 
specification,  the  need  for  a  loop  to  compute  the  predicate  that  guards  entry  to  the 
critical  section  is  avoided  via  the  SMC  ALL  quantifier. 
Although  the  SMC  specification  is  difficult  to  read,  this  is  due  to  the  guarded 
command  syntax  of  the  language,  rather  than  the  method  by  which  symmetry  is 
handled. 
4.3.4  A  more  realistic  specification 
The  authors  of  [141  note  that  their  specification  uses  atomicity  in  a  somewhat  unre- 
alistic  manner: 
In  our  implementation  the  global  predicate  that  guards  the  entry  in 
the  critical  section  is  checked  atomically  As  this  guard  ranges  over 
allprocess:  indices,  the  atomicity  wasnecessary  due  to  the  restrictions 
on  statements  that  can  be  used  such  that  the  state-space  symmetryis 
preserved. 
Indeed,  if  the  loop  in  the  SymmSpin  specification  was  not  executed  within 
an  atomic  statement,  the  boolean  variable  ok  would  be  updated  sequentially  with 
respect  to  the  process  flags  in  a  fixed  order.  This  order  would  destroy  symmetry 
between  the  processes. 
In  Appendix  A.  1.4  we  give  a  Promela  specification  of  the  protocol  where  the 
predicate  ok  is  computed  non-atomically,  and  the  process  flags  are  considered  in  an 4.4:  A  PRIORITISED  RESOURCE-ALLOCATOR  92 
arbitrary  order.  This  is  achieved  by  each  process  using  a  local  array,  checked,  indexed 
by  process  identifiers,  to  track  whetherflag[j]  has  been  considered  for  each  1<j  !ý 
n.  Making  the  order  of  this  computation  arbitrary  means  that  the  model  checker 
will  consider  every  possible  ordering.  This  makes  no  assumptions  about  the  order 
which  an  implementation  of  the  protocol  would  use,  making  the  specification  very 
general.  Additionally,  not  imposing  an  execution  ordering  preserves  symmetry  in 
the  underlying  model.  The  state-space  associated  with  a  two-process  version  of  this 
specification  is  small  enough  that  we  can  use  SPIN-tO-GRAPE  to  identify  a  symmetry 
group  of  order  2. 
As  noted  in  [14],  the  scalarset  restrictions  do  not  allow  us  to  specify  sym- 
metry  in  this  more  realistic  specification.  Also,  we  cannot  write  an  equivalent  SMC 
specification  since  the  language  does  not  allow  an  update  to  refer  to  a  specific  pro- 
cess  of  a  given  module  type.  This  example  shows  that  even  if  there  isj'ull  symmetry 
between  identical  processes,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  specify  this  symmetry  using 
scalarsets  or  a  restricted  input  language. 
4.4  A  Prioritised  Resource-Allocator 
We  now  model  a  system  which  consists  of  n  client  processes,  each  of  which  requires 
access  to  a  resource,  and  a  resource  allocator  process  which  takes  requests  from  the 
clients  wishing  to  use  the  resource,  granting  access  to  one  client  at  a  time.  Each 
client  has  a  fixed  priority  level,  and  when  faced  with  multiple  requests  the  resource 
allocator  grants  access  to  the  requesting  client  with  the  highest  priority.  When  sev- 
eral  requests  are  made  with  the  same  priority  the  resource  allocator  chooses  non- 
deterministically  which  to  satisfy.  The  system  has  a  star  topology,  where  the  resource 
allocator  process  is  the  central  node  and  all  of  the  client  processes  communicate  with 
thds  process  only.  The  model  is  similar  to  an  example  used  for  symmetry  reduction 
in  partially  symmetric  systems  using  GQSs  [165]  (see  Section  3.7). 
Communication  between  a  client  and  the  resource  allocator  is  controlled  by 
a  basic  protocol.  A  client  sends  a  request  message  to  the  allocator.  When  the  allo- 
cator  decides  to  allow  this  client  access  to  the  resource  it  sends  back  a  confinnation 
message.  Once  the  client  finishes  using  the  resource  it  sends  a  finished  message  to 
the  allocator.  There  is  one  (asynchronous)  communication  channel  between  the  re- 
source  allocator  and  each  client.  In  order  to  allow  a  comprehensive  investigation  of 
the  state-space  of  the  associated  specification  using  SPIN-to-GRAPE,  it  is  important 
that  the  number  of  states  is  kept  to  a  minimum.  To  reduce  the  number  of  states  re- 
sulting  from  the  interleaving  of  events  internal  to  each  process,  atomic  statements 
are  used  so  that  each  execution  step  takenby  each  process  includes  a  send  or  receive 
event  (this  state-space  reduction  is  also  suggested  in  [69]).  An  additional  channel, 
nullchan,  is  used  as  a  default  value  for  local  channel  variables.  This  channel  is  de- 
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A  Promela  specification  of  the  system  with  seven  clients  and  three  levels 
of  priority  is  given  in  Appendix  A.  M.  There  are  two,  three  and  two  clients  with 
priority  levels  0,1  and  2  respectively. 
4.4.1  Analysis  of  symmetry  in  the  resource  allocator  specification 
The  model  M  associated  with  the  Promela  specification  ?  with  seven  clients,  as 
described  above,  has  1,921  states.  Using  our  combination  Of  SPIN,  SPIN-to-GRAPE, 
GAP  and  GRAPE  we  find  that  lAut(.  A4)1  =  24.  It  is  clear  that  these  automorpl-dsms 
arise  from  the  interchangeability  of  clients  with  the  same  priority  level,  and  we  can 
use  GAP  to  show  that  Aut(M)  is  isomorphic  to  a  direct  product  (see  Definition  14) 
of  symmetric  groups: 
Proposition  I  Let  M  be  the  model  associated  with  the  resource  allocator  specifi- 
cation  described  above.  Then  Aut(M)  - 
ýj  S2  X  S3  X  S2- 
We  used  GAP  to  construct  a  group  G  ý_-  S2  X  S3  X  S2  (GAP  provides  functionality  to 
compute  the  direct  product  of  permutation  groups).  The  I  somorphismGroups  () 
function  was  used  to  show  that  Aut(M)  ý_`-  G.  Each  symmetric  group  consists  of 
automorphisms  which  permute  the  identifiers  of  one  set  of  similarly  prioritised 
processes.  The  Quot  ientKripke  ()  function  shows  that  IMAW(M)  I=  337. 
In  general,  for  a  resource  allocator  specification  with  n  processes  and  k  pri- 
ority  levels  (k,  n>  0),  if  mi  denotes  the  number  of  clients  which  have  priority  level 
Ei  -  i  (0  <i<k, 
k  61  m-  =  n)  then  it  is  clear  that  Aut(M)  will  be  isomorphic  to  the  =0  I 
group  FIO:  5i<k  Sm,  where  11  denotes  the  direct  product. 
mj>l 
4.4.2  Re-modelling  for  SymmSpin  and  SMC 
Symmetry  in  this  example  can  be  handled  using  scalarsets  or  input  language  re- 
striction  by  separating  the  client  processes  into  three  distinct  process  types,  cliento, 
clietal  and  clieW2,  according  to  their  priority  level.  To  specify  the  example  using 
scalarsets  for  use  with  SymmSpin,  three  separate  scalarset  types  can  be  declared. 
The  client  proctype  declarations  will  be  essentially  the  same,  and  the  resource  allo- 
cator  process  will  also  involve  duplicated  code. 
We  have  specified  the  example  using  SMC  in  Appendix  A.  2.2.  Due  to  the 
major  differences  between  the  Promela  and  SMC  languages,  the  SMC  specification 
does  not  generate  exactly  the  same  state-space  as  the  Promela  specification  (the 
SMC  state-space  is  larger).  However,  both  specifications  model  the  same  essential 
behaviour.  Note  that  the  three  client  modules  in  the  SMC  specification  are  almost 
identical,  and  that  statements  of  the  resource  allocator  module  are  separated  into 
three  similar  blocks,  one  for  each  client  module  type. 4.4:  A  PRIORITISED  RESOURCE-ALLOCATOR  94 
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Figure  4.4:  Inter-process  sharing  in  the  resource  allocator  specification. 
4.4.3  Sharing  between  client  processes 
No  communication  between  client  processes  takes  place  in  our  model  of  the  re- 
source  allocator.  Consider  an  alternative  specification  where  client  processes  can 
share  the  resource.  If  client  i  is  configured  to  share  with  client  j  then  on  receiving  a 
cwlýflrniatioii  message  (i.  e.  gaining  access  to  the  resource),  client  i  uses  the  resource 
then  checks  to  see  if  client  j  has  sent  a  request  to  the  resource  allocator.  If  this  is  the 
case,  client  i  intercepts  the  request  and  gives  client  j  access  to  the  resource.  When 
client  j  finishes  using  the  resource  it  sends  afiiiished  message  as  usual.  Client  i  inter- 
cepts  thisfiiiished  message,  and  sends  its  ownfiiiished  message  back  to  the  resource 
allocator.  Appendix  A.  2.3  shows  a  Promela  specification  of  the  resource  allocator 
system  where  client  3  shares  with  client  4,  client  4  with  client  5,  and  client  5  with 
client  3. 
Let  M'  denote  the  model  associated  with  this  specification.  Our  automated 
setup  shows  that  lAut(M')  I=  12,  thus  the  degree  of  symmetry  in  the  Kripke  struc- 
ture  is  reduced  by  enabling  sharing  between  certain  processes.  This  is  because  there 
is  now  a  cyclic  relationship  between  clients  3,4  and  5  due  to  the  configuration  of  the 
additional  sharing  functionality.  This  cyclic  relationship  is illustrated  by  Figure  4.4. 
We  can  use  GAP  to  show  that  Aut(M') 
-  where  C3  is  the  cyclic  group  ý'  S2  X  C3  X  S21 
of  order  3  (see  Definition  12). 
It  is  not  possible  to  specify  this  product  of  symmetric  and  cyclic  groups  using 
SymmSpin  or  SMC  as  cyclic  symmetries  cannot  be  handled  by  either  teclu-dque. 
The  resource  allocator  example  illustrates  that  while  priority  information 
can  be  conveniently  embedded  within  a  specification,  in  order  to  specify  symme- 
try  between  components  of  the  same  priority  level  using  SymmSpin  or  SMC  it  is 
necessary  to  explicitly  partition  distinctly  prioritised  process  into  separate  process 
types.  This  results  in  duplicated  code,  and  makes  the  task  of  adding  or  removing 
priority  levels  laborious.  Additionally,  altering  the  communication  structure  to  al- 
low  h-iter-process  sharing  changes  the  nature  of  symmetry  in  the  associated  model. 
The  resulting  symmetry  group  cannot  be  specified  using  either  technique. 4.5:  A  THREE-TIERED  ARCHITECTURE  95 
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Figure  4.5:  Flow  of  control  in  a  three-tiered  architecture. 
4.5  A  Three-Tiered  Architecture 
A  common  software  engineering  design  pattern  for  distributed  systems  is  the  three- 
tiered  arcliftecture.  Components  in  such  an  architecture  are  separated  into  three  lay- 
ers,  a  layer  of  clients,  a  layer  of  servers  and  a  layer  of  data  storage  systems.  The  typ- 
ical  flow  of  messages  for  such  a  system  is  shown  in  Figure  4.5  (adapted  from  [171]). 
TI-ds  pattern  is  common  in  the  e-business  domain,  where  customers  buy  products 
or  make  bookings  over  the  Internet.  A  set  of  servers  at  various  geographical  loca- 
tions  deal  with  customer  (client)  requests  and  communicate  with  a  central  (possibly 
replicated)  database. 
Our  next  specification  is  of  a  simple  three-tiered  system  consisting  of  three 
process  types:  client,  server  and  database.  Each  client  process  is  parameterised  by  an 
input  channel  name,  and  a  channel  name  associated  with  a  server  process.  The  server 
processes  are  parameterised  by  two  channel  names.  The  first  of  these  channels  is 
used  to  receive  requests  from  client  processes,  and  the  second  to  send  queries  to 
the  database.  A  client  process  loops  continuously,  sending  a  request  message  and  a 
reference  to  its  incoming  channel  to  the  server  to  which  it  is  connected,  and  wait- 
ing  until  a  result  message  is  received  on  its  incoming  channel.  Similarly  each  server 
process  continuously  repeats  the  actions  of  receiving  a  request  and  channel  refer- 
ence  from  a  client,  sending  a  query  to  the  database  and  receiving  data,  then  sending 
a  result  back  to  the  client  on  the  given  channel.  The  database  process  continuously 
receives  queries  from  the  servers  and  returns  data.  All  the  channels  in  the  specifi- 
cation  are  synchronous,  to  minimise  the  state-space  sufficiently  to  allow  us  to  use 
SPIN-to-GRAPE  for  analysis. 
The  configuration  we  consider  consists  of  a  database,  three  servers,  and 
eight  clients.  There  are  three  blocks  of  clients,  two  of  size  three,  one  of  size  two. 
Each  block  is  associated  with  a  distinct  server.  The  Promela  specification  is  given 
as  Appendix  A.  3  and  the  topology  illustrated  by  Figure  4.6. 
4.5.1  Analysis  of  symmetry  in  the  three-tiered  specification 
Let  P  denote  the  three-tiered  specification  of  Appendix  A.  3,  and  M  the  associated 
model.  The  model  is  small  enough  to  allow  comprehensive  analysis  using  our  au- 4.5:  A  THREE-TIERED  ARCHITECTURE  96 
databas 
servers 
clients 
Figure  4.6:  Topology  of  the  three-tiered  architecture  specification. 
tornated  setup.  This  configuration  of  processes  is interesting  as  there  are  multiple 
servers  as  well  as  multiple  clients,  and  the  tree  of  processes  is  not  perfectly  bal- 
anced,  a  feature  which  is  reflected  in  the  symmetry  of  the  underlying  model. 
We  have  used  our  automated  setup  to  prove  the  following  result: 
Proposition  2  Let  M  be  the  model  associated  with  the  three-tiered  specification 
described  above.  Then  Aut(M)  C--  (S3  I  S2)  X  S2- 
Here  S3  I  S2  denotes  the  outer  wreath  product  of  S3  and  S2  (see  Definition  16).  As 
for  direct  products,  GAP  provides  functionality  for  computing  the  wreath  product 
of  two  permutation  groups. 
The  original  Kripke  structure  has  2,021  states.  The  QuotientKripke 
function  reveals  that  the  quotient  structure  with  respect  to  Aut(M)  has  107  states. 
This  is  a  significant  factor  of  reduction  which,  for  realistic  sizes  of  model,  could 
prove  extremely  effective  in  combatting  state-space  explosion.  However,  the  kind 
of  symmetry  exhibited  by  this  specification  cannot  be  specified  using  scalarsets  or 
input  language  restriction. 
Intuitively,  the  reason  that  Aut(M)  (S3  I  S2)  X  S2  is  that  there  are  two 
blocks  of  three  identical  client  processes  (giving  rise  to  the  subgroup  S3  I  SA  and  a 
single  block  of  two  client  processes  (giving  rise  to  the  subgroup  S2).  Consider  the 
model  M  associated  with  an  arbitrary  configuration  of  this  three-tiered  system.  Let 
k  be  the  maximum  number  of  clients  connected  to  any  server  in  the  configuration, 
and  let  mi  denote  the  number  of  servers  which  are  connected  to  i  clients  for  each 
1<i<k.  Since,  for  any  i>0,  Si  =  Si  I  S1,  the  above  discussion  and  result  clearly 
gencralises  to  give: 
Aut(M)  rj  (Si  ý  S.,  )). 
I<i<k 
MiAO 
In  [106],  the  automorphism  group  of  an  arbitrary  rooted  tree  is  described, 
which  could  be  used  to  generalise  the  above  argument  to  systems  with  more  than 
three  tiers. 
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Figure  4.7:  A  4-dimensional  hypercube. 
4.5.2  Mixed  modes  of  communication  in  the  three-tiered  specification 
As  noted  above,  all  communication  in  our  three-tiered  architecture  specification 
is  modelled  using  synchronous  channels,  so  that  messages  are  passed  via  a  hand- 
shake  between  sender  and  recipient,  with  no  buffering.  Consider  a  modified  ver- 
sion  of  the  specification  where  the  channel  which  clieitt&  clieW9  and  clientlo  use 
to  send  requests  to  server3  (channel  cl_se_2)  is  changed  to  be  an  asynchronous 
buffer  with  size  1. 
For  the  Kripke  structure  M  associated  with  the  original  specification  we 
have  Aut  (M)  ýJ:  (S3  I  S2)  X  S2.  Let  M'  be  the  Kripke  structure  associated  with  the 
altered  specification.  Analysis  using 
SPIN-to-GRAPE  reveals  that  Aut(  1) 
- 
S3  X  M  ýj 
S3  X  S2.  which  is  smaller  than  (S3  ?  S2)  X  S2.  This  is  because  the  modified  channel 
means  that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  permute  server  processes  2  and  3,  and  their 
associated  channels. 
4.6  Message  Routing  in  a  Hypercube  Network 
A  popular  topology  used  in  the  implementation  of  switch-based  multi-computers 
is  the  hypercube  [171].  The  following  definition  is  adapted  from  [173]: 
Definition  25  The  it  -dimensional  hypercube  (where  it  >  1)  is  a  graph  G=  (V,  E) 
where 
0V=  10,1}" 
oE=  If  x,  y}  :  x,  yEV  differ  in  exactly  one  bit}. 
A  4-dimensional  hypercube  can  be  displayed  graphically  as  two  cubes,  as 
shown  in  Figure  4.7.  In  a  switch-based  multi-computer  using  a  hypercube  topology, 
messages  are  routed  between  the  processors.  Algorithm  3  is  a  simplified  version  of 
a  routing  algorithm  described  in  [61].  For  xi  E  10,1},  we  use  7,  to  denote  1-  xi 
(the  complement  of  xi).  Each  node  has  an  ii-bit  process  identifier.  On  receiving  a 
message,  a  node  in  the  hypercube  checks  the  id  of  the  intended  recipient.  If  this  is 4.6:  MESSAGE  ROUTING  IN  A  HYPERCUBE  NETWORK  98 
Algorithm  3  Basic  algorithm  for  message  routing  in  a  hypercube  network. 
Behaviour  of  node  x=  (xj,  x2,.  ..,  x,,  ): 
while  true  do 
receive  message  destined  for  node  y=  (Yl 
i  Y21  -  Yn) 
if  x=y  then 
process  message 
choose  a  new  destination  node  y 
end  if 
choose  iE  11,2,...,  n}  such  that  xi  0  yi 
forward  message  to  neighbour  (xl,...,  x,,  ) 
end  while 
the  same  as  its  own  id  then  it  processes  the  message,  and  chooses  a  new  destina- 
tion.  Otherwise  (or  after  a  new  destination  has  been  chosen)  the  node  forwards  the 
message  to  a  neighbour  whose  id  has  one  more  bit  in  common  with  the  id  of  the 
intended  recipient. 
In  our  final  example  we  model  a  system  where  messages  are  routed  through 
a  hypercube  network  using  Algorithm  3.  Appendix  A.  4.1  gives  the  Promela  spec- 
ification  for  message  passing  in  a  3-dimensional  hypercube.  The  processes  are  de- 
fined  via  a  node  proctype,  parameterised  by  an  input  channel  and  n  output  channels 
(where  n  is  the  dimension  of  the  hypercube),  each  of  which  is  the  input  channel  for 
a  distinct  neighbour.  Global  variables  record  the  destination  and  current  position 
of  the  message.  Communication  is  achieved  via  a  channel  for  each  node  in  the  hy- 
percube,  and  the  init  process  sends  the  first  message  to  a  non-deterministically 
chosen  node.  To  ensure  that  the  state-space  of  the  model  is  small  enough  to  analyse, 
only  one  message  is  passed  through  the  network  at  a  time. 
In  our  specification  the  identifier  of  a  node  is  an  integer  i  in  the  range 
1,2,...,  it.  This  represents  the  n-bit  vector  i-1  (viewed  as  a  binary  number).  The 
subtraction  is  necessary  since  SPIN  assigns  process  ids  starting  from  1  rather  than 
0  (wl-dch  is  reserved  for  the  init  process).  Given  a  message  destined  for  node  pro- 
cess  k,  node  process  i  computes  the  bitwise  exclusive-or  of  k-1  and  i-1.  If  there  is 
aI  in  position  in  of  the  result  then  the  message  can  be  forwarded  to  the  neighbour 
of  i  with  id  j  such  that  i-1  and  j-1  (viewed  as  binary  numbers)  differ  only  bit  in. 
The  node  process  non-deterministically  chooses  one  such  suitable  neighbour. 
4.6.1  Analysis  of  symmetry  in  the  hypercube  specification 
The  automorphism  group  of  an  n-dimensional  hypercube  is  well  understood, 
and  is  derived  in  [761.  For  any  permutation  &E  Sn,  we  define  the  action  of  Lt 
on  x=  (X1,  X21  ...  i  Xn)  by  a(x)  =  (Xa(l),  Xa(2)i  ---,  X,,  (n)).  For  each  1<i<n, 
define  the  ith  complennentation  permutation  ri  by  -ri(x)  =  Let 
Kn  =  (711  721  ...  #  IN),  the  group  generated  by  all  combinations  of  the  ri.  The  au- 
tomorphism  group  of  the  n-dimensional  hypercube  is  the  semi-direct  product  Of  Sn 4.6:  MESSAGE  ROUTING  IN  A  HYPERCUBE  NETWORK  99 
and  K,,,  denoted  &X  Sn  (see  Definition  18,  Section  3.1.4).  It  can  be  shown  that 
JKn  X  SnI  =  jKnj  x  jSnj  =  2n  X  I,!. 
When  analysing  the  nature  of  the  symmetry  in  our  hypercube  specification 
we  would  have  liked  to  have  used  a  configuration  with  at  least  four  dimensions 
as  a  case  study.  However,  the  state-space  of  even  the  4-dimensional  configuration 
proved  too  large  to  analyse  using  our  setup  (1.6  x  107  states)  so  we  restrict  ourselves 
to  the  3-dimensional  configuration  (a  cube).  This  problem  demonstrates  the  rapid 
explosion  of  a  state-space,  and  hence  the  need  for  techniques  such  as  symmetry 
reduction. 
Proposition  3  Let  M  be  the  model  associated  with  the  3-dimensional  hypercube 
specification  described  above.  Then  Aut(M)  c--  K3  M  S3- 
Again  we  have  proved  this  result  using  our  automated  setup.  The  original 
Kripke  structure  has  15,409  states.  Using  QuotientKripke  ()  we  find  that  the  re- 
sulting  quotient  structure  has  411  states.  Again  the  factor  of  reduction  is  encourag- 
ing.  As  with  the  three-tiered  architecture  example,  the  kind  of  symmetry  exhibited 
by  this  specification  cannot  be  specified  using  existing  techniques. 
Our  specification  of  message  routing  in  a  hypercube  involves  arithmetic  op- 
erations  on  variables  which  have  pid  type.  Process  ids  are  used  as  operands  in 
bit-wise  exclusive-or  operations  in  order  to  determine  how  the  packet  should  be 
routed.  Approaches  to  exploiting  symmetry  usually  prohibit  these  kind  arithmetic 
operations,  e.  g.  Condition  2  of  Definition  22  prohibits  this  use  of  scalarset  vari- 
ables.  This  example  shows  that  restrictions  on  the  use  of  process  identifiers  in  arith- 
metic  operations  are  not  always  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  symmetry.  In  Sec- 
tion  7.6.2  we  discuss  the  problem  of  automatically  identifying  cases  where  process 
ids  can  be  used  as  operands  to  arithmetic  expressions  without  breaking  symmetry. 
Let  M  be  the  model  associated  with  a  configuration  of  the  hypercube  speci- 
fication  with  n  dimensions  for  some  n  ý:  1.  It  would  seem  likely,  from  the  previous 
discussion,  that  the  above  result  generalises  to  give  Aut(M)  ý--  Kn  x  Sn. 
4.6.2  Message  routing  in  a  hypercube  with  a  fixed  initiator 
Recall  that  in  the  hypercube  specification  the  packet  is  first  sent  non-deterministic- 
ally  by  the  init  process  on  one  of  the  channels  in  the  system.  Such  non- 
determinism  in  a  model  can  often  lead  to  a  blow  up  of  states,  and  a  common  ap- 
proach  to  improve  efficiency  would  be  to  remove  this  non-determinism.  Indeed, 
altering  the  specification  so  that  the  init  process  always  sends  the  packet  on  the 
channel  associated  with  node  process  1  results  in  a  model  with  8,866  states,  com- 
pared  with  15,409  states  in  the  original  model.  3 
3.  Applying  Us  modification  to  t1w  4-dimensional  specification  results  in  a  reduction  from  1.6  x  107 
to  8.9  x  106  states.  However,  the  smaller  state-space  is  still  too  large  for  analysis  Using  SPIN-to-GRAPE. 4.6:  MESSAGE  ROUTING  IN  A  HYPERCUBE  NETWORK  100 
SPIN-to-GRAPE  shows  that  the  resulting  automorphism  group  of  the  altered 
model  M'  is  isomorphic  to  a  subgroup  of  the  automorphism  group  of  a  cube.  More 
specifically,  Aut(M')  stabK3  AS3(0)Owhere  stabK3,,  s3(O)  is  the  stabiliser  of  iiode  0 
(0,0,0)  (see  Definition  9,  Section  3.1.2). 
Interestingly,  the  QuotientKripke  0  function  shows  that  the  quotient 
structure  corresponding  to  M'has  1,669  states,  whereas  that  corresponding  to  M 
has  size  411.  For  this  example,  although  removing  non-determinism  from  the  spec- 
ification  results  in  a  reduction  of  size  in  the  Kripke  structure,  the  corresponding 
reduction  in  symmetry  means  that  the  quotient  structure  of  the  altered  model  is 
actually  larger  than  the  quotient  structure  of  the  model  with  no  alterations. 
Summary 
We  have  introduced  SPIN-to-GRAPE,  a  software  tool  which  allows  automorphisms 
of  small  state-graphs  associated  with  Promela.  specifications  to  be  explicitly  com- 
puted.  We  have  used  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to  study  five  Promela  examples.  The  first  three 
examples  highlight  disadvantages  of  using  scalarsets  or  input  language  restriction 
(via  the  SMC  language)  to  specify  symmetry.  Our  modified  specification  of  Peter- 
son's  mutual  exclusion  protocol  is  an  example  for  which  there  is  full  symmetry 
between  components,  and  yet  neither  SymmSpin  nor  SMC  can  be  used  to  express 
it.  The  final  two  examples  exhibit  fairly  complex  symmetry  groups  which  decom- 
pose  as  wreath  or  semi-direct  products  of  subgroups.  This  type  of  symmetry  cannot 
be  specified  using  scalarsets  or  the  SMC  language. 
By  making  modifications  to  the  example  specifications  and  analysing  the 
corresponding  changes  in  symmetry  in  the  underlying  models,  we  have  observed 
that  the  automorphism  group  of  a  model  depends  on  the  communication  struc- 
ture  of  its  high  level  specification.  In  addition,  we  have  shown  that  modiýring  a 
specification  may  reduce  its  state-space  but  result  in  a  loss  of  symmetry,  so  that  the 
corresponding  quotient  model  is  larger  than  the  quotient  model  associated  with 
the  original  specification. Chapter  5 
Channel  Diagrams 
In  Chapter  4  we  identified  a  relationship  between  the  communication  structure  of 
a  Promela  specification  and  the  automorphisms  of  its  associated  model.  In  the  re- 
source  allocator  specification,  allowing  client  processes  to  communicate  with  each 
other  in  order  to  share  the  resource  reduces  symmetry  in  the  underlying  model; 
making  one  of  the  communication  links  asynchronous  in  the  three-tiered  arcl-dtec- 
ture  specification  destroys  some  of  the  original  symmetry,  and  fixing  the  initiating 
process  in  the  3-dimensional  hypercube  specification  results  in  a  corresponding  re- 
duction  in  symmetry. 
One  formal  notion  of  the  communication  structure  of  a  Promela  specifica- 
tion  is  its  chamiel  diagram  [1571.  In  this  chapter  we  show  for  each  of  the  example 
specifications  discussed  in  Chapter  4  that  there  is  a  correspondence  between  au- 
tomorphisms  of  the  channel  diagram  and  automorphisms  of  the  Kripke  structure 
associated  with  a  Promela.  specification.  This  correspondence  is  the  motivation  for 
the  automatic  symmetry  detection  techniques  developed  in  Chapters  7  and  8,  based 
on  static  chamiel  diagram  analysis. 
5.1  Channel  Diagram  Associated  with  a  Promela  Specification 
The  channel  diagram  [157]  associated  with  a  Promela  specification  is  a  graphical 
representation  of  its  channel-based  communication  structure.  The  definition  we 
present  here  is  adapted  from  the  original  presented  in  [157]. 
Given  a  Promela  channel  declaration  chan  c=  [a  I  of  {Tj 
,  T2,  ...,  Tk}, 
a  is  the  capacity  and  IT,,  T2,...,  Tk}  the  message  type  of  c.  Note  that  {T1..  T2.,  ---.  '  Tk} 
denotes  an  ordered  list  of  types  rather  than  a  set.  We  use  the  set-based  notation 
throughout  for  consistency  with  Promela.  TI-ie  signature  of  c,  denoted  signature(c) 
is  the  pair  (a,  ITI,  T2,  ...,  Tk}).  For  example,  if  a  channel  A  is  declared  as  follows: 
chan  A=  [31  of  Imtype,  byte}  then  signature(A)=(3,  Imtype,  byte}). 
Let  P  be  a  Promela  specification  in  which  all  process  are  instantiated  atom- 
ically  by  the  init  process,  and  all  channels  are  globally  instantiated  (see  Sec- 
tion  2.4.1).  Let  Vp  denote  the  set  of  process  identifiers  and  Vc  the  set  of  global  chan- 5.1:  CHANNEL  DIAGRAM  FOR  A  PROMELA  SPECIFICATION  102 
nel  names  in  P.  For  iE  Vp  let  proctype(i)  be  the  name  of  the  proctype  of  which 
process  i  is  an  instantiation. 
Definition  26  If  M=  (S,  so,  R)  is  the  Kripke  structure  associated  with  P  then  the 
clianitel  diagram  of  P  is  a  coloured,  bipartite  digraph  CV(P)  =  (V,  E,  C)  where: 
*V=  Vp  U  VC  is  the  set  of  process  identifiers  and  channel  names  in  P 
o  Fori  E  Vp  andc  E  VC, 
(i,  c)  EE  iff  there  is  a  reachable  transition  (s,  t)  ER  which  involves 
process  i  sending  a  message  on  channel  c 
(c,  i)  EE  iff  there  is  a  reachable  transition  (s,  t)  ER  which  involves 
process  i  receiving  a  message  on  channel  c 
C  is  a  colouring  function  defined  by  C(v)  =  proctype(v)  if  VE  Vp,  and 
C(v)  =  signature(v)  if  VE  VC. 
Note  that  while  it  may  not  be  possible  to  determine  the  operations  involved  in  a 
transition  (s,  t)  by  examination  of  s  and  t  alone  (e.  g.  if  the  transition  results  from 
execution  of  an  atomic  block),  this  information  can  always  be  obtained  from  ex- 
arnination  of  s  and  t  in  the  context  of  the  specification  P. 
Examples  of  channel  diagrams  are  given  throughout  Sections  5.2  and  5.3. 
When  displaying  a  channel  diagram  as  a  figure  we  use  ovals  and  rectangles  to 
represent  processes  and  channels  respectively.  I  The  type  of  a  process  is  given  by  its 
proctype  name,  and  channel  signatures  are  indicated  using  a  key. 
5.1.1  Deriving  channel  diagrams 
Since  Definition  26  depends  on  the  transition  relation  R,  construction  of  CV(P)  in 
general  requires  exploration  of  the  reachable  states  of  M.  Thus  we  can  only  de- 
rive  the  channel  diagram  for  a  specification  if  its  associated  model  is  tractable.  The 
channel  diagrams  used  for  illustration  in  this  chapter  have  been  manually  derived 
from  their  associated  Promela  specifications  via  simulation  With  SPIN.  This  process 
could  be  automated  by  adding  code  to  log  the  use  of  channels  during  verification 
to  the  pan.  c:  file  produced  by  SPIN  (see  Section  2.4.2). 
In  Chapter  7  we  define  the  static  channel  diagram  of  a  specification,  which 
can  be  efficiently  constructed  by  syntactic  inspection  of  P. 
5.1.2  Channel  diagram  automorphisms 
An  automorphism  of  the  channel  diagram  CD(P)  =  (V,  E,  C)  is  an  automor- 
pl-dsm  of  the  directed,  coloured  graph  (V,  E,  C)  (see  Definition  19,  Section  3.1.5). 
1.  In  the  original  presentation  of  channel  diagrams,  ovals  were  used  for  channels  and  rectangles 
for  processes  [157].  The  notation  was  changed  by  mistake  in  [42,48,49].  To  be  consistent  with  work 
published  from  this  thesis  we  use  the  modified  notation. 5.1:  CHANNEL  DIAGRAM  FOR  A  PROMELA  SPECIFICATION  103 
chan  one_ýtwo  -  Ell  of  lint);  chan  two-one  =  Ell  of  lint); 
proctype  node(chan  in;  chan  out)  ( 
pid  x; 
if 
in?  ... 
outl  ... 
init  j 
atomic 
run  node(one 
- 
two,  two_one); 
run  node(two-one,  one-two); 
Figure  5.1:  A  fragment  of  a  Promela  specification. 
The  group  of  all  automorphisms  of  CDOP)  is  denoted  Aut(CD(P)).  We  can  com- 
pute  Aut(CD(P))  by  inputting  CD(P)  to  GAP.  The  vertices  of  Vp  are  directly 
represented  using  the  integers  {1,2,.  n};  the  vertices  of  VC  are  represented  by 
I  it  +  1,  it  +  2,. 
.  .,  n+  ni},  where  I  Vc  I  m.  The  group  Au  t  (CD  (p))  is  computed 
by  the  GRAPE  function  AutGroupGraph  0  (see  Section  3.1.6).  The  colouring  C  is 
specified  as  an  argument  to  this  function. 
An  element  aE  Aut(CD(P))  has  a  natural  action  on  M,  the  model  asso- 
ciated  with  P,  which  we  illustrate  using  an  example.  Let  P  be  a  Promela  spec- 
ification,  part  of  which  is  shown  in  Figure  5.1,  with  associated  model  M.  Fig- 
ure  5.2  shows  the  channel  diagram  for  P.  It  is  easy  to  check  that  Attt(CV(P)) 
lid,  (12)  (one-two  two-one)}.  A  state  s  of  M  has  the  form: 
s=  (contents  of  one_two,  contents  of  two_one,  ini,  out,,  xi,  pcl, 
in2,  OUt2,  X21  P02)' 
where  yj  denotes  the  value  of  variable  y  of  node  process  i.  The  internal  program 
counter  variable  for  process  i  is  denoted  pci.  For  it  E  Aut(CV(P)),  the  state  et(s) 
has  the  form: 
a(s)  =  (contents  of  a(one_two),  contents  of  a(two-plie),  a(ingj)),  a(out,  (j)), 
l*x(l))p  PC,  %(J)ý  C4(illa(2)),  Ci(OUta(2))--  it(X&(2))ý  PCa(2))* 
n-ie  values  of  the  variables  of  node  i  at  s  are  initially  those  of  node  a  (i)  at  a  (s), 
then  ci  is  applied  to  the  values  of  the  channel  and  process  id  variables  xi,  ini  and 
outi.  Similarly,  the  contents  of  channel  c  at  s  are  those  of  channel  a(c)  at  a(s).  If  a 
process  id  variable  has  value  yi  =0  then  we  define  a  (yi)  =  0. 
Concretely,  suppose  s=  ([  1,  [5],  two 
-  one,  one_two,  0,10,  one_two, 
two_one,  1,8)  and  a=  (1  2)  (one_two  two_one).  Then  a  (s)  =  ([51,  [  ],  two_one, 
one_two,  2,8,  one_two,  two_one,  0,10). 5.2:  EXAMPLES  OF  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS 
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Figure  5.2:  Channel  diagram  associated  with  the  Prometa  code  fragment  of  Figure  5.1. 
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Figure  5.3:  Channel  diagram  for  three-tiered  architecture  specification. 
We  show  that  in  some  cases  elements  of  Aut(CE)(P))  induce  autoniorphisills 
of  M  with  this  natural  action. 
5.2  Channel  Diagrams  for  the  Channel-based  Specifications 
We  first  consider  the  channel  diagrams  associated  with  the  three-tiered  architec- 
ture,  hypercube  and  resource  allocator  specifications  (see  Sections  4.5,4.6  and  4.4 
respectively),  since  in  these  specifications  processes  communicate  using  channels 
rather  than  variables. 
5.2.1  Three-tiered  architecture  channel  diagram 
Recall  from  Section  4.5  the  three-tiered  architecture  example,  the  Promela  specifi- 
cation  of  which  is  given  in  Appendix  A.  3.  Figure  5.3  shows  the  channel  diagram 
associated  with  this  specification. 5.2:  EXAMPLES  OF  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS  105 
We  use  GRAPF  to  compute  the  following  generating  set  for  the  group 
Aiit(CD(P)): 
Aut(CD(P))  =  ((5  6)  (cll  c12),  (6  7)  (c12  c13),  (8  9)  (c14  c15), 
(9  10)  (c15  c16),  (11  12)  (c17  c18), 
(5  8)  (cll  c14)  (6  9)  (c12  c15)  (7  10)  (c13  c16) 
(2  3)  (sel  se2)  (cl_se_  1  cl_se_2». 
Note  that  the  last  two  lines  in  the  presentation  of  this  generating  set  denote 
a  single  group  element.  We  can  see  from  Figure  5.3  that  the  first  generator  of  this 
group,  the  permutation  (5  6)  (M  c12)  is  an  automorphism  of  CE)  (P)  since  swap- 
ping  clients  5  and  6  and  simultaneously  swapping  the  associated  channels  c1l  and 
c12  leaves  the  structure  and  colouring  of  the  channel  diagram  unchanged.  Pie  other 
generators  can  similarly  be  verified  to  be  automorphisms  of  CE)(P). 
Our  automated  setup  shows  that  the  groups  AW(M)  and  AW(CD('P))  are 
isomorphic,  thus  there  is  a  direct  correspondence  between  channel  diagram  and 
Kripke  structure  automorphisms  for  this  example. 
Now  consider  the  three-tiered  specification  with  mixed  modes  of  commu- 
nication,  discussed  in  Section  4.5.2.  The  difference  between  this  specification  and 
the  original  is  that  the  signature  of  channel  cl_se_2  (the  channel  which  client 
processes  8,9  and  10  use  to  send  requests  to  server  process  3)  is  changed  from 
(O,  f  mtype,  chanj)  to  (1,  jmtype,  chanj).  Let  P'  denote  the  modified  specifica- 
tion,  with  associated  model  AT.  We  observed  in  Section  4.5.2  that  AW(.  AA')  is  a 
smaller  group  than  Aiit(M),  since  changing  this  channel  signature  destroys  sym- 
metry  between  servers  2  and  3.  Since  channel  nodes  are  coloured  accord  ing  to  their 
signature,  this  change  in  symmetry  is  reflected  in  the  automorphisms  of  the  channel 
diagram  associated  with  the  specification:  we  find  that  AW(M)  ý---  AW(CE)(P'))- 
5.2.2  Channel  diagram  for  the  hypercube  specification 
The  channel  diagram  for  the  3-dimensional  hypercube  specification  (see  Section  4.6 
and  Appendix  A.  4.1)  is  showii  in  Figure  5.4.  Recall  that  the  init  process  initially 
seiids  the  packet  to  a  iion-deterministically  chosen  node,  thus  there  are  edges  from 
the  node  representing  the  init  process  (with  identifier  0)  to  every  channel  in  the 
diagram.  For  neatness  this  is  simplified  in  Figure  5.4. 
The  channel  diagram  CD(P)  is  essentially  a  cube.  Since  the  itode  processes 
in  P  are  all  identical,  we  expect  any  automorphism  of  the  channel  diagram  to  cor- 
respond  to  an  automorphism  of  the  underlying  Kripke  structure,  and  indeed  this 
is  the  case.  As  with  the  three-tiered  architecture  example,  GRAPE  shows  that  the 
groups  Alit(M)  and  AW(CE)(P))  are  isomorphic. 
In  Section  4.6.2  we  considered  a  modified  specification  where  the  init  pro- 5.2:  EXAMPLES  OF  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS  106 
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Figure  5.4:  Channel  diagram  for  3d  hypercube  specification. 
cess  always  sends  the  packet  initially  to  tiodc  process  1.  Let  P'  denote  this  modified 
specification  and  A4'  its  associated  model.  We  found  that  this  modification  resulted 
in  a  corresponding  loss  in  symmetry,  since  node  process  1  is  no  longer  equivalent 
to  the  other  nodes.  'Hie  channel  diagram  CD(P')  is  identical  to  CD(P)  except  that 
the  only  edge  from  the  node  representing  the  init  process  is  that  to  the  channel 
node  labelled  link].  Removal  of  the  other  edges  results  in  a  loss  of  symmetry  in  the 
channel  diagram,  and  the  relationship  between  symmetries  of  the  channel  diagram 
and  symmetries  of  the  Kripke  structure  is  maintained.  Using  our  automated  setup 
we  find  that  Atit(.  A4')  Aut(CD(P)). 
5.2.3  Channel  diagram  for  the  prioritised  resource  allocator 
Figure  5.5  shows  the  channel  diagram  for  the  prioritised  resource  allocator  speci- 
fication  discussed  in  Section  4.4.  The  specification  is  given  in  Appendix  A.  2.1.  The 
priority  level  of  each  client  is  also  indicated  in  Figure  5.5,  though  this  information 
is  not  part  of  the  channel  diagram. 
Let  P  denote  the  resource  allocator  specification  and  M  its  associated 
model.  Recall  from  Section  4.4.1  that  Aut(M)j  =  24.  Inputting  the  channel  dia- 5.2:  EXAMPLES  OF  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS 
Key  to  channel  signatures 
(I,  (.  typý)) 
(0,  j  typý  1) 
f 
-I'  I  'xi  gil;  g 
linkl  II  link2  II  link3  II  link4  II  link5  II  link6  II  link7 
priorities: 
Figure  5.5:  Channel  diagram  for  resource  allocator  specification. 
gram  CD(P)  to  GRAPE,  and  computing  its  automorphism  group  reveals  that: 
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A  tit(CD(P))  =  ý(l  2)(linkl  link2),  (2  3)(link2  link3),...,  (6  7)(link6  Iink7)), 
and  JAW(CD(P))  I=5,040.  Since  JAW(M)l  ý4  jAut(CD(P))j,  there  is  not  a  direct 
correspondence  between  Kripke  structure  and  channel  diagram  automorphisms. 
This  is  because  priority  levels,  which  induce  asymmetry  between  components,  are 
not  encoded  in  the  channel  diagram. 
However,  we  can  use  the  function  I  somorphi  c  Subgroups  (AW(CE)(P)), 
AW(M))  to  show  that  there  is  a  monomorphism  (see  Definition  8,  Section  3.1.1) 
which  maps  AW(M)  to  a  subgroup  G  of  AW(CD(P)).  ByTheorern  2  (Section3.1.1), 
G  ý_-  AW(M).  G  is  clearly  the  subgroup  of  AW(CD(P))  which  preserves  the  prior- 
ity  information  indicated  in  Figure  5.5. 
Let  P'  denote  the  resource  allocator  specification  where  certain  clients  share 
the  resource  (see  Section  4.4.3),  with  associated  model  AT.  The  corresponding 
channel  diagram,  CD(P'),  is  shown  in  Figure  5.6.  The  cyclic  relationship  between 
clients  3,4  and  5  resulting  from  the  configuration  of  process  sharing  (illustrated  by 
Figure  4.4)  is  captured  by  the  additional  edges  in  Figure  5.6  compared  with  Fig- 
ure  5.5. 
We  showed  in  Section  4.4.3  that  Atit(M')  is  smaller  than  Attt(M):  introduc- 
ing  sharing  reduces  the  symmetry  inherent  in  the  model.  This  reduction  in  symme- 
try  is  reflected  in  the  channel  diagram:  we  have  JAW(CD(P))  I=  144.  Again  there 
is  a  monomorphism  from  AW(AT)  to  a  subgroup  of  Aut(CD(P')). 5.3:  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS  FOR  THE  MUTUAL  EXCLUSION  EXAMPLES  108 
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Figure  5.6:  Channel  diagram  for  resource  allocator  specification  with  resource  sharing 
enabled. 
Figure  5.7:  Form  of  channel  diagram  for  the  Mutual  exclusion  examples. 
5.3  Channel  Diagrams  for  the  Mutual  Exclusion  Examples 
The  Promela  specifications  of  the  simple  mutual  exclusion  protocol  (see  Sections  2.2 
and  4.2)  and  Peterson's  mutual  exclusion  protocol  (see  Section  4.3)  do  not  involve 
channels.  Instead,  processes  communicate  via  global  arrays.  However,  each  of  these 
examples  still  has  a  well-defined  associated  channel  diagram  consisting  of  just  a 
set  of  process  nodes  -  both  the  sets  VC  and  E  of  Definition  26  are  empty.  Figure  5.7 
shows  the  general  form  of  the  channel  diagram  associated  with  an  it-process  mu- 
tual  exclusion  specification  (either  the  simple  example,  or  Peterson's  protocol). 
Although  the  channel  diagram  of  Figure  5.7  is  trivial,  its  automorphism 
group  is  the  group  S,  since  all  tiser  processes  are  interchangeable.  This  group  is 
isomorphic  to  the  group  of  Kripke  structure  automorphisms  for  a  mutual  exclu- 
sion  protocol  with  it  processes. 
5.4  Approximating  Channel  Diagrams 
As  discussed  in  Section  5.1.1,  construction  of  CD(P)  requires  exploration  of  the 
reachable  states  of  A4,  which  is  precisely  what  model  checking  with  symmetry 
reduction  aims  to  avoid. 
In  Chapter  6  we  introduce  Promela-Lite,  a  specification  language  based  on 
Promela.  In  Chapter  7  we  define  the  static  channel  diagram  SCD(P)  associated 
with  a  Promela-Lite  specification  P  and  show  that  SCD(P)  can  be  efficiently  com- 5.4:  APPROXIMATING  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS  109 
puted  by  static  analysis  of  P.  The  static  channel  diagram  is  an  approximation  of 
the  channel  diagram  associated  with  a  specification.  We  then  show  that  there  is  a 
general  correspondence  between  automorphisms  of  SCD(P)  and  automorphisms 
of  M,  the  model  associated  with  P. 
Summary 
We  have  defined  the  channel  diagram  of  a  Promela  specification  (first  introduced 
in  [1571),  and  used  our  automated  setup  to  show  for  the  examples  of  Chapter  4  that 
there  is  a  correspondence  between  automorphisms  of  the  channel  diagram  CD(P) 
and  automorphisms  of  the  Kripke  structure  M  associated  with  a  Promela.  specifi- 
cation  P.  We  have  discussed  the  limitations  associated  with  channel  diagrams  and 
motivated  the  use  of  the  static  channel  diagram,  an  approximation  of  the  channel 
diagram  that  can  be  efficiently  computed  via  static  analysis  of  P. Chapter  6 
Promela-Lite 
The  examples  of  Chapter  4  and  the  correspondence  between  channel  diagram  and 
Kripke  structure  automorphisms  observed  in  Chapter  5  motivate  us  to  develop  au- 
tomatic  symmetry  detection  techniques  for  Promela,  which  are  not  restricted  to  full 
symmetry,  based  on  analysis  of  a  structure  similar  to  the  channel  diagram.  This  is 
the  topic  of  Chapters  7  and  8.  In  order  to  support  our  techniques  with  a  formal 
proof,  we  first  present  Promela-Lite,  a  specification  language  which  captures  the  es- 
sential  features  of  Promela.  The  Promela  language  includes  a  large  set  of  keywords 
and  language  features  which  facilitate  the  specification  of  complex  communica- 
tions  protocols.  The  downside  of  this  is  that  proving  properties  about  Promela  spec- 
ifications  is  laborious,  requiring  many  case-by-case  arguments.  Rigorous  proofs  are 
also  hindered  by  the  lack  of  a  formal  definition  of  the  semantics  of  Promela  as  im- 
plemented  by  SPIN. 
Promela-Lite  is  a  smaller  specification  language  that  includes  core  Promela 
features  such  as  parameterised  processes,  first-class  channels  and  global  variables, 
but  omits  many  language  features  such  as  enumerated  types,  record  types,  arrays 
and  rendez-vous  channels.  We  are  able  to  present  a  full  grammar  and  type  sys- 
tem  for  this  smaller  language,  and  define  precise  Kripke  structure  semantics  for 
Promela-Lite  specifications.  In  Chapter  7  we  use  the  semantics  to  rigourously  prove 
the  correctness  of  our  symmetry  detection  techniques  for  a  Promela-like  language. 
Promela-Lite  and  Promela  are  similar  enough  that  it  is  not  too  great  a  leap  of  faith 
to  accept  that  our  results  can  be  applied  to  Promela,  for  which  a  rigorous  proof  is 
not  practical  (as  discussed  above).  In  addition,  omitting  certain  omate  features  of 
Promela  from  Promela-Lite  makes  our  proof  easier  to  understand,  and  thus  easier 
to  transfer  to  other  specification  formalisms. 
It  is  important  to  stress  that  we  do  not  intend  to  implement  a  Promela-Lite 
model  checker,  or  for  users  to  write  Promela-Lite  specifications  in  practice  (though 
we  do  illustrate  the  language  with  an  example  specification).  While  it  may  seem 
that  the  restricted  syntax  of  Promela-Lite  does  not  meet  our  aim  of  reducing  the 
restrictions  placed  on  the  form  of  a  specification,  the  restricted  syntax  is  only  for 
case  of  presentation  of  our  results.  Our  Promela  implementation  (see  Chapter  8) 6.1:  SYNTAX  ill 
lifts  most  of  these  restrictions. 
The  name  Promela-Lite  was  inspired  by  Featherweight  Java,  a  calculus  which 
captures  the  core  object  oriented  features  of  Java  (classes,  methods  and  inheritance), 
but  omits  most  features  of  the  full  language  [981. 
We  define  the  syntax  and  type  system  of  Promela-Lite  in  Sections  6.1  and  6.2 
respectively.  In  Section  6.3  we  present  Kripke  structure  semantics  for  the  language, 
and  prove  that  a  well-typed  Promela-Lite  specification  has  a  well-defined  associ- 
ated  Kripke  structure. 
6.1  Syntax 
6.1.1  A  note  on  BNF 
We  use  the  standard  Backus-Naur  form  (BNF,  see  e.  g.  [1])  to  specify  the  syntax  of 
Promela-Lite.  BNF  notation  can  be  used  to  specify  the  grammar  of  a  language  via 
a  sequence  of  production  rules  (also  called  non-terminals).  A  production  rule  (prod) 
has  the  form: 
(prod)  ::  =  Aj,  j  AI,  2  ... 
Aj,, 
ý 
I  A2,1  A2,2 
... 
A2, 
s2 
Ak,  l 
Ak,  2  ... 
AkSk 
where  each  A  ij  is  either  a  production  rule,  or  a  terminal  symbol.  The  terminal  sym- 
bols  include  language  keywords  such  as  do,  operators  such  as  :  :,  variable  names 
and  literal  values.  A  BNF  grammar  must  have  a  designated  initial  production  rule. 
A  seWetice  in  the  language  is  a  sequence  of  terminal  symbols  which  conforms  to  the 
structure  of  the  initial  rule. 
Let  (prod)  be  a  BNF  production  rule.  We  use  the  following  shorthand  no- 
tation  to  refer  to  occurrences  of  (prod)  on  the  right  hand  side  of  other  production 
rules: 
"  (prod)?  denotes  an  optional  occurrence  of  (prod) 
"  (prod)  *  denotes  a  sequence  of  zero  or  more  occurrences  of  (prod) 
"  (prod)  +  denotes  a  sequence  of  one  or  more  occurrences  of  (prod) 
"  (prod-list,  V)  denotes  a  o-separated  list  of  one  or  more  occurrences  of  (prod), 
i.  e. 
(prod-list,  V)  ::  =  (prod) 
I  (prod)  o  (prod-list,  V) 
6.1.2  Syntax  of  types 
The  syntax  of  Promela-Lite  data  types  is  surnmarised  in  Figure  6.1  (see  Figure  6.3 
for  details  of  the  (name)  production  rule).  The  initial  production  rule  for  this  gram- 
mar  is  (type),  and  we  refer  to  a  sentence  in  the  language  of  types  as  a  type.  The 6.1:  SYNTAX  112 
(type)  ::  =  int 
pid 
(chantype) 
(typevar) 
(chantype)  (recursive)?  chan  f  (type-list, 
(recursive)  rec  (typevar) 
(typevar)  ::  =  (name) 
Figure  6.1:  Promela-Lite  type  syntax. 
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Figure  6.2:  Infinite  tree  representing  the  recursive  type  recX.  chan  I  X,  int}. 
language  includes  two  primitive  data  types,  int  and  pid,  representing  integer  val- 
ues  and  process  id  values  respectively.  Basic  channel  types  have  the  form  chan  IT}, 
where  T  denotes  a  comma-separated  list  of  types.  The  types  which  comprise  T  may 
themselves  be  channel  types,  thus  Promela-Lite  support  first-class  channels. 
It  can  be  useful  for  a  channel  of  type  T  to  accept  a  channel  of  type  T  as  one  of 
its  arguments.  In  this  case,  T  is  a  recursive  type  -  its  form  is  self-referential.  Accord- 
ingly,  Promela-Lite  includes  syntax  for  recursive  channel  types  (the  (recursive)  rule 
of  Figure  6.1).  For  example,  consider  a  type  T  of  the  form  rec  X.  chanIX,  int}.  Then 
T  denotes  a  channel  which  accepts  messages  consisting  of  two  fields:  a  channel  of 
type  T,  and  an  integer.  This  recursive  type  can  be  unfolded  by  removing  the  initial 
'rec  X.  'and  substituting'X'for  the  original  expression,  resulting  in  the  type  expres- 
sion  cluinfrec  X.  chanIX,  int},  int}  (which  can  in  turn  be  unfolded).  The  resulting 
types  are  the  same,  and  intuitively  they  represent  the  type  illustrated  as  an  infinite 
tree  in  Figure  6.2.  We  discuss  the  implicit  use  of  recursive  types  in  Promela  in  Sec- 
tion  8.2.2.  We  use  chan  IT}  to  refer  to  an  arbitrary  channel  type,  since  a  channel  type 
of  the  form  rec  X.  cluzn  I 
... 
}  can  always  be  unfolded  into  this  form.  In  Section  8.2.2 
we  discuss  an  algorithm  for  minimising  recursive  types  by  converting  them  to  a 
canonical  form.  We  say  that  two  recursive  types  are  equal  if  they  are  identical  after 
minimisation. 
The  name  W  used  in  the  above  example  is  a  type  variable,  and  is  said  to  be 
bound,  as  it  is  introduced  by  the  prefix  We  X.  '  and  then  occurs  within  the  scope 
of  this  prefix.  A  type  variable  which  is  not  bound  is  said  to  be  ftee.  A  well-formed 6.1:  SYNTAX  113 
type  is  one  for  which  there  are  no  free  type  variables.  The  types  int,  chanjint}  and 
rec  X.  cliaii  JX,  itzt}  are  all  well-formed;  the  type  chaii  JX}  is  not.  Note  that  a  type 
such  as  rec  X.  int  is  well  formed;  this  type  unfolds  to  int. 
6.1.3  Syntax  of  the  language 
A  Promela-Lite  specification  consists  of  a  series  of  channel  and  global  variable  dec- 
larations,  one  or  more  proctypes,  and  an  init  process.  The  syntax  is  given  in  Fig- 
ure  6.3.  The  initial  production  rule  is  (spec),  and  we  have  simplified  the  presenta- 
tion  of  the  rules  (name)  and  (number).  We  refer  to  a  valid  Promela-Lite  sentence  as 
a  specification.  In  the  (guard)  production  rule,  m  denotes  an  operator  taken  from  the 
set  I  -j<  j<  =1  >,  >  =}.  For  simplicity,  we  have  not  included  the  division  operator 
in  Promela-Lite.  This  is  to  avoid  the  need  for  detailed  semantics  for  division-by- 
zero  errors  in  Section  6.3,  an  issue  which  is  orthogonal  to  the  symmetry  detection 
techniques  which  we  present  in  Chapter  7. 
A  channel  declaration  chan  c=  (a]  of  IT}  (according  to  the  (channel)  rule 
of  Figure  6.3)  defines  a  buffered  channel  c  with  type  chan  IT}  and  length  a.  This  is 
similar  to  a  globally  instantiated  channel  in  Promela  (see  page  28).  We  define  the 
signature  of  c  by  signature(c)  =  (a,  IT}).  This  is  similar  to  the  notion  of  channel 
signatures  for  Promela  specifications  defined  in  Section  5.1.  We  refer  to  channels 
declared  in  this  way  as  static  channels.  The  name  of  a  static  channel  cannot  be 
re-assigned  (either  by  appearing  on  the  left  hand  side  of  an  assignment,  or  as  an 
argument  to  a  channel  receive  operation).  If  signature(c)  =  (a,  IT})  we  use  cap(c) 
to  denote  the  capacity  of  c,  which  is  equal  to  a. 
A  global  variable  declaration  Tx=a  associates  a  name  x  with  a  type  TE 
lint,  pid}  and  an  initial  value  a. 
A  Promela-Lite  proctype  is  a  parameterised  process  definition.  A  proctype 
has  a  list  of  parameters,  and  a  set  of  statements  contained  in  a  do...  od  loop.  -  For 
simplicity  we  do  not  allow  proctypes  to  declare  local  variables.  In  Promela,  param- 
eters  to  a  proctype  and  local  variables  are  treated  identically,  thus  any  local  variable 
can  be  equivalently  declared  as  a  parameter,  with  an  initial  value  supplied  as  a  run 
statement  argument.  For  this  reason  we  use  the  terms  parameter  and  local  variable 
interchangeably  throughout  this  chapter  and  Chapter  7. 
Each  statement  has  the  form  atomic  I  (guard)  ->  (update-list,  Exe- 
cutability  of  the  statement  is  decided  by  (guard),  a  boolean  expression  over  vari- 
ables  and  channels  of  the  specification.  The  effect  of  a  statement  is  determined 
by  (update-list,  ';  '),  which  is  a  sequence  of  updates  to  variables  and  channels.  The 
atomic  block  which  surrounds  the  guard  and  updates  indicates  that  executing  the 
statement  results  in  a  single  transition  of  the  system.  Keywords  to  determine  the 
length,  fullness  and  emptiness  of  channels  are  provided  by  the  language. 
The  init  process  consists  of  a  set  of  run  statements.  Each  run  statement 
instantiates  a  process  of  a  given  proctype,  assigning  initial  values  to  all  of  its  lo- 6.1:  SYNTAX  114 
(spec)  ::  =  (channel)*  (global)*  (proctype)+  (init) 
(channel)  ::  =  (name)  =[  (number)  I  of  (type-list, 
(global)  ::  =  (type)  (name)  =  (number)  ; 
(proctype)  ::  =  (name)  (  (param-list,  do  (statement-list,  od 
(param)  ::  =  (type)  (name) 
(statement)  ::  =  atomic  {  (guard)  ->  (update-list,  Y) 
(guard)  ::  =  (expr)  x  (expr) 
nfull  (  (name)  ) 
nempty  (  (name) 
i  (guard) 
(guard)  &&  (guard) 
(guard)  11  (guard) 
(  (guard)  ) 
(update)  :  -=  skip 
(name)=  (expr) 
(name)  ?  (name-list, 
(name)  I  (expr-list, 
(init)  init  {  atomic  (run-list, 
(run)  run  (name)  (  (arg-list,  ',  ')? 
(arg)  ::  =  (name) 
(number) 
null 
(expr)  ::  =  (name) 
(number) 
_pid 
null 
len  (  (name) 
(  (expr)  ) 
(expr)  o  (expr)  (where  oE  I+, 
(name)  ::  =  an  alpha-numeric  string,  which  may  include'_',  and  must  start  with  a  letter  or 
with  '-' 
(number)  ::  =  an  integer 
Figure  6.3:  Syntax  of  Promela-Lite. 6.2:  TYPE  SYSTEM  115 
judgements 
r  F-  o  r  is  a  well-formed  type  environment 
F  i-  T  T  is  a  well-formed  type  in  r 
rT  TI,  T2,...,  Tk  are  well-formed  types  in  F 
r  e:  T  e  is  a  well-formed  expression  of  type  T  in  F 
r  iF:  T  el,  e2,.  .  .,  ek  are  well-formed  expressions  of  types 
TI,  T2,...,  Tk  respectively  in  r 
rý-f  OK  f  is  a  well-formed  Promela-Lite  fragment  in  r 
rH  fi  OK  (1  <  i:  5  1)  fl,  f2,...,  fi  are  well-formed  Promela-Lite  fragments  in  r 
General  form  of  a  type  rule 
ri  H  Ji  F2  I-  J2 
... 
r,  H  (other  conditions)  (rule  name)  IF  ý-  j 
Figure  6.4:  Notation  for  type  rules. 
cal  variables.  The  atomic  block  surrounding  the  run  statements  indicates  that  all 
processes  in  the  specification  are  instantiated  simultaneously,  If  process  i  is  an  in- 
stantiation  of  proctype  p,  we  write  proctype(i)  =  p. 
There  is  a  special  channel  literal,  null,  which  denotes  an  undefined  channel 
reference,  intended  for  use  as  a  default  value.  The  typing  rules  of  Section  6.2  pre- 
vent  the  use  of  null  for  communication.  The  value  0  can  be  used  as  a  default  value 
for  variables  with  pid  type.  Like  Promela,  each  Promela-Lite  process  has  a  built  in 
constant,  _pid,  which  records  its  run-time  instantiation  number.  This  is  defined  as 
the  position  of  its  run  statement  in  the  init  process. 
An  example  Promela-Lite  specification  is  given  in  Figure  6.8  and  discussed 
in  Section  6.5. 
6.2  TýTe  System 
We  present  a  type  system  for  Promela-Lite,  using  the  notation  of  [23],  adapted  with 
shorthand  notation  from  [98].  In  Section  6.3  we  present  Kripke  structure  semantics 
for  Promela-Lite  specifications,  and  show  that  if  P  is  a  well-typed  Promela-Lite 
specification  then  it  has  a  well-defined  associated  Kripke  structure  (Theorem  11). 
A  typhig  etivironmetit  r  is  an  ordered  list  of  distinct  variables  and  their  types, 
and  has  the  form  x1  :  T1,  X2  :  T2 
......  Xk  :  Tk.  Here  x:  T  reads  "x  has  type  T".  The 
empty  typing  environment  is  denoted  0,  and  the  set  of  variables  declared  in  typing 
environment  r  is  denoted  dom  (r).  We  associate  with  ra  set  sc(r)  consisting  of  the 
names  of  all  static  channels  declared  in  r.  We  define  sc(O)  =0  (the  first  0  denotes 
the  empty  typing  environment,  the  second  an  empty  set). 
Figure  6.4  surnmarises  the  forms  of  type  judgement  which  we  use,  together 
with  the  general  form  of  a  typing  rule.  The  judgements  can  be  used  to  assert  that  an 6.2:  TYPE  SYSTEM  116 
environment  r  is  well-formed,  a  type  T  is  well-formed  in  r  (see  Section  6.1.2),  an  ex- 
pression  is  well-formed  and  has  type  T  in  F,  and  a  fragment  of  a  specification  (e.  g.  a 
proctype  declaration  or  a  statement)  is  well-formed  in  IF.  Intuitively,  an  expression 
or  fragment  is  well-formed  if  it  can  be  attributed  clear  semantics  (so,  for  example, 
the  expression  '5+true'  is  not  well-formed,  whereas  '5+6'  is  a  well-formed  expres- 
sion  with  type  ffit),  and  an  environment  is  well-formed  if  it  is  comprised  of  sensible 
variable  declarations.  Formally,  asserting  that  an  environment,  type,  expression  or 
fragment  is  well-formed  just  means  that  it  is  regarded  as  legal  by  the  type  system. 
Given  a  language  together  with  a  type  system  and  formal  semantics,  the  intuitive 
and  formal  notions  of  well-formedness  coincide  if  we  can  prove  a  theorem  show- 
ing  that  well-formed  sentences  in  the  language  are  well  behaved  according  to  the 
semantics. 
For  brevity,  we  use  IF  T  to  assert  that  types  T1,  T2,...,  Tk  are  well-formed 
in  r,  and  r  ý-  7:  T  to  assert  that  for  1<i<k,  expression  ei  is  well-formed  and  has 
type  Ti  in  F.  Similarly,  r  ý-  fi  OK  (1  <i  <_  1)  asserts  that  Promela-Lite  fragments 
fl,  f2,.  .  .,  fi  are  all  well-formed  in  r.  A  typing  rule  consists  of  a  horizontal  line,  with 
a  list  of  judgements  and  other  conditions  above  the  line,  and  a  single  judgement 
below.  If  the  judgements  and  conditions  above  the  line  all  hold  then  the  truth  of  the 
judgement  below  the  line  can  be  inferred. 
Figure  6.5  gives  a  complete  set  of  typing  rules  for  Promela-Lite.  The  value 
?i  referred  to  by  rule  T-PID-LITERAL  is  the  number  of  processes  in  the  specifica- 
tion,  and  is  determined  by  the  number  of  run  statements  in  the  init  process.  For 
presentation  of  the  type  system  we  introduce  a  tuple  type,  to  represent  the  form  of 
arguments  for  a  proctype.  A  proctype  which  accepts  an  ordered  list  of  arguments 
of  types  T1,  T2,...,  Tk  has  type  (T1,  T2,...,  Tk).  The  symbols  a  and  7  refer  to  literal 
values;  e,  ei  and  F  to  expressions;  c  to  a  static  channel;  p  to  a  proctype  name;  x 
and  Y  to  local/global  variable  names  (x  could  also  be  a  proctype  name  in  T-VAR); 
ui  to  updates;  gi  to  guards,  and  ri  to  run  statements.  In  rule  T-PROCTYPE  we  use 
p  (T  Y)  as  shorthand  for  a  proctype  name  together  with  a  list  of  formal  parameters 
X1,  X2,  ---0  Xk,  where  xi  has  type  Ti  (1  <i<  k).  We  use  alldiff  (xi,  X2.  Xk)  to  assert 
that  xi  :A  xj  if  i  34  j  (i.  e.  the  xi  are  all  different). 
The  rules  T-SEND  and  T-RECV  require  that  the  fullness  /emptiness  of  a  chan- 
nel  is  checked  before  it  can  be  used  for  communication.  Note  that  in  both  rules  the 
guard  g  and/or  updates  U2.  U1  can  be  omitted  (for  conciseness  this  is  not  indi- 
cated  in  Figure  6.5). 
A  literal  value  in  the  range  10,  it}  has  both  type  pid  and  int  according 
to  the  type  system.  We  say  that  such  a  literal  occurs  in  a  pid  coittext  if  it  is  assigned 
to  a  pid  variable,  sent  as  a  pid  argument  on  a  channel,  passed  as  a  pid  argument  in  a 
run  statement,  or  compared  with  a  pid  variable  using  ==  or  I  =.  We  say  that  a  literal 
a  has  type  pid  if  it  occurs  in  a  pid  context,  otherwise  it  has  type  ffit. 6.2:  TYPE  SYSTEM  117 
Environment 
3  -,  (T-ENv-0)  I  t-0  I  t--  Ixe  aomki)  (T-ENV-X)  10F, 
x:  T  ý-  oI 
a  EIL  (T-INT-LITERAL)  I  r-*  ae  ju,  i,...,  nk 
,  (T-PID-LITERAL) 
a:  int  F  ý-  a:  pid 
ro  ýrl  PrOC"e  SCope  (T-  PID) 
r  I-  e:  T 
(T-PARENTHESlS-e) 
F  ý- 
_pid:  pid  r  ý-  (e)  :T 
rFo  r  ý-  T, 
T-NULL) 
rx:  Tr'  Fo 
(T-VAR) 
r  ý-  null  :  chan  ITI  '  Fx:  Tr'F  x:  T 
r  ý-  el  :  int  rF  e2:  int  oE  (+, 
(T-ARITH) 
rFc:  clwn  fTj 
(T-LEN) 
r  ý-  e,  o  e,  :  in  tF  ý-  len  (c)  -  int 
i  t-  el  :  int  i  t--  e2  :  int  MEI<,  <-,  >,  >=  f  (T-REL) 
F  ý-  el  m  e2  OK 
F  ý-  el  :Tr  I-  e2  :T  ME  (=-,  1=1  TA  (TI,  T2,. 
.., 
TO 
(T-EQ) 
F  ý-  el  D4  e2  OK 
r  ý-  g  oy.  (T-PARENTHESIS7g) 
r  ý-  gOK  (T-NOT) 
r  I-  (g)  OK  rý-  IgOK 
r  ý-  g,  oK  r  ý-  g,  OK  (T-AND) 
r  t-  gý  OK  r  ý-  g2  OK  (T-OR) 
rP  gi  &&gl-,  OK  rPg,  g2  37 
Bas  "ic  -u  p-Ta  -te  -s 
I  F-x:  'i  I  ý-  e:  Tx  14  Sc(r)  T  --pL 
(TI,  T2,...,  I  j) 
(T-ASSIGN) 
F  ý-  0  (T-SKIP) 
rPx=  eOK  r  ý-  skip  OK 
F  ý-  gOK  r  i-  ui  oy,  (l  !,  ý  i  !  ý,  i) 
(T-UPDATE) 
r  ý-  atomic  f9-  ý-  lil,  U2;  ...  ;  Ul  I  OK 
r  goK  rx:  chanM  r  ý-  7:  T  rF  uj  OK  (2!  5  i!  ý  1) 
(T-SEND) 
FF  atomic  (g)  &&  nful  1  (X)  ->C  17;  U2;  ...  ;  Ul  I  OK 
r  i-  g  oK  r  ý-  x:  chanf-T)  r  ý-  7:  -T 
r  ý-  Ui  OK  (2  -!  5  i!  5  1)  alldiff(T)  fTj  n  sc(r)  =0  (T-RECV) 
atomic  (  (g)  &&  nempty  (X)  ->C?  T;  U2;  ...  ;  ul  )OK 
- 
r,  x:  T  F-  (global)*  (proctype)  -'  (init)  OK 
n-  a:  TTE  fint,  pid)  x  tt  do?  n(F)  (T-GLOBAL) 
r  I-  Tx-a;  (global)*  (proctype)  +  (init)  Ox 
r,  c:  chanfTJ  ý-  (diannel)*  (global)*  (proch 
. 
Ipe)+  (init)  OK 
rý-T  c  Q!  dom(r)  a>0  (T-sc) 
rF  chan  c-  (a]  of  IT};  (channel)  *(global)*  (prochjpe)+  (init)  0_ 
rf-T  Fj:  T  ý-  si  OK  (1:  5  i<  1) 
r,  p:  (T)  I-  (procývpe)*  (init)  OK  jp,  Tj  n  dom(F)  =0  alldiff(p,  *K) 
(T-PROCTYPE) 
r  ý-  proctype  p  (T  T)  (  do  s,  -*  :  S2  ...  ::  sl  od  I  (pmctjipe)  *  (init)  OK 
r  ý-  P:  (T)  rý-T:  T  TCZUfnulllux(r) 
(T-RUN) 
r  ý-  lUn  p  (W)  OK 
r  ý-  ri  OK  (1  :5i<  k) 
(T-INIT) 
r  ý-  init  atomic  (  rl;  r2;  ...  ;  rk  OK 
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A  Promela-Lite  spedfication  P  has  one  of  the  three  forms: 
1.  chan  c=  [a]  of  (channel)*  (global)*  (proctype)  '(init) 
2.  Tx=a;  (global)  *  (proctype)  '  (init) 
3.  proctype  p  (T  7)  1  do  s,  S2  sl  od  }  (proctype)*  (init) 
depending  on  whether  or  not  there  are  any  channel  or  global  variable  declarations 
in  P.  Depending  on  which  formP  takes,  one  of  the  typing  rules  T-SC,  T-GLOBAL 
or  T-PROCTYPE  is  applicable.  We  say  that  P  is  well-typed  if  0  ý-  P  OK.  We  now 
present  Kripke  structure  semantics  for  Promela-Lite,  and  show  that  these  seman- 
tics  unambiguously  define  the  model  associated  with  a  well-tYPed  Promela-Lite 
specification. 
6.3  Kripke  Structure  Semantics 
Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification  with  n  processes  for  some  n>0  (i.  e.  there  are 
it  run  statements  in  the  init  j  atomic  I 
... 
}}  block).  We  now  detail  the  seman- 
tics  of  P  as  a  Kripke  structure  M.  We  show  that  if  P  is  well-typed  according  to  the 
type  system  of  Section  6.2  then  the  Kripke  structure  M  is  well-defined. 
For  a  well-formed  type  T,  let  lit(T)  denote  the  set  of  all  possible  literal  val- 
ues  which  can  have  type  T  in  the  specification  P.  Thus  lit(int)  =  Z1,  lit(pid)  = 
10,1,...,  n}  and  lit(clzanjT})  =  Ic  :c  is  the  name  of  a  static  channel  with 
c:  c1wiijT}}  U  (null}.  Note  that  typing  rule  T-NULL  ensures  that  null  is  a  literal 
value  for  any  well-formed  channel  type. 
We  define  the  doniaiii  of  a  variable  or  static  channel  as  follows.  If  x  is  a  global 
or  local  variable  of  type  T  then  the  domain  of  x  is  lit  (T).  If  c  is  a  static  channel  with 
sig?  iature(c)  =  (1,  JT1,  T2,...,  Tkj)  (for  some  k,  I>  0)  then  the  domain  of  c  is  the  set: 
1[(al,  l,  al,  2,...,  al,  k)i 
(azl,  42,2,  ---,  a2,  k),...,  (a.,,,  a.,  2,...,  a,,,  k)] 
:<m<1,  aij  E  lit(Tj)  (1  <i<m,  1<j:  5  k)}. 
This  set  consists  of  all  possible  sequences  of  messages  for  the  channel,  including 
the  empty  sequence  [  ]. 
Let  p  be  a  proctype  in  P,  and  xa  parameter  of  P.  Suppose  that  proctype(i) 
p  for  some  i  (1  :5i  <-  it).  We  use  p[i].  x  to  denote  the  local  variable  x  for  tl-ds  process. 
If  c  is  a  channel  with  type  chaitITI,  T2,...,  Tk},  we  use  das  a  shorthand  for  a  message 
(a,,  a2,  -  ..,  ak)  on  c  (where  ai  :  Ti,  1<i<  k). 
6.3.1  States  of  a  specification 
A  state  of  a  Promela-Lite  specification  P  can  be  expressed  as  an  ordered  tuple  con- 
sisting  of  a  value  for  each  variable  in  the  specification,  using  the  notation  preceding 
1.  In  practice,  lit  (int)  is  a  finite  range  of  integers  which  can  be  represented  using  a  fixed  word  size. 6.3:  KRIPKE  STRUCTURE  SEMANTICS  119 
chan  A-  Ell  of  ipid,  chanfint));  chan  B-  121  of  {int);  chan  c=  [21 
of  (int);  pid  leader  =  0; 
proctype  user(chan(int)  in;  chanfint)  out;  int  x)  { 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  UBer(B,  C,  O); 
run  user(C,  B,  O); 
Figure  6.6:  Part  of  a  simple  Promela-Lite  specification. 
Definition  1  (Section  2.2),  where  the  domain  of  each  variable  is  as  described  above. 
However,  it  is  more  convenient  to  reason  about  a  state  as  a  set  of  propositions. 
If  s  is  a  set  consisting  of  exactly  one  proposition  of  the  form  (x  =  a)  for  each 
variable  x  in  P  (where  a  is  a  value  in  the  domain  of  x),  then  s  can  be  converted  into 
a  state  by  writing  the  value  of  each  variable  and  static  channel  as  an  appropriately 
ordered  tuple.  Thus  we  can  equivalently  (and  more  conveniently)  reason  about  a 
state  as  a  set  of  assignments  to  variables. 
Figure  6.6  shows  part  of  a  simple  Promela-Lite  specification  with  three  static 
channels,  A,  B  and  C,  a  global  variable  leader  and  two  instantiations  of  a  user 
proctype.  If  we  order  the  static  channels  and  global  variables  as  they  appear  in  the 
specification,  and  order  the  local  variables  of  user  1  before  those  of  user  2,  then  an 
example  state  of  the  associated  model  is: 
([(1,  B)  ],  [4,5],  [  ],  1,  B,  C,  0,  C,  B,  0). 
Using  the  equivalent  set-based  notation  we  have: 
s=f  (A  =[  (1,  B)  1),  (B  =  [4,5]),  (C  =[  1),  (Icader  =  1), 
(user[1].  iiz  B),  (user[1].  out  C),  (user[1].  x  0), 
(user[2].  in  C),  (user[2].  out  B),  (user[2].  x  0)}. 
We  will  use  the  latter  notation  in  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  and  in  Chapter  7. 
The  set  S  of  (potential)  states  of  M  consists  of  every  possible  assignment  to  vari- 
ables  and  channels  of  P.  As  discussed  in  Footnote  1  (page  118),  the  range  of  allowed 
integer  values  is  finite,  thus  S  is  a  finite  set. 
6.3.2  Initial  state 
The  values  with  which  global  variables  are  assigned  on  declaration,  together  with 
the  parameter  values  which  are  passed  to  proctypes  in  run  statements,  determine 
the  initial  state  of  M. 
For  a  global  variable  x  with  x:  T,  let  init(x)  denote  the  value  in  lit(T)  to 6.3:  KRIPKE  STRUCTURE  SEMANTICS  120 
which  x  is  assigned  at  its  declaration.  For  a  local  variable  p[i].  x  with  p[i].  x  :  T,  let 
hdt(p[i].  x)  denote  the  initial  value  in  lit(T)  to  which  x  is  assigned  in  the  ith  run 
statement.  M  has  a  single  initial  state  so,  defined  thus: 
so  =  f(c=[]):  cisastaticchannelnameinP}U 
I  (x  =  fitit  (x))  :x  is  a  global  variable  of  P}  U 
I  (p[i].  x  =  hift(p[i].  x))  :x  is  a  parameter  of  proctypep 
instantiated  by  the  ith  ruit  statement  (1  <i<  n)} 
6.3.3  Expression  evaluation 
We  define  a  function  evalp,  i  which  takes  a  state  sES  and  an  expression  e  of  the 
form  (expr)  (see  Figure  6.3),  and  returns  the  value  of  e  when  evaluated  at  s  in  the 
context  of  process  i  with  proctype(i)  =  p.  Let  sES  be  a  state  of  M.  Then: 
"  evalp,  j  (s,  x)  =a  if  (x  =  a)  Es  (i.  e.  x  is  a  global  variable) 
"  evalpj  (s,  x)  =a  if  (p  [il.  x  =  a)  Es  (i.  e.  x  is  a  local  variable  of  p) 
"  evalp,  j  (s,  c)  =c  if  c  is  a  static  channel  name  or  null 
"  evalpj  (s,  a)  =a  if  aEZ 
"  evaIp,  j(s,  _pid)  =i 
"  evalpi(s,  len  W)=m  if  c  is  a  static  channel  and  (c  d2,...,  d,  *,  ]) 
s  (0  <m  :5  cap(c)) 
"  evall,,  i  (s,  1  en  (nu  11)  )=0 
"  evalp,  j  (s,  1  en  W)=  evalp,  j  (s,  len  (c))  if  (p[i].  x  =  C)  Es 
"  evalpj(s,  (e)  )=  evalp,  i(s,  e) 
"  evalp,  j  (s,  el  o  e2)  =  evalp,  j  (s,  el)  o  evalpj  (s,  e2)  (where  0E 
As  discussed  in  Footnote  1  (page  118),  lit(int)  is  a  finite  range  of  integers  in  prac- 
tice.  Let  min(int)  and  tnax(int)  denote  the  minimum  and  maximum  values  in  tl-ds 
range,  and  assume  min(int)  <  0.  If  the  result  evalp,  i(s,  el)  o  evalpj(s,  e2)  falls  out- 
with  the  allowed  range,  we  define  evalpi(s,  el  o  e2)  =  ((evalp,  i(s,  el)  o  evalp,  i(s,  e2)  + 
Iminj)  mod  (max  -  min))  -  Iminj.  This  definition  means  that  the  result  of  such  a 
calculation  is  truncated  so  that  e.  g.  nwx(int)  +1=  min(int).  This  follows  the  ap- 
proach  used  by  SPIN  to  deal  with  out-of-range  operations  in  Promela  specifications 
[921. 
6.3.4  Satisfaction  of  guards 
We  use  the  evalpj  function  to  define  a  relation  [--pi  between  states  and  guards  which 
determines  whether  a  guard  holds  at  a  given  state.  For  a  guard  g  of  the  form  (guard) 
(see  Figure  6.3)  and  a  state  sES,  with  p  and  i  as  above,  s  ý--pj  g  means  that  the 
state  s  satisfies  the  guard  g  in  the  context  of  p  and  i.  The  relation  1---p,  i  is  defined  as 
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s  ý=pj  elm  e2  iff  evalp,  i(s,  el)  m  evalp,  i(s,  e2)  (where  ME 
>=})2 
S  F--pi  nf  ul  1(c)  iff  (c  d2*,.  dm*l)  Es  and  cap(c)  >  m,  where  c  is  a 
static  channel 
"S  ý--pj  nempty(c)  iff  (c  [d*,,  a2,.  41)  Es  and  m>0,  where  c  is  a  static 
channel 
"S  ý=pj  nfu11(x)/nempty(x)  iff  (p[i].  x  =  c)  Es  and  s  ý=pj  nfull(c)/ 
nempty(c),  where  x  is  a  locally  declared  channel  of  p 
"s  ý=P,  i  Ig  iff  s  V=o  g 
"s  ý=pj  gI  &&g2  iff  s  ý=pj  gI  and  s  ý=pj  g2 
"S  1--p,  i  91  1192  iff  S  ý=pj  gj  or  s  ý=pj  92 
"s  ý=P,  i  (g)  iff  S  1--P,  i  g. 
6.3.5  Effect  of  updates 
For  a  proctype  p,  variable  name  x  and  process  identifier  i  wiffi  proctype(i)  =  p, 
define: 
var(x) 
x  if  x  is  a  global  variable 
p[i].  x  if  x  is  a  local  variable 
For  each  update  u  described  by  the  (update)  rule  in  Figure  6.3,  the  effect  of 
u  on  a  state  s  (in  the  context  of  a  process  i  with  proctype  p)  is  given  in  Figure  6.7. 
In  each  case  we  define  the  update  u,  the  conditions  under  which  u  applies,  and 
the  result  of  applying  u  to  s  (denoted  execpj  (s,  u)).  Given  a  sequence  of  updates 
Uli  U21  ---i  Uk  and  a  state  s  the  rules  of  Figure  6.7  can  be  applied  repeatedly  to 
define  the  state  reached  by  executing  the  ui  in  sequence,  starting  in  state  s.  The 
resulting  state  is  denoted  execp,  j(s,  U1;  U2;  ...  ;  Uk),  where  execp,  i(s,  ul;  U2;  ...  ;  Uk) 
execp,  i  (...  execpj  (execp,  i  (s,  u  1)  1UA,  ---I  Uk)  - 
Note  that  for  certain  updates  it  may  be  the  case  that  none  of  the  rules  of 
Figure  6.7  are  applicable.  For  example,  suppose  (c  =  [dj,  d2,...,  d,  *nD  E  s,  where 
m=  cap(c),  i.  e.  the  static  channel  c  is  full  in  state  s.  In  this  case  there  is  no  rule 
which  defines  the  effect  of  executing  'clei,  e2,  -..,  ek',,  since  a  condition  of  the  rule 
for  sending  on  static  channels  is  that  the  channel  must  not  be  full.  We  say  that 
execp,  i(s,  u)  is  undefined  if  no  rule  of  Figure  6.7  is  applicable. 
A  state  s  is  well-defined  if  it  can  be  equivalently  expressed  as  a  tuple. 
This  is  the  only  the  case  if  it  contains  exactly  one  proposition  for  each  variable 
of  P.  Thus  for  the  state  resulting  from  an  update  to  be  well-defined  it  must  be 
the  case  that  the  rule  corresponding  to  the  update  removes  propositions  about  a 
distinct  set  of  variables,  then  adds  one  proposition  for  each  variable.  For  an  arbi- 
trary  Promela-Lite  specification  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Consider  an  update 
2.  Strictly,  m  on  the  right  hand  side  of'iff'is  =,  0,:  5  or  >-if  >o  on  the  left  hand  side  is  ==,!  =,  <=Or 
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U  Conditions  on  s  Resulting  state  execy,,  i(s,  u) 
'skip'  none 
- 
5 
'x  -  e' 
S  (var(x)  =  a;  7EF  (s\f(var(x)  =a)  1)  Uf(var(x)  =evai,,,  i(s,  e))  I 
'ciej,  e2,...,  ek' 
-77171,472-  ES 
s  ý--pý  nfull(c)  J(C  (evalpj(s,  ej),  eval,,  (s,  e2),..., 
evalp,,  (s,  ek))])) 
C?  Xl,  X2,  ---,  Xk' 
--ýc  7-  F7-1- 
arl,.  Jal,  2,...,  alk), 
r:  s  (var(xi)  =  bi),  (var(x2)  =  b2),...,  (var(Xk)  =  bk)I)U 
s  pi  empty(c)  {(c  (var(xi)  =  al,  l),  (Var(x2)  =  al,  2), 
(-r(Xi)  =  bi)  Es  (1  <j<  k) 
.... 
(var(xk)  =  alk)l 
(Pjij.  X  =  C)  ES  execp,  i(s,  'c  lej,  e2-..,  eý)  (if  well-defined) 
I  'X?  XI,  X2,  ---,  Xk'  (p[II.  X  =  C)  E5  exec,,,  (S,  'C?  xl,  x2,.  -.,  xj)  (if  wellmdefined) 
Figure  6.7:  Update  execution  rules.  Eadi  rule  is  interpreted  in  the  context  of  process  i 
which  is  an  instantiation  of  proctype  p. 
#c?  x,  x',  where  c  is  a  static  channel  and  x  is  a  global  variable.  Suppose  (x  =  a)  E  s, 
(c  =  [(al,  a2)1)  Es  and  al  ýý  a2.  The  rule  for  executing  receive  updates  constructs 
state  execpj(s,  'c?  x,  x)  by  removing  (x  =  a)  from  s,  then  adding  the  propositions 
(x  =  a,  )  and  (x  =  a2)-  Thus  execpj(s,  'c?  x,  x1)  is  not  well-defined. 
The  following  theorem  states  that,  for  a  well-typed  Promela-Lite  specifica- 
tion  P,  if  the  guard  associated  with  a  statement  of  P  is  satisfied  at  state  sEM, 
then  the  rules  of  Figure  6.7  lead  to  a  well-defined  next-state  t.  In  other  words,  the 
theorem  shows  that  execution  of  a  well-typed  specification  at  a  given  state  can  al- 
ways  progress  if  some  process  has  a  guard  which  is  true  at  the  state.  The  proof  is 
presented  in  Appendix  B.  1. 
Theorem  11  (Progress  theorem)  Let  P  be  a  well-typed  Promela-Lite  specification 
with  associated  model  M,  sa  state  of  M,  atomic  fg->  ul;  U2;  ...  ul  Ia  state- 
ment  of  proctype  p,  and  i  the  identifier  of  an  instantiation  of  p.  Supposes  ý=pj  g. 
Then  execpi(s,  UI;  U2;  ...  ;  ul)  is  well-defined. 
From  now  on,  when  we  refer  to  a  Promela-Lite  specification  P  we  assume 
that  P  is  well-typed. 
6.3.6  Deriving  a  Kripke  structure 
Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification.  The  states  S  and  initial  state  so  of  M  are 
as  defined  above.  The  transition  relation  R  is  defined  as  follows.  Let  sES  and 
let  atomic  {g  ->  Ul;  U2;  ...  ;  uk  I  be  a  statement  of  proctype  p  in  P.  Suppose 
process  i  is  an  instantiation  of  p.  If  s  ý=pj  g  then  (s,  execp,  i(s..  Ul; U2;  ...  ;  Uk))  E  R.  By 
Theorem  11,  execpj  (s,  U  1;  U2;  ...  ;  Uk)  is  well-defined. 6.4:  PROMELA-LUE  --+  PROMELA  123 
6.4  Promela-Lite  -  Promela 
Promela-Lite  is  not  a  subset  of  Promela  since  it  includes  extended  notation  for  chan- 
nel  types,  and  the  built-in  null  constant. 
Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification.  Then  P  can  be  converted  into  a 
Promela  specification  as  follows.  Firstly,  unfold  all  recursive  type  expressions  in 
?  so  that  they  have  the  form  chan  IT}  (where  the  types  comprising  T  may  be  re- 
cursive).  Secondly,  replace  every  type  expression  of  the  form  chanfT}  with  chan. 
Finally,  add  the  declaration  chan  null  =[01  of  IT}  to  the  beginning  of  the 
specification,  where  T  is  any  Promela  type  (e.  g.  bit). 
The  Promela-Lite  semantics  described  in  Section  6.3  are  based  on:  the  se- 
mantics  for  Promela  described  informally  in  [92],  four  years  of  SPIN  use,  and  the 
SPIN  source  code.  The  semantics  have  been  designed  so  that  if  P  is  a  well-typed 
Promela-Lite  specification  and  P'  the  corresponding  Promela  specification  then  P 
and  P'  have  the  same  associated  model.  In  Appendix  C.  1  we  discuss,  in  detail,  the 
Promela  features  which  Promela-Lite  omits. 
6.5  Example:  Load-balancing 
To  illustrate  Promela-Lite  we  now  discuss  an  example  specification  of  a  message 
passing  system,  given  in  Figure  6.8.  The  specification  consists  of  three  server  pro- 
cesses,  six  client  processes  and  three  loadbalancer  processes.  A  particular  client  has 
been  blocked  by  the  system,  indicated  by  the  global  pid  variable  blocked_client. 
A  loadbalancer  process  continuously  receives  requests  sent  by  client  pro- 
cesses.  A  requestconsists,  of  twoparts:  the  identity  of  a  client  (derived  from  its 
_pid 
variable),  and  the  input  channel  of  the  client.  If  the  message  is  from  the  blocked 
client  then  the  loadbalancer  sends  back  the  value  0,  indicating  that  the  request  has 
been  denied.  Otherwise  the  loadbalancer  forwards  the  name  of  the  input  channel  of 
the  given  client  to  the  server  with  the  shortest  queue  of  incoming  messages  (choos- 
ing  non-deterministicaRy  between  servers  which  share  the  shortest  queue  length). 
On  receiving  a  client  channel  name,  a  server  uses  it  to  send  the  value  1  to  the  client, 
whid-i  abstractly  represents  the  result  of  the  request. 
The  specification  has  a  dynamic  communication  structure  since  channel  ref- 
erences  are  passed  between  processes. 
Summary 
In  order  to  allow  the  rigorous  development  of  automatic  symmetry  detection  tech- 
niques  for  Promela,  we  have  presented  the  syntax,  type  system  and  Kripke  struc- 
ture  semantics  for  Promela-Lite,  a  specification  language  which  captures  the  essen- 
tial  features  of  Promela,  but  is  easier  to  work  with  in  practice.  We  have  illustrated 
Promela-Lite  using  a  specification.  of  a  loadbalancing  system. 6.5:  EXAMPLE:  LOAD-BALANCING  124 
chan  sel  -  [3)  of  (chan(int)); 
chan  se2  -  131  of  (chan(int)); 
chan  se3  =  [31  of  (chan(int))l 
chan  lbi  -  Ell  of  (pid,  chanjint)); 
chan  lb2  -  [I]  of  lpid,  chanfint)); 
chan  lb3  -  [11  of  (pid,  chan(int)); 
chan  cll  =  (11  of  (int);  chan  c12  =  [11  of  (int); 
chan  c13  -  [11  of  (int);  chan  c14  -  Ill  of  (int); 
chan  C15  -  Ell  of  (int);  chan  c16  -  Ill  of  (int); 
pid  blocked_client  -  9; 
proctype  loadbalancer(chan[pid,  chan(int))  in; 
chan(int)  client-link;  pid  client_id;  int  pc) 
do 
atomic  pc=-l  &&  nempty(in)  ->  in?  client-id,  client_link; 
pc  -2 
atomic  pc--2  client 
- 
idl-blocked  client  ->  pc  -3 
atomic  pc=-2  client  id==blocked7client  && 
nfull(client-link)  ->  client_linkIO;  pc  =4 
atomic  pc..  3  &&  len(sel)<=Ien(se2)  &&  len(se1)<=len(se3) 
&&  nfull(sel)  ->  seliclient 
- 
link;  pc  -4) 
atomic  pc=-3  &&  len(se2)<=len(seI)  &&  len(se2)<=len(9e3) 
&&  nfull(se2)  ->  se21client 
- 
link;  pC  =4) 
atomic  pc.  =3  &&  len(se3)<=len(sel)  &&  len(se3)<-len(se2) 
&&  nfull(se3)  ->  se3tclient-link;  pc  -4) 
atomic  pc--4  ->  client-id  =  0;  client-link  -  null;  pc  =I 
od 
proctype  server(chanichanfint))  in;  chan(int)  client-link;  int  pc) 
do 
atomic  pc-=l  &&  nempty(in)  ->  in?  client_link;  pc  =2 
atomic  pc-=2  &&  nfull(client-link)  ->  client_link1l; 
pc  -3) 
atomic  pc--3  ->  client-link  -  null;  pc  =1 
od 
proctype  client(chan(int)  in;  chan(pid,  chan(int))  lb; 
int  response;  int  pc) 
do 
atomic  pc--l  &&  nfull(lb)  ->  lbl_pid,  in;  pc  -2 
atomic  pc--2  &&  nempty(in)  ->  in?  response;  pc  -3 
atomic  pc--3  ->  response  =  -1;  pc  =1 
od 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  server(sel,  null,  l);  run  server(se2,  null,  2); 
run  server(se3,  null,  3);  run  loadbalancer(lbl,  null,  0,1); 
run  loadbalancer(lb2,  null,  0,1);  run  loadbalancer(lb3,  null,  0,1); 
run  client(cll,  lbl,  -1,1);  run  client(cl2,  lbl,  -1,1); 
run  client(cl3,  lb2.  -I,  I);  run  client(cl4,  lb2,  -1,1); 
run  client(cl5,  lb3,  -1,1);  run  client(cl6,  lb3,  -1,2); 
Figure  6.8:  Promela-Lite  specification  of  a  loadbalancing  system. Chapter  7 
Finding  Symmetry  by  Static  Channel  Diagram  Analysis 
The  examples  in  Chapter  4  have  led  us  to  identify  some  problems  with  existing 
symmetry  detection  teclu-tiques  using  scalarsets  and  input  language  restriction. 
These  approaches  cannot  handle  certain  kinds  of  symmetry  which  arise  from  the 
communication  structure  of  a  system,  and  they  place  undue  restrictions  on  the  form 
of  specifications;  in  particular  the  way  in  which  process  identifiers  may  be  used.  In 
Chapter  5  we  established  a  correspondence  between  channel  diagram  automor- 
pl-dsms  and  Kripke  structure  automorphisms,  for  these  example  specifications. 
In  this  chapter  we  introduce  the  static  cliannel  diagram  of  a  Promela-Lite  spec- 
ification.  This  diagram  type  is  similar  to  the  channel  diagram,  but  can  be  extracted 
by  syntactic  inspection  of  a  specification  even  if  the  associated  model  is  intractably 
large.  We  formally  establish  a  general  correspondence  between  automorphisms  of 
the  static  channel  diagram  and  automorphisms  of  the  Kripke  structure  associated 
with  a  Promela-Lite  specification. 
We  present  a  symmetry  detection  technique  based  on  this  correspondence, 
which  can  be  surnmarised  as  follows:  generators  for  a  group  of  candidate  symme- 
tries  for  a  Promela-Lite  specification  are  found  by  analysing  the  static  channel  di- 
agram  of  the  specification.  These  generators  are  checked  individually  against  the 
specification  to  see  if  they  induce  valid  automorphisms  of  the  associated  model. 
Starting  with  the  set  of  candidate  generators  which  are  valid,  the  largest  possible 
subgroup  of  candidate  symmetries  which  are  all  valid  is  computed.  These  symme- 
tries  can  then  be  used  for  reduced  model  checking. 
Unlike  previous  approaches  to  symmetry  detection,  our  approach  can  de- 
tect  arbitrary  component  symmetries  arising  from  the  communication  structure  of 
a  specification.  The  approach  can  be  fully  automated  (as  we  demonstrate  in  Chap- 
ter  8),  and  requires  no  additional  information  from  the  user.  The  only  requirement 
is  that  the  specification  satisfies  certain  restrictions  wl-dch  are  formally  described 
using  the  type  system  of  Section  6.2.  The  restrictions  can  be  automatically  checked, 
and  are  less  strict  than  those  imposed  by  the  scalarset  data  type  or  the  SMC  input 
language. 
At  the  end  of  this  chapter  we  discuss  various  ways  in  which  the  technique 7.1:  STATIC  CHANNEL  DIAGRAMS  126 
could  be  extended  to  further  reduce  restrictions  on  the  form  of  a  specification,  and 
to  capture  symmetry  between  global  variables.  We  emphasise  that  the  static  chan- 
nel  diagram  is  merely  used  as  a  heuristic  for  finding  a  good  group  of  candidate 
symmetries,  and  discuss  other  possible  diagram  types. 
7.1  Static  Channel  Diagrams 
Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification  with  n  processes.  Let  Vp  =  {1,2,...,  ii}  be  the 
set  of  process  identifiers,  and  VC  the  set  of  static  channel  names  for  P.  Recall  from 
rules  T-SEND  and  T-RECV  (Figure  6.5,  Section  6.2)  that  a  Promela-Lite  statement 
involves  at  most  one  send  or  receive  update,  and  this  update  must  appear  at  the 
beghu-dng  of  the  sequence  of  updates  for  the  statement. 
Definition  27  The  static  channel  diagram  associated  with  P  is  a  coloured,  bipartite 
digraph  SCV  (P)  =  (V,  E,  C)  where: 
"V=  Vp  U  VC  is  the  set  ofprocess;  identifiers  and  static  channel  names  inP 
"  For  iE  Vp,  cE  VC  and  proctype  (i)  =  p, 
(i,  c)  EE  iff  p  has  a  statement  of  the  form  'atomic  {g->  (name)  i  el,  e2, 
....  ek;  U2;  ...  ;  ul  }'where  (name)  is  c,  or  (name)  is  a  parameter  of  p 
initialised  with  value  c 
(c,  i)  EE  iff  p  has  a  statement  of  the  form  'atomic  Ig->  (name)  ?  xl.,  X2. 
-,  Xk;  U2;  ...  ;  ul  }'where  (name)  is  c,  or  (name)  is  a  parameter  of  p 
mitialised  with  value  c 
C  is  a  colouring  function  defined  by  C(v)  =  proctype(v)  if  VE  Vp,  and 
C(v)  =  signature(v)  if  VE  Vc. 
The  difference  between  the  static  channel  diagram  of  a  Promela-Lite  specification 
and  the  channel  diagram  of  a  Promela  specification  (Definition  26,  Section  5.1) 
is  that  the  channel  diagram  records  all  possible  channel-based  communication, 
whereas  the  static  channel  diagram  records  potential  communication  on  certain 
channels.  The  static  channel  diagram  of  a  specification  can  be  seen  as  a  static  ap- 
proximation  of  the  communication  structure  for  the  specification.  It  does  not  cap- 
ture  communication  arising  from  dynamic  passing  of  channel  references,  and  edges 
of  the  diagram  may  result  from  send/receive  updates  which  in  practice  cannot  be 
executed  in  any  reachable  state  of  M. 
7.1.1  Deriving  static  channel  diagrams 
Given  a  Promela-Lite  specification  P,  SCD(P)  can  be  efficiently  derived  via  a  sin- 
gle  pass  of  P.  The  node  set  and  colouring  can  be  deduced  immediately  from  the 
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If  a  proctype  p  involves  an  explicit  send  /receive  on  static  channel  c  then  ail 
edge  (i,  c)  I  (c,  i)  is  added  to  the  diagram  for  each  iG  V1,  such  that  pwctype(i)  =  1). 
Each  channel  parameter  x  of  p  is  marked  as  a  send  parameter  and/or  a  receive  pa- 
rameter  if  1)  contains  an  update  of  the  form  X!  C1,  e2,  ---i  ek  and/or  X?  X1,  X2,  ...,  Xk- 
For  each  iE  V1,  with  proctype(i)  =  p,  suppose  the  actual  value  for  x  in  the  ith  run 
statement  is  c  (where  c  is  a  static  channel  name).  If  x  is  marked  as  a  send/receive 
parameter  then  an  edge  (i,  c)  /  (c,  i)  is  added  to  the  diagram. 
The  next  result  follows  from  the  above  discussion: 
Proposition  4  Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification.  The  complexity  of  deriving 
SCD('P)  fromP  is  linear  in  the  size  of  P. 
Therefore,  unlike  deriving  the  channel  diagram  of  a  Promela  specification  (Sec- 
tion  5.1.1),  it  is  possible  to  derive  SCD(P)  from  a  Promela-Lite  specification  P 
even  if  A4  is  intractably  large. 
Figure  7.1  shows  the  static  channel  diagram  for  the  Promela-Lite  specifica- 
tion  of  the  loadbalancer  system,  given  in  Figure  6.8.  The  graphical  notation  is  sim- 
ilar  to  that  for  channel  diagrams  introduced  in  Section  5.1.  Note  that  there  are  no 
outgoing  edges  from  the  server  processes  to  the  clietit  input  channels.  This  is  because 
communication  from  a  server  process  to  a  clietit  channel  is  achieved  dyllaillically,  us- 
ing  the  channel  reference  passed  to  a  server  by  one  of  the  loadbalancer  processes. 
The  state-space  associated  with  the  corresponding  Promela  version  of  the 
specification  (derived  using  the  method  described  in  Section  6.4)  is  intractably 
large,  thus  we  cannot  compute  its  associated  channel  diagram. 
Figure  7.1:  Static  channel  diagram  associated  with  the  loadbalancer  specification  (Fig- 
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7.2  Static  Channel  Diagram  Automorphisms 
An  automorphism  of  the  static  channel  diagram  SCV  (P)  =  (V,  E,  C)  is  an  au- 
tomorphism  of  the  directed,  coloured  graph  (V,  E,  C)  (see  Definition  19,  Sec- 
tion  3.1.5).  The  group  of  all  automorphisms  of  SCV(P)  is  denoted  Aut(SCV(P)). 
This  is  analogous  to  the  notion  of  a  channel  diagram  automorphism  (see  Sec- 
tion  5.1.2).  For  it  E  Aut(SCV(P))  we  define  a(0)  =0  and  a(nuil)  =  null, 
where  0  and  null  are  the  default  values  used  by  variables  of  type  pid  and  chait 
respectively. 
Since  SCV(P)  is  a  small  graph  (its  size  is  proportional  to  the  size  of  P), 
the  group  Aut(SCV(P))  can  be  efficiently  computed  directly  using  a  standard  al- 
gorithm  such  as  nauty  [125],  or  via  GRAPE  as  described  in  Section  5.1.2  (for  chan- 
nel  diagrams).  Let  P  denote  the  loadbalancer  specification  of  Figure  6.8.  The  static 
channel  diagram  SCV(P)  is  shown  in  Figure  7.1.  Using  GRAPE  we  find: 
Aut(SCV(P))  =  ((7  8)  (cll  c12),  (9  10)  (c13  c14),  (1112)  (cI5  c16), 
(4  5)  (Ibl  1b2)  (7  9)  (cll  c13)  (8  10)  (c12  c14), 
(5  6)  (1b2  1b3)  (9  11)  (c13  c15)  (10  12)  (c14  c16), 
(12)  (sei  se2),  (2  3)  (sei  se2». 
Recall  that  i  is  the  pid  of  the  ith  proctype  inistantated  in  the  init  process. 
It  is  straightforward  to  check  that  each  generator  of  this  group  is  indeed 
an  automorphism  of  SCD(P).  We  have  used  GAP  to  show  that  Aut(SCV(P))  C-- 
S3  X  (S2  I  S3).  Intuitively,  the  wreath  product  group  S2  I  S3  arises  due  to  symmetry 
within  each  of  the  three  blocks  of  clients  (the  group  SA  combined  with  symmetry 
between  the  three  blocks  (the  group  SA  The  group  S3  on  the  left  hand  side  of 
the  direct  product  corresponds  to  permutation  of  the  server  processes  (and  their 
associated  channels). 
We  now  define  the  image  of  P  under  an  element  of  Aut(SCD(P)),  and  an 
action  of  Aut(SC*D(P))  on  the  states  of  M. 
7.2.1  Image  of  P  under  &E  Aut(SCD(P)) 
Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification  and  aE  Aut(SCD('P)).  The  specification 
a  (P)  is  obtained  from  P  by  replacing  every  applied  occurrence  of  a  static  channel 
name  c  with  a(c);  every  occurrence  of  a  value  aE  in  a  pid  context 
(see  Section  6.2)  with  it  (a),  and  permuting  the  order  of  run  statements  so  that  run 
statement  i  appears  in  position  tt(i)  in  a  (P)  (1  <i<  n). 
Similarly,  given  an  expression  e,  guard  g,  update  u  or  statement  s  of  'P,  the 
expression  a  (e),  guard  a  (g),  update  a  (u)  or  statement  a  (s)  is  obtained  by  replacing 
every  static  channel  name  c  and  pid  literal  a  with  a  (c)  and  a  (a)  respectively. 7.3:  CORRESPONDENCE  RESULT  129 
7.2.2  Action  of  Aut(SCD(P))  on  the  states  of  M 
Let  it  E  Aut(SCV(P)).  We  first  define  the  effect  of  a  on  propositions  which  refer  to 
variables  and  static  channels  of  P: 
"  Let  (x  =  a)  be  a  proposition  referring  to  a  global  variable  x  with  xT  and 
aE  lit(T).  If  T=  pid  then  a  ((x  =  a))  =  (x  =a  (a)),  otherwise  a  ((x  a))  = 
(x  =  a).  (Note  that  the  Promela-Lite  type  system  ensures  that  TEI  hit,  pid}.  ) 
"  Let  (p[i).  x  =  a)  be  a  proposition  referring  to  a  local  variable  x  of  process 
i,  with  x:  T  and  aE  lit(T).  If  T=  pid  or  T=  clwnlT}  then  &((p[i].  x  = 
a))  =  (p[&(i))  =  a(a)).  Otherwise  a((p[i].  x  =  a))  =  (p[a(i)]  =  a).  Since 
a  preserves  the  colouring  of  processes  according  to  their  proctype,  process 
a(i)  is  also  an  instantiation  of  proctype  p  and  therefore  the  local  variable 
p  [a  (i)  ].  x  exists.  Thus  the  action  of  a  is  well-defined. 
"  Let  (c  =  [XI,  ir2,...,  be  a  proposition  referring  to  a  static  channel  c  with 
signature  (1,  I-T})  where  0:  5  m<1.  Then  a((c  =  [dl,  X2,..  =  (a(c)  = 
If  d,  =  (aj,  a2P-,  ak)  then  4'  =  (bj,  b2,...,  bk)  where 
bi  =  it  (ai)  if  Tj  =  pid  or  Ti  =  clian{U}  and  bi  =  ai  otherwise.  The  action  of  a 
is  well-defined  as  a  preserves  the  signature  of  static  channels. 
Let  M=  (S,  so,  R)  be  the  model  associated  with  P.  Recall  that  a  state  sES 
is  a  set  of  propositions,  one  for  each  variable  and  static  channel  of  P.  The  state  a  (s) 
is  defined  as  follows:  a  (s)  =fa  (z)  :zE  s}. 
For  all  SES  and  a,  P  E  Aut(SCV(P)),  it  is  clear  that  (ap)(s)  =  a(fi(s)) 
and  id(s)  =  s,  therefore  thedefinitionof  a(s)  is  anaction  of  Aut(SCD(P))  on  S  (see 
Definition  13,  Section  3.1.3). 
7.3  Correspondence  Result 
Let  p  be  the  permutation  representation  of  Aut(SCD(P))  corresponding  to  its 
action  on  S.  By  Theorem  3  (Section  3.1.3),  p(Aut(SCD(P)))  :!  ý  Sym(S).  Now 
Aut(M)  :5  Sy?  ii(S),  but  we  cannot,  in  general,  say  anything  about  the  relationship 
between  p(Aut(SCD(P)))  and  Aut(M)  with  respect  to  the  subgroup  relation. 
In  this  section  we  define  what  it  means  for  an  element  of  Aut(SCD(P))  to 
be  valid  for  P,  and  show  that  the  set  of  all  valid  elements  of  Aut(SCD(P))  form  a 
subgroup  G  :5  Aut(SCV(P)).  We  prove  that  if  aE  Aut(SCD(P))  is  valid  for  P 
then  p(a)  E  Aut(M).  Thus  p(G)  :5  Aut(M).  The  relationship  between  the  various 
groups  is  illustrated  in  Figure  7.2. 
7.3.1  Valid  elements  of  Aut(SCD(P)) 
We  say  that  two  Promela-Lite  specifications  P,  and  P2  are  equivalent,  and  write 
P,  =-  P2,  if  they  are  identical  up  to  re-arrangement  of  statements  in  the  do...  od 7.3:  CORRESPONDENCE  RESULT  130 
Aut(SCD(*P)) 
.......... 
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ýNýh  i,  -fid 
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mnt,,  blý  fý 
p(c  sy-try 
.  d-ti- 
p(ALt(SCD(P))) 
Figure  7.2:  Relationship  between  valid  automorphisms  of  SCE)(P)  and  aUtOrnor- 
phisins  of  AA. 
construct,  and  operands  to  the  commutative,  associative  operators  +,  *,  &&  and 
For  brevity,  we  then  say  that  PI  and  P2  are  identical  "up  to  re-arrangement". 
An  element  aC  Atit(SCD(P))  is  valid  forP  if  a(P)  =-  P. 
Theorem  12  Let  G=  ja  E  Aut(SCD(P))  :a  is  valid  for  Pl.  Then  G< 
Aut(SCD(P)). 
Proof  Since  id(P)  =  P,  clearly  id(P)  --  'P,  thus  id  E  G.  Associativity  is  inher- 
ited  from  Aitt(SCD(P)).  Let  a,  ýEG.  Then  it  (P)  and  P(P)  are  identical  to  P  up 
to  re-arrangement.  It  follows  that  aý(P)  -- 
V  (by  successively  applying  the  rear- 
rangements  of  a  to  those  of  ý),  i.  e.  aý  E  G.  Since  AW(SCD(P))  is  finite,  aI=  iyk 
for  some  k>0,  thus  a1cG  by  the  above  argument.  The  result  follows.  0 
If  H  is  a  subgroup  of  Aut(SCE)(P))  such  that  every  element  of  H  is  valid 
for  P  we  say  that  H  is  valid  for  P.  The  group  G  of  Theorem  12  is  the  largest  valid 
subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)). 
To  check  whether  'P  --  a(P)  for  aC  Aut(SCE)(P)),  we  use  a  function 
iiontialise.  The  specification  iiontialise(P)  is  obtained  from  P  by  sorting  the  state- 
meiits  in  the  do  ...  od  loop  of  a  proctype  and  the  operands  of  commutative  oper- 
ators,  using  the  natural  ordering  on  strings.  It  is  clear  that  if  two  specifications  are 
equal  after  normalisation  then  they  are  equivaletit.  Thus  aE  A11t(SCD('P))  is  valid 
for  P  if  i  zoritin  list,  (P)  =  tiorittalise(ix(P)).  This  provides  an  efficient,  conservative 
test  of  validity  for  elements  of  Aut(SCE)(P)).  Since  the  complexity  of  sorting  a  list 
of  length  k  is  0(klog(k)),  we  have: 
Proposition5  Thecomplexity  of  checking  whether'P  =-  a(P)  is  O(IPI  log(IPI)). 7.3:  CORRESPONDENCE  RESULT  131 
7.3.2  Main  result 
In  this  section  we  prove  the  following  theorem: 
Theorem  13  Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification,  and  aE  Aut(SCD(P)).  If  a  is 
valid  for  P  then  p(a)  E  Aut(M). 
For  case  of  presentation,  we  shall  use  a(s)  rather  than  p(a)  (s)  to  denote  the  image 
of  s  under  the  element  p(a).  The  proof  of  Theorem  13  uses  two  technical  lemmas, 
proofs  of  which  are  given  in  Appendix  B.  2. 
Lemma  1  If  aE  Aut(SCD(P))  and  g  is  a  guard  in  P  then 
a(s)  a(g). 
Lemma2  Letul,  u2  ......  uk  be  updates  of  P,  aE  Aut(SCD(P))  and  sa  state  such 
thatexecp,  i(s..  UI;  U2;  ...  ;  uk)  is  well-defined.  Then 
execp,  jt(j)(a(s)j  a  (Ul);  C02);  ...  ;  ft(Uk))  =  a(execpi(s..  u,;  U2;  ;  Uk))- 
Proof  of  Theorem  13  By  Definition  20  (Section  3.2),  we  must  show  that  (i)  if  (s,  t)  E 
R  then  (a  (s),  a  (t))  E  R,  and  (ii)  a  (so)  =  so. 
If  (s,  t)  ER  then  there  is  a  process  with  pid  i  such  that  proctype(i)  =p 
(for  some  proctype  p),  and  a  statement  z  in  p  such  that  the  guard  of  z  holds  for 
process  i  at  s,  and  execution  of  the  updates  of  z  by  process  i  at  s  leads  to  state  t. 
Since  it  (P)  =-  P  the  statement  a  (z)  (possibly  re-arranged)  also  appears  in  proctype 
p.  By  Lemma  1,  the  guard  of  a  (z)  holds  for  process  a  (i)  at  a  (s),  and  by  Lemma  2, 
execution  of  the  updates  of  a(z)  by  process  a(i)  at  a(s)  leads  to  state  a(t).  Therefore 
(a  (s),  a  (t))  E  R. 
We  must  show  that  for  any  proposition  (v  =  d)  in  so,  a  ((v  =  d))  E  so  also. 
In  so,  all  static  channels  are  empty,  so  for  any  static  channel  c,  the  propositions 
(c  =[  ])  and  a  ((c  =[  ]))  =  (a  (c)  =[  ])  both  belong  to  so.  For  each  global  variable 
x,  (x  =  xo)  E  so,  where  xo  is  the  initial  value  for  x  (specified  at  declaration).  If  x:  ifit 
then  a  ((x  =  xo))  =  (x  =  xo)  E  so.  If  x:  pid  then  we  must  have  a  (xo)  =  xo  (since 
a(P)  =-  P),  so  a((x  =  xo))  =  (x  =  a(xo))  =  (x  =  xo)  E  so. 
For  any  local  variable  x,  suppose  xo  is  the  initial  value  given  for  x  in  run 
statement  i.  Then  (p[ij.  x  =  xo)  E  so.  Let  yo  be  the  initial  value  given  for  x  in  run 
statement  a(i),  so  that  (p[a(i)].  x  =  yo)  E  so.  If  x:  hit  then,  since  P  a(P),  the 
value  for  x  in  run  statements  i  and  a(i)  must  be  the  same,  i.  e.  xo  yo.  So  we 
have  a((p[i].  x  =  xo))  =  (p[a(i)].  x  xo)  =  (P[a(i)]-X  =  yo)  E  so.  Suppose  that 
x:  pid  or  x:  cliaiff.  Then,  since  Pa  (P),  the  value  for  x  in  run  statement  a  (i) 
is  the  image  under  a  of  the  value  for  x  in  run  statement  i,  i.  e.  yo  =a  (xo).  We  have 
A((p[i]-X  =  Xo))  =  (p[a(i)].  x  =  a(xo))  =  (P[It(i)].  x  =  yo)  E  so.  M 7.4:  FINDING  THE  LARGEST  VALID  SUBGROUP  OF  AUT(SCV(P))  132 
7.4  Finding  the  Largest  Valid  Subgroup  of  AW(SCD(P)) 
We  showed  in  Section  7.3.1  (Theorem  12)  that  the  set  G  consisting  of  all  elements  of 
Aut(SCD(P))  which  are  valid  for  P  is  a  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)).  G  is  thus  the 
largest  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P))  which  is  valid  for  P. 
In  this  section  we  present  an  algorithm  to  find  this  subgroup.  First  we  es- 
tablish  some  preliminary  results.  For  the  relevant  group  theoretic  definitions,  see 
Section  3.1. 
Lemma  3  Let  X  be  a  set  of  generators  for  Aut(SC*D(P)).  Let  X'  EX 
a  is  valid  for  P}.  Then  (XI)  is  valid  for  P. 
Proof  By  definition  of  G,  X'  C  G.  Therefore  (X')  <  G,  and  the  result  follows.  0 
Lemma  4  Suppose  H<  Aut(SCD(P))  is  valid  for  P  and  aE  Aut(SCD(P))  is 
valid  for  P.  Then  (H  U  ja})  is  valid  for  P. 
Proof  Since  H  is  valid  for  P,  H  <-  G.  Similarly,  since  a  is  valid  for  P,  aEG.  Thus 
HU  ja}  C  G.  It  follows  from  Lemma  3  that  (H  U  ja})  :5G.  0 
Our  algorithm  for  finding  G  starts  with  a  known  valid  subgroup  H  of 
Aut(SCV(P)),  and  adds  valid  coset  representatives  (see  Definition  6,  Section  3.1.1) 
to  the  generators  of  H  to  obtain  successively  larger  valid  subgroups.  The  following 
lemma  is  used  to  determine  when  G  has  been  found. 
Lemma  5  Suppose  H<  Aut(SCD('P))  and  His  valid  for?.  Let  jaliLx2---.,  Lxkj 
be  a  set  of  coset  representatives  for  H  in  Aut(SCV(P)),  where  oil  E  H,  ai  E 
Aut(SCD(P))  \H  for2  <-  i 
-< 
k  and  k=  JAut(SCD(P))j1jHj.  SUPPOSea2i 
...  i  Nk 
are  not  valid  for  P.  Then  H  is  the  unique  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)) 
(i.  e.  H=  G). 
Proof  Since  H  is  valid  for  P,  H  :5G.  Suppose  HCG.  Then  there  exists  aEG 
with  a  ýt  H.  So  Ha  is  a  right  coset  of  H  in  Aut(SCE)(P)),  and  Ha  =  Hai  for  some 
2:  5  i<k.  Since  it  E  G,  Hit  C  G,  so  Hai  CG  and  thus  ai  E  G.  This  is  a  contradiction 
since  G  is  valid  for  P  and  ai,  by  hypothesis,  is  not.  Hence  H=G.  0 
Algorithm  4  can  be  used  to  compute  the  largest  valid  subgroup  G  of 
Aut(SCD(P)). 
Theorem  14  Algorithm  4  computes  the  largest  valid  subgroup  ofAut(SCD(?  )). 
Proof  By  Lemmas  3  and  4,  the  group  H  computed  by  Algorithm  4  is  valid  for 
P.  The  group  H  is  the  largest  subgroup  of  Aut(SCV(P))  which  is  valid  for  P  by 
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Algorithm  4  Algorithm  to  find  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)) 
X:  =  generators  of  Aut(SCD(P)) 
H:  =  Q&  E  X:  a(P)  -= 
P}) 
U:  =  representatives  of  right  cosets,  of  H  in  Aut(SCV(P))  except  H 
while  U  ýý  0  do 
U:  =  U  ja} 
if  Lx(P)  P  then 
H  :=  (H  U  I&}) 
if  lAut(SCD(P))IIIHI  <  JUI  then 
U  :=  representatives  of  right  cosets  of  H  in  Aut(SCD(P))  except  H 
end  if 
end  if 
end  while 
We  illustrate  Algorithm  4  using  the  loadbalancer  example.  Let  P  be  the  spec- 
ification  of  Figure  6.8.  Generators  for  Aut(SCD  (P))  computed  by  GRAPE  are  given 
in  Section  7.2.  The  generators  which  do  not  fix  the  process  identifier  9  are  not  valid 
for  P  since,  if  a  is  one  of  these  generators,  the  declarationpid  blocked_client 
-9  in  Pis  replaced  withpid  blocked 
-  client  =  a(9)  in  a(P),  and  a(9)  0  9, 
thus  a  (P)  0-  P.  The  other  generators  are  valid  for  P,  therefore: 
H=  ((78)(cllcl2),  (1112)(cl5cl6), 
(12)  (sel  se2),  (2  3)  (sel  se2» 
is  valid  for  P.  GAP  tells  US  that  jAut(SCD(P))j  =  288  and  IHI  =  24,  so  there 
are  jAut(SCV(P))j1jHj  =  12  cosets  of  H  in  Aut(SCD(P)).  We  can  use  GAP 
to  compute  representatives  al.  a2,  ...  all  for  the  11  cosets  of  H  in  Aut(SCD(P)) 
which  are  distinct  from  H.  We  find  that  the  first  nine  of  these  are  not  valid  for 
P,  but  alo  =  (4  6)(lbl  10)(7  11)(cll  c15)(8  12)(cI2  c16)  is  valid  for  P.  This  el- 
ement  is  added  to  the  generators  of  H,  and  we  find  IHI  =  48,  so  there  are  now 
JAW(SCV(P))  II  IHI  =6  cosets  of  H  in  Aut(SCV(P)).  However,  it  is  more  effi- 
cient  to  check  the  final  original  coset  representative  all  than  to  compute  and  check 
a  new  set  of  coset  representatives.  This  is  the  purpose  of  the  innermost  conditional 
statement  in  Algorithm  4.  We  find  that  all  is  not  valid  for  P,  thus: 
H=  ((78)(cllcl2),  (1112)(cl5cl6), 
(12)  (sei  se2),  (2  3)  (sei  se2), 
(4  6)  (Ibl  1b3)  (7  11)  (cll  c15)  (8  12)  (c12  c16» 
is  the  largest  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P))  which  is  valid  for  P. 
Algorithm  4  performsbadly  if  the  initial  group  H  is  small,  and  Aut(SCD(P)) 
very  large.  If  H  is  the  largest  valid  subgroup  then  (JAut(SCD(P))  I  11HI)  -1  coset 7.5:  GENERALISING  STATIC  CHANNEL  DIAGRAM  AUTOMORPHISMS,  134 
representatives  must  be  checked.  We  discuss  the  implementation  of  Algorithm  4, 
together  with  a  group  theoretic  optimisation,  in  Section  8.3.3. 
7.5  Generalising  static  Channel  Diagram  Automorphisms 
Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification  with  associated  model  M.  We  have  shown 
that  automorphisms  of  M  can  be  derived  from  the  group  Aut(SCD('P)).  We  now 
define  a  group  Aut('Y(P))  such  that  Aut(SCV(P))  :5  Aut('Y(P)),  and  show  that 
our  techniques  can  be  generalised  so  that  automorphisms  of  M  can  be  derived 
from  Aut(Y(P)). 
Definition  28  'T(P)  is  a  colouredgraphY(P)  =  (V,  OC)  where: 
V=  Vp  U  VC  is  the  set  ofprocess  identifiers  and  static  channel  names  in  P 
C  is  a  colouring  function  defined  by  C(v)  =  proctype(v)  if  vE  Vp,  and 
C(v)  =  sigizature(v)  if  vE  VC. 
The  graph  T(P)  could  be  obtained  from  SCD(P)  by  removing  all  of  the 
edges  of  SCD(P),  although  it  is  trivial  to  obtain  V  from  P.  The  group  Aut(T(P)) 
is  the  subgroup  of  Syni(V)  which  preserves  the  colouring  C,  i.  e.  Aut('Y(P))  =  lei  E 
SyM(V)  :  C(V)  =  C(a(v))  VVE  V}. 
The  techniques  presented  in  fl-ds  chapter  were  motivated  by  the  correspon- 
dence  between  channel  diagram  and  Kripke  structure  automorphisms  observed 
in  Chapter  4.  However,  if  Aut(SCD(P))  is  replaced  with  Aut('Y(P))  consistently 
throughout  Sections  7.3  and  7.4,  the  correspondence  result  still  holds,  and  Algo- 
rithm  4  can  be  used  to  find  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut('Y(P)). 
We  show  that  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut("Y(P))  is  the  same  as  the 
largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)): 
Theorem  15  Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification,  and  G  the  largest  subgroup  of 
Aut('Y(P))  which  is  valid  for  P.  Then  G  :ý  Aut(SCD(P))  and  G  is  the  largest 
subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P))  which  is  valid  for  P. 
Proof  T(P)  =  (V,  0,  C)  and  SC*D(P)  =  (V,  E,  C),  where  V=  Vp  U  VC.  Let  aEG. 
Suppose  a  V:  Aut(SCD(P)).  Since  aE  Aut('Y(P)),  a  preserves  the  colouring  C, 
therefore  there  must  be  an  edge  (U,  V)  EE  such  that  (a  (u),  a  (v))  ký  E.  By  definition 
of  SCD(P),  we  have  (u,  v)  =  (i,  c)  or  (u,  v)  =  (c,  i)  for  some  iE  Vp  and  CE  VC. 
Suppose  (u,  v)  =  (i,  c).  By  Definition  27  (Section  7.1)  there  is  a  proctype 
p  in  P  such  that  proctype(i)  =p  and  p  contains  a  statement  z  which  involves  a 
write  on  a  static  channel  c  or  on  a  local  variable  of  p  initialised  with  value  c  in  run 
statement  i.  Since  a(P)  =-  P,  the  statement  a(z)  (possibly  re-arranged)  also  appears 
in  proctype  p.  If  z  involves  a  write  on  static  channel  c  then  a  (z)  involves  a  write  on 7.6:  EXTENDING  THE  TECHNIQUES  135 
static  channel  a  (c).  If  z  involves  a  write  on  a  local  variable  of  p  initialised  with  value 
c  in  run  statement  i  then  a  (z)  involves  a  write  on  the  same  variable  which,  since 
a  (P)  =-  P,  is  initialised  with  value  a  (c)  in  run  statement  a  (i).  In  both  cases,  since 
proctype(a(i))  =  p,  (a  (i),  a  (c))  E  E.  If  (u,  v)  =  (ci)  then,  by  a  similar  argument, 
(it  (c),  a  (i))  E  E. 
This  is  a  contradiction,  so  we  must  have  (u,  v)  EE=:  ý-  (a  (u),  a  (V))  E  E,  i.  e. 
aE  Aut(SCD(P)).  The  result  follows.  N 
We  have  G<  Aut(SCV(P))  :!  ý  Aut('Y(P)),  where  G  is  the  largest  valid 
subgroup  of  Aut(IF(P)).  Since  Aut(SCD(P))  is  usually  smaller  than  Aut('Y(P))  it 
is  more  practical  to  search  for  G  in  Aut(SCD(P))  than  Aut('Y(P)).  For  example, 
let  P  be  the  loadbalancing  specification  (see  Figure  6.8).  Then  IF(P)  is  obtained  by 
removing  all  the  edges  from  SCD(P)  shown  in  Figure  7.1.  Any  permutation  which 
maps  a  process  /channel  node  coloured  with  a  given  proctype  name  or  channel  sig- 
nature  to  a  similarly  coloured  process/channel  node  is  an  automorphism  of  T(P). 
Using  GRAPE  we  find: 
Aut(Y(P))=  (  (12),  (23),  (45),  (56),  (78), 
(8  9),  (9  10),  (10  11),  (1112), 
(cI5  c16),  (c14  c15),  (c13  c14), 
(cl2  c13),  (cll  c12),  (lb2  10), 
(Ibl  lb2),  (se2  se3),  (sel  se2) 
and  jAut(T(P))  I=  671,846,400.  None  of  the  generators  of  Atit(ly(p))  are  valid 
for  P.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Section  7.4  we  showed  that  jAut(SCD(P))j  = 
288,  and  that  the  initial  valid  subgroup  generated  by  the  valid  generators  of 
Aut(SCD(P))  has  size  24.  The  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCE)(P))  (and  thus 
of  Aut(Y(P)))  was  shown  to  have  size  48.  Computing  within  Aut(SCD(P))  rather 
than  Aut(T(P))  reduces  the  problem  of  searching  the  whole  of  Aut('Y(P))  for  48 
elements  to  searching  a  small  set  of  coset  representatives  in  a  much  smaller  group. 
Aut(SCD(P))  can  be  thought  of  as  a  good  upper  bound  for  valid  symme- 
tries,  from  which  the  least  upper  bound  G  can  be  computed.  An  open  research 
problem  is  to  determine  whether  there  is  an  alternative  diagram  to  SCD(P),  F(P) 
say,  such  that  for  any  Promela-Lite  specification  P,  IF(P)  can  be  extracted  from  P 
in  polynomial  time  and  Aut(F(?  ))  =  G,  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut("Y(P)). 
7.6  Extending  the  Techniques 
The  Promela-Lite  syntax  and  type  system  place  fewer  restrictions  on  the  use 
of  pid  literals  and  expressions  than  those  associated  with  scalarset  variables  in 
Muro/SymmSpin  (see  Definition  22,  Section  3.3-2),  or  index  variables  in  SMC  (see 7.6:  EXTENDING  THE  TECHNIQUES  136 
Guards  (ctd.  ) 
r-e:  pid-  rý-aEJO,  1,...,  ný  V4EJ<,  <=,  >,  >=j  (T-RELATIONAL-PID-LIT) 
FFeD<aOK 
rFe:  pid  r  ý-  aE  10,  nj  NE  J<,  <=,  >,  >=I  (T-RELATIONAL-LIT-PID) 
F  ý-  a  Doe  OK 
Figure  7.3:  Typing  rules  to  allow  pid  expressions  to  be  compared  with  literal  values 
using  relational  operators. 
Section  3.3.3).  In  particular,  literal  pid  values  can  be  referred  to  explicitly  in  expres- 
sions  and  updates.  However,  relational  and  arithmetic  operations  involving  pid  ex- 
pressions  are  still  not  allowed.  The  techniques  presented  in  this  chapter  can  handle 
arbitrary  kinds  of  symmetry  which  arise  from  the  static  channel  diagram  of  a  spec- 
ification,  but  symmetry  between  global  variables  cannot  be  detected,  and  the  check 
for  validity  of  static  channel  diagram  automorphisms,  is  not  as  sophisticated  as  it 
could  be. 
We  now  outline  some  ways  in  which  certain  restrictions  on  the  use  of  pid 
expressions  can  be  relaxed,  and  sketch  how  the  static  channel  diagram  can  be  ex- 
tended  to  allow  symmetries  between  global  variables  to  be  captured.  We  then  illus- 
trate  the  conservative  nature  of  our  validity  check. 
7.6.1  Allowing  relational  operators  with  pid  arguments 
Since  lit(pid)  is  a  finite  set  of  integers  Q0,1,...,  n}),  if  e  is  an  expression  with 
e:  pid  and  aE  {O,  n},  the  guard  e<a  can  be  re-written  as  a  disjunction: 
(e==OJJe==1JJ  ...  e==a  -  1)  (where  a-1  denotes  a  value  rather  than  an  arith- 
metic  expression).  The  guards  e>a,  e<=a,  e>=a,  a<e,  a>e,  a<=e  and  a>=e 
can  be  expanded  in  a  similar  way. 
Suppose  we  extend  the  type  system  to  include  the  typing  rules  given  in  Fig- 
ure  7.3.  These  rules  allow  expressions  of  pid  type  to  be  compared  relationally  with 
pid  literals.  Let  P'  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification  which  is  well-typed  in  this  ex- 
tended  type  system.  Let  P  be  the  specification  obtained  from  P'  by  expanding  ev- 
ery  guard  exa  or  axe  (where  e:  pid  is  either  a  variable  name  or  _pid,  and 
aE  10,1,... 
,  n})  using  the  method  described  above.  Clearly  P'  is  a  Promela-Lite 
specification  which  is  well-typed  with  respect  to  the  original  type  system,  and  P' 
and  P  have  identical  associated  models.  Thus  our  symmetry  detection  techniques 
can  be  applied  to  P  to  obtain  a  group  of  static  channel  diagram  automorphisms 
suitable  for  symmetry  reduction  when  model  checking  P'. 
This  straightforward  expansion  technique  makes  Promela-Lite  less  restric- 
tive  and  so  allows  our  automatic  symmetry  detection  techniques  to  apply  to  a 
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7.6.2  Symmetrically  invariant  operations 
The  Promela-Lite  type  system  prohibits  the  use  of  process  identifiers  in  arithmetic 
operations  (rule  T-ARITH).  This  restriction  is  typical  of  techniques  for  symmetry 
identification  (see  Sections  3.3.2  and  3.3.3).  However,  as  discussed  in  Section  4.6.1 
for  the  hypercube  example,  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  arithmetic  operations 
of  this  kind  destroy  symmetry. 
An  arithmetic  operation  involving  only  literal  integers  and  pid  variables 
XliX2i  ...  I  Xk  can  be  thought  of  as  a  function  f  (xi,  X2.  ...  i  Xk).  Given  an  element  aE 
Aut(SCD(?  )),  if  k  is  small  then  it  is  feasible  to  check  whether  a  (f  (a,,  a2,  ...  1170)  _" 
f  (a(aj),  a(a2).  -..,  a(ak))  for  every  combination  of  values  ai  E  11,2,...,  n}.  If  this 
is  true  we  say  that  f  is  itivariant  under  a. 
For  example,  in  a  uni-directional  ring  network  with  five  processes,  the  up- 
date  next  =  (current  %-  5)  +1  could  be  used  to  find  the  neighbour  or  the  process 
identified  by  ctirrent.  Let  aE  Aut(SCV(P))  have  the  form  (1  234  5)A,  where 
A  is  a  permutation  of  static  channels.  It  is  easy  to  check  that,  for  any  value  of 
curretit  E  11,2,3,4,5},  &((curreizt%5)  +  1)  =  (a(current)%5  +  1). 
Suppose  we  extend  the  type  system  to  allow  an  update  of  the  form  x 
f(XlýX21 
...  i  Xk)  where  X.  X1  f ...  i  Xk  are  pid  variables,  as  long  as  the  enclosing  state- 
ment  has  a  guard  of  the  form  g  &&  xi  I=0  &&  X2!  =0  &&  ...  &&  Xk  I=  0.  This  ensures 
that  the  operation  f  is  not  applied  to  arguments  which  have  the  value  0,  which  rep- 
resents  a  default  pid  value. 
If  P  is  well-typed  according  to  the  extended  type  system,  we  can  replace  a 
statement  of  the  form  atomic  {g  &&  xi  I  =0  &&  X21  =0  &&  ...  &&  Xk!  =0  -1  ...  ; 
X=f  (X1oX21 
---i  Xk);  ... 
I  (where  X.  X1i  ...  i  Xk  are  variables  with  type  pid)  with  Ilk 
distinct  statements,  each  of  the  form: 
atomic  g  &&  xl==al  &&  X2==a2  &&  ...  &&  Xk==ak 
...  ;xf  (a,,  a2,  ....  ak)  ;  ... 
} 
where  ai  E  11,2,.  it  1  (1  <i<  n)  and  f  (a,,  a2,  ak)  is  the  value  of  f  for  this 
input.  Since  f  only  involves  the  xi  and  constant  values,  this  value  can  be  statically 
computed  for  each  statement.  If  the  resulting  specification  is  well-typed  according 
to  the  original  type  system  (i.  e.  if  each  value  f(al,  a21...,  ak)  E  lit(pid))  then  the 
standard  symmetry  detection  technique  can  be  applied.  In  this  case  the  complexity 
of  checking  whether  a  is  valid  for  P  is  still  polynomial  in  the  size  of  P,  but  the  size 
of  P  is  now  0  (Ilk)  where  k  is  the  highest  arity  of  any  arithmetic  function  involving 
pid  variables.  Using  the  above  example,  the  statement: 
atomic  Ig  &&  current  0->  next  =(current%5)+I;  ... 
is  replaced  by  five  statements: 
atomic  g  &&  current==1  next  =  2;  ... 
atomic  g  &&  current==2  next  =  3;  ... 
atomic  g  &&  current==3  next  =  4;  ... 7.6:  EXTENDING  THE  TECHNIQUES  138 
atomic  g  &&  current==4  next  =  5;  ... 
atomic  g  &&  current==5  next  =  1;  ... 
Clearly  this  approach  is  not  practical  if  k  is  large,  in  which  case  more  sophis- 
ticated  techniques  are  required. 
7.6.3  Capturing  symmetry  between  global  variables 
If  global  variables  are  used  for  communication  in  a  specification  P  then  automor- 
phisms  of  the  associated  model  M  may  arise  due  to  permutations  of  the  variables. 
The  symmetry  detection  techniques  presented  earlier  cannot  handle  this  kind  of 
symmetry,  since  the  static  channel  diagram  SCD(P)  does  not  capture  the  relation- 
sl-dp  between  processes  and  global  variables. 
We  now  sketch  an  extension  of  our  technique  to  deal  with  this  kind  of  sym- 
metry,  based  on  the  notion  of  an  extended  static  channel  diagram.  For  a  Promela-Lite 
specification  P,  let  VG  denote  the  set  of  global  variable  names  for  P. 
Definition  29  Let  SCD(P)  =  (V',  E',  C')  be  the  static  channel  diagram  associated 
with  P.  The  extended  static  channel  diagram  associated  with  P  is  a  coloured,  tripartite 
digraphl  ESCD  (P)  =  (V,  E,  C)  where: 
9V=  Vp  U  VC  U  VG  is  the  set  of  process  identifiers,  static  channel  names  and 
global  variable  names  in  P 
"  Ife  E  E'  thene  EE 
"  For  iE  Vp,  xE  VG  and  proctype(i)  =  p, 
-  (i,  X)  EE  iff  p  has  an  update  of  the  form  x=e 
-  (X,  i)  EE  iff  p  has  an  update  of  the  form  y=e  where  the  expression  e 
refers  to  global  variable  x 
"C  is  a  colouring  function  defined  by  C(v)  =  C'(V)  if  VE  V',  and  C(v) 
type  (V)  if  VE  VG  - 
This  definition  is  identical  to  Definition  27  (Section  7.1)  except  that  SSCD  ('P) 
includes  nodes  for  global  variables,  and  edges  between  process  identifiers  and 
global  variables.  An  edge  from  a  process  identifier  to  a  global  variable  node  is  in- 
cluded  if  the  process  can  potentially  update  the  variable;  an  edge  from  a  global 
variable  node  to  a  process  identifier  is  included  if  the  result  of  an  update  made  by 
the  process  can  potentially  be  affected  by  the  value  of  the  variable. 
TI-ic  group  Aut(ESCD(P))  is  the  set  of  all  automorphisms  of  the  di- 
rected,  coloured  graph  ESCD(P)  (see  Definition  19,  Section  3.1.5).  Given  aE 
Aut(ESCD  (P)),  the  definition  of  a  (P)  is  similar  to  the  case  where  aE  SCD  (P),  ex- 
cept  that  each  applied  occurrence  of  a  global  variable  name  x  in  P  is  replaced  with 
1.  The  definition  of  a  tripartite  digraph  is  a  natural  extension  of  the  definition  of  a  bipartite  digraph 
given  in  Section  3.1.5. 7.6:  EXTENDING  THE  TECHNIQUES  139 
&(x)  in  a(P),  a  declaration  int  x=  init(x)  is  replaced  with  int  x=  init(a(x)),  and 
a  declaration  pid  x=  iWt(x)  is  replaced  with  pid  x=  a(init(&(x))). 
If  M=  (S,  so,  R)  is  the  model  associated  with  P,  the  action  of  Aut(ESCD  (P)) 
on  S  is  similar  to  that  of  Aut(SCD(P)),  except  that  if  x  is  a  global  variable  then 
a((x  =  a))  =  (a(x)  =  a)  if  x:  int,  and  a((x  =  a))  =  (a(x)  =  a(a))  if  x:  pid. 
The  statements  and  proofs  of  Lemmas  1  and  2  and  Theorem  13  are  readily 
adapted  to  show  that,  for  aE  Aut(ESCV(P)),  if  a(P)  =-  P  then  p(a)  E  Aut(M). 
It  is  trivial  to  modify  the  computational  group  theoretic  approach  of  Section  7.4  in 
order  to  compute  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(ESCD(P)). 
7.6.4  Extending  the  notion  of  validity 
In  the  following  example  we  show  that  our  notion  of  validity  may  be  unneces- 
sarily  restrictive.  Let  P  be  a  Promela-Lite  specification  with  associated  model  M, 
pa  proctype  of  P,  x,  y,  z  local  variables  of  p  with  x:  pid  and  y,  z  :  int,  and 
aE  Aut(SCD(P)).  Suppose  a  maps  2  to  1  and  1  to  2,  and  a(P)  =-  P,  so  that 
p(a)  E  Aut(M). 
Assume  that  the  body  of  p  begins  with  the  fonowing  two  statements: 
atomic  x==l  &&  y1  =3  &&  z1  =4  ->  x=O; 
atomic  x==2  &&  y1  =3  &&  z!  =4  ->  x=O; 
so  that  the  body  of  p  in  a  (P)  begins  with  the  same  statements  in  a  different  order. 
Clearly  we  can  re-write  these  statements  as  follows: 
atomic  x==1  &&  y!  =3  &&  z1  =4  ->  x=O; 
atomic  x==2  &&  (!  (y==3  II  z==4)  )  ->  x=O; 
without  changing  M.  In  this  case,  we  still  have  p  (a)  E  Aut(M).  However,  the  body 
of  p  in  a  (P)  now  begins  with  the  statements: 
atomic  {x==2  &&yl=3  &&ZI=4  ->X=O;  } 
atomic  I  x==1  &&  (I  (y==3  11  Z==4)  )  ->  X=O; 
Assuming  that  P  does  not  happen  to  also  include  these  statements,  the  bodies  of  p 
in  P  and  a  (p)  are  not  the  same  up  to  re-arrangement,  i.  e.  a  (P)  #  (P). 
Nevertheless,  our  approach  to  checking  the  validity  of  elements  is  safe  and 
fast,  and  is  sufficient  for  most  sensibly  written  specifications.  It  would  be  possible 
to  extend  our  techniques  to  employ  a  more  sophisticated  equivalence  check,  e.  g.  by 
using  a  theorem  prover. 
Summary 
We  have  defined  the  static  chamiel  diagram  SCD(P)  associated  with  a  Promela-Lite 
specification  P,  and  shown  that  it  can  be  efficiently  computed  via  a  single  pass  of 
P.  After  defining  a  group  action  of  the  automorphism  group  Aut(SCD(P))  on  the 
states  S  of  M,  the  model  associated  with  P,  we  have  proved  that  there  is  a  largest 7.6:  EXTENDING  THE  TECHNIQUES  140 
valid  subgroup  G  :5  Aut(SCD(P))  for  which  p(G)  :ý  Aut(M),  where  p  is  the 
permutation  representation  of  the  group  action.  Furthermore,  we  have  presented 
a  computational  group  theoretic  algorithm  for  computing  the  group  G.  This  tech- 
nique  allows  a  subgroup  of  Aut(M)  to  be  efficientlY  derived  from  the  specification 
P,  to  be  subsequently  used  for  symmetry  reduction. 
We  have  shown  that  our  teclu-dque  can  be  generalised  to  apply  to  any  sub- 
group  of  Aut("Y(P)),  but  that  Aut(SCD(P))  can  be  a  good  candidate  group  for 
efficient  symmetry  detection.  We  have  discussed  extensions  to  the  approach  which 
allow  certain  relational  and  arithmetic  operations  involving  process  identifier  vari- 
ables,  and  the  detection  of  symmetry  between  global  variables.  In  addition,  we 
have  suggested  how  the  notion  of  valid  automorphisms  could  be  extended. Chapter  8 
SymmExtractor  -  an  Automatic  Symmetry  Detection  Tool  for 
Promela 
In  this  chapter  we  describe  SymmExtractor,  an  automated  symmetry  detection  tool 
for  Promela  which  we  have  developed,  based  on  the  static  channel  diagram  anal- 
ysis  techniques  of  Chapter  7.  After  providing  an  overview  of  the  tool,  we  discuss 
the  restrictions  on  the  form  of  a  Promela.  specification  which  must  be  satisfied  be- 
fore  SymmExtractor  can  be  applied.  We  then  discuss  two  problems  related  to  type- 
checking  which  SymmExtractor  solves:  how  to  deduce  the  type  of  an  incompletely 
specified  channel  in  order  to  check  the  validity  of  static  channel  diagram  automor- 
phisms,  and  how  to  convert  recursive  channel  types  to  a  canonical  form  to  allow 
comparison  when  constructing  a  static  channel  diagram. 
We  discuss  the  way  in  which  the  GAP  and  saucy  tools  are  used  to  com- 
pute  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)),  and  provide  experimental  results 
showing  how  SymmExtractor  performs  on  a  variety  of  specifications  based  on  the 
motivating  examples  of  Chapter  4. 
In  order  to  assess  the  practical  feasibility  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by 
SymmExtractor  we  have  carried  out  a  user  study,  applying  SymmExtractor  to  a 
set  of  Promela  examples  written  as  solutions  to  two  student  assessed  exercises. 
We  present  the  results  of  this  evaluation,  which  highlight  some  mismatches  be- 
tween  the  restrictions  imposed  by  SymmExtractor  and  the  specification  styles  used 
in  practical  Promela  examples. 
8.1  An  Overview  of  SymmExtractor 
SymmExtractor  is  a  Java  program  based  on  a  Promela  parser  generated  using  the 
SableCC  compiler  generation  framework  [621.  The  Promela.  grammar  is  adapted 
from  a  BNF  grammar  presented  in  [92],  with  the  SPIN  source  code  used  to  resolve 
ambiguity  in  the  grammar  specification. 
The  abstract  syntax  tree  representation  of  the  input  specification  is  type- 
checked,  and  type  reconstruction  is  used  to  obtain  the  fun  types  of  all  chan- 
nels  in  the  specification.  Reconstructed  channel  types  which  are  recursive  are  then 8.1:  AN  OVERVTEW  OF  SYMMEXTRACTOR  142 
pr  octype  Pr 
! 
octype 
Promela 
Spec. 
SableCC  parser  Type  reconstruction 
link  result  link:  clumimtype;  result  :  mtvpc 
Syntax  tree  Typed  syntax  tree 
Valid  subgroup 
H 
GAP 
G 
Aut(SCD(P))  - 
saucil 
-  mr 
ý-ý 
Largest  subgroup  of 
Aut  (SCD  (P))  which  is  valid 
for  symmetry  reduction 
AM& 
Static  channel  diagram 
SCD('P) 
Figure  8.1:  The  automatic  symmetry  detection  processes  used  by  SymmExtractor. 
converted  to  a  minimised  canonical  form.  The  typed  abstract  syntax  tree  is  then 
checked  to  see  whether  it  satisfies  certain  restrictions  imposed  by  the  theory  of 
Chapter  7.  If  these  restrictions  are  satisfied  then  the  static  channel  diagram  SCD('P) 
for  the  specification  P  is  derived,  and  its  automorphisms  are  computed  using  the 
saucy  program  [371.  Algorithm  4  of  Section  7.4  is  then  used  to  compute  the  largest 
subgroup  of  Aut(,  5CD(P))  which  is  valid  forP.  Checking  validity  depends  on  the 
reconstructed  type  information  obtained  by  SymmExtractor,  and  GAI,  is  used  to 
calculate  sets  of  coset  representatives. 
The  automatic  symmetry  detection  process  is  summarised  in  Figure  8.1.  The 
SymmExtractor  implementation  is  embedded  in  our  symmetry  reduction  package 
TopSPIN  (see  Chapter  11),  and  is  available  online.  Instructions  on  how  to  use  Symm- 
Extractor  are  included  in  the  TopSi'IN  manual,  Appendix  C.  2.  We  discuss  various 
aspects  of  our  automatic  symmetry  detection  process  in  the  remainder  of  this  chap- 
ter. 
8.1.1  Summary  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by  SymmExtractor 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  6,  Promela  includes  a  number  of  language  features  which 
are  not  included  in  Promela-Lite.  Most  of  these  features  could  be  handled  by  a 
straightforward  extension  of  the  results  of  Chapter  7,  and  are  therefore  supported 
by  SymmExtractor.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  certain  features  of  Promela  for 
which  the  theory  of  Chapter  7  cannot  obviously  be  extended.  These  features  are 
not  supported  by  SymmExtractor. 
Appendix  C.  ]  provides  a  detailed  summary  of  non-Promela  -Lite  features 
which  SymmExtractordoes  and  does  not  support.  We  now  summarise  the  restric- 8.2:  TYPECHECKING  PROMELA  143 
tions  on  the  form  of  a  Promela  specification  which  SymmExtractor  requires,  and 
automaticallY  checks: 
1.  The  ini  t  process  must  have  the  form 
init  I 
atomic 
run  (name)j(... 
run  (nameY-); 
run  (name),,  (... 
(statement-list,  ';  ') 
(statement-list, 
The  fist  (statemetit-list,  ';  ')of  statements  within  the  atomic  block  must  con- 
sist  of  assignments  of  literal  values  to  distinct  variables.  This  is  explained  in 
Section  8.3.2.  The  it  run  statements  must  be  the  only  run  statements  occur- 
ring  in  the  specification. 
2.  All  global  channel  declarations  must  include  a  channel  initialiser  (see  Sec- 
tion  2.4.1),  and  names  of  global  channels  must  be  treated  as  constants. 
3.  Variables  of  type  pid  must  only  be  assigned  to  values  in  the  range  10,1, 
...,  n}, 
to  other  pid  variables  or  to  the 
_pid  constant,  and  may  not  be  used  as 
operands  to  arithmetic  operators. 
4.  An  array  must  either  be  indexed  by  pid  variables  and  literal  values  in 
the  range  10,  n},  or  by  byte  variables  and  literal  values  in  the  range 
10,1,. 
..,  255}.  The  former  case  is  only  permissible  if  the  array  is  declared 
with  size  it  +  1. 
5.  The  assignment  x=y,  where  x  and  y  are  chait  variables,  is  only  permissible 
if  x  and  y  have  the  same  channel  type  and  x  is  not  a  static  channel.  Similarly, 
supplying  a  chatz  variable  x  as  a  send/receive  argument  to  a  channel  is  only 
permissible  if  the  type  of  x  matches  the  corresponding  field  type  for  the 
channel  (and  in  the  receive  case,  x  must  not  be  a  static  channel). 
In  Section  8.5  we  investigate  the  implications  of  these  restrictions  in  practice  by 
studying  a  set  of  Promela  specifications  written  as  solutions  to  student  assessed 
exercises. 
8.2  Typechecking  Promela 
When  designing  Promela-Lite,  to  case  presentation  of  our  theoretical  results  we  in- 
cluded  notation  for  fully  specifying  channel  types,  and  for  defining  recursive  types. 
In  Promela,  the  type  of  a  first-class  channel  can  only  be  partially  specified  using  a 8.2:  TYPECHECKING  PROMELA  144 
chan  A-  [I]  of  (chan); 
chan  B-  (11  of  (pid,  int); 
proctype  00  ( 
chan  C; 
A?  C, 
C13,4, 
proctype  Ro 
AIB; 
Figure  8.2:  Promela  example  where  type  information  is  partially  specified. 
channel  initialiser,  and  while  recursive  types  cannot  be  explicitly  declared,  they  can 
be  used  implicitly  as  we  demonstrate  in  Section  8.2.2. 
We  now  show  that  full  type  information  for  a  Promela  specification  can  be 
obtained  using  type  reconstructioti,  and  that  resulting  recursive  types  can  be  stored 
canonically  via  a  minimisation  process.  This  complete  type  information  allows  the 
theoretical  results  of  Chapter  7  to  be  applied  to  Promela  specifications. 
8.2.1  Reconstructing  channel  types 
As  noted  in  Section  6.4,  a  key  difference  between  Promela-Lite  and  Promela  is  that 
channel  types  in  Promela-Lite  are  fully  specified,  whereas  certain  Promela  channel 
types  are  only  partially  specified. 
Consider  a  Promela  specification  P  which  includes  the  fragment  of  code 
shown  in  Figure  8.2.  The  local  variable  C  of  Q  is  declared  to  be  a  channel,  but  the 
type  of  messages  it  accepts  is  unspecified.  Messages  for  channel  A  are  references 
to  channels,  but  the  type  of  these  channels  is  not  specified  in  the  initialiser  for  A. 
The  type  for  channel  B  is  fully  specified  -B:  chan  1pid,  int}.  A  value  for  C  is  ob- 
tained  via  the  statement  A?  C,  by  which  C  is  assigned  to  some  global  channel  name 
which  has  been  sent  on  A  by  another  process  (an  instantiation  of  proctype  R,  for 
example).  Let  a=  (3  4).  We  cannot  deduce  the  form  of  a  (P)  without  knowing  the 
complete  type  of  C.  If  C:  chan  (pid,  pid}  then  the  statement  'C  !  3,4'  is  replaced  in 
a  (P)  with  'C  Ia  (3),  a(4)',  i.  e.  'C!  4,3'.  On  the  other  hand  if  B:  chan1pid,  int}  then 
the  corresponding  statement  in  a(P)  is'C  I  a(3),  4',  i.  e.  'C  14,4'. 
Complete  type  information  for  A  and  therefore  C  can  be  obtained  using 
constraint-based  type  reconstruction  (also  known  as  type  inference)  [141].  We  explain 
this  process  using  the  Promela  fragment  of  Figure  8.2. 
The  channel  type  information  which  is  available  from  the  specification  is 
recorded,  and  is  annotated  with  type  variables  Xj,  iEN,  which  record  missing 
type  information,  as  shown  in  the  top  left  panel  of  Figure  8.3. 
Each  time  a  channel  name  is  used  for  communication  in  the  specification,  a 
constraint  is  posted.  For  example,  the  statement  A?  C  implies  that  channel  A  must 8.2:  TYPECHECKING  PROMELA  145 
accept  single-field  messages  where  the  field  has  the  same  type  as  C.  We  know  al- 
ready  that  A  accepts  single  type  messages  of  type  chan  X1,1  and  we  know  that 
C:  clum  X2,  so  we  can  post  the  constraint  chan  X2  =  chan  X1.  Constraints  are  posted 
similarly  for  the  other  communication  statements.  We  use  the  notation  pidlint  to 
denote  a  type  which  is  either  int  or  pid,  and  use  this  notation  to  handle  the  literal 
values  3  and  4  which  (out  of  context)  can  be  assigned  either  type.  The  constraints 
for  our  example,  together  with  the  statements  from  which  they  arise,  are  shown  in 
the  top  right  panel  of  Figure  8.3. 
The  resulting  system  of  constraints  is  then  solved  using  a  process  known  as 
unification.  This  process  checks  whether  the  system  is  consistent,  and  if  so  provides 
concrete  values  for  type  variables.  If  we  attempt  to  unify  the  constraints  X2  =  X1, 
X2  =  lpidlint,  pidlint}  and  X,  =  lpid,  int},  then  since  X2  is  a  tuple  of  size  2,  X, 
must  also  be  a  tuple  of  size  2.  Furthermore,  each  entry  of  the  tuple  for  X2  must 
match  the  corresponding  entry  in  X1.  This  is  the  case  since  pidlint  matches  pid  in 
the  first  case,  and  pidlint  matches  int  in  the  second.  Since  X1  =  lpid,  int}  is  a  stricter 
constraint  than  X2  =  lpid  lint,  pidlint},  lpid,  int}  is  taken  as  a  concrete  value  for  X1 
and  X2.  The  unification  process  is  illustrated  in  the  middle  panel  of  Figure  8.3. 
If  the  constraints  shown  in  Figure  8.3  are  the  only  constraints  which  arise 
from  P  relating  to  channels  A,  B  and  C,  then  the  complete  types  for  A,  B  and  C  are 
reconstructed  as  shown  at  the  bottom  of  the  figure,  by  substituting  type  variables 
for  their  concrete  values.  Armed  with  this  additional  type  information,  with  a= 
(3  4)  as  above,  we  can  unambiguously  assert  that  the  statement  'C!  3,4'  should 
be  replaced  with  'C  14,4'  in  a  (P).  This  example  shows  that  type  reconstruction  is 
critical  to  our  automatic  symmetry  detection  techniques. 
Unification  fails  when  the  system  of  constraints  is  inconsistent:  in  this  case 
the  unification  process  should  stop  and  report  a  type  error.  Unification  of  consistent 
constraints  may  not  provide  a  concrete  value  for  all  type  variables  if,  for  example, 
a  channel  is  never  used.  If  we  declare  chan  A=[  11  of  I  chan},  but  never  use  A, 
then  A  will  be  assigned  the  type  chanjchan  Y}  where  Y  is  a  type  variable,  but  no 
constraints  relating  to  Y  will  be  posted.  For  the  purposes  of  automatic  symmetry 
detection  we  can  simply  assign  Y=  lint}  in  this  case. 
For  a  more  general  description  of  constraint-based  type  reconstruction,  see 
[141].  Our  implementation  is  based  on  an  algorithm  described  in  [1]. 
8.2.2  Dealing  with  recursive  types 
Let  P  be  a  Promela  specification.  Recall  from  Definition  27,  Section  7.1,  that  two 
channel  nodes  in  the  static  channel  diagram  for  P  are  coloured  the  same  if  they 
1.  Note  that  the  type  expression  dian  X,  denotes  a  channel  with  accepts  a  tuple  of  messages,  where 
both  the  arity  of  the  tuple  and  the  type  of  each  message  field  are  unknown.  This  is  different  from 
the  expression  dian  [XI  a  channel  with  this  type  accepts  messages  comprised  of  a  single  field  of 
unknown  type. 8.2:  TYPECHECKING  PROMELA  146 
Initial  type  information,  Constraints  posted  based 
annotated  with  type  variables  on  channel  usage 
A:  clian1clian  Xj}  A?  C  --+  chan  X2  =  chan  X, 
B  chanlpid,  int}  C?  3,4  X2  =  1pidlint,  pidlint} 
C  clian  X2  I  AIB  chanXj=chanjpidjntj 
Solution  to  system  of  constraints 
chan  X2  =  chan  X1  A  X2  =  lpidlint,  pidlint}  A  chan  X,  =  chanfpidint} 
X2  =  XI  A  X2  =  lpidlint,  pidlint}  A  X1  =  1pid,  int} 
X,  =  X2  =  1pid,  intj 
Reconstructed  channel  types 
A:  chanjcIianjpid,  int}}  B:  chanlpid,  int}  C:  chanfpid,  int} 
Figure  8.3:  Type  reconstruction  for  a  simple  example. 
have  the  same  channel  signature.  In  order  to  construct  the  colouring  function  asso- 
ciated  with  SCD  (P)  it  is  necessary  to  be  able  to  compare  channel  types  for  equality. 
TI-ds  is  straightforward,  unless  the  types  are  recursive  (see  Section  6.1.2).  Al- 
though  Promela  does  not  include  syntax  for  specifying  recursive  channel  types, 
they  can  be  implied  by  channel  usage.  Consider  the  channel  declaration  chan  A= 
[11  of  (chan},  and  the  statement  A!  A.  Using  constraint-based  type  reconstruc- 
tion,  we  record  that  A:  clzanIchaii  X}  from  the  declaration  of  A,  where  X  is  a  type 
variable.  We  then  post  the  constraint  X=  Ichan  X}  according  to  the  statement 
AIA.  Since  X  appears  on  both  sides  of  this  equation,  X  is  defined  recursively.  We 
can  assign  to  A  the  recursive  type  rec  X.  chan  I  X}.  This  kind  of  channel  usage  has 
been  employed  in  realistic  Promela  specifications,  e.  g.  a  specification  of  a  telephone 
system  [20]. 
Due  to  the  manner  in  which  type  reconstruction  works,  we  may  end  up  with 
the  same  recursive  type  appearing  in  many  different  forms.  Suppose  that  a  specifi- 
cation  includes  channels  A,  B  and  C,  and  that  after  applying  type  reconstruction 
we  find  A:  recX.  chanjXint},  B:  chanfchanfrecX.  chanIX,  int},  int},  int}  and 
C:  rec  X.  clian  jcliaii  {chan  JX,  int},  ffit},  ffit}.  The  types  for  A,  B  and  C  are  an  the 
same,  and  are  intuitively  represented  by  the  infinite  tree  shown  in  Figure  6.2,  Sec- 
tion  6.1.2. 
In  order  to  compare  recursive  types  for  equality,  we  first  convert  them  to 
a  minimal,  canonical  form.  This  is  achieved  using  an  algorithm  for  minimisation 
of  deterministic  finite  automata  [122].  The  algorithm  requires  a  type  to  be  rep- 
resented  as  a  directed  graph;  this  is  illustrated  on  the  left  of  Figure  8.4  for  the 
type  cliaii  Ichaii  frec  X.  clia?  iIX,  iizt},  int},  int}.  The  largest  bisimulation  on  this  graph 
is  then  computed.  This  relation  partitions  the  graph  nodes  into  equivalence  classes. 
The  type  graph  for  the  minimised  type  expression  is  the  quotient  graph  with  re- 8.3:  OBTAINING  STATIC  CHANNEL  DIAGRAM  AUTOMORPHISMS  147 
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Figure  8.4:  Minimisation  of  the  recursive  type  chanfchan{recX.  chanIXint},  int},  int}. 
spect  to  the  bisimulation  equivalence  relation,  shown  on  the  right  of  Figure  8.4. 
As  we  have  explained,  recursive  type  minimisation  is  necessary  for  static 
channel  diagram  extraction.  In  addition,  when  a  Promela  specification  is  not  well- 
typed,  minimising  recursive  type  expressions  can  make  type  error  messages  easier 
to  understand. 
8.3  Obtaining  Static  Channel  Diagram  Automorphisms  from  a 
Promela  Specification 
Given  a  Promela  specification  P,  the  static  channel  diagram  SCD(P)  is  defined 
analogously  to  the  static  channel  diagram  for  a  Promela-Lite  specification  (Defini- 
tion  27,  Section  7.1).  SCD(P)  can  be  extracted  from  P  in  linear  time,  as  discussed 
in  Section  7.1.1. 
8.3.1  Computing  Aut(SCD(P)) 
For  illustration  in  Chapter  5  we  used  the  GRAPE  package  to  compute  static  channel 
diagram  automorphisms.  GRAPE  interfaces  with  the  nauty  graph  automorphism 
package[126]. 
For  efficiency  and  ease  of  implementation,  SymmExtractor  uses  saucy  [37], 
a  graph  automorphism  program  based  on  nauty,  to  compute  Aut(SCD(P)).  We 
chose  sa  ucy  over  na  u  ty  as  we  found  it  easier  to  program  with.  Additionally,  sa  ucy 
has  been  shown  to  perform  better  than  nauty  when  applied  to  large,  sparse  graphs 
[37].  We  have  found  that  static  channel  diagrams  are  typically  sparse  (though  they 
may  not  be  large).  Our  implementation  uses  a  prototype  extension  of  saucy  which 
can  handle  directed  graphs  (personal  communication,  P.  Darga.  and  I.  L.  Markov, 
2007). 
8.3.2  Checking  the  validity  of  an  element  of  Aut(SCD(P)) 
As  discussed  in  Section  8.2.1,  application  of  an  element  aE  Aut(SCD(P))  to  P 
requires  information  about  the  types  of  message  arguments  to  channel  variables 
which  may  not  be  directly  available  from  the  specification.  This  information  is 
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The  notion  of  validity  for  Promela  specifications  is  slightly  different  to  that 
for  Promela-Lite  specifications.  Promela  specifications  P,  and  P2  are  equivalent 
if  they  are  identical  up  to  re-arrangement  of  operators  to  commutative  operands, 
options  in  do  ...  od  statements,  options  in  if  ...  fi  statements,  and  statements 
which  appear  after  the  run  statements  in  the  init  I  atomic  I 
... 
}}  block. 
Each  of  these  statements  assigns  a  distinct  variable  to  a  literal  value  (see  Sec- 
tion8.1.1),  and  theyare  enclosed  in  anatomic  block,  so  their  order  does  not  matter. 
The  intended  use  of  these  statements  is  for  initialising  pid-indexed  arrays,  such  as 
the  array  of  priority  levels  in  the  resource  allocator  example  (see  Section  4.4). 
Once  the  specification  a  (P)  has  been  obtained,  checking  whether'P  =-  a  (P) 
involves  an  in-order  traversal  of  the  abstract  syntax  tree  for  each  specification, 
sorting  the  operands  to  commutative  operators  and  the  options  of  do.  ..  od  and 
if  ...  fi  statements,  and  sorting  the  initilisation  statements  described  above.  If 
P  =-  a  (P)  then  the  specifications  should  be  identical  after  this  normalisation  pro- 
cess  has  been  applied. 
8.3.3  Using  GAP  to  compute  the  largest  valid  subgroup 
In  order  to  compute  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCV(P)),  SymmExtractor 
uses  a  GAP  implementation  of  Algorithm  4  (Section  7.4).  The  Java  and  GAP  COM- 
ponents  of  SymmExtractor  communicate  using  redirected  standard  input  and  out- 
put.  Given  a  group  G  and  a  subgroup  H  of  G,  GAP  provides  a  function  to  effi- 
ciently  compute  right  coset  representatives  of  H  in  G.  The  number  of  generators  of 
Aut(SCD(P))  is  typically  small,  and  so  initial  generators  for  the  valid  group  H  are 
found  quickly  by  checking  each  generator  of  Aut(SCD(P))  for  validity  against  the 
specification  P. 
As  discussed  in  Section  7.4,  Algorithm  4  performs  badly  if  the  initial  group 
H  is  small,  and  Aut(SCD(P))  is  very  large.  Our  implementation  includes  a  heuris- 
tic  which  can  be  applied  to  try  to  combat  this  problem.  If  the  size  of  the  initial 
valid  subgroup  H  can  be  increased,  fewer  coset  representatives  need  to  be  con- 
sidered.  An  initial  approach  for  increasing  the  size  of  H  involved  taking  a  set  A 
of  random  elements  of  Aut(SCD(P))  \H  and  checking  the  validity  of  each  ele- 
ment  of  A  against  P,  adding  the  valid  ones  to  the  generators  of  H.  However,  when 
Aut(SCD(P))  is  large,  the  probability  of  a  random  element  being  valid  for  P  may 
be  small.  In  this  case  a  better  approach  is,  for  each  AEA  and  each  generator  a  of  H, 
to  check  the  validity  of  the  element  A-lap  (the  conjugate  of  a  by  A,  see  Definition  7, 
Section  3.1.1),  adding  each  valid  element  A-lap  to  the  generators  of  H  (if  it  is  not  al- 
ready  contained  in  H).  Adding  random  conjugates  to  the  generators  of  H  can  work 
well  in  practice:  discarding  invalid  generators  of  Aut(SCD(P))  often  results  in  a 
group  which  can  permute  disjoint  sets  of  processes  and  channels;  adding  random 
conjugates  to  this  group  can  provide  mappings  between  these  disjoint  sets. 
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Key  to  channel  signatures 
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Figure  8.5:  Static  channel  diagram  for  a  prioritised  resource  allocator  specification. 
Already  in  H  NotvalidforP  Valid  forP  and  notin  H 
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Figure  8.6:  Conjugation  of  the  generators  of  H  by  elements  ýj  =  (1  6  5)(2  7  3), 
/),  =  (1  3742  5)  and  ,  133  =  (1  65732  4).  For  brevity,  (i  j)  is  used  to  denote 
(I  .  j)  (linki  linkj). 
a  version  of  the  specification  with  seven  clictit  processes,  where  client  4  has  priority 
level  1,  and  all  other  clients  have  priority  level  0.  The  static  channel  diagram  for 
such  a  specification  is  shown  in  Figure.  8.5.  Using  saucy  to  compute  a  generating 
set  for  this  group,  and  using  (i  j)  to  denote  the  element  (i  ffllitzki  Iinkj)  we  find 
that: 
Aut(SCD(P))  =  ((1  2),  (2  3),  (3  4),  (4  5),  (5  6),  (6  7)), 
and  jAW(SCP(P))j  =  5040.  However,  as  clietit  4  is  distinguished  by  its  differing 
priority  level,  the  generators  (3  4)  and  (4  5)  are  not  valid  for  'P.  Removing  these 
elements  from  the  generating  set  has  the  effect  of  eliminating  any  permutations 
which  map  clicia  processes  in  the  set  11,2,31  to  the  set  J5,6,71,  arid  vice-versa. 
The  result  is  a  significantly  smaller  group  H,  with  IHI  =  36. 
We  can  use  GAP  to  pick  three  random  elements  of  Alit(SCD(P)),  say 
(1  6  5)(2  7  3),  02  ý  (1  3742  5),  ý3  =  (1  65732  4).  Figure  8.6  shows 
the  elements  obtained  by  conjugating  each  generator  a  of  H  by  one  of  the  Pi  (i.  e. 
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Observe  that  these  random  conjugates  yield  six  elements  of  G  which  are 
valid  for  P,  but  do  not  belong  to  H.  Adding  any  one  of  these  elements  to  the 
generators  of  H  to  give  the  group  H'  say,  we  find  that  IH'I  =  720  whereas 
IHI=  36.  Thus  by  considering  12  random  conjugates,  we  have  reduced  the  prob- 
lem  of  checking  JAut(SCD(P))J1JHJ  =  140  coset  representatives  to  checking 
JAut(SCD('P))J1JH'J  =  7. 
We  cannot  say  anything  about  how  well  this  approach  works  in  general,  and 
it  is  likely  to  be  problem-specific.  However,  it  can  be  a  useful  optimisation  when 
Aut(  SCD  (P))  is  large  and  H,  the  initial  valid  subgroup,  is  small  but  non-trivial. 
The  user  can  set  a  time-out  period,  after  which  the  search  for  the  largest  valid 
subgroup  will  terminate,  returning  the  valid  subgroup  computed  so  far.  Symm- 
Extractor  provides  feedback  to  the  user  by  displaying  the  number  of  cosets  which 
need  to  be  checked,  in  the  worst  case.  This  feedback  indicates  whether  it  is  worth 
waiting  a  little  longer  for  a  larger  valid  subgroup  to  be  computed. 
8.4  Experimental  Results 
We  now  present  experimental  results  running  SymmExtractor  on  a  variety  of 
Promela  specifications,  based  on  the  examples  described  in  Chapter  4.  We  divide 
the  specifications  into  sixfamilies,  and  refer  to  an  individual  specification  as  a  coll- 
figuratioii  of  one  of  the  families.  For  convenience,  we  introduce  some  shorthand 
notation  for  referring  to  configurations. 
8.4.1  Specification  families  and  configurations 
The  families  of  specifications  we  consider  are:  simple  mutex,  Peterson,  Peterson  with- 
out  atomicity,  resource  allocator,  three-tiered  architecture  and  hypercube. 
The  simple  mutex,  Peterson  and  Peterson  without  atomicity  families  consist  of 
versions  of  mutual  exclusion  protocols  based  on  the  examples  presented  in  Sec- 
tions  2.4.1,4.3.2  and  4.3.4  respectively  (with  Promela  examples  given  in  Figure  2.6 
and  Appendices  A.  1.2  and  A.  1.4).  A  configuration  of  one  of  these  families  is  iden- 
tified  via  the  number  n  of  processes  considered  in  the  specification. 
A  configuration  in  the  resource  allocator  family  is  a  version  of  the  resource 
allocator  specification  introduced  in  Section  4.4  and  Appendix  A.  2.1.  We  consider 
two  kinds  of  configuration.  A  configuration  is  identified  by  the  signature  ao-al- 
...  -ak-li  where  ai  >0  (0  :ýi<  k)  if  there  are  k>1  distinct  priority  levels  and 
client  processes  1,2,...,  ao  have  priority  level  0,  ao  +  1,  ao  +  2,...,  a,  have  priority 
level  1,  etc.  A  configuration  is  referred  to  as  alternating  x,  where  x>0  is  even, 
if  there  are  two  priority  levels,  x  client  processes,  and  the  priority  level  alternates 
between  0  and  1  every  three  client  processes.  For  example,  alternating  10  denotes 
a  10-client  configuration  where  client  processes  1,2,5,6,9  and  10  have  priority 8.4:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  151 
level  0  and  client  processes  3,4,7  and  8  have  priority  level  1.  The  resource  allo- 
cator  specifications  reveal  an  interesting  problem.  If  an  array  of  size  it  +1  is  in- 
dexed  using  only  literal  values  in  the  range  O-n  then  it  is  not  possible  to  deter- 
mine  whether  the  index  type  of  the  array  should  be  pid  or  byte.  This  is  true  of  the 
priorities  array  in  the  resource  allocator  specification  (see  Appendix  A.  2.1).  By 
default,  SymmExtractor  conservatively  assigns  the  index  type  for  such  an  array  to 
be  byte.  This  causes  symmetry  detection  to  return  a  trivial  group  for  the  resource 
allocator  examples.  We  overcome  this  problem  by  incorporating  an  assertion  of 
the  form  assert  (priorities  [_pid]  <n)  (where  n  is  the  number  of  client  pro- 
cesses)  in  one  of  the  atomic  blocks  in  the  body  of  the  client  proctype.  Since 
-pid 
has  type  pid,  this  makes  the  index  type  of  the  array  unambiguous. 
A  configuration  in  the  three-tiered  architecture  family  is  a  version  of  the  three- 
tiered  architecture  specification  introduced  in  Section  4.5  and  Appendix  A.  3.  A  con- 
figuration  with  k  server  processes  (k  >  0)  and  ai  >0  client  processes  connected  to 
server  i  (1  <_  i  <_  k)  is  identified  via  the  signature  a,  -a2--  ..  -ak.  For  example,  5-5-5-5 
denotes  a  configuration  with  5  servers  and  20  clients,  5  connected  to  each  server. 
Recall  that  the  hypercube  specification  of  Section  4.6  and  Appendix  A.  4.1 
involves  arithmetic  operations  on  variables  which  have  pid  type.  This  was  dis- 
cussed  in  Section  4.6.1.  However,  we  used  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to  check  that  the  symme- 
try  group  associated  with  the  hypercube  specification  is isomorphic  to  the  group  of 
automorpl-dsms  of  a  3-dimensional  cube,  which  is  in  turn  isomorphic  to  the  group 
of  automorphisms  of  the  channel  diagram  associated  with  the  specification  (see 
Section  5.2.2).  SymmExtractor  is  based  on  the  type  system  of  Figure  6.5,  Section  6.2, 
which  does  not  allow  pid  variables  to  be  operands  in  arithmetic  expressions.  In  or- 
der  to  apply  SymmExtractor  to  examples  based  on  the  hypercube  specification,  we 
have  used  teclu-dques  similar  to  those  described  in  Section  7.6.2  to  re-model  the 
specification  without  these  arithmetic  expressions  in  a  semantics-preserving  way. 
The  re-modelled  version  of  the  3-dimensional  hypercube  specification  is  given  in 
Appendix  A.  4.2.  As  discussed  in  Section  7.6.2,  this  specification  is  much  longer  than 
the  original.  A  configuration  of  the  hypercube  family  is  a  version  of  the  modified  hy- 
percube  specification.  A  configuration  is  identified  via  the  number  n  of  dimensions 
of  the  hypercube.  Note  that  configuration  it  is  comprised  of  21  node  processes. 
8.4.2  Results  and  discussion 
For  various  configurations  of  the  families  described  in  Section  8.4.1,  Figure  8.7  re- 
ports  the  following  figures: 
"  jAut(SCE)(P))j  -size  of  the  automorphism  group  of  the  static  channel  dia- 
gram  associated  with  configuration  P 
"  IHI  -  size  of  the  initial  subgroup  generated  by  the  valid  generators  of 
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ConfigurationP  I  lAut(SCD(P))l  I  IHI  I  IGI  I  saucytime  Ffi-nd  largest  ti-m-el 
simple  mutex 
5  120  0.03  0.07 
10  3.6  x  106-  0.03  0.20 
20  2.4  x  1018  0.03  0.59 
40  8.1  x  103ý1  0.03  1.64 
Peterson 
3  6  0.03  0.06 
6  720  0.02  0.16 
9  362880  0.04  0.30 
12  4.8  x  108  0.03  0.56 
Peterson  without  atomicity 
3  6  0.03  0.08 
6  720  0.08  0.25 
9  362880  0.03  0.52 
1 
12  4.8  x  101  0.03  0.89 
resource  allocator 
3/4  5040  144  144  0.03  1.52 
2/2/3  5040  24  24  0.03  5.24 
5/5  3.6  x  106  14400  14400  0.05  8.34 
3/3/4  3.6  x  1011  864  864  0.03  114.49 
alternating  10  3.6  x  106  32 
. 
17280  0.03  18.12 
alternating  12  4.7  x  106  64  -  1-518400  1  0.04  314.87 
alternating  14  8.7  x  107r'  128  2.9  x  106  0.06  >  12  hours 
alternating  16  2.1  x  10TT'-  256  1.6  x  10'  0.05  >  12  hours 
three-tiered  architecture 
3/3/2  144  0.04  0.09 
3/3/3  1296  0.05  0.14 
4/4/3  6912  0.05  0.17 
4/4/4  82944  0.05  0.26 
5/5/5/5  5.0  x  W,  0.07  0.55 
hypercube 
2d  8  2  4  0.04  0.59 
3d  48  2  8  0.03  2.50 
4d  384  2  16  0.04  99.11 
5d  3840  2  32  0.08  7171.57 
Figure  8.7:  Experimental  results  for  automatic  symmetry  detection.  For  each  configu- 
ration  the  sizes  of  Aut(SCD(P)),  H  and  G  are  given,  together  with  the  time  (in  sec- 
onds,  unless  otherwise  stated)  to  compute  Aut(SCD(P))  using  saucy,  and  to  compute 
the  largest  valid  subgroup  G  using  GAP.  Experiments  were  performed  on  a  PC  with  a 
2.4GHz  Intel  Xeon  processor  and  3Gb  or  main  memory. 8.4:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  153 
2  conjugates  5  conjugates  1  10  conjugates 
Configuration  I  IHI  I  time  I 
__LHI----L 
time  I  IHI  I  timp  e 
resource  allocator 
altemating  10  192  9.86  2880  9.32  17280  8.50 
alternating  12  34560  39.14  518400  32.66  518400  33.59 
alternating  14  414720 
, 
172.3  2.9  x  10'3  115.45  2.9  x  10'3  116.39 
alternating  16  1.6  x  109  539.65  1.6  x  109  541.86  1.6  x  107-  543.87 
hypercube 
2d  2  0.65  2  0.79  4  0.84 
3d  4  1.85  8  1.60  8  1.98 
4d  4  71.26  16  23.10  16  26.73 
5d  8  3409.03  16  1786.33  32  957.79 
Figure  8.8:  Optimised  symmetry  detection  using  random  conjugates. 
*  IGI  -  size  of  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)),  computed  using 
Algorithm  4  (Section  7.4) 
"  saucy  time  -  time  (in  seconds)  taken  by  saucy  to  compute  generators  for 
Aut(SC*D(P)) 
"  find  largest  time  -  time  (in  seconds)  taken  to  compute  G  given  generators 
forAut(SCD(P)). 
When  all  generators  of  Aut(SCD(P))  are  valid,  Aut(SCD(P)),  H  and  G  are 
equal,  so  there  is  no  need  to  use  Algorithm  4.  This  is  indicated  by'='  in  Figure  8.7. 
When  IGI  could  notbe  computed  within  12  hours,  the  entry'>  12  hours'appears  in 
the  table.  In  these  cases,  the  configuration  is  given  in  italics,  as  the  group  G  has  been 
successfully  computed  by  other  means,  which  we  discuss  below.  All  experiments 
were  performed  on  a  PC  with  a  2.4GHz  Intel  Xeon  processor  and  3Gb  of  main 
memory.  2 
The'saucy  time'column  shows  that,  for  all  the  configurations  we  tried,  there 
is  a  minimal  overhead  associated  with  using  saucy  to  compute  Aut(SCD(P)),  re- 
gardless  of  how  large  this  group  is. 
Configurations  from  the  three  mutual  exclusion  families,  as  well  as  three- 
tiered  architecture  configurations,  show  that  automatic  symmetry  detection  is  very 
efficient  when  all  generators  of  Aut(SCD(P))  are  valid.  In  this  case  the  ' fiiui  largest 
time'  column  reports  the  time  taken  to  check  validity  of  these  generators  against 
the  input  specification  P.  The  results  for  the  simple  mutex  configuration  with  40 
processes,  and  configuration  5-5-5-5  in  the  three-tiered  architecture  family  (which  in- 
volves  25  processes)  show  that  SymmExtractor  is  robust  enough  to  handle  large 
Promela  specifications. 
Results  for  the  first  four  resource  allocator  configurations  shown  in  Figure  8.7 
illustrate  cases  where  the  initial  valid  subgroup  H  turns  out  to  be  the  largest  valid 
subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)).  In  these  cases,  since  H  y'-  Aut(SCD(P)),  it  is  necessary 
2.  All  of  the  Promela  specifications  used  for  these  experiments  are  available  online  in  ard-tived  form 
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to  run  Algorithm  4  to  confirm  that  H  is  indeed  the  largest  valid  subgroup.  This  is 
time-consuming  for  the  3-3-4  configuration. 
The  alternating  resource  allocator  and  hypercube  specifications  illustrate  a  strict 
containment  relationship:  lid}  cHcGc  Aut(SCD(P)).  Although  the  number 
of  cosets  of  H  in  Aut(SCV(P))  may  be  large,  if  G  is  significantly  larger  than  H 
then  the  number  of  coset  representatives  which  need  to  be  checked  for  validity 
diminishes  rapidly  as  valid  representatives  are  found.  However,  for  the  alternating 
14  and  alternating  16  configurations  the  number  of  cosets  of  H  in  Aut(SCD(P))  is 
so  large  that  G  could  not  be  computed  within  12  hours.  Note  that  the  size  of  G  in 
these  larger  examples  has  been  computed  with  the  aid  of  random  conjugates,  as 
discussed  below. 
In  Section  4.6.1  we  computed  the  automorphism  group  of  the  Kripke  struc- 
ture  associated  with  the  3-dimensional  hypercube  specification.  (The  results  of  Sec- 
tion  4.6.1  are  the  same  if  we  re-run  SPIN-to-GRAPE  using  the  modified  specifica- 
tion  considered  here.  )  We  used  GAP  to  show  that  this  group  is  isomorphic  to  the 
automorphism  group  of  a  cube  -  the  group  K3  X  S3.,  which  has  order  48.  If  P  is 
the  3-dimensional  lzypercube  specification,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Aut(SCD(P))  C-- 
K3  x  S3  (given  the  similar  result  for  Aut(CV(P))  described  in  Section  5.2.2),  and 
the  results  of  Figure  8.7  confirm  that  JAut(SCD(P))J  =  48  also.  It  is  surprising, 
therefore,  that  G,  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)),  has  order  8.  Symm- 
Extractor  describes  Aut(SCD(P))  in  terms  of  three  generators  as  follows: 
Aut(SCD(P))  =  ((23)(litik2litik3)(67)(Iiiik6litik7), 
(3  5)  (Iink3  link5)  (4  6)  (Iink4  link6) 
(12)  (linkyl  link2)  (3  4)  (link3  link4)  (7  8)  (5  6)  (link5  link6) 
Qink7  link8)). 
The  first  two  of  these  generators  are  invalid.  To  see  why  this  is  the  case, 
for  the  generator  it  =  (2  3)(Ibzk2  link3)(6  7)(1hik6  link7),  consider  the  first  run 
statement  of  P: 
run  node(linkl,  link2,  link3,  link5); 
By  the  definition  of  a  (P)  in  Section  7.2.1,  the  first  run  statement  of  a  (P)  is: 
run  node(linkl,  link3,  link2,  link5); 
The  fact  that  these  run  statements  are  not  identical  implies  that  P#  a(P).  Sim- 
ilarly,  the  second  generator  above  is  shown  to  be  invalid  for  P.  The  largest  valid 
subgroup  G  can  be  shown  to  be  isomorphic  to  the  subgroup  K3  of  K3  M  S3.  For 
each  of  the  hypercube  configurations  we  have  analysed  we  see  a  similar  result: 
jAut(SCD(P))j  =  JK,  x  S,,  l  =  2n  x  n!,  IHI  =  2,  and  IGI  =  I&I  =  2n  (where 
it  is  the  dimension  of  the  hypercube).  SymmExtractor  does  not  detect  a  symmetry 
group  isomorphic  to  Kn  x  Sn  (which,  for  the  3-dimensional  case,  we  have  identified 8.4:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  155 
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rigure  8.9:  Applying  SymmExtractor  to  the  modified  resource  allocator,  thrce-tiered  ar- 
chitecture  and  Itypercube  specifications. 
as  a  symmetry  group  for  the  associated  model)  due  to  the  definition  of  validity  given 
in  Section  73.1.  It  may  be  possible  to  relax  this  notion  (as  discussed  in  Section  7.6-4) 
to  automatically  detect  larger  symmetry  groups  for  the  Itypercube  specifications. 
While  the  elimination  of  arithmetic  expressions  from  the  specification  is  un- 
related  to  this  validity  issue,  re-modelling  the  specification  to  avoid  arithmetic 
on  pid  variables  results  in  a  much  larger  specification;  this  problem  was  noted 
in  Section  7.6.2.  The  complexity  of  checking  whether  it  E  Aut(SCD(P))  is  valid 
for  P  is  proportional  to  the  size  of  P,  and  is  therefore  time-consuming  for  the 
4-  and  5-dimensional  Itypercube  specifications.  This  explains  the  lengthy  compu- 
tation  of  G  for  the  5-dimensionzal  configuration,  despite  the  fact  that  the  ratio 
jAut(SCV(P))j1jHj  is  not  large  (compared  to  that  for  e.  g.  the  altenzatitig  12  re- 
sourceallocator  configuration,  for  which  the  time  to  compute  G  is  much  less). 
Results  using  the  random  cx)njugates  optimisation 
The  alteniating  resource  allocator  configurations  and  the  hypercube  configurations 
are  examples  when,  the  initial  valid  subgroup  H  is  non-trivial,  but  the  search  for 
G  involves  checking  a  significant  number  of  coset  representatives.  To  alleviate  this 
problem  we  tried  increasing  the  size  of  H  using  random  conjugates  as  described  in 
Section  8.3.3. 
For  each  of  the  relevant  specifications,  Figure  8.8  shows  the  size  of  H,  en- 
larged  using  two,  five  and  ten  random  conjugates,  and  the  resulting  time  to  find  G. 
The  sizes  of  Aut(SCD(P))  and  G  are  as  in  Figure  8.7.  The  results  show  that  this  op- 
timisation  can  Ix,  useful  in  practice:  symmetry  detection  using  conjugates  is  faster 
in  all  cases.  The  speed-up  is  particularly  noticeable  for  the  alteniating  12  resource 
allocator  and  5-dimensional  Ity1wrcube  configurations,  and  it  was  possible  to  detect 
symmetry  for  the  alicniating  14  and  16  resource  allocator  configurations,  which  were 
Previously  intractable. 
Applying  S)7nmExtractor  to  modified  versions  of  the  specifications 
In  Sections  4.4.3,4.5.2  and  4.6.2  we  considered  modifications  to  the  resource  allo- 
cator,  three-fieredarchitectureand  hypercube  specifications  respectively,  and  used 
Sri-N-to-GRArr  to  see  the  effect  of  these  modifications  on  the  associated  automor- 
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Figure  8.9  shows  the  results  of  applying  SymmExtractor  to  these  modified 
specifications.  Symmetry  detection  is  effective  for  the  three-tiered  architecture  spec- 
ificition  with  mixed  modes  of  communication,  and  the  resource  allocator  specifica- 
tion  which  features  sharing  between  client  processes,  and  the  symmetry  groups 
obtained  in  each  case  conform  to  the  groups  computed  using  SPIN-to-GRAPE  in  SeC- 
tions  4.4.3  and  4.5.2  respectively. 
For  the  hypercube  specification  with  a  fixed  initiator  SymmExtractor  does 
not  detect  any  non-trivial  symmetry,  and  must  enumerate  Aut(SCD(P))  to  de- 
termine  this.  Recall  from  Section  4.6.2  that  the  symmetry  group  associated  with 
this  modified  specification  is  isomorphic  to  stabK3.  s3(0).  Since  the  symmetry  group 
which  SymmExtractor  computes  for  the  original  specification  is  isomorphic  to  K3 
rather  than  K3  M  S3*  it  not  surprising  that  the  group  computed  for  the  modified 
specification  corresponds  stabK3(o)  =  {id). 
8.5  Using  T%vo  Student  Assessed  Exercises  to  Evaluate  SymmExtractor 
The  SymmExtractor  tool  can  handle  more  general  kinds  of  symmetry  than  Symm- 
Spin  or  SMC,  places  fewer  restrictions  on  the  form  of  specifications,  and  does  not 
require  annotation  of  a  specification  with  additional  data  types.  3  However,  Symm- 
Extractor  still  places  some  restrictions  on  the  form  of  specifications,  as  summarised 
in  Section  8.1.1.  Due  to  the  fundamental  difficulty  of  automatic  symmetry  detection 
(see  Section  3.3.5),  these  restrictions  are  not  unreasonable.  Nevertheless,  it  is  impor- 
tant  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  restrictions  on  the  practical  use  of  SymmExtractor. 
We  present  an  evaluation  of  SymmExtractor  based  on  a  set  of  example  solu- 
tions  to  two  assessed  exercises  from  the  Modelling  Reactive  Systetns  final  year  course 
at  the  University  of  Glasgow.  We  discuss  the  ethical  issues  involved  in  using  stu- 
dentprograms  forrescarch,  present  the  designof  our  evaluation,  and  propose  some 
changes  to  SymmExtractor,  and  directions  for  future  work,  based  on  the  evaluation 
results.  As  well  as  providing  insight  into  the  challenges  of  automatic  symmetry 
detection,  the  chapter  is  a  novel  case  study  in  formal  methods  evaluation. 
8.5.1  The  Modelling  ReactIve  Systems  course 
Modellitkj  Reactive  Systc-nis  (MRS)  is  a  final  year  20-lecture  formal  methods  course 
at  the  University  of  Glasgow.  111c  primary  focus  of  the  course  is  on  the  theory 
and  practice  of  model  checking,  and  students  Use  SPIN  in  practical  sessions.  The 
main  prerequisite  for  MRS  is  a  discrete  mathematics  course  for  computing  science, 
3.  Arguably,  making  a  distinction  between  the  pid  and  byte  data  types,  which  SPIN  regards  as  inter- 
changeable,  means  that  the  use  of  the  pid  type  is  a  form  of  symmetry-related  annotation.  However, 
this  primitive  type,  Is  already  part  of  the  sjxýdfication  langmage,  and  is  simple  to  use. 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  157 
which  covers  the  basics  of  set  theory,  predicate  logic,  relational  algebra  and  meth- 
ods  of  proof.  In  addition,  students  are  required  to  have  passed  first  year  mathemat- 
ics  courses  on  calculus  and  algebra,  as  well  as  multiple  computing  science  courses 
on  programming,  data  structures  and  algorithms.  Almost  20%  of  the  assessment 
for  MRS  is  via  a  practical  exercise  which  involves  specifying  a  reactive  system  us- 
ing  Promela,  then  reasoning  about  the  specification  with  SPIN.  We  now  describe  the 
practical  assignments  which  were  set  for  sessions  2004/2005  and  2005/2006. 
Telephone  Exchange 
The  MRS  practical  exercise  for  2004/2005  involved  producing  three  versions  of  a 
specification  for  a  two  user  telephone  system.  Version  one  was  a  naive  model,  ver- 
sion  two  a  model  in  which  acknowledgments  were  included,  and  version  three  a 
model  in  which  call  clear-down  was  made  to  be  asymmetric  (only  the  initiator  of  a 
call  could  terminate  the  call).  Intuitively,  a  Promela  specification  of  a  two-user  tele- 
phone  exchange  should  exhibit  one  non-trivial  symmetry  which  switches  the  local 
states  of  the  users  (and  their  associated  channels)  throughout  all  global  states.  Tllus 
solutions  to  this  modelling  task  provide  a  good  set  of  Promela  examples  with  which 
to  evaluate  the  restrictions  imposed  by  SymmExtractor.  Furthermore,  the  associ- 
ated  state-spaces  are  small  enough  for  SPIN-to-GRAPE  (see  Section  4.1)  to  compute 
all  state-space  symmetries  present  in  a  given  specification,  which  can  be  compared 
with  those  detected  by  SymmExtractor. 
P%a  il  way  Signa  Hing  Sys  tem 
The  practical  exercise  for  2005/2006  involved  designing  a  specification  of  a  rail- 
way  system  consisting  of  two  train  processes,  eight  gate  processes  and  a  controller 
process.  The  trains  were  each  to  travel  around  one  of  two  circular  tracks  which 
intersected  along  a  section,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  8.10.  The  trains  were  to  commu- 
nicate  with  the  controller  process  to  indicate  their  approach  to  and  departure  from 
the  gates,  and  the  controller  process  in  turn  was  to  communicate  with  the  gates  to  in- 
struct  them  to  raise  and  lower,  as  appropriate.  The  communication  protocol  was  to 
be  designed  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  the  two  trains  having  access  to  the  section  of 
shared  track  simultaneously.  The  diagonal  grey  line  of  Figure  8.10  illustrates  sym- 
rnetry  in  the  structure  of  the  system.  We  would  expect  a  model  of  such  a  system  to 
exhibit  one  non-trivial  automorphism  corresponding  to  simultaneously  swapping 
the  local  states  of  gates  0  and  4,1  and  5,2  and  6,3  and  7,  and  trains  1  and  2. 
8.5.2  Ethical  approval 
Before  we,  describe  how  we  have  used  solutions  to  the  practical  exercises  for  MRS 
to  evaluate  SYmmExtractor,  we  outline  the  ethics  procedure  we  have  followed. 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  158 
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Figure  8.10:  Layout  of  railway  signalling  system. 
To  ensure  that  our  user  study  is  ethical,  we  have  followed  the  Glasgozt)  EtIzics 
Code  check-list  [144].  This  is  a  12-point  check-list  distilled  from  the  ethical  standard 
of  the  British  Psychological  Society  [161,  and  focuses  on  the  issues  which  are  most 
relevant  to  computing  science  projects.  Compliance  with  most  of  the  points  on  the 
check-list  was  straightforward.  The  following  points  required  some  care: 
9  All  participants  explicitly  stated  that  they  agreed  to  take  part.  Students 
who  allowed  us  to  use  their  solutions  in  the  study  were  provided  with  an 
information  sheet  detailing  the  aims  of  the  study,  and  asked  to  sign  a  consent 
form.  The  information  sheet  and  consent  form  given  to  students  in  session 
2005/2006  are  included  as  Appendix  D,  and  are  adapted  from  a  standard 
example  [143].  The  intended  usage  of  students'  solutions  is  detailed  in  Sec- 
tion  8.5.3. 
The  researcher  conducting  the  experiment  is  not  in  a  position  of  authority 
or  influence  over  any  of  the  participants.  As  the  solutions  formed  part  of 
the  course  assessment,  it  was  important  that  the  consent  of  students  was  not 
sought  until  after  solutions  had  been  assessed  and  returned.  This  assured 
students  that  their  decision  to  take  part  in  the  study  could  I-lave  no  effect 
oil  their  score  for  the  exercise,  and  encouraged  thern  to  answer  the  assessed 
questions  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  they  would  have  otherwise. 
A  further  ethical  concern  is  that  the  assessed  exercises  should  be  designed  to  meet 
the  intended  learning  outcomes  of  the  course  and  not  to  meet  research  aims  (unless 
these  overlap).  In  addition,  since  assessment  has  been  shown  to  narrow  students' 
focus  [151,  care  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  an  assessment  biased  towards  the 
research  interests  of  the  course  director  does  riot  restrict  bread  th  of  learning.  In  our 
case  the  exercises  had  been  set  to  meet  the  course  aims  before  we  designed  our 
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The  study  was  approved  by  the  ethics  committee  of  the  Faculty  of  Informa- 
tion  and  Mathematical  Sciences  at  the  University  of  Glasgow  (ref.  FIMS00203).  We 
obtained  signed  consent  forms  from  17  students  from  session  2004/2005,  and  12 
students  from  session  2005/2006.  The  average  class  size  for  these  years  was  35. 
8.5.3  Methods 
For  each  specification  in  the  sample  set  we  gathered  the  following  data  by  a  com- 
bination  of  automatic  and  manual  analysis: 
1.  Size  of  the  unreduced  state-space  (computed  using  SPIN) 
2.  State-space  symmetries  computed  by  SPIN-to-GRAPE,  and  size  of  the  result- 
ing  quotient  state-space  (if  feasible) 
3.  Symmetry  breaking  features  of  the  specification,  and  modifications  required 
to  restore  symmetry  (documented  by  experimenter) 
4.  Violations  of  restrictions  imposed  by  SymmExtractor  (as  reported  by  the 
tool)  and  modifications  required  to  satisfy  restrictions  (documented  by  ex- 
perimenter) 
5.  Symmetries  detected  by  SymmExtractor. 
We  also  used  our  symmetry  reduction  package  TopSPiN,  which  is  described  in 
Chapter  11,  to  check  that  our  symmetry  reduction  results  agree  with  the  quotient 
state-spaces  produced  independently  by  SPIN-to-GRAPE. 
Symmetry  breakingfeatu  res  are  aspects  of  a  specification  which  destroy  the  in- 
tuitive  symmetry  discussed  in  Section  8.5.1.  When  SPIN-to-GRAPE  showed  absence 
of  this  expected  symmetry  in  a  given  specification,  the  experimenter  manually  ex- 
amined  the  specification  to  identify  symmetry  breaking  features.  In  the  cases  where 
it  was  not  feasible  to  use  SPIN-to-GRAPE  for  state-space  analysis,  the  experimenter 
looked  for  certain  commonly  occurring  symmetry  breaking  features. 
We  classify  the  modifications  of  4  above  as  minor  if  they  could  be  avoided 
by  a  straightforward  extension  of  SymmExtractor,  medium  if  they  would  be  un- 
necessary  if  SymmExtractor  could  capture  symmetry  between  global  variables  (as 
discussed  in  Section  7.6.3),  or  major  if  they  could  only  be  avoided  by  significant 
development  of  the  theory  of  Chapter  7  on  which  SymmExtractor  is  based. 
8.5.4  Results 
Telephone  exchange 
We  refer  to  the  individual  components  of  a  three  part  solution  as  specifications.  Of 
the  51  specifications  analysed,  just  over  half  did  not  exhibit  the  expected  symmetry 
due  to  symmetry  breaking  features.  In  most  cases  this  was  because  run  statements 
were  not  surrounded  by  an  atomic  block;  for  other  examples  the  telephone  users 
were  initialised  asymmetrically  (e.  g.  ha?  tdset  variables  for  users  1  and  2  were  set  to 
up  and  dowit  respectively,  destroying  symmetry  between  users).  In  all  cases  it  was 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  160 
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Figure  8.11:  Typical  static  channel  diagram  for  the  telephone  examples. 
possible  to  restore  symmetry  by  trivial  modifications,  with  a  negligible  effect  on 
the  global  state-space.  With  these  modifications,  SymmExtractor  was  able  to  de- 
tect  symmetry  immediately  from  23  of  the  resulting  specifications.  A  further  13  re- 
quired  modifications  which  we  classified  as  minor;  these  included  replacing  locally 
instantiated  channels  with  globally  instantiated  channels,  and  removing  channel 
instantiation  statements  from  record  declarations.  Another  seven  specifications  re- 
quired  medium  modifications  (as  described  above).  The  final  eight  specifications 
required  major  modifications.  These  modifications  have  identified  a  problem  with 
the  usability  of  SymmExtractor,  which  involves  the  way  that  arrays  indexed  by 
process  identifiers  are  accessed.  This  is  discussed  further  in  Section  8.5.5.  An  exam- 
ple  of  a  typical  specification  which  required  major  modifications,  together  with  our 
re-modelled  version,  can  be  found  in  Appendix  A.  5. 
After  necessary  modifications,  SymmExtractor  was  able  to  efficiently  detect 
symmetries  for  all  specifications.  Figure  8.11  shows  the  typical  static  channel  dia- 
gram  structure  associated  with  the  example  solutions. 
Railway  signalling  system 
The  12  Promela  solutions  to  the  railway  signalling  exercise  all  resulted  in  large 
state-spaces.  Thus  for  these  examples  it  was  not  possible  to  use  SPIN-to-GRAPE  to 
compute  symmetries  of  the  global  state-space.  However,  in  six  of  the  solutions  the 
experimenter  was  able  to  identify  the  common  symmetry  breaking  feature  of  run 
statements  occurring  outwith  an  atomic  block. 
SymmExtractor  proved  to  be  ineffective  in  detecting  symmetry  for  this  set 
of  examples  (after  fixing  symmetry  breaking  features):  in  all  cases,  specifications 
required  major  modifications.  We  illustrate  the  kind  of  re-modelling  required  for 
SymmExtractor  to  be  applicable  to  these  solutions  using  an  example. 
Figure  8.12  shows  part  of  Promela  specification  which  is  typical  of  the  set 
of  solutions  for  this  exercise.  Specifically,  the  figure  includes  a  train  proctype  and 
the  init  process,  but  omits  proctypes  for  gate,  sliared_gate  and  controller  processes. 
Figure  8.13  shows  the  portion  of  the  example  after  re-modelling.  Full  versions  of 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  161 
mtype  -  japproaches,  leaves,  lower,  raise,  atgate,  faraway,  up,  down); 
chan  control  link  -  101  of  (mtype,  byte); 
chan  gate_lia  (8)  -  101  of  (mtype); 
mtype  bar[81  =  down; 
bool  on  shared  track[2)  false; 
bool  sh7ared_track_open  false 
proctype  train(byte  current_gate,  id) 
mtype  position  -  atgate; 
control_linklapproaches,  current-gate; 
do  ::  atomic  (  position=.  faraway  -> 
if  ::  current_gate-=3  ->  current-gate  -  0;  assert(id  -  0)  W 
current_gate.  =7  ->  current-gate  -  4;  assert(id  ==  1) 
else  ->  current_gate++; 
fi; 
control-linklapproaches,  current-gate;  position=atgate) 
atomic  f  (bar[current_gate1==up  &&  position==atgate)-> 
if  (current_gate  -  (id  4))  ->  on_shared_track(id]  true 
else  ->  skip 
fi; 
position  -  faraway;  control  linkileaves,  current-gate; 
if  (current_gate  ==  (id  4+  1))  -> 
on  shared  tracklid)  -  false 
else  ->  eiip 
fi 
od 
init 
atomic 
run  controllerol  run  sharedgate(O);  run  gate(l),  run  gate(2); 
run  gate(3):  run  sharedgate(4);  run  gate(S);  run  gate(6); 
run  gate(7);  run  train(2,0);  run  train(6,1); 
Figure  8.12:  Typical  example  of  a  solution  to  the  railway  signalling  problem. 
both  Promela  specifications  are  given  in  Appendix  A.  6. 
In  the  original  specification,  a  train  process  is  instantiated  with  an  id  which 
is  either  0  or  1.  Similarly,  the  eight  gate  processes  are  instantiated  with  an  id  in 
the  range  0-7.  A  train  is  also  instantiated  with  the  identifier  of  the  gate  at  which  it 
starts.  Recall  from  Section  8.1.1  that  SymmExtractor  requires  processes  to  use  their 
built-in 
_pid  variable,  rather  than  being  passed  an  id  as  a  parameter,  and  that 
processes  instantiated  by  the  init  process  are  assigned  identifiers  in  order,  starting 
from  1.  Comparing  lines  marked  (*)  in  the  original  and  modified  specifications 
illustrates  this.  Instead  of  referring  to  gates  3  and  0,  in  the  re-modelled  specification 
we  refer  to  gates  5  and  2.  This  is  because  the 
_pid  values  for  gate  and  shared-gate 
processes  are  in  the  range  2-9.  Similarly,  instead  of  asserting  that  id=  =  0,  we  now 
assert  that 
-Pidm=10, 
since  the 
_pid  value  for  the  first  train  process  in  the  re- 
modelled  specification  is  10. 
The  major  disadvantage  of  this  modification  is  that  train  processes  must  now 
index  into  the  on-shared-track  array  using  their 
_pid  variable,  which  is  in  the 
range  10-11,  and  thus  the  array  mustbe  declared  with  size  12.  The  first  ten  positions 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  162 
of  this  array  are  unused,  but  still  form  part  of  the  state-vector. 
Another  significant  re-modelling  step  is  illustrated  by  the  lines  marked 
Recall  from  Section  8.1.1  that  SymmExtractor  does  not  allow  variables  of 
type  pid  to  be  used  in  arithmetic  operations.  Thus  the  expression  current-gate 
==  (id*4+1)  must  be  re-modelled.  In  the  original  specification  this  expression 
can  be  re-written  as  a  disjunction:  (id==O&&current_gate==1)  II  (id==l&& 
current_gate==5),  since  id  is  either  0  or  1.  In  the  re-modelled  specification  tl-ds 
translates  to: 
(_pid==lo&&current_gate==3)11(_pid==11&&current_gate==7). 
In  the  re-modelled  specification,  to  avoid  the  use  of  a  global  array  of  chan- 
nels  (another  restriction  of  SymmExtractor),  gate  and  shared_gate  proctypes  are  pa- 
rameterised  by  a  channel.  For  details  of  this  re-modelling,  see  the  online  specifica- 
tions. 
After  this  heavy-weight  re-modelling,  SymmExtractor  can  be  used  to  find 
valid  static  channel  diagram  automorphisms  for  the  specification  of  Figure  8.13. 
However,  the  process  of  symmetry  detection  is  slow  for  this  example.  Tl-te  static 
channel  diagram  for  the  specification  is  shown  in  Figure  8.14.  SymmExtractor  com- 
putes  generators  for  Aut(SCD(P))  as  follows:  Aut(SCD(P))  = 
(3  4)  (gate-litzk_  3  gate_  link_4),  (4  5)  (gate 
- 
link_  4  gate_  link-5), 
(5  7)  (gate_li?  ik_  5  gate_  litzk_7),  (7  8)  (gate 
_link_ 
7  gate_  link_8), 
(8  9)  (gate_link_  8  gate_  link_9),  (2  6)  (gate 
_liizk  _2 
gate_  litzk_6), 
(1011)  ). 
Here  lAut(SCV(P))  I=  2880.  However,  the  largest  possible  subgroup  computed 
by  SymmExtractor  has  order  2,  and  consists  of  the  identity  and  the  element: 
(2  6)  (gate_li?  tk-2  gate_li?  ik_6)  (3  7)  (gate_link_3  gate-link-7) 
(4  8)  (gate_li)tk_4  gate_litzk_8)  (5  9)  (gate_link_5  gate_li?  ik-9)  (10  11). 
Thus  SymmExtractor  must  search  the  group  Aut(SCD(P))  to  find  this  single  non- 
trivial  valid  symmetry.  Clearly  if  there  were  more  processes  in  the  specification 
Aut(SCV(P))  would  be  would  be  larger,  and  fl-ds  search  might  not  be  feasible.  For 
this  example,  the  random  conjugates  optimisation  presented  in  Section  8.3.3  does 
not  help,  as  the  initial  valid  subgroup  is  trivial. 
8.5.5  Outcomes  of  the  evaluation 
The  evaluation  has  led  to  some  straightforward  changes  to  the  documentation  and 
design  of  SymmExtractor,  as  well  as  some  interesting  open  research  questions.  We 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  163 
mtype  -  japproaches,  leaves,  lower,  raise,  atgate,  faraway,  up,  down), 
chan  control_link  [01  of  (mtype,  pid); 
chan  gate_link_2  [01  of  (mtype); 
...  ;  chan  gate_link_9  =  [01  of  jmtype); 
mtype  bar(121  =  down; 
bool  on 
- 
shared_track[121  -  false; 
bool  shared_track_open  =  false 
proctype  train(pid  current_gate) 
mtype  position  =  atgate; 
control_linklapproaches,  current-gate; 
do  atomic  j  position-faraway  -> 
if  current_gate=.  2->  CUrrent_gate=3 
current_gate==3->  CUrrent_gate=4 
current_gate==4->  CUrrent_gate=5 
current_gate-=5  ->  current-gate  2;  assert(_pid  10) 
current_gate==6  ->  current_gate=7 
current_gate=-7  current_gate=8 
current_gate==8  current_gate=9 
current_gate==9  current-gate=6;  assert(_pid  ==  11) 
fi; 
control-link  [approaches,  current-gate;  position=atgate) 
atomic  (  (bar[current-gatel==up  &&  position==atgate) 
if  ((_pid=-Io  &&  current_gate  2)11 
(_pid==ll  &&  current_gate  6)) 
on 
- 
shared_trackl_pid)  =  true 
else  ->  skip 
fi; 
position  -  faraway;  control_linklleaves,  current-gate; 
if  ((_pid==10  current_gate  -  3)11 
(_pid-=ll  current-gate-7))  -> 
on  shared  track[_pid]  =  false 
else  ->  siip 
fi 
od 
init 
atomic 
run  controllero;  run  sharedgate(gate_link  2); 
run  gate(gate 
- 
link_3),  run  gate(gate_link_47; 
run  gate(gate_link_5);  run  sharedgate(gate_link_6); 
run  gate(gate_link 
- 
7);  run  gate(gate 
- 
link 
- 
8); 
run  gate(gate_link_9),  run  train(4);  run  train(8); 
Figure  8.13:  Re-modelled  version  of  the  railway  signalling  specification. 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  164 
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Figure  8.14:  Static  channel  diagram  for  the  modified  railway  signalling  specification. 
have  extended  the  SymmExtractor  documentation  with  a  short  set  of  modelling 
guidelines  based  on  the  problems  encountered  when  applying  the  tool  to  this  set 
of  examples  (see  Appendix  C.  2.3).  It  is  clear  that  the  tool  would  be  more  useful  if  it 
could  handle  symmetry  between  global  variables,  as  discussed  in  Section  7.6.3. 
The  line  marked  (**)  in  Figure  8.13  illustrates  a  case  where  using  a  pro- 
cess  identifier  in  an  arithmetic  operation  does  tiot  destroy  symmetry  in  the  underly- 
ing  model.  'Thus  an  open  research  question  is:  under  what  conditions  is  it  possible 
to  relax  this  restriction  of  SymmExtractor?  We  outlined  a  possible  solution  to  this 
problem  in  Section  7.6.2. 
As  discussed  in  Section  8.5.4,  for  the  re-modelled  railway  signalling  exam- 
ple,  Aut(SCD(P))  is  much  larger  than  the  valid  subgroup  which  SymmExtractor 
eventually  computed.  For  this  example,  the  static  channel  diagram  does  not  reflect 
the  communication  structure  of  the  system  very  well.  As  discussed  in  Section  7.5, 
it  would  be  interesting  to  investigate  other  graphical  representations  derived  from 
Promela  specifications  which  may  better  reflect  the  symmetry  present  in  examples 
such  as  this  one. 
A  major  challenge  which  the  evaluation  results  have  presented  is  to  find 
techniques  to  automatically  determine  the  relationship  between  numeric  identifiers 
passed  as  parameters  to  processes  by  the  user  (and  used  to  access  arrays),  and  the 
run-time  id  values  which  SPIN  assigns  to  processes.  This  was  a  problem  associated 
with  some  of  the  telephone  specifications,  and  with  all  of  the  railway  signalling 
solutions. 
The  problem  is  that  the  built-in 
_pid 
variable  indicates  the  instantiation 
number  of  a  process  with  respect  to  all  processes,  not  with  respect  to  a  given  proc- 
type.  Therefore.  the  first  traht  process  in  Figure  8.13  has 
-pid  value  10,  even  though 
it  is  the  first  traiii  process  to  be  instantiated.  This  means  that  if  the 
_pid 
variable 
is  used  as  an  index  for  an  array  of  values  relevant  to  processes  of  a  given  proctype, 
the  array  must  be  as  large  as  the  highest  id  of  any  instantiation  of  this  proctype,  and 8.5:  USING  ASSESSED  EXERCISES  TO  EVALUATE  SYMMEXTRACTOR  165 
tI-ds  may  significantly  increase  the  space  requirement  for  each  state  of  the  model. 
An  elegant  solution  to  this  problem  would  greatly  improve  the  usability  of  Symm- 
Extractor. 
Summary 
We  have  described  SymmExtractor,  an  automatic  symmetry  detection  tool  for 
Promela  based  on  the  techniques  presented  in  Chapter  7.  In  particular,  we  have  dis- 
cussed  the  way  in  which  SymmExtractor  uses  type  reconstruction  and  bisimulation 
minimisation  to  handle  incomplete  channel  types  and  recursive  types  respectively. 
We  have  described  the  way  in  which  the  saucy  and  GAP  tools  are  used  to  find  the 
largest  valid  group  of  static  channel  diagram  automorpl-dsms  for  a  Promela  speci- 
fication. 
Experimental  results  show  that  the  overhead  of  applying  SyrnmExtractor 
to  detect  Kripke  structure  automorphisms  before  search  is  minimal,  except  when 
Atit(SCD(P))  is  large  and  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P))  is  small. 
We  have  suggested  an  optimisation  based  on  random  conjugates  to  help  overcome 
this  problem,  and  shown  that  this  optimisation  can  help  with  symmetry  detection 
for  practical  examples. 
We  have  presented  the  methods  and  results  of  a  user  study  to  asses  the 
feasibility  of  the  restrictions  on  the  form  of  a  Promela  specification  which  Symm- 
Extractor  imposes.  This  evaluation  has  identified  some  cases  where  SymmExtractor 
is  over-restrictive  and  cannot  detect  symmetries  which  SPIN-to-GRAPE  has  shown  to 
exist.  The  evaluation  results  have  identified  some  challenging  open  research  prob- 
lems  in  the  area  of  automatic  symmetry  detection. Chapter  9 
Exact  and  Approximate  Strategies  for  Symmetry  Reduction 
In  Chapters  7  and  8  we  have  been  concerned  with  the  problem  of  detecting  au- 
tomorphisms  of  the  Kripke  structure  associated  with  a  Promela  specification.  We 
now  turn  our  attention  to  the  problem  of  efficiently  exploiting  symmetry  in  order 
to  verify  large  systems  using  model  checking. 
As  discussed  in  Section  3.4,  given  a  symmetry  group  G,  a  common  approach 
to  ensuring  that  equivalent  states  are  recognised  during  search  is  to  convert  each 
newly  encountered  state  s  into  MillASIGi  the  smallest  state  in  its  orbit  (under  a 
suitable  total  ordering  ý),  before  it  is  stored.  However,  the  problem  of  computing 
min<[SIG  for  an  arbitrary  group  (where!  ý  is  the  lexicographic  ordering  on  vectors), 
known  as  the  constructive  orbit  problem  (COP),  is  NP-hard  [27]  (see  Definition  24  and 
Theorem  10,  Section  3.4). 
Existing  symmetry  reduction  packages,  such  as  SymmSpin  [14]  and  SMC 
[166],  are  limited  as  they  can  only  exploit  full  symmetry  between  identical  compo- 
nents  of  a  system.  This  eases  the  problem  of  identification  of  symmetry,  and  the 
COP  can  be  solved  efficiently  for  this  special  case.  However,  as  illustrated  in  Chap- 
ter  4,  the  automorphism  group  associated  with  a  Kripke  structure  may  be  more 
complex.  Since  the  automatic  symmetry  detection  techniques  of  Chapters  7  and  8 
can  detect  arbitrary  kinds  of  symmetry  arising  from  the  static  channel  diagram  of  a 
specification,  it  is  important  to  have  techniques  to  solve  the  COP  efficiently  using 
information  about  the  structure  of  G,  or  to  provide  an  efficient,  approximate  solution 
to  the  COP  (see  Sections  3.4.1  and  3.4.2  respectively)  when  no  such  information  is 
available. 
In  this  chapter  we  generalise  existing  techniques  for  efficiently  exploiting 
symmetry  under  a  simple  model  of  computation,  and  give  an  approximate  strat- 
egy  for  use  with  symmetry  groups  for  which  fast,  exact  strategies  cannot  be  found. 
We  use  computational  group  theory  to  automatically  determine  the  structure  of  a 
group  as  a  disjoint/wreath  product  of  subgroups  before  search  so  that  an  appro- 
priate  symmetry  reduction  strategy  can  be  chosen. 9.1:  A  MODEL  OF  COMPUTATION  WITHOUT  REFERENCES  167 
9.1  A  Model  of  Computation  Without  References 
We  refer  to  a  process,  global  variable  or  buffered  channel  in  a  concurrent  system  as 
a  conipoixid.  We  now  justify  the  claim  made  in  Section  3.4  that  we  can  reason  about 
states  of  a  concurrent  system  using  a  single  integer  variable  for  each  component. 
Let  V=  Ivi,  v2,...,  v1}  be  the  set  of  variables  associated  with  a  concurrent 
system,  and  Di  the  finite  domain  of  vi  (1  <i<  1).  Let  m=  maxIlDil  :1<i< 
1}.  Then  we  can  enlarge  each  Di  so  that  I  Di  I=m,  and  assume  without  loss  of 
generality  that  Di  =  11,2,...,  m}  (1  <i<  1).  Let  M=  (S,  so,  R)  be  a  Kripke 
structure  defined  in  terms  of  D=D,  x  D2  X  ...  x  D,  (see  Definition  1,  Section  2.2). 
Suppose  V  is  partitioned  into  n  subsets,  V1,  V2,...,  Vn  for  some  n>0,  where 
each  set  Vi  consists  of  the  variables  associated  with  a  single  component  i  of  the 
system.  Then,  for  1<i<n,  Vi  =  JViji  Vi,  21  --.,,  vi)J,  for  some  Vq  EV  and 
1i  >  0,  such  that  1i  =  1.  If  component  i  is  a  global  variable,  Vi  consists  of  a 
single  variable.  If  component  i  is  a  buffered  channel  with  capacity  t  then  Vi  con- 
sists  of  t  variables,  one  for  each  place  in  the  buffer.  On  the  other  hand,  if  i  is  a 
process,  Vi  is  the  set  of  local  variables  for  that  process.  Then  D  Dij 
where  Dij  is  the  domain  of  vq,  for  1<i<  it,  1<j  :5  Ii.  Let  f  be  the  size  of 
the  largest  Vi.  For  1<i<  it,  define  a  map  Oi  :D  --+  11,2,. 
.  .'  mf  }  as  follows: 
for  any  state  s=  (dl,,,  dl,  2,...,  d1j1,  d2j,  d2,2,...,  d2J2i-..,  dn,  1,  dn,  2,  -.., 
dn,  1,,  )  E  D, 
Oi(d)=  d-  -mi-1.  Define  O(s)  =  (01(s),  02(s),...,  On(s)).  Itis  straightforward  to 
check  that  0  is  injective.  We  can  define  a  Kripke  structure  M'  =  (S',  so,  R')  thus: 
S'=  O(D) 
so  =0  (SO) 
9  R'  =f  (0  (S),  0  (t»  :  (5,  t)  G 
Tlie  structure  M'  is  obtained  from  M  by  representing  all  variables  for  a 
given  component  by  a  single  variable  with  a  larger  domain.  Clearly  M'  is  essen- 
tially  the  same  as  M:  since  0  is  injective  and  is  (trivially)  a  surjection.  from  D  to  O(D), 
we  can  always  translate  a  state  of  M'  back  to  a  unique  state  of  M. 
The  above  argument  justifies  the  assumption  made  throughout  this  chapter 
that  a  Kripke  structure  representing  a  system  of  n  components  can  be  defined  in 
terms  of  a  set  of  ii  variables,  each  with  finite  domain  LcZ,  so  that  a  state  is 
a  vector  in  Ln.  We  compare  states  using  ! ý,  the  natural  lexicographic  ordering  on 
vectors  (see  Section  3.4).  Throughout,  let  I=  11,2,...,  n}. 
9.1.1  Action  of  Sn  on  states 
Let  G  !ýS,,  and  s=  (XI 
i  X2t  ...  i  Xn)  E  Ln.  Assuming  that  components  in  the  system 
do  not  hold  references  to  one  another,  we  can  define  the  state  a  (s)  as  follows: 
=  (x_1(1),  X_1(2),.  . 9.2:  EXPLOITING  BASIC  SYNWETRY  GROUPS  168 
database 
servers 
clients 
10  11 
Figure  9.1:  Communication  structure  for  a  three-tiered  architecture. 
In  Chapter  10  we  consider  a  more  realistic  model  of  computation  where  compo- 
nents  may  hold  references  to  one  another,  and  present  a  corresponding  action  of 
S,  Throughout  this  chapter  we  use  Mill[SIG  to  denote  min<[S]G,  the  <-Minimum 
state  in  the  orbit  of  s  under  G. 
9.1.2  Symmetry  detection 
We  assume  that  generators  for  a  symmetry  group  G  have  been  computed  via  the 
communication  structure  associated  with  a  high  level  specification,  or  have  been 
provided  explicitly.  To  make  our  results  general,  we  do  not  assume  that  symmetry 
has  necessarily  been  detected  using  the  techniques  of  Chapter  7. 
For  illustration,  throughout  this  chapter  we  consider  a  system  with  a  three- 
tiered  architecture  based  on  the  example  in  Section  4.5.  Figure  9.1  shows  a  possible 
communication  graph  for  this  system,  which  we  assume  has  been  extracted  from  a 
specification  of  the  system  by  some  symmetry  detection  tool.  Let  M3T  be  a  model  of 
the  system.  Using  the  GRAPE  program,  we  compute  G3T#  the  automorphism.  group 
of  the  communication  graph  in  terms  of  generators: 
G3T  ý--  ((12),  (23),  (45),  (56),  (78),  (89),  (1011), 
(12  13)  (14)  (2  5)  (3  6),  (13  14)  (4  7)  (5  8)  (6  9)). 
Note  that  the  last  two  elements  of  the  generating  set  of  G3T  are  products  of  trans- 
positions.  We  assume  that  p(G3T)  :  ý,  Aut(M3T)  (where  p  is  the  permutation  repre- 
sentation  of  G3T  on  the  states  Of  M3T),  and  will  use  this  group  and  its  subgroups 
as  examples  to  illustrate  some  of  our  techniques. 
9.2  Exploiting  Basic  Symmetry  Groups 
9.2.1  Efficient  application  of  permutations 
Before  we  discuss  symmetry  reduction  strategies,  we  consider  the  problem  of  ap- 
plying  a  permutation  a  to  a  state  s  (i.  e.  computing  a  (s)). 
Direct  application  of  a  permutation  a  to  a  state  s=  (X1iX2t 
...  iXn)  clearly 
requires  exactly  ii  operations:  we  must  compute  x,,  (j)  for  each  i.  On  the  other 9.2:  EXPLOITING  BASIC  SYMMETRY  GROUPS  169 
hand,  applying  a  transposition  (i  j)  to  s  is  a  constant  time  operation  -  the  local 
states  xi  and  xj  are  simply  exchanged. 
Lemma  6  Let  aES,  Then  a  can  be  expressed  as  a  product  of  at  most  it  -1  trans- 
positions.  1 
Proof  If  a  is  a  cycle  (a,  a2  ...  a)  for  some  m  <-  iz  then  a  can  be  expressed  as 
*  product  of  m-1  transpositions:  a=  (a,  a2)  (a,  a3)  ... 
(a,  am)  (where  1<  ai  !ý 
*  for  each  1  <_  i  ::  ý  m)  1811.  Suppose  a  is  instead  a  product  of  I  disjoint  cycles, 
Itli  tt2  iti,  for  some  I>0,  where  cycle  ai  has  length  mi  (I  <i<  1).  We  have 
rI 
_i=l  mi  <  ii.  Since  each  ai  can  be  written  as  a  product  of  mi  -1  transpositions,  a 
can  be  written  as  a  product  of  li.,  (mi  -  1)  <n-1  transpositions.  N  2 
In  Section  11.3  we  provide  experimental  evidence  that  representing  a  per- 
mutation  a  as  a  list  of  transpositions,  and  computing  a  (s)  by  successively  applying 
these  transpositions,  speeds  up  symmetry  reduction  by  a  significant  constant  fac- 
tor. 
9.2.2  Enumerating  small  groups 
The  most  obvious  strategy  for  computing  Mi"[SIG  is  to  consider  each  state  in 
[s]G,  and  return  the  smallest.  This  can  be  acl-deved  by  enumerating  the  elements 
a  (S),  aEG.  If  G  is  small  then  this  strategy  is  feasible  in  practice,  and  provides  an 
exact  symmetry  reduction  strategy.  The  SymmSpin  package  provides  an  enumera- 
tion  strategy  for  full  symmetry  groups,  which  is  optimised  by  generating  permuta- 
tions  incrementally  by  composing  successive  transpositions. 
We  generalise  this  optimisation  for  arbitrary  groups  using  stabiliser  chains.  A 
stabiliser  chain  for  G  is  a  series  of  subgroups  of  the  form  G=  GM  >  G(2)  >  ...  > 
GM  =  lid},  for  some  k>1,  where  GW  =  stabG(i-1)(X)  for  some  XE  moved(GO-1)) 
(2  <i<  k).  If  U(i)  is  a  set  of  representatives  for  the  cosets  of  GW  in  G(i-1)  (2  <_  i  <_ 
k),  then  each  element  of  G  can  be  uniquely  expressed  as  a  product  Uk-lUk-2  ...  Ulf 
where  Ili  E  U(')  (1  <i<  k)  [191.  Permutations  can  be  generated  incrementally 
using  elements  from  the  coset  representatives,  and  the  set  of  images  of  a  state  s 
under  G  computed  using  a  sequence  of  partial  images  (see  Algorithm  5).  To  ensure 
efficient  application  of  permutations,  the  coset  representatives  are  stored  as  a  list  of 
transpositions,  applied  in  succession,  as  described  above. 
GAP  provides  functionality  to  efficiently  compute  a  stabiliser  chain  and  as- 
sociated  coset  representatives  for  an  arbitrary  permutation  group.  Although  this 
approach  still  involves  enumerating  the  elements  a  (s)  for  every  aEG  (and  is  thus 
infeasible  for  large  groups),  calculating  each  it  (s)  is  faster.  The  experimental  results 
1.  This  is  a  well  known  fact  for  which  we  could  not  find  an  explicit  proof.  We  include  on  here  for 
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Algorithm  5  Computing  Mill  [SIG  using  a  stabiliser  diain. 
Mif?  [SIG  :=S 
for  all  ul  E  U,  do 
S1  :=  Ul(s) 
for  all  U2  E  U2  do 
S2  :  -=  U2(SI) 
for  all  uk  E  Uk  do 
Sk  :=  Uk(Sk-1) 
if  Sk  <  min[sIG  then 
"liti[SIG  :  ý--  Sk 
end  if 
end  for 
end  for 
end  for 
of  Section  11.3  show  an  improvement  over  basic  enumeration.  Additionally,  it  is 
only  necessary  to  store  coset  representatives,  rather  than  all  elements  of  G. 
Stabiliser  chains  are  used  extensively  in  computational  group  theory  119,63], 
and  have  been  utilised  in  symmetry  breaking  approaches  for  constraint  program- 
ming  [64].  We  are,  to  our  knowledge,  the  first  to  apply  these  techniques  to  model 
checking. 
9.2.3  Minimising  sets  for  G  if  G  S,,  (m  <  n) 
For  systems  where  there  is  full  symmetry  between  components,  the  smallest  state  in 
the  orbit  of  s=  (X1 
i  X2  Xn)  can  be  computed  by  sorting  the  tuple  s  lexicograph- 
ically  [14,271.  For  example,  for  a  system  with  four  components,  sorting  equiva- 
lent  states  (3,2,1,3)  and  (3,3,2,1)  yields  the  state  (1,2,3,3),  which  is  clearly  the 
smallest  state  in  the  orbit.  Since  sorting  can  be  performed  in  polynomial  time,  this 
provides  an  efficient  solution  for  the  COP  when  G=  Sn- 
Recall  the  group  G3T  of  automorphisms  of  the  communication  graph  of  Fig- 
ure  9.1.  Consider  the  subgroup: 
H=  ((1213)(14)(25)(36),  (1314)(47)(58)(69)). 
n-iis  group  permutes  server  components  12,13  and  14,  with  their  associated  blocks 
of  client  components.  It  is  clear  that  H  is  isomorphic  to  S1.  the  symmetric  group  on 
3  objects.  However,  we  cannot  compute  Mill  [SIH  by  sorting  s  in  the  usual  way,  since 
this  is  equivalent  to  applying  an  element  aE  S16  to  s,  which  may  not  belong  to  H. 
We  can  deal  with  a  group  G  acting  in  this  way  using  a  minimising  set  for 
G.  Using  terminology  from  [59],  G  is  said  to  be  nice  if  there  is  a  small  set  XCG 
such  that,  for  any  SES,  s=  min[s]  ý*  S  :!  ý  a(s)  VaEX.  In  this  case  we  call  X 9.2:  EXPLOITING  BASIC  SYMMETRY  GROUPS  171 
Algorithm  6  State  minimisation  using  a  minimising  set  X. 
min:  =  s 
repeat 
mill'  :=  min 
fora  EX  do 
if  LY(min')  <  min  then 
min:  =  a(min) 
end  if 
end  for 
until  min'=  mitt 
a  miiiindshig  set  for  G.  If  a  small  minimising  set  X  can  be  found  for  a  large  group 
G,  then  computing  the  representative  of  a  state  involves  iterating  over  the  small 
set  X,  minimising  the  state  until  a  fix-point  is  reached.  At  this  point,  no  element  of 
the  minimising  set  maps  the  state  to  a  smaller  image,  thus  the  minimal  element  has 
been  found.  This  approach  is  described  by  Algorithm  6. 
We  show  that  for  a  large  class  of  groups  which  are  isomorphic  to  S..  for 
some  m<  it,  a  minimising  set  with  size  polynomial  in  m  can  be  efficiently  found. 
This  minimising  set  is  derived  from  the  swap  permutations  used  in  a  selection  sort 
algorithm.  As  discussed  in  Definition  10  (Section  3.1.2),  we  use  orbc,  (i)  rather  than 
[i]  G  to  refer  to  the  orbit  of  iEI  under  G.  This  is  to  avoid  confusion  between  orbits 
of  states  and  orbits  of  component  identifiers. 
Theorem  16  Suppose  that  I  GI  =  m!;  every  non-trivial  orbit  of  I  under  G  has  size 
m;  for  any  iEI,  stabG(i).  fixes  exactly  one  element  from  each  orbit,  and  if  ij  belong 
to  the  same  orbit  then  for  any  kE1,  stabG(i)  and  stabGU)  both  fix  ki=j. 
Then  there  is  an  isomozphism  0:  S,,  --+  G  such  that  I(i  j)O  :1<i<j  m}  is  a 
minimising  set  for  G. 
Proof  Assume,  without  loss  of  generality,  that  all  orbits  of  -T  under  G  are  non- 
trivial.  Let  (Ili  n21 
---, 
rld  be  the  orbits,  and  say  r1l  jXli  X2t  ---,  X,  }. 
For  1<i<M  let  Ci  =  Iz  EI:  a(z)  zV  cc  E  stabG(xj)}.  By  our 
hypothesis,  ci  n  qj  =0  when  i  5A  j,  and  it  is  clear  that  every  kEI  belongs  to  some 
Ci.  We  call  the  Ci  columm. 
For  1  :!  ý,  i<d,  we  can  write  ni  as  Oi  =  jzj'l,  zi,  2,...  I  zim}  where  zij  E  Cj  (1  < 
j  :5  m),  (and  so  xi  =  z1j).  For  1<i<m,  define  aij  =  (ZlJ  Zlj)  (Z2,  i  Z2,  j)  ... 
(Zd,  i  Zdj)- 
It  can  be  shown  that  aij  E  G.  The  element  aij  transposes  the  elements  of  column  Ci 
with  those  of  Cj.  Let  0:  S.  --+  G  be  defined  on  generators  by  (i  j)O  =  aij.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  0  is  a  monomorpl-dsm,  and  since  IGm!  =  S.  (by  hypothesis),  0  is  an 
isomorphism. 
Now  consider  states  s  and  s',  where  s'  a(s)  for  some  aEG.  Let  i  be  the 
smallest  index  for  wl-dch  s  (i)  jA  s'(i).  Let  j  be  the  index  such  that  j=a  -1  (i).  All 9.2:  EXPLOITING  BASIC  SYMMETRY  GROUPS  172 
of  the  elements  in  the  column  containing  j  (column  j'  say)  are  mapped  via  a  to 
the  column  containing  i  (column  i'  say).  Then  s'  <s  iff  (i'  j')O(s)  <  s.  Hence  s  is 
minimal  in  its  orbit  iff  (i  j)O  (s)  ý:  s  for  all  i<j.  So  the  set  I  (i  j)O  :1<i<j  :5  m}  is 
a  minimising  set  for  G.  M 
Note  that  the  minimising  set  is  much  smaller  than  G,  and  the  conditions 
of  Theorem  16  can  be  easily  checked  using  GAP.  Although  testing  two  arbitrary 
groups  for  isomorphism  can  be  very  inefficient,  if  a  set  of  m  candidate  columns  is 
found,  testing  whether  the  action  of  G  on  the  columns  is  isomorphic  to  S"  can  be 
performed  efficiently  using  the  GAP  function  I  sNaturalSymmetricGroup  (G). 
It  may  seem  that  the  conditions  of  Theorem  16  are  unnecessary,  and  that, 
given  any  isomorphism  0:  S,,  -+  G,  the  set  I  (i  j)  0:  I<i<j:!  ý  m}  is  a  minimis- 
ing  set  for  G.  However,  consider  the  group  G  below,  which  is  a  subgroup  of  the 
symmetry  group  of  a  hypercube  (see  Section  4.6): 
G=  ((l  2)  (5  6)  (9  10)  (13  14),  (12  4  8)  (3  6  12  9)  (5  10)  (7  14  13  11))  ý:  S14 
G  is  isomorphic  to  S4.  with  an  isomorphism  0:  S4  --+  G  defined  on  generators  by 
(12  3  4)0  =  (12  4  8)  (3  6  12  9)  (5  10)  (7  14  13  11),  (12)0  =  (4  8)  (5  9)  (6  10)  (7  11). 
The  state  s=  (6,10,3,6,3,5,7,10,4,8,2,1,9,3)  E  {1,2,...,  lo)14  can  not  be  min- 
imised  using  the  set  I  (i  j)O  :1  -< 
i<j<  4}. 
Theorem  17  If  G  satisfies  the  conditions  of  Theorem  16  and  X=I  (i  j)O  :1  <- 
i<j  :5  m}  then  nfin[s]G  can  be  computed  in  O(M3)  time  for  any  SE  Ln,  using 
Algorithm  6. 
Proof  Clearly1XI  =  I(ij)0:  1  <i  <j:  ý  m}1  =  m(m-l)/2. 
A  column  entry  Ci(s)  for  a  state  s  with  respect  to  a  column  Ci  is  a  tuple  of 
local  states  of  s  whose  indices  (in  s)  belong  to  Ci,  viewed  as  an  ordered  list.  Clearly 
we  can  order  columns  and  column  entries  lexicographically.  An  element  (i  j)'  EX 
has  the  effect  of  transposing  two  column  entries  for  a  given  state. 
We  say  that  Q  is  minimal  in  s  if,  for  all  Cj  <  Ci,  Cj(s)  :5  Ci(s).  That  is,  no 
smaller  column  has  a  larger  entry.  Now  suppose  that  the  smallest  column  entry 
for  s  which  is  not  minimal  in  s  has  index  j  and  let  i  be  the  largest  i  such  that  Ci  is 
minimal  and  Ci  <  Cj.  Then  clearly  min{a(s)  :aE  X}  =  (i  j)O(s).  Hence,  after 
the  first  iteration  of  the  outer  loop  of  Algorithm  6,  the  state  min'  has  at  least  its  first 
(left-most)  column  entry  as  small  as  possible.  Similarly,  after  the  second  iteration 
mitt'  has  (at  least)  its  first  and  second  column  entries  as  small  as  possible,  and  after 
m  iterations  all  column  entries  are  ordered  in  such  a  way  that  mitt'  =  min,  in  which 
case  the  outer  loop  terminates. 
We  have  shown  that,  in  the  worst  case,  Algorithm  6  involves  iterating  m 
times  over  a  set  of  size  O(M2).  The  result  follows.  M 9.2:  EXPLOITING  BASIC  SYMMETRY  GROUPS  173 
Algorithm  7  Optimised  state  minimisation  using  a  minimising  set  X. 
milt:  =  S 
repeat 
"till'  :=  mill 
fora  EX  do 
if  a(min)  <  miti  then 
milt:  =  a(mill) 
end  if 
end  for 
until  miii'  =  miii 
Each  iteration  of  the  outer  loop  of  Algorithm  6  applies  every  element  of  X 
to  min',  the  minimum  state  found  by  the  previous  iteration,  and  updates  min'  to 
the  smallest  image  under  X.  Algorithm  7  works  similarly,  but  updates  the  current 
minimum  every  time  an  element  of  X  is  found  which  yields  a  smaller  image.  We 
have  found  that  this  works  better  in  practice. 
9.2.4  Local  search  for  unclassifiable  groups 
If  G  is  large  group  then  computing  min[SIG  by  enumeration  of  the  elements  of  G 
may  be  infeasible,  even  with  the  group-theoretic  optimisations  discussed  in  Sec- 
tions  9.2.1  and  9.2.2.  If  no  minimising  set  is  available  for  G,  and  G  cannot  be  classi- 
fied  as  a  composite  symmetry  group  (see  Sections  9.3  and  9.4)  then  we  must  exploit 
G  via  an  approximate  symmetry  reduction  strategy. 
We  propose  an  approximate  strategy  based  on  gradient-descent  local  search,  2 
which  has  proved  successful  for  a  variety  of  search  problems  in  artificial  intelli- 
gence  [152].  In  this  case  the  function  min  works  by  performing  a  local  search  of  [SIG 
starting  at  s,  using  the  generators  of  G  as  operations  from  which  to  compute  a  suc- 
cessor  state.  The  search  starts  by  setting  t=s,  and  proceeds  iteratively.  On  each 
iteration,  a  (t)  is  computed  for  each  generator  a  of  G.  If  t<a  (t)  for  all  a  then  a  local 
minimum  has  been  reached,  and  t  is  returned  as  a  representative  for  [SIG-  Other- 
wise,  t  is  set  to  the  smallest  image  a  (t),  and  the  search  continues.  In  Section  11.3  we 
show  that  this  local  search  algorithm  is  effective  when  exploring  the  state-spaces  of 
various  configurations  of  message  routing  in  a  hypercube  network. 
There  are  various  local  search  techniques  which  could  be  employed  to  at- 
tempt  to  improve  the  accuracy  of  this  strategy.  Random-restart  local  search  [152] 
involves  the  selection  of  several  random  elements  of  [SIG  in  addition  to  s,  and  per- 
forming  local  search  from  each  of  them,  returning  the  smallest  result.  In  our  case 
we  could  apply  such  a  technique  by  finding  the  image  of  a  state  s  under  distinct, 
random  elements  of  G  (GAP  provides  functionality  for  generating  random  group  el- 
ements).  Another  potential  improvement  would  be  to  use  simulated  annealing  [1091 
to  escape  local  minima. 
2.  TWs  is  referred  to  in  [43,44]  as  hilldimbing  local  search 9.3:  EXPLOMNG  DISJOINT  PRODUCTS  174 
9.3  Exploiting  Disjoint  Products 
Certain  kinds  of  symmetry  groups  can  be  decomposed  as  a  product  of  subgroups. 
In  this  case  it  may  be  possible  to  solve  the  COP  separately  for  each  subgroup, 
providing  a  solution  to  the  COP  for  the  whole  group.  In  particular,  if  a  symme- 
try  group  permutes  disjoint  sets  of  components  independently  then  the  group  can 
be  described  as  the  disjoint  product  of  the  groups  acting  on  these  disjoint  sets  (see 
Definition  15,  Section  3.1.4). 
Disjoint  products  occur  frequently  in  model  checking  problems.  For  exam- 
ple,  the  symmetry  group  associated  with  the  resource  allocator  specification  of  Sec- 
tion  4.4  is  a  disjoint  product  of  two  groups,  which  independently  permute  com- 
ponents  with  priority  levels  0  and  1  respectively.  In  our  three-tiered  architecture 
example  (see  Section  9.1.2),  the  group  G3T  can  be  shown  to  decompose  as  a  disjoint 
product  G3T  =  HI  *  H2  where: 
Hi  =  ((l  2),  (2  3),  (4  5),  (5  6),  (7  8),  (8  9), 
(12  13)  (14)  (2  5)  (3  6),  (13  14)  (4  7)  (5  8)  (6  9)) 
H2  =  ((10  11)). 
If  G  is  a  disjoint  product  of  subgroups  H1,  H2,...,  Hk  then  min[SIG  -`  Mi?  4... 
Mb?  [n1i11[S1HJ1f2 
... 
I  Hk  [271,  so  the  COP  for  G  can  be  solved  by  considering  each 
subgroup  Hi  in  turn.  Even  if  it  is  necessary  to  enumerate  over  the  elements  of  each 
Hi,  it  is  more  efficient  to  enumerate  over  the  resulting  Eki.,  I  Hi  I  elements  than  the 
FIL,  JHil  elements  of  G.  Furthermore,  it  may  be  that  some  or  all  of  the  Hi  can  be 
handled  using  minimising  sets,  or  wreath  product  decompositions  (see  Section  9.4). 
However,  the  above  result  is  only  useful  when  designing  a  fully  automatic 
symmetry  reduction  package  if  it  is  possible  to  automatically  and  efficiently  de- 
termine,  before  search,  whether  or  not  G  decomposes  as  a  disjoint  product  of  sub- 
groups. 
We  present  two  solutions  to  this  problem:  a  sound,  incomplete  approach 
which  runs  in  polynomial  time,  and  a  sound,  complete  approach  which  in  the 
worst  case  runs  in  exponential  time.  We  show  that  the  second  approach  can  be 
optimised  using  computational  group  theory  to  run  efficiently  for  the  kind  of  sym- 
metry  groups  which  arise  in  model  checking  problems. 
9.3.1  Efficient,  sound,  incomplete  approach 
Let  G=  (X)  for  some  X  C-  G  with  id  V-  X.  Define  a  binary  relation  BC  X2  as 
follows:  for  all  ci,  AEX  (a,  P)  EB  -ý*  moved(a)  n  moved(A)  34  0.  Clearly  B  is 
symmetric,  and  since  for  any  aEG  with  a0  id,  moved(a)  34  0,  B  is  reflexive.  It 
follows  that  the  transitive  closure  of  B,  denoted  B*,  is  an  equivalence  relation  on  X. 
We  now  show  that  if  B*  has  multiple  equivalence  classes  then  each  class  generates 9.3:  EXPLOITING  DISJOINT  PRODUCTS  175 
a  subgroup  of  G  which  is  a  non-trivial  factor  for  a  disjoint  product  decomposition 
of  G. 
Lemma  7  Suppose  thatit,  AEX,  and  that  (a,  B*.  Then  moved(ci)nmoved(p) 
0  and  a  and  P  commute. 
Proof  If  moved(a)  nmoved(P)  ýý  0  then  (a,  A)  EBC  B*,  a  contradiction,  thus 
moved(a)  nmoved(P)  =  0.  Therefore  if  al  and  P1  are  cycles  in  the  disjoint  cycle 
forms  of  it  and  A  respectively  then  al  and  Pi  are  disjoint  and  therefore  commute. 
By  repeatedly  swapping  disjoint  cycles,  it  follows  that  ap  =  Pa.  M 
Theorem  18  SUPPOSC  Cli  C21  ...  i  Ck  are  the  equivalence  classes  of  X  under  B* 
where  k>2.  For  1<i  :5k  let  Hi  (Q.  Then  G=  Hl  *  H2  Hk,  and 
Hi  34  lid}  (1  <i<  k). 
Proof  Clearly  HIH2...  Hk  9  G.  If  it  EG  then  a=  a1eq  ...  1Xd  for  some 
1XIi  it2  Cid  E  X,  d>0.  By  Lemma  7  we  can  arrange  the  al  so  that  elements 
of  Ci  appear  before  those  of  Cj  whenever  i<j.  It  follows  that  G=  HjH2...  Hk. 
By  Lemma  7,  ?  iioved(Hj)  n  nioved(Hj)  =0  for  1  <-  i  34  j  : ý,  k  and  so  G 
H,  *  H2  *  ...  9  Hk,  where  (since  id  ý  X)  the  Hi  are  non-trivial.  0 
Consider  the  group  G3T  which  is  generated  by  the  set  X=1  (12),  (2  3),  (4  5), 
(5  6),  (7  8),  (8  9),  (12  13)(1  4)(2  5)(3  6),  (13  14)(4  7)(5  8)(6  9)(10  11)}.  It  is 
straightforward  to  check  that  the  equivalence  classes  under  B*  for  this  example  are 
as  follows: 
C1  (12),  (2  3),  (4  5),  (5  6),  (7  8),  (8  9),  (12  13)  (14)  (2  5)  (3  6), 
(13  14)  (4  7)  (5  8)  (6  9)} 
C2  WO  11)b 
which  generate  the  groups  HI  and  H2  respectively,  described  at  the  start  of  Sec- 
tion  9.3.  This  is  the  finest  disjoint  product  decomposition  of  G3T. 
The  approach  is incomplete  as  it  does  not  guarantee  the  finest  decomposi- 
tion  of  an  arbitrary  group  G  as  a  disjoint  product.  To  see  this,  suppose  that  the  ele- 
ment  (12)  (10  11)  is  added  to  the  generating  set  for  the  group  G3T.  This  causes  the 
equivalence  classes  C1  and  C2  to  merge,  and  a  non-trivial  disjoint  decomposition 
for  G3T  is  not  obtained. 
However,  in  practice  we  have  not  found  a  case  in  which  the  finest  decompo- 
sition  is  not  detected  when  generators  have  been  computed  by  a  graph  automor- 
phism  program.  The  approach  is  very  efficient  as  it  works  purely  with  the  genera- 
tors  of  G,  of  which  there  are  typically  few. 9.3:  EXPLOMNG  DISJOINT  PRODUCTS  176 
Algorithm  8  disjoint-deCompositim(G,  0)  -G  is  a  group  and  0  its  non-trivial  orbits. 
forall  artitionsJ01,02}of0do 
if  GX1  <G  and  GC72<  G  then 
return  disjoint-decompositio?  z  (GO',  01)  o  disjoint_decomposition(GO2,02) 
end  if 
end  for 
return 
9.3.2  Sound  and  complete  approach 
We  now  present  an  algorithm  for  computing  the  finest  non-trivial  decomposition  of 
G  as  a  disjoint  product  of  subgroups.  The  algorithm  runs  in  exponential  time  in  the 
worst  case,  but  for  many  groups  which  arise  in  model  checking  problems  we  can 
obtain  polynomial  run-time  via  a  computational  group  theoretic  optimisation.  We 
present  three  lemmas,  the  proofs  of  which  can  be  found  in  Appendix  B.  3.  Through- 
out  this  section  we  use  (variations  of)  n  and  0  to  refer  to  orbits  and  sets  of  orbits 
respectively. 
Let  G  :ýS.,  and  0  the  set  of  all  non-trivial  orbits  of  G.  For  0'  C  0,  any 
it  EG  can  be  written  as  it  ---:  U02  ...  &sP1P2  ... 
Pt.  where  moved(ai)  9nE  0'  for 
some  n  (1  <i<  s)  and  ?  iioved  (Ai)  9  11  E  (0  \  0')  for  some  n  (1  <i<  t).  With  LY 
in  this  form,  the  restrictioit  of  a  to  0'  is  the  permutation  et  of  =  a1&2  ...  as.  In  general, 
ao'  ý  G.  For  H<G,  the  restrictioit  of  H  to  0'  is  the  group  HO'  =  JaO'  :aE  H}.  In 
general,  HO'  Z  G. 
Lemma  8  Suppose  G=  HI  *  H2  where  111  54  lid}  and  H2  34  lid}.  Then  there  are 
Sets  01. 
- 
02  of  non-trivial  orbits  of  G  such  that  JOL,  02}  is  a  partition  of  0  and  for 
iE  11,2},  Hi  =  GOi. 
Algorithm  8  is  a  recursive  algorithm  for  computing  a  disjoint  decomposition 
of  G.  If  G  can  be  decomposed,  then  by  Lemma  8  there  is  some  partition  101,02} 
of  0  such  that  G=  GO,  9  GC'h.  The  algorithm  detects  when  a  partition  with  this 
property  has  been  found,  based  on  the  following  lemma: 
Lemma  9  If  {01i  02}  is  a  partition  of  0  and  GOi  <G  for  iE  {1,2}  then  G 
Go'  o  GO2. 
Once  a  decomposition  of  the  form  G=  GO,  *  G02has  been  found,  the 
groups  GC71  and  G02  are  recursively  decomposed.  This  guarantees  the  finest  de- 
composition  of  G  as  a  disjoint  product,  thus  Algorithm  8  is  complete. 
Computing  GOi  by  restricting  each  generator  of  G  to  Oi  is  trivial.  Testing 
whether  GO'  <G  can  be  done  in  low-degree  polynomial  time  using  standard  com- 
putational  group  theoretic  data  structures  [191.  Thus  the  complexity  of  Algorithm  8 
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worst  case.  If  G  does  not  decompose  as  a  disjoint  product  then  every  partition  of  0 
of  size  two  must  be  considered.  The  number  of  such  partitions  is  S(I  01,2),  a  Stirling 
number  of  the  second  kind  [70],  and  it  can  be  shown  that  S(I  0  1,2)  =  2101-1  -  1.  In 
the  worst  case,  10  1  may  be  n  /2,  thus  the  complexity  of  Algorithm  8  is  0  (2n). 
A  computational  group  theoretic  optimisation 
We  can  optimise  the  performance  of  Algorithm  8  for  many  commonly  occurring 
symmetry  groups  by  introducing  the  notion  of  depeWmit  orbits: 
Definition  30  Let  nl,  n2  E  0.  We  say  that  n,  is  dependent  on  n2  if  Istab*  (r)2)011 
G 
I  Gcll 
Intuitively,  01  is  dependent  on  n2  if  fixing  every  point  in  r)2  has  an  effect 
on  the  action  of  G  on  nj.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  r1l  is  dependent  on  112  iff  r)2  is 
dependent  on  f1j,  so  we  say  that  two  orbits  are  dependent  if  one  is  dependent  on  the 
other.  We  now  show  that  dependent  orbits  must  belong  to  the  same  element  of  the 
partition  of  Lemma  8: 
Lemma  10  Let  {01,02}  be  a  partition  of  0  such  that  G=  GO'  9  G02  (as  in 
Lemma  8).  Let  fli,  nj  E0  be  dependent.  Then  f  ni,  nj}  9  01  or  jr)j,  r)j}  9  02- 
Define  a  binary  relation  B  C-  0x0  as  follows:  (ill,  n2)  EB  if  r1l  and  n2 
are  dependent.  We  have  already  established  that  B  is  symmetric,  and  B  is  obviously 
reflexive.  We  have  not  determined  whether  B  is,  in  general,  transitive,  so  we  use  B* 
to  denote  the  transitive  closure  of  B.  Suppose  101,02}  is  a  partition  of  0  with  G= 
GO,  9  G02  (as  in  Lemma  8).  ff  C  is  an  equivalence  class  of  B*,  called  a  depetidency 
class,  then  by  Lemma  10  and  induction,  CC  Oi  for  some  i. 
Since  Algorithm  8  depends  critically  on  the  size  of  the  set  0,  we  can  po- 
tentially  improve  performance  by  taking  0  to  be  the  set  of  all  dependency  classes, 
rather  than  the  set  of  all  orbits,  if  there  are  fewer  dependency  classes.  Computing 
the  dependency  classes  involves  computing  pointwise  stabilisers,  which  is  a  poly- 
nomial  time  operation  [191. 
Examples 
We  illustrate  the  sound  and  complete  approach  using  a  group  for  which  the  op- 
timisation  above  reduces  the  problem  so  that  there  is  only  one  potential  partition 
1011  02}  to  consider.  We  also  give  a  pathological  example  for  which  our  optimisa- 
tion  does  not  help  at  all. 
Lot  G  be  the  following  group: 
((l  2  3)  (4  5  6)  (7  8  9)  (10  1112)  (14  15)  (17  18)  (20  21), 
(2  3)  (5  6)  (8  9)  (11  12)  (13  14  15)  (16  17  18)  (19  20  21)). 9.3:  EXPLOMNG  DISJOINT  PRODUCTS  178 
Due  to  the  manner  in  wl-dch  the  generators  of  G  have  been  presented,  applying  the 
sound  and  incomplete  approach  of  Section  9.3.1  does  not  yield  a  disjoint  product 
decomposition.  Using  GAP,  we  find  that  G  has  seven  non-trivial  orbits: 
{11,2,3},  14,5,6},  17,8,9},  110,11,12},  113,14,15},  116,17,18},  fl9,20,21}  I 
and  there  are  S  (7,2)  =  63  partitions  of  these  orbits.  However,  analysing  the  orbits 
for  dependency,  we  find  that  the  orbits  01  =  if  1,2,3},  f  4,5,6},  f  7,8,9},  f  10,11,12}} 
are  all  dependent,  and  02  =  if  13,14,15},  116,17,18},  f  19,20,21}}  are  all  depen- 
dent.  There  is  only  one  partition  of  0  which  preserves  these  dependencies  -  the 
partition  101,02}-  It  is  straightforward  to  check  that 
G=  Go'  9 
G02 
((1,2,3)(4,5,6)(7,8,9)(10,11,12),  (1,2)(4,5)(7,8)(10,11)) 
o  ((13,14,15)  (16,17,18)  (19,20,21),  (13,14)  (16,17)  (19,20)). 
This  is  an  example  for  which  the  computational  group  theoretic  optimisation  is 
very  effective. 
Now  consider,  for  any  even  ii  >  2,  the  following  group: 
((l  2)  (3  4), 
(34)(56), 
(it-6  it-5)(n-4  it-3), 
(n-3  it-2)(n-l  n)). 
It  is  clear  that  G,  has  n/2non-trivial  orbits:  0=  JJ1,2},  J3,4},  J5,6},..., 
In  -  1,  n}}.  It  is  not  so  obvious,  but  easy  to  check,  that  no  two  orbits  are  dependent. 
Hence  the  computational  group  theoretic  optimisation  does  not  reduce  the  number 
of  partitions  of  0  which  must  be  checked  to  determine  whether  G"  decomposes  as 
a  disjoint  product.  The  number  of  partitions  is  S  (J,  2)  =  2n  /2  -  1,  and  all  of  these 
must  be  checked  since  G,,  does  not  decompose  as  a  non-trivial  disjoint  product  for 
any  n  (tl-ds  can  be  proved  by  induction).  However,  this  is  not  a  group  which  we 
have  encountered  in  association  with  a  model  checking  problem. 
An  open  problem  in  this  area  is  to  determine  whether  there  is  a  polynomial 
time  algorithm  for  finding  the  finest  disjoint  product  decomposition  of  an  arbitrary 
group  G.  A  possible  approach  is  to  find  a  stronger  notion  of  dependent  orbits,  with 
the  property  that  if  C1,  C2,...,  Ch  are  the  dependency  classes  of  the  orbits  then  G 
GC1  *  GC2  *  ...  *  GCk. 
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checking  perspective,  the  sound  and  incomplete  approach  of  Section  9.3.1  returns 
the  finest  disjoint  product  decomposition  of  groups  whose  generators  have  been 
automatically  computed.  The  sound,  complete  approach,  with  our  computational 
group  theoretic  optimisation,  can  efficiently  handle  all  the  types  of  symmetry  group 
which  we  have  observed  in  connection  with  model  checking  problems,  regardless 
of  the  way  their  generators  are  presented. 
9.4  Exploiting  Wreath  Products 
Suppose  that  a  symmetry  group  partitions  the  components  of  a  system  into  subsets 
such  that  there  is  analogous  symmetry  within  each  subset,  and  symmetry  between 
the  subsets.  Then  the  group  can  be  described  as  the  itmer  wreath  product  of  the  group 
which  acts  on  the  subsets,  and  the  group  which  permutes  the  subsets  (see  Defini- 
tion  17,  Section  3.1.4). 
Wreath  products  occur  in  model  checking  problems  when  systems  are  mod- 
elled  using  a  tree  structure.  In  Section  4.5  we  established  that  the  symmetry  group 
associated  with  the  three-tiered  architecture  specification  exhibits  wreath  product 
symmetry.  Recall  the  group  G3T  introduced  in  Section  9.1.2.  In  Section  9.3,  we 
showed  that  G3T  decomposes  as  a  disjoint  product  H,  *  H2.  We  now  show  that 
the  factor  HI  of  this  product  decomposes  as  an  inner  wreath  product. 
We  have  HI  ::  5  Sy?  ii  (X)  where  X=  11,2,...,  9,12,13,14}.  Consider  the  fol- 
lowing  partition  JX1,  X2,  X3}  of  X,  where  we  describe  each  Xi  as  an  ordered  set  of 
elements  X1  =  Jxi,  i,  xi,  2,...,  xi,  4}  (as  in  Definition  17,  Section  3.1.4): 
X,  =  11,2,3,12} 
X2  =  14,5,6,13} 
X3  =  17,8,9,14} 
Taking  K=  S3  and  H=  S31  3  let  LT  be  the  permutation  representation  corre- 
sponding  to  the  action  of  K  on  X  and  crI,  LT2  and  o,  3  those  for  H  on  X  as  in  Defird- 
tion  17.  Then: 
o,  (K)  =  ((14)(25)(36)(1213),  (47)(58)(69)(1314)) 
o,  l  (H)  ((l  2),  (2  3)) 
L72  (H)  ((4  5),  (5  6)) 
o,  3  (H)  ((7  8),  (8  9)) 
The  group  a(K)  permutes  the  partition  JXI,  X2,  X3},  whereas  each  group 
qj(H)  permutes  the  set  Xi.  One  can  verify  (using  GAP)  that  H,  =  LT(K)  o-I  (H)  a2  (H) 
L73  (H),  i.  e.  HI  =HIK. 
3.  The  group  H  can  bethought  of  as  the  subgroup  of  Synl([1,2,3,41)  which  fixes  the  point  4. 9.4:  EXPLOMNG  WREATH  PRODUCTS  180 
Suppose  that  G  :  ý,  S,,  has  a  non-trivial  (inner)  wreath  product  decomposition 
(H,  K,  X)  with  associated  permutation  representations  0-,  ol,  0'2,.  .  .,  O'd  for  the  ac- 
tions  of  K  and  H  on  11,2,...,  n}  (where  d=IX  1).  For  a  state  sE  Ln  it  can  be  shown 
that  min[s]G  =  min[min[...  min  [min  [s],,  (H)l  oý(H)  ... 
]o,, 
j(H)1o,  (K)  [271.  This  means  that 
the  COP  for  G  can  be  solved  by  considering  each  subgroupcTi  (H)  in  turn,  followed 
by  the  subgroupLT(K).  Even  if  we  have  to  deal  with  these  groups  using  enumer- 
ation,  it  is  more  efficient  to  enumerate  over  the  resulting  dx  IHI  +  IKI  elements 
than  all  JHIdJKJ  elements  of  G.  Furthermore,  it  may  be  possible  to  deal  with  the 
groups  LT(K)  and  o-i(H)  (I  <i<  d)  efficiently  using  minimising  sets  or  further 
disjoint/wreath  decompositions. 
As  with  the  similar  result  for  disjoint  products  presented  in  Section  9.3, 
the  result  for  wreath  products  is  only  useful  for  automatic  symmetry  reduction 
if  we  can  automatically  determine,  before  search,  whether  an  arbitrary  permuta- 
tion  group  is  a  wreath  product.  We  present  an  algorithm  to  determine  whether  a 
group  G  decomposes  as  a  wreath  product  for  the  case  when  G  is  transitive  (see  Def- 
inition  10,  Section  3.1.2).  We  then  propose  an  extension  of  our  approach  to  the  case 
where  G  may  not  be  transitive. 
9.4.1  Wreath  product  decomposition  for  transitive  groups 
If  G  is  a  transitive  permutation  group  then  we  can  determine  whether  G  has  wreath 
product  structure  by  considering  the  block  systems  of  G.  We  introduce  some  stan- 
dard  definitions  and  results  on  block  systems.  See  [85,150]  for  details. 
Definition  31  Let  G  !ý  Syni(X)  and  YgX,  where  X  is  a  non-empty  set.  Then  Y  is 
a  block  for  G  iff,  for  all  aEG,  a  (Y)  =Y  or  a  (Y)  nY=0. 
Essentially  a  block  is  a  subset  of  X  which  is  either  fixed  by  an  element  of  G, 
or  moved  completely  by  the  element.  The  sets  X,  jx}  (for  any  xE  X),  and  0  are 
always  blocks  for  G,  and  are  called  trivial  blocks.  Given  a  non-empty  block  Y,  it  can 
be  shown  that  the  set  jet(Y)  :aE  G}  is  a  partition  of  G,  each  set  in  this  partition 
is  a  block,  and  all  the  blocks  have  the  same  size.  Such  a  partition  is  called  a  block 
system  for  G,  generated  by  Y.  In  general,  rather  than  singling  out  a  specific  block,  we 
say  that  a  partition  X=  JXI,  X2,...,  Xd}  of  X  is  a  block  system  for  G  if  each  Xi  is  a 
block  for  G,  and  the  blocks  are  all  images  of  each  other  under  G.  A  non-trivial  block 
system  is  one  for  which  the  blocks  are  non-trivial. 
Definition  32  Let  {Xj,  X2,...,  Xd}  be  a  block  system  for  G  :5  Sym(X).  For  1<i 
d,  the  group  (stabG(Xi))X'  is  called  the  block  stabiliser  for  Xi. 
This  is  the  restriction  of  the  group  stabG  (Xi)  to  the  block  Xj,  and  is  analogous 
to  the  restriction  of  a  group  to  a  union  of  orbits  in  Section  9.3.2.  This  restriction  is 9.4:  EXPLOMNG  WREATH  PRODUCTS  181 
well-defined  since  Xj  is  clearly  an  orbit  of  stabG(Xi).  It  can  be  shown  that  for  any 
blocks  Xi,  Xj,  (stabG  (Xi))Xi  and  (stabG  (Xj))Xj  are  identical  up  to  renaming  of  the 
points  on  which  they  act.  If  I  Xil  =m  we  can  identify  all  of  the  groups  (stabG(Xi))X' 
with  a  group  H<S  by  renaming  points  in  the  obvious  way.  We  call  H  the  block 
stabilizer  for  the  system. 
The  block  stabiliser  for  Xi  shows  the  effect  of  G  on  the  points  contained  in 
Xi.  The  effect  of  G  on  the  blocks,  regarded  as  "black  boxes",  is  characterised.  by  the 
block  perniu  ter: 
Definition  33  Let  X=f  XI,  X2,...,  Xd}  be  a  block  system  for  G  :!  ý,  Sym(X).  For 
aEG  and  Y9X  define  a(Y)  =f  a(x)  :xE  Y}  in  the  usual  way.  It  is  easy  to 
check  that  this  is  an  action  of  G  on  X  (see  Definition  13,  Section  3.1.3).  Let  o,  be  the 
permutation  representation  of  this  action  so  that  a(G)  :5  Syni(X).  We  can  identify 
Syni(X)  with  Sd  by  renaming  Xi  as  i  (1  :!  ý,  i<  d).  The  group  obtained  by  regarding 
cr(G)  as  a  subgroup  of  Sd  is  called  the  block  permuter  for  X. 
The  following  important  theorem  in  wreath  product  theory  (see,  for  exam- 
ple,  [1291  for  a  proof)  shows  that  if  G  is  a  transitive  permutation  group  which  ad- 
mits  a  non-trivial  block  system  then  G  is 
' 
contained  in  an  (inner)  wreath  product. 
The  theorem  is  followed  by  a  straightforward  lemma. 
Theorem  19  Let  G  :5  Syni(X)  be  transitive  and  Xa  non-trivial  block  system  for  G. 
Let  H  and  K  be  the  block  stabiliser  and  block  permuter  for  X  respectively.  Den  H 
and  K  are  non-trivial  and  G  is  contained  in  the  (hon-trivial)  inner  wreath  product 
of  H  and  K  with  associated  partition  X,  i.  e.  G<HIK. 
Lemma  11  Let  HIK  be  the  inner  wreath  product  of  Theorem  19,  with  associated 
block  system  X.  Leto,,,  o,  2,...,  od  be  the  actions  of  H  on  X  described  in  Definition  17 
Then  oj(H)  =  (stabG(Xj))Xi,  the  stabiliser  of  block  Xi  (1  :ýi<  d). 
Conversely  to  Theorem  19,  we  show  that  any  inner  wreath.  product  exhibits 
a  block  system. 
Lemma  12  Let  G  :5  Syiii(X)  and  suppose  G  is  an  inner  wreath  product  HIK  with 
associated  partition  X=  IX1,  X2,...,  Xd}.  Then  X  is  a  block  system  for  G. 
Proof  Let  o,  and  aj,  q2,...,  vd  be  the  permutation  representations  of  the  actions  of 
K  and  H  on  X.  Any  element  9EG  has  the  form  9ý  0(A)Lr1(&1)0'2(IX2)  ...  O'd(Cid)  for 
some  AEK,  ltloit2i  ---,  &d  E  H.  For  any  Xj  E  X,  clearly  cj(aj)(Xi)  =  Xj,  therefore 
9  (Xi)  =  o,  (A)  (Xi).  By  definition  of  a,  either  o,  (A)  (Xi)  =  Xj,  or  o,  (A)  (Xi)  n  Xi 
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Algorithm  9  Computing  a  wreath  product  decomposition  for  a  transitive  permu- 
tation  group  G. 
for  all  non-trivial  block  systems  X=  JXI,  X2,...,  Xd}  for  G  do 
K:  =  block  permuter  for  X 
0:  G  --*  K  :=  permutation  representation  of  action  of  G  on  X 
o,,  (H)  :=  (stabG(Xl))Xl 
if  IGI  =  loI(H)  Id  IKI  then 
for  all  iE  12,...,  d}  do 
cri(H)  :=  (stabG(Xj))Xi 
end  for 
for  all  monomorphisms  or':  K  --+  G  do 
if  K=  0(o,  (K))  then 
O':  =  cr, 
break 
end  if 
end  for 
return  LT(K),  oI(H),...,  o-d(H) 
end  if 
end  for 
return  fail 
The  next  theorem  is  a  direct  consequence  of  Theorem  19,  Lemma  12  and 
Theorem  4  (Section  3.1.4). 
Theorem  20  Let  G  :5  Sym(X)  be  transitive.  Then  G  can  be  decomposed  as  a  non- 
trivial  inner  wreathproductH  ?  K,  with  associated  partition  X,  iff  X  is  a  non-trivial 
block  system  for  G,  K  and  H  are  the  block  permuter  and  block  stabiliser  for  X 
respectively,  and  IGI  =  IHIIXI  IKI. 
The  consequence  of  Theorem  20  is  that  our  search  for  a  non-trivial  inner 
wreath  product  decomposition  of  an  arbitrary  transitive  permutation  group  G  boils 
down  to  searching  the  non-trivial  block  systems  for  G.  Given  a  block  system,  we 
know  that  G  is  contained  in  the  inner  wreath  product  associated  with  the  block 
system,  and  can  determine  whether  G  is  tl-ds  wreath  product  by  checking  the  order 
of  G. 
Algorithm  9.4.1  (the  correctness  of  wl-dch  follows  from  Theorem  20)  can  be 
used  to  find  a  non-trivial  wreath  product  decomposition  for  a  transitive  group  G,  if 
one  exists.  Rather  than  returning  a  decomposition  in  the  form  (H,  K,  X),  the  algo- 
rithm  returns  the  groups  o,  (K)  and  i7j(H)  (1  <i<  d),  which  are  all  that  we  require 
to  solve  the  constructive  orbit  problem  efficiently. 
For  each  non-trivial  block  system  X,  the  block  permuter  K  and  a  single 
block  stabiliser  (stabG(X,  ))Xl  are  computed.  Since  (stabG(Xj))XI  is  isomorpl-dc  to 
the  block  stabiliser  for  X  it  is  sufficient  to  compare  IGI  with  j(stabG(X1))X1jajKj 9.4:  EXPLOMNG  WREATH  PRODUCTS  183 
to  determine  (by  Theorem  20)  whether  the  current  block  system  corresponds  to 
a  wreath  product  decomposition.  In  the  case  where  equality  of  orders  holds,  by 
Lemma  11  the  groups  vj(H)  can  be  computed  as  block  stabilisers.  The  challenge 
is  to  compute  a,  the  permutation  representation  of  the  action  of  K.  We  know  that 
cr  maps  K  to  an  isomorphic  subgroup  of  G,  therefore  o-  must  be  a  monomorphism 
(see  Theorem  2,  Section  3.1.1).  Furthermore,  the  restriction  of  o,  (K)  to  act  on  the 
blocks,  i.  e.  the  group  O(cr(K)),  must  be  equal  to  K.  Therefore  a  can  be  computed  by 
considering  (in  the  worst  case)  all  monomorphisms  from  K  to  G. 
Efficiency 
We  can  compute  0,  K  and  an  individual  block  system  for  G,  and  determine  the  or- 
ders  of  K  and  (stabG  (XI)  XI)  in  polynomial  time  using  algorithms  presented  in  185]. 
Although  polynomial  time  algorithms  are  not  available  for  computation  of  arbi- 
trary  setwise  stabilisers,  a  block  stabiliser  stabG  (Xi)  cait  be  computed  in  polynomial 
time  [85],  after  which  computing  the  restricted  group  (stabG(XMXi  is  straightfor- 
ward.  The  potential  bottlenecks  of  Algorithm  9.4.1  are:  the  number  of  block  systems 
which  may  need  to  be  considered,  and  the  computation  of  all  monomorphisms 
from  K  to  G. 
It  can  be  shown  (by  counting  chains  of  blocks)  that  an  upper  bound  for  the 
number  of  distinct  block  systems  for  a  permutation  group  G  is  nlog2  n,  where  it  is 
the  degree  of  G  (personal  communication,  P  J.  Cameron,  2007).  This  upper  bound 
is  not  too  large  for  the  sizes  of  it  which  occur  in  model  checking  problems. 
Computing  all  monomorphisms  from  K  to  G  can  be  achieved  via  the  GAP 
function  I  somorphic  Subgroups  (G,  K)  (see  Section  3.1.6).  The  complexity  of 
this  algorithm  is  not  documented,  but  it  is  not  a  polynomial-time  algorithm  (per- 
sonal  communication,  S.  Linton,  2007).  An  alternative  algorithm  for  computing 
o,  (K)  is  presented  as  part  of  a  constructive  proof  [110,  Lemma  2.41,  though  this  al- 
gorithm  does  not  appear  to  be  more  efficient  than  I  somorphic  Subgroups.  Note 
that  it  is  only  necessary  to  compute  the  monomorphism.  o,  if  G  does  indeed  de- 
compose  as  an  inner  wreath  product.  The  benefits  wl-dch  can  result  from  having  a 
wreath  product  decomposition  for  G  may  therefore  justify  fl-ds  computation. 
We  have  observed  that  in  many  practical  examples  o-  is  the  mapping  defined 
by:  a(p)  (xq)  =  xp(i)j,  where  each  block  Xi  has  the  form  JX1.,  X2.,  _..  I  xm}  with  xi  :ý 
xj  whenever  i<j.  Our  implementation  of  Algorithm  9.4.1  tries  this  simple  pre-test 
for  a  before  resorting  to  monomorphism.  computation. 
9.4.2  Extending  the  approach  to  intransitive  permutation  groups 
The  results  of  Section  9.4.1  provide  a  solution  to  the  wreath  product  decomposition 
problem  for  transitive  groups.  However,  wreath  product  groups  which  occur  in 
model  checking  problems  are  not  necessarily  transitive.  Consider  the  subgroup  H, 9.5:  DIRECT  AND  SEMI-DIRECT  PRODUCTS  184 
of  G3T  (see  Sections  9.3  and  9.1.2  respectively).  H1  has  two  orbits,  11,2,...,  9}  and 
112,13,14}.  More  generally,  the  symmetry  group  associated  with  a  rooted  tree  is 
an  intransitive  wreath  product  [106]:  nodes  at  differing  depths  in  the  tree,  or  nodes 
at  the  same  depth  which  occur  in  non-isomorphic  sub-trees,  must  be  in  separate 
orbits.  Unfortunately,  there  is  very  little  literature  on  intransitive  wreath  products. 
Even  works  which  are  dedicated  to  the  topic  of  wreath  products  either  assume 
transitivity  throughout  [1101,  or  only  briefly  discuss  the  intransitive  case  [129]. 
Transitivity  is  imposed  in  Section  9.4.1  due  to  Theorem  19.  The  need  for  tran- 
sitivity  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  19  (see  [1291)  is  unclear:  it  appears  that  transitivity  is 
required  simply  because  the  theorem  appears  in  the  context  of  imprimitive  permuta- 
tion  groups,  which  are  transitive  by  definition  [150].  We  conjecture  that  Theorem  19 
holds  when  the  transitivity  condition  is  omitted. 
Assuming  this  conjecture,  there  is  a  further  problem:  techniques  for  com- 
puting  block  systems  are  restricted  to  transitive  groups  [85].  We  use  an  algorithm 
to  work  around  this  problem  as  follows:  if  G  has  f>1  distinct  orbits  then  for 
each  orbit  rl  we  find  a  (possibly  trivial)  block  system  for  Gn.  We  then  attempt  to 
construct  a  block  for  G  which  is  the  union  of  f  blocks,  one  from  each  block  system. 
Formally,  assume  that  the  orbits  of  G  are  n1,  n2/  ...,  [If,  and  assume  with- 
out  loss  of  generality  that  these  orbits  are  non-trivial.  For  each  ni,  let  blocks(ni)  be 
the  set  of  all  block  systems  for  Gni,  excluding  {ni}  but  including  the  trivial  sys- 
tem  fix}  :xE  ni}.  For  each  X1  E  blocks(ni),  consider  every  set  of  block  systems 
{X1,  X2,...,  Xf  }  such  that  Xi  E  blocks(ni),  JXiJ  =  JX1  I  for  all  i>1,  and  at  least 
one  Xi  is  non-trivial.  We  attempt  to  construct  a  block  from  the  Xi  as  follows:  Set 
B=X,  where  X,  is  any  block  in  X1.  Find  a  block  X2  E  X2  such  that  BU  X2  is  a 
block  for  G,  and  set  B=  X1  U  X2.  Continue  this  process  until  no  suitable  Xi  exists, 
or  B=  X1  U  X2  U  ...  U  Xf  is  a  block  for  G  (Xi  E  Xi,  1<i<  f).  In  the  latter  case, 
store  the  block  system  generated  by  B. 
Algorithm  9.4.1  can  be  applied  to  the  set  of  block  systems  for  G  obtained  via 
this  process,  to  obtain  an  inner  wreath  product  decomposition. 
The  symmetry  reduction  package  TopSPiN,  described  in  Chapter  11,  uses 
the  techniques  described  above  to  compute  wreath  product  decompositions  for  ar- 
bitrary  groups.  If  our  conjecture  above  proves  to  be  incorrect,  it  is  possible  that 
our  implementation  may  compute  an  erroneous  wreath  product  decomposition  for 
a  group  G.  The  worst  case  scenario  then  is  that  representative  computation  for  G 
might  result  in  multiple  orbit  representatives.  This  compromises  the  optimality,  but 
not  the  soundness,  of  symmetry  reduction. 
9.5  Direct  and  Semi-direct  Products 
As  noted  in  Section  3.1.4,  disjoint  products  are  a  special  case  of  direct  product,  and 
both  direct  and  wreath  products  are  examples  of  semi-direct  products.  It  is  natu- 9.5:  DIRECT  AND  SEMI-DIRECT  PRODUCTS  185 
ral  to  ask  whether  the  idea  of  solving  the  COP  efficiently  by  decomposing  G  as 
a  disjoint/wreath  product  can  be  extended  to  apply  to  direct/semi-direct  prod- 
ucts.  We  use  the  symmetry  group  of  a  3-dimensional  hypercube  to  provide  counter- 
examples  which  show  that  a  direct  extension  of  the  techniques  is  not  possible. 
Recall  the  group  K3  M  S3.  the  symmetry  group  of  a  3-dimensional  hypercube 
(i.  e.  a  cube),  introduced  in  Section  4.6.1.  For  1<i<8  we  use  the  integer  i  to 
represent  the  node  in  a  cube  corresponding  to  the  boolean  vector  for  i_1.4  Then 
the  groups  K3  and  S3  can  be  expressed  using  generators  as  follows: 
K3  ý  ((l  2)  (3  4)  (5  6)  (7  8),  (13)  (2  4)  (5  7)  (6  8),  (15)  (2  6)  (3  7)  (4  8)) 
S3  "  ((2  3  5)  (4  7  6),  (2  3)  (6  7)). 
Conjecture  1  If  G  :5  Sn  and  G=H,  x  H2  then,  fOr  SE  Ln,  nzin[s]c, 
min[min[s],  -1,111,  or  miti[s]r,  =  min[niiyz[s]H,  ]H,. 
Counterexample  Consider  the  group  G  =--  K3  ý4  S3  :!  ý-  S8..  and  the  state  s= 
(4,3,2,4,2,1,1,3).  Using  GAP,  we  can  compute  min[s1c;  by  enumeration  of  G, 
and  we  find  that  mhz[s]G  =  (1,2,2,4,3,1,4,3).  Again  using  GAP,  we  find  that 
nihi[s]K,  =  (1,2,3,1,3,4,4,2)  =t  say,  and  that  mht[t]s,  =t0  Mi?  I[SIG-  Similarly, 
we  find  that  mi?  i[nfi?  t[s]sjK3=  (1,2,2,4,3,4,1,3)  34  min[SIG-  M 
Conjecture  2  If  G=H,  x 
H2  x  ... 
X  Hk  :!  ý  Sn  then,  for  sE  L",  mi?  z[slc; 
Miil[-  --  Mi?  l["lhl[SIHJff,...  IH, 
- 
Counterexample  It  is  easy  to  show  that  the  group  K3  decomposes  as  a  direct  prod- 
uct  -  K3  =  H,  x  H2  x  H3,  where: 
Hi  =  ((12)  (3  4)  (5  6)  (7  8)) 
H2  =  ((13)  (2  4)  (5  7)  (6  8)) 
H3  =  ((l  5)  (2  6)  (3  7)  (4  8)). 
Consider  the  state  s=  (3,4,4,2,5,4,1,5).  Using  enumeration  we  find  that 
miii[s]K3  =  (1,5,5,4,4,2,3,4).  However,  mi?  i[mi?  t[min[sjHjHjHk  =  (3,4,4,2,5,4,1,5) 
for  any  distinct  i,  j,  kE  {1,2,3}.  This  shows  that  s  cannot  be  minimised  by  consid- 
ering  HI,  H2  and  H3  independently,  no  matter  which  order  they  are  applied  in.  M 
Note  that  Conjectures  1  and  2  show  simply  that  the  COP  for  semi-direct 
4.  We  use  the  integers  11,2,...,  81  rather  than  10,1,...,  71  so  that  we  can  present  examples  com- 
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and  direct  products  cannot,  in  general,  be  solved  by  straightforward  application  of 
techniques  which  work  for  disjoint  and  wreath  products.  Of  course  this  does  not 
mean  that  there  is  no  way  to  efficiently  solve  the  COP  by  exploiting  this  product 
structure. 
9.6  Choosing  a  Strategy  for  G 
The  strategies  we  have  presented  for  minimising  a  state  with  respect  to  basic  and 
composite  groups  can  be  combined  to  yield  a  symmetry  reduction  strategy  for  the 
arbitrary  group  G  by  classifying  the  group  using  a  top-down  recursive  algorithm. 
The  algorithm  starts  by  searching  for  a  minimisirig  set  for  G  of  the  form 
prescribed  in  Theorem  16,  so  that  min[s]G  can  be  computed  as  described  in  Sec- 
tion  9.2.3.  If  no  such  minimising  set  can  be  found,  a  decomposition  of  G  as  a  dis- 
joint/wreath  product  is  sought.  In  this  case  the  algorithm  is  applied  recursively  to 
obtain  a  minimisation  strategy  for  each  factor  of  the  product  so  that  nfin  [SIG  can  be 
computed  using  these  strategies  as  described  in  Sections  9.3  and  9.4  respectively.  If 
G  remains  unclassified  and  IGI  is  sufficiently  small,  enumeration  is  used,  otherwise 
local  search  (see  Section  9.2.4)  is  selected. 
Summary 
In  this  chapter  we  have  developed  techniques  for  solving  the  constructive  orbit 
problem,  which  is  key  to  exploiting  symmetry  in  explicit-state  model  checking.  We 
have  described  a  method  for  efficiently  applying  a  permutation  to  a  state,  an  op- 
eration  which  is  fundamental  to  symmetry  reduction.  We  have  also  shown  that 
a  basic  symmetry  reduction  strategy  based  on  enumeration  can  be  optimised  by 
representing  a  symmetry  group  using  sets  of  coset  representatives  for  a  stabiliser 
chain. 
Previous  approaches  to  symmetry  reduction  have  exploited  full  symmetry 
groups  by  sorting  states.  We  have  generalised  this  idea  using  the  concept  of  a  min- 
imising  set,  and  have  shown  how  a  minimising  set  for  many  commonly  occurring 
groups  which  are  isomorphic  to  fully  symmetric  groups  can  be  computed. 
It  has  been  established  that  the  COP  can  be  solved  compositionally  if  a  group 
can  be  decomposed  as  a  disjoint/wreath  product  of  subgroups  [27].  However,  these 
results  are  only  useful  for  automated  model  checking  if  the  decomposition  process 
can  be  automated.  We  have  proposed  two  approaches  to  decomposing  a  group  as 
a  disjoint  product  of  subgroups.  The  first  is  sound,  very  efficient,  but  incomplete. 
However,  we  have  found  it  to  work  well  in  practice  when  applied  to  groups  which 
have  been  automatically  computed  using  graph  automorphism  software.  The  sec- 
ond  approach  is  sound  and  complete,  but  runs  in  exponential  time.  We  have  pro- 
posed  a  computational  group  theoretic  optimisation  for  this  approach  which  works 9.6:  CHOOSING  A  STRATEGY  FOR  G  187 
well  for  commonly  occurring  groups.  We  have  shown  how  a  wreath  product  de- 
composition  for  a  transitive  group  can  be  found  by  examining  non-trivial  block  sys- 
tems  for  the  group.  Based  on  a  computational  group-theoretic  conjecture,  we  have 
extended  this  decomposition  approach  to  apply  to  arbitrary  imprimitive  wreath 
products,  and  discussed  the  efficiency  of  the  decomposition  algorithm. 
We  have  shown  that,  in  general,  the  COP  cannot  be  solved  compositionally 
for  groups  which  decompose  as  direct  or  semi-direct  products  of  subgroups  by 
straightforward  extension  of  the  techniques  for  disjoint  and  wreath  products. Chapter  10 
Extending  Symmetry  Reduction  Strategies  to  a  Realistic 
Model  of  Computation 
When  components  do  not  hold  references  to  other  components,  the  simple  model  of 
computation  and  the  action  of  a  permutation  on  a  state  described  in  Section  9.1  are 
sufficient  to  reason  about  concurrent  systems.  The  model  is  common  to  numerous 
works  on  symmetry  reduction  for  model  checking  (e.  g.  [27,57,59]),  and  is  adequate 
for  reasoning  about  input  languages  where  components  do  not  individually  hold 
references  to  other  components,  e.  g.  the  input  languages  of  SMC  [1661,  SYMM  [271 
and  PRISM  [83],  or  where  components  are  specified  using  synchronisation  skeletons 
157]. 
However,  if  components  can  hold  references  to  one  another  then  any  permu- 
tation  that  moves  component  i  will  affect  the  local  state  of  any  components  which 
refer  to  i.  Sophisticated  specification  languages,  such  as  Promela,  include  data- 
types  to  represent  process  and  channel  identifiers.  Both  the  results  presented  in 
[271  on  solving  the  COP  for  groups  which  decompose  as  disjoint/wreath  products, 
and  our  results  on  minimising  sets  for  fully  symmetric  groups  (see  Section  9.2.3) 
do  not  hold  in  general  for  this  extended  model  of  computation.  We  illustrate  this 
using  an  example  in  Section  10.1.2. 
Thus  for  Promela  specifications  where  local  variables  refer  to  process  and 
channel  identifiers,  the  efficient  symmetry  reduction  strategies  presented  in  Chap- 
ter  9  are  not  always  exact;  in  some  cases  they  may  yield  an  approximate  implementa- 
tion  of  the  function  min,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.4.2.  This  does  not  compromise  the 
safety  of  symmetry  reduced  model  checking,  but  means  that  symmetry  reduction 
is  not  memory-optimal. 
For  the  simple  case  of  full  symmetry  between  identical  components,  the 
SymmSpin  package  deals  with  local  variables  which  are  references  to  component 
identifiers  by  dividing  the  local  state  of  each  component  into  two  portions,  one 
which  does  not  refer  to  other  components  (the  insensitive  portion),  and  another 
which  consists  entirely  of  such  references  (the  sensitive  portion).  A  state  is  min- 
imised  by  first  sorting  it  with  respect  to  the  insensitive  portion.  Then,  for  each  sub- 
set  of  components  with  identical  insensitive  portions,  every  permutation  of  the  sub- 10.1:  A  MODEL  OF  COMPUTATION  WrrH  REFERENCES  189 
set  is  considered,  and  the  permutation  which  leads  to  the  smallest  image  is  applied. 
This  is  known  as  the  segmented  strategy.  In  tl-ds  chapter  we  show  that  the  segmented 
strategy  can  be  generalised  so  that  the  exact  strategies  presented  in  Chapter  9  yield 
exact  strategies  under  a  more  realistic  model  of  computation. 
We  present  the  constructive  orbit  problem  with  references  (COPR),  and  show 
that  polynomial  time  strategies  for  the  COP  under  the  simple  model  of  compu- 
tation  of  Chapter  9  do  not  directly  solve  the  COPR.  We  then  present  a  computa- 
tional  group  theoretic  approach  based  on  the  segmented  strategy,  which  extends 
any  strategy  for  solving  the  COP  to  a  solution  for  the  COPR.  Our  extension  results 
in  exact  symmetry  reduction,  at  the  expense  of  polynomial  time.  However,  exper- 
imental  results,  which  we  present  in  Section  11.3,  demonstrate  that  in  practice  our 
approach  is  significantly  more  efficient  than  symmetry  reduction  by  enumeration 
(see  Section  9.2.2).  We  show  that  the  COPR  is  polynomial-time  equivalent  to  COP, 
and  discuss  the  relationship  between  these  problems  and  the  computational  group 
theoretic  problem  of  finding  the  smallest  image  of  a  set  under  a  group  [121]. 
10.1  A  Model  of  Computation  With  References 
As  in  Chapter  9,  let  I=  11,2,...,  n}  be  the  set  of  component  identifiers  for  a  con- 
current  system.  Suppose  that  the  local  state  of  a  component  is  comprised  of  two 
parts,  its  coWrol  state  and  its  referetice  state. 
Tlie  control  state  of  a  component  is  determined  by  the  values  of  all  local 
variables  of  that  component  which  are  itot  references  to  other  components,  e.  g.  a 
program  counter  or  boolean  flag.  Without  loss  of  generality  (see  Section  9.1),  we 
can  represent  a  local  control  state  abstractly  as  an  integer  taken  from  a  finite  set 
Lc  c  Z. 
The  reference  state  of  a  component  is  determined  by  the  values  of  all  local 
variables  which  are  references  to  other  components.  For  example,  components  in  a 
leader  election  protocol  may  require  a  reference  variable  to  (eventually)  hold  the 
identity  of  the  leader;  a  user  in  a  model  of  telephony  may  hold  a  reference  to  its 
current  partner.  Thus  a  reference  state  is  a  tuple  in  the  set  Lr  =  (I  U  10})'  for  some 
m>0.  Here  m  is  the  number  of  references  held  by  a  component,  and  0  is  used 
as  a  default  value  (e.  g.  to  represent  that  the  leader  is  unknown).  Without  loss  of 
generality  we  can  assume  that  all  components  have  exactly  m>0  reference  local 
variables. 
Thus  a  global  state  sE  (Lc  x  L,.  )'  has  the  form: 
rn,  m)), 
where  Ii  E  L,  represents  the  control  state  of  component  i,  and  rij  EIU  10}  is  the 
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In  the  special  case  where  m=0,  i.  e.  when  components  do  not  hold  ref- 
erences  to  one  another,  L,  consists  of  a  0-tuple,  and  can  thus  be  ignored.  A  state 
sEL,  "  then  has  the  form  s=  (Ili  12/  -,  1,,  )  described  in  Section  9.1.  We  refer  to 
models  of  computation  where  nz  >0  and  m=0  as  a  model  of  computation  with 
and  without  references,  respectively. 
10.1.1  The  Constructive  Orbit  Problem  with  References 
With  the  extended  model  of  computation,  in  order  to  define  a  total  ordering 
-<  on  S9  (L,  x  L,  )",  we  define  two  projection  mappings,  ctrI  and  ref,  pro- 
jecting  a  state  on  to  its  control  and  reference  parts  respectively  For  a  state 
s=  (11,  (rij,  rl,  2,  ...  .  rl,,  ) 
. 
12,  (r2,1 
.  r2,2,,  ...,  r2,  m)  .  ...  ,  In,  (rn,  1,  rn,  2,  rn,  m)),  arl(s) 
(Ils  12., 
---i 
In)  and  ref  (s)  =  (rij,  rl,  2,.  ..,  rl,,  ........  rn,  m)- 
Definition  34  For  s,  tES,  sýt  if  either  s=t;  ctrI(s)  <  ctrl(t);  or  ctrl(s)  = 
ctrl(t)  and  ref  (s)  <  ref  (t).  Here  ref  (s)  and  ref  (t)  are  compared  using  the  usual 
lexicographic  ordering  on  vectors  (similarly  ctrl(s)  and  ctrl(t)). 
It  is  clear  that  -<  is  a  total  ordering  on  states.  We  write  s  -<  t  if  s  -<  t  and  s  jA  t.  We 
now  extend  the  COP  to  the  model  of  computation  with  references: 
Definition  35  The  COP  with  ref  erences  (COPR)  Given  a  group  G  :5S,,  and  a  state 
sE  (L,  x  L,  )n,  find  min-.  ([s]  G,  the  -<-least  element  in  the  orbit  of  s  under  G. 
It  is  clear  that  the  COPR  is  a  generalisation  of  the  COP:  in  the  special  case  where 
ni  =0  the  COP  and  the  COPR  are  identical.  Since  the  COP  is  NP-hard  (Theorem  10), 
the  COPR  is  NP-hard  by  restriction.  In  fact,  the  two  problems  can  be  shown  to  be 
polynomial-time  equivalent.  An  instance  of  the  COP  is  trivially  an  instance  of  the 
COPR,  and  an  instance  of  the  COPR  can  be  converted,  in  quadratic  time,  to  an  in- 
stance  of  the  COP.  The  latter  is  achieved  by  replacing  each  component  id  reference 
rij  by  a  vector  of  n  binary  values,  which  are  all  0  unless  rij  =I>0,  in  which 
case  the  binary  value  I  places  from  the  right  is  one.  For  example,  if  it  =8  and 
ri,  j  =  5,  the  value  of  rij  is  converted  to  the  binary  sequence  0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0.  The 
n-5  5 
variables  introduced  to  hold  these  values  are  modelled  as  components  with  binary 
valued  local  state.  If  convert  denotes  a  function  which  performs  this  conversion, 
then  placing  the  value  one  I  places  to  the  right  ensures  that,  for  states  s  and  t,  s  ::  ý  t 
iff  convert(s)  :5  convert(t).  Elements  of  the  symmetry  group  G  must  also  be  trans- 
formed  appropriately,  so  that  if  s  is  a  state  and  it  E  G,  the  transformed  element  a' 
must  satisfy  convert  (a  (s))  =  a'(convert  (s)). 10.1:  A  MODEL  OF  COMPUTATION  WITH  REFERENCES  191 
Algorithm  10  A  COP  strategy  for  S,,  based  on  selection  sort. 
a  :=  id 
for  all  iEn-  1]  do 
A:  =  id 
for  all  jE  [i  +  n)  do 
if  (i  j)a  (s)  <  Pa  (s)  then 
A  :=  (ij) 
end  if 
end  for 
a  :=  pa 
end  for 
return  a 
10.1.2  Problems  with  references 
Recall  the  polynomial  time  strategies  for  the  COP  described  in  Chapter  9.  Clearly 
the  strategy  based  on  enumeration  extends  immediately  to  a  model  of  computation 
with  references,  if  IGI  is  polynomial  in  ii.  However,  the  other  strategies  are  not 
immediately  applicable.  We  show  this  for  the  COP  strategy  where  G=S,  '  and 
representatives  are  computed  by  sorting.  Similar  arguments  can  be  applied  for  the 
other  strategies. 
The  proof  that  the  COP  for  G=S,,  can  be  solved  by  sorting  a  state  s  is  based 
on  the  following  lemma: 
Lemma  13  In  the  simple  model  of  computa  tion,  there  are  no 
il 
i 
il 
ý 
i21  j2  EI  where 
il  <  jl,,  i2  <  j2. 
- 
(i2  j2)(S)  <  sand  (i,  ji)(s)  ý:  s,  but  (i2  j2)(il  il)(S)  <  (i2  j2)(S). 
However,  this  result  does  not  hold  in  the  presence  of  references. 
Lemma  14  Lemma  13  does  not  hold  for  the  model  of  computation  with  references 
where  the  ordering:  5  is  replaced  with  --<. 
Proof  We  prove  Lemma  14  by  counter-example.  Suppose  n=3,  L,  =  10,1},  and 
consider  s=  (1,0,0,2,0,2).  Take  ii  =  2,  ji  =  3,  i2  =1  and  j2  =  3.  Then  we  have 
(i2  j2)  (s)  =  (0,2,0,2,1,0)  -<  S,  (ij  ji)  (s)  =  (1,0,0,3,0,3)  >-  s.  But  (h  j2)  (il  il) 
(13  2),  and  (13  2)  (s)  =  (0,1,0,1,1,0)  -<  (i2  j2)  (s).  M 
This  counter-example  for  the  case  n=3  can  be  extended  to  give  a  counter-example 
for  any  n>  3-  consider  ijjjj2andj2  as  above,  and  s=  (1,0,0,2,0,2,0,0,...,  0,0). 
Applying  Algorithm  10  with  <  replaced  by  :ý  to  s=  (1,0,0,2,0,2)  gives  the 
element  (13)  which  does  not  minimise  s,  whereas  enumeration  Of  S3  gives  (13  2), 
which  does.  Thus  this  adaptation  of  Algorithm  10  does  not  yield  an  exact  COPR 
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Suppose  G  :!  ý  S,,  is  a  symmetry  group  and  G'  <  S,,,  is  the  group  isomorphic 
to  G  obtained  by  the  conversion  of  a  COPR  instance  to  a  COP  instance  discussed  in 
Section  10.1.1  (here  it'  >n  is  the  number  of  components  used  in  the  representation 
of  converted  states).  A  polynomial  time  COP  strategy  for  G  does  not  in  general 
yield  a  corresponding  COPR  strategy  for  G',  as  the  action  of  G'  on  J1,2,...,  n'} 
may  be  fundamentally  different  to  that  of  G  on  11,2,...,  n}.  For  example,  if  G  is  the 
disjoint  product  of  subgroups  H  and  K  then  G'  is  the  direct  product  of  subgroups 
Wand  K',  but  it  may  not  be  the  case  that  H'and  K'  act  disjointly  on  11,2,...,  n'}. 
We  now  show  how  a  polynomial  time  exact  COP  strategy  can  be  extended 
to  an  exact  COPR  strategy.  The  result  is  not  a  polynomial  time  strategy,  but  may  be 
significantly  more  efficient  than  the  enumeration  strategy  if  G  is  large. 
10.2  Segmentation:  Extending  Strategies  to  a  Model  of  Computation 
With  References 
Our  approach  to  extending  a  strategy  for  COP  to  one  for  COPR  works  by  construct- 
ing  a  partitio?  i  of  I  from  a  given  state,  and  enumerating  the  stabiliser  of  this  partition. 
10.2.1  Segmenting  a  state 
We  define  a  subset  of  [s]G  whose  elements  have  minimal  control  states. 
D  efinition  36  Let  smallr,  (s)  =  It  E  [s]  c;  :  ctrl(t)  ::  ý  ctrl(u)  VuE  [s]  r,  } 
- 
Clearly  Mill--([S]  GE  smallG  (s).  Given  a  state  s,  the  vector  ctrI(s)  can  be  viewed  as 
a  state  under  a  model  of  computation  without  references.  The  following  result  is  a 
consequence  of  this  observation  and  Definition  36: 
Lemma  15  For  sES,  t  E  smalIG(s)  #>ctrl(t)  =min<  [ctrl(s)]G. 
For  kEL,  let  S(k)  =  ji  EI:  Ii  =  k},  i.  e.  the  set  of  indices  of  components  which 
have  control  state  k  in  s.  Define  the  function  seg  acting  on  states  by: 
seg(s)  =  IS(k)  :kEL,  }. 
Then  clearly,  for  any  state  s,  seg(s)  is  a  partition  of  I. 
10.2.2  Symmetry  reduction  via  segmentation 
So  far  we  have  defined  a  COP  strategy  for  G  to  be  a  function  f:  S  --+  S  with 
the  property  that  f  (s)  ":  Mill<  [SIG.  Note  that  we  can  equivalently  define  a  COP 
strategy  with  respect  to  a  group  G  as  a  function  f:  S  --+  G  such  that,  for  all  sES, 10.2:  SEGMENTATION:  EXTENDING  COP  STRATEGIES  193 
Algorithm  11  Extending  an  exact  COP  strategy  f  for  a  group  G  to  an  exact  COPR 
strategy. 
A:  =  f  (ctrl  (s)) 
H  :=  stabG(seg(p(s))) 
a=  id 
forall  bEH  do 
if  bp(s)  ap(s)  then 
end  if 
end  for 
return  ap 
if  it  =f  (s)  then  a(s)  =  min<  [s]c;.  We  adopt  the  latter  definition  for  the  rest  of  this 
chapter. 
For  a  group  H  acting  on  a  set  X,  recall  the  definition  of  the  stabiliser  of  a 
partition  X  of  X  (Definition  9,  Section  3.1.2),  denoted  stabH(X). 
Lemma  16  If  tE  smalIG(S)  and  a  (t)  -<  t  for  some  aEG  then  aE  stabc;  (seg(t)). 
Proof  Since  tE  smallc,  (s)  and  a(t)  -<  t,  by  Definition  36  we  have  ctrI(t)  = 
ctrl(it(t))  and  ref(t)  >  ref(a(t)).  Since  arl(t)  =  Ctrj(a(t)),  t(k)  =  &(t)(k)  for  all 
kEL,  i.  e.  seg(t)  =  seg(a(t)).  Thus  a  preserves  seg(t),  i.  e.  aE  stabc;  (seg(t)).  0 
Thus,  if  a  state  tE  snialIG  (S)  is  not  the  smallest  element  in  [s]  G  under  -<  then 
search  for  a  minimising  element  of  G  can  be  restricted  to  stabG  (seg  (t)).  Note  that 
if  component  indices  i,  j  EXE  seg(t),  it  is  still  necessary  to  consider  elements  of 
G  which  map  i  to  j.  TI-ius  we  cannot  treat  the  elements  of  seg(t)  as  sequences  and 
compute  their  pointwise  stabiliser  (which  would  be  computationally  easier). 
Suppose  that  we  have  an  exact  COP  strategy  f  for  G.  Let  A=f  (ctrl(s)),  so 
that  fi(ctrl(s))  =  min:  5[ctrI(s)jG.  Clearly  A(ctrl(s))  =  ctrl(A(s)),  and  therefore  by 
Lemma  15,  p(s)  E  snialIG  (s).  By  Lemma  16,  the  group  H  stabG  (seg(A(s)))  can 
now  be  enumerated  to  find  an  element  a  such  that  ap(s)  bp(s)  for  all  bEH. 
Thus  we  have  proved  the  foflowing: 
Theorem2l  Lets  E  S,  G:  S  Sym(l),  andletf  bean  exact  COP  strategy  for  G.  7hen 
Algorithm  11  is  an  exact  COPR  strategy  for  G. 
Figure  10.1  illustrates  graphically  the  relationship  between  [s]  G  (represented 
by  the  outer  ellipse)  and  its  subset  smalIG  (S)  (represented  by  the  inner  ellipse),  and 
the  process  of  computing  an  element  of  G  which  minimises  s.  We  illustrate  the 
approach  further  with  an  example. 
Let  n,  ni,  L,  and  Lr  and  G  be  as  in  the  example  in  Section  10.1.2.  Let 10.3:  EFFICIFNCY  194 
[SIG 
-  (ctrl(s 
cz  H 
min--<  [SIG 
sinall  G  (S)  -  [9  (S)  IH 
ctrl(p(s))  -  min<[ctrl(s)]c;  H=  stabc;  (seg(p(s))) 
Figure  10.1:  Symmetry  redUction  by  segmentation. 
s=  (1,2,0,1,0,1,2,1).  Then  ctrl(s)  =  (1,0,0,2),  and  applying  Algorithm  10,  we 
find  that  13  =  (1  3)  satisfies  O(ctrl(s))  =  tWtz<[ctr1(s)jG.  Applying  ý  to  s  gives 
t=  (0,3,0,3,1,2,2,3),  and  seg(t)  =  111,21,121,1311.  It  is  easy  to  check  that 
stabG(s,  cg(t))  =  ((1  2)),  a  group  of  order  2,  and  that  applying  (1  2)  to  t  gives 
niin-ý[s,  IG  =  (0,3,0,3,1,1,2,3).  For  this  example,  the  application  of  6  group  ele- 
ments  is  required  by  Algorithm  10,  followed  by  enumeration  of  a  group  of  order  2. 
Computing  iiiiii  .ý 
[s]  G  by  basic  enumeration  would  have  required  the  application  of 
all  24  elements  of  G  to  s. 
10.3  Efficiency 
Assuming  thatf  can  be  computed  in  polynomial  time  (using  strategies  described 
in  1271  and  Chapter  9),  the  efficiency  of  Algorithm  11  is  dominated  by  computation 
of  and  iteration  over  H. 
Computing  H=  sh&G(stW(s))  is  equivalent  to  computing  the  stabiliser  of  a 
set  in  a  group.  The  most  efficient  algorithms  available  for  computing  set  stabilis- 
ers  involve  backtrack  search  of  the  group  using  a  base  and  strong  generating  set 
[191.  Typically  this  search  can  be  heavily  pruned  using  both  problem-independent 
heuristics,  and  heuristics  based  on  properties  of  set  stabilisers.  Thus,  despite  the 
fact  that  no  polynomial  time  algorithm  is  known  for  computing  set  stabilisers,  the 
associated  overhead  is  not  large.  Furthermore,  as  the  experimental  results  of  Sec- 
tion  11.3  show,  the  set  Iseg(s)  :scSI  of  all  partitions  of  I  which  must  be  con- 
sidered  during  search,  is  often  much  smaller  than  the  number  of  possible  parti- 
tions  of  1.1  Thus,  re-computation  of  partition  stabilisers  can  be  avoided  by  caching 
1.  The  TIumber  of  such  partitions  is  B,,,  the  nth  Bell  nuniber,  which  is  dvfiý-tvd  recursively  by  BO  -I 
and  B,,  (',  ')Bj  forn  -,  0[  15  11. 10.3:  EFFICIENCY  195 
partition-stabiliser  pairs. 
In  the  worst  case,  H  may  have  size  I  GI  (e.  g.  when  Iseg(s)  I=  1),  and  IGI  may 
be  as  large  as  W  (in  the  case  where  G=S,,  ).  However,  if  the  number  of  distinct 
component  control  states  is  reasonably  large,  many  states  s  will  have  the  property 
that  Iseg(s)  I=  ii,  in  which  case  stabG(seg(s))  is  the  trivial  group. 
Summary 
In  order  for  our  symmetry  reduction  techniques  to  be  applicable  to  the  Promela 
specification  language,  we  have  defined  a  realistic  model  of  computation  where 
components  may  hold  references  to  one  another.  We  have  defined  the  COP  with  ref- 
eretices,  and  shown  that  although  the  COP  and  COPR  are  polynomial-time  equiva- 
lent,  polynomial  time  strategies  for  solving  the  COP  for  specific  groups  do  not,  in 
general,  directly  extend  to  solve  the  COPR. 
We  have  presented  a  technique  for  extending  any  COP  strategy  to  solve 
the  COPR  by  gencralising  the  segniented  symmetry  reduction  strategy  used  by  the 
SymmSpin  tool  [14].  The  extended  strategy  involves  applying  the  initial  strategy, 
followed  by  an  enumeration  process  to  compute  the  minimum  state  in  the  set  of 
states  regarded  as  minimal  by  the  initial  strategy.  Although  the  extended  strategy 
does  not  run  in  polynomial  time,  it  is  more  sophisticated  than  basic  enumeration. 
For  many  states,  solving  the  COPR  involves  applying  a  polynomial  time  COP  strat- 
egy,  then  enumerating  over  a  small  (even  trivial)  permutation  group. Chapter  11 
TbpSPIN 
-a  Computational  Group  Theoretic  Symmetry 
Reduction  Package  for  SPIN 
In  this  chapter  we  describe  TopSPIN,  a  symmetry  reduction  package  which  we  have 
developed  for  the  SPIN  model  diecker.  TopSPIN  uses  SymmExtractor  (see  Chap- 
ter  8)  for  automatic  symmetry  detection,  and  the  strategies  presented  in  Chapters  9 
and  10  to  exploit  symmetry  efficiently. 
We  provide  an  overview  of  TopSPIN  in  Section  11.1,  and  present  some  exam- 
ples  of  the  source  code  generated  by  TopSPIN  for  a  selection  of  symmetry  reduc- 
tion  strategies  hi  Section  11.2.  We  present  experimental  results  which  demonstrate 
the  effectiveness  of  our  symmetry  reduction  techniques  for  a  variety  of  Promela. 
specifications  Section  11.3,  and  discuss  some  possible  extensions  to  TopSPIN  in  Sec- 
tion  11.4. 
11.1  An  Overview  of  TbpSPIN 
As  described  in  Section  2.4.2  and  illustrated  by  Figure  2.9,  to  check  properties  of 
a  Promela  specification  SPIN  converts  the  specification  into  aC  source  file,  pan.  c. 
This  verifier  is  then  compiled  and  executed,  and  the  state-space  thus  generated  is 
searched,  resulting  in  a  counter-example,  an  exhaustive  search  with  an  absence  of 
counter-examples,  or  an  incomplete  search  due  to  memory  restrictions. 
TopSPIN  follows  the  approach  used  by  the  SymmSpin  symmetry  reduction 
package  [141  (see  Section  3.9.1),  where  pan.  c  is  generated  as  usual  by  SPIN,  and 
then  converted  to  a  new  file,  syrnpan.  c,  which  includes  algorithms  for  symmetry 
reduction.  With  TopSPIN,  because  we  allow  for  arbitrary  system  topologies,  sym- 
metry  must  be  detected  before  sympan.  c  can  be  generated.  The  process  involved 
in  generating  sympan.  c  is  summarised  in  Figure  11.1,  which  combines  the  process 
of  Figure  2.9  with  automatic  symmetry  detection  and  classification. 
The  SymmExtractor  tool  (see  Chapter  8)  is  used  to  extract  the  static  channel 
diagram  SCV(P)  of  the  Promela  specification  P,  and  to  compute  the  largest  valid 
subgroup  G  :5  Aut(SCD(P))  with  respect  to  P.  The  symmetry  detection  process  is 11.1:  AN  OVERVIEW  OF  TopSi'l  N  197 
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Figure  11.1:  The  symmetry  reduction  process. 
illustrated  in  Figure  8.1,  Section  8.1,  and  involves  the  construction  of  a  syntax  tree 
representation  of  P,  annotated  with  type  information. 
Based  on  the  symmetry  reduction  strategy  specified  by  the  user  (see  below), 
or  using  the  default.  fast  strategy,  TopSPIN  generates  C  algorithms  for  symmetry  re- 
duction.  The  overall  structure  of  this  code  is  strategy-dependent,  but  the  fine  details 
(in  particular  the  function  which  applies  a  permutation  to  a  state)  are  specification- 
specific,  and  depend  critically  on  the  type  information  provided  by  Sym  n-lEx  tractor. 
These  algorithms  are  merged  with  pan.  c  to  form  sympan.  c,  which  can  be  com- 
piled  and  executed  as  usual.  TopSi,  IN  is  currently  limited  to  the  verification  of  safety 
properties,  which  can  be  expressed  using  assertions. 
TopSPIN  provides  four  symmetry  reduction  strategies:  enutneration,  local- 
searcli,  fiist,  and  segniented.  The  cnianeration  and  localsearch  strategies  use  the  gen- 
eral  representative  computation  techniques  presented  in  Sections  9.2.2  and  9.2.4 
respectively.  The  enioncration  strategy  provides  exact  symmetry  reduction,  thus  is 
memory  optimal.  However,  it  may  be  very  slow  if  G  is  large.  TTie  localsearch  strategy 
is  approximate  (it  does  not  guarantee  computation  of  a  unique  representative  from 
each  equivalence  class)  but  computationally  inexpensive.  With  both  thefiast  and  seg- 
niented  strategies,  TopSi,  IN  analyses  the  structure  of  G  using  a  GAP  implementation 
of  the  algorithms  presented  in  Chapter  9,  and  generates  routines  for  representative 
computation  based  on  this  structural  information.  If  the  fast  strategy  is  selected 
then  these  routines  may  or  may  not  provide  exact  symmetry  reduction,  depend- 
ing  on  whether  processes  in  the  input  specification  hold  references  to  one  another. 
If  the  stginentcd  strategy  is  used  then  the  representative  computation  routines  are 
followed  by  a  scgiiientation  phase  (as  described  in  Chapter  10)  which  guarantees 
unique  representatives  (unless  local  search  is  selected  for  the  initial  representative 11.2:  COMPUTING  REPRESENTATIVES  198 
computation,  in  wl-dch  case  it  is  inadvisable  to  use  the  segmeWed  approach).  Note 
that  TopSPIN  implements  the  sound,  incomplete  approach  of  Section  9.3.1  for  de- 
composing  a  group  as  a  disjoint  product. 
To  allow  the  user  to  manually  specify  symmetry  (e.  g.  when  SymmExtractor 
is  not  capable  of  detecting  it  automatically),  and  to  allow  TopSPIN  to  be  linked  with 
alternative  automatic  symmetry  detection  tools,  TopSPIN  also  accepts  generators 
for  a  group  of  process  and  channel  automorphisms  specified  (in  disjoint  cycle  form) 
in  an  input  file.  The  resulting  group  can  still  be  automatically  classified  if  thefast  or 
segnietited  strategy  is  used. 
In  Sections  9.2.1  and  9.2.2  we  discussed  optimisations  for  efficient  applica- 
tion  of  permutations,  and  efficient  enumeration  of  a  group  respectively.  TopSPIN 
uses  these  optimisations  by  default,  but  they  can  be  disabled  for  purposes  of  com- 
parlson. 
11.2  Computing  Representatives 
A  key  component  of  the  pan.  c:  verifier  is  the  store  function.  Given  a  single  ar- 
gument  s  (a  SPIN  state-vector)  the  store  function  determines  whether  s  already 
belongs  to  the  set  of  previously  stored  states,  adding  it  to  the  set  if  it  is  not.  In  sum- 
mary,  TopSPIN  adds  a  function  rep  to  pan.  c,  and  replaces  each  call  of  the  form 
store  W  with  a  call  store  (rep  (s)  ).  If  rep  returns  a  unique  representative  of 
[s]  C;  it  is  clear  that  by  modifying  every  call  to  store  in  fl-ds  way  we  ensure  only 
a  single  state  from  each  equivalence  class  is  ever  added  to  the  state-space,  result- 
ing  in  optimal  symmetry  reduction.  Alternatively,  rep  may  provide  sub-optimal 
symmetry  reduction  by  mapping  [s]  c;  on  to  a  small  set  of  representatives. 
We  now  give  some  examples  to  illustrate  the  C  code  which  TopSPIN  gen- 
erates  for  the  function  rep,  for  a  variety  of  symmetry  reduction  strategies.  The 
examples  use  the  standard  C  functions  memcpy  (a,  b,  c),  which  copies  c  bytes  from 
the  memory  region  pointed  to  by  b  to  the  memory  region  pointed  to  by  a,  and 
memcmp  (a,  b,  c),  which  compares  these  memory  regions,  returning  0  if  they  are 
equal,  a  positive  value  if  b  is  larger  than  a  (viewed  as  a  binary  vector),  and  a  neg- 
ative  value  otherwise.  Tlie  state  type  denotes  a  SPIN  state-vector,  and  state* 
denotes  a  pointer  to  a  state-vector.  Each  version  of  the  rep  function  relies  on  a  sub- 
sidiary  function  applyPermToS  tat  e.  This  function  computes  the  image  of  a  state 
under  a  given  permutation.  Its  implementation  is  specification-specific,  dependent 
on  the  location  of  pid  and  chaii  variables  and  pid-indexed  arrays.  The  type  informa- 
tion  gathered  from  the  input  specification  during  symmetry  detection  is  critical  to 
the  generation  of  this  function.  If  a  symmetry  group  is  specified  manually  then  it  is 
necessary  for  TopSPIN  to  type-check  the  input  specification  in  order  to  successfully 
generate  the  applyPermTostate  function.  We  do  not  give  a  code  example  for  this 11.2:  COMPUTING  REPRESENTATIVES  199 
State*  rep(State*  9)  ( 
int  10,  il,  12,13,14; 
State  partiallmagesl5l; 
memcpy(min,  9,  vaize); 
for(14-0;  14<2;  14++)  ( 
memcpy(&partialImages[41,  s,  vsize); 
applyPermToState(&partialimageB[4l,  coset_reps[4][i4l); 
for(13-0;  13<3;  13++)  1 
memcpy(&partialImagee[31,  &partialImagefi[41,  veize); 
applyPermToState(&partiallmages[33,  COBet_reps[3][i3l); 
for(12-0;  12<4;  12++)  ( 
memcpy(&partialImages[2],  &partialImages[3l,  vsize), 
applyPermToState(&partialImages[21,  coset-reps[2](i2l); 
for(il.  0;  il<5;  il++)  ( 
memcpy(&partialImages[ll,  &partialimagei3l2],  vsize); 
applyPermToState(&partiallmages[il,  coi3et-repatiltill); 
for(iO=O;  iOt6;  10++)  ( 
memcpy(&partialImages[O],  &partialimagestil,  vaize); 
applyPermToState(&partiallmages[O],  COBet-reps[01[iO]); 
if(meincmp(&partialImages[Ol,  min,  vsize)<O) 
memcpy(min,  &partialImages[o],  veize); 
return  min; 
Figure  11.2:  Representative  computation  for  6  process  Peterson  mutual  exclusion  pro- 
tocol  via  enumeration,  using  a  stabiliser  chain. 
function;  for  details  see  the  TopSPIN  source  code  (the  location  of  which  is  given  in 
Section  1.2),  or  examine  the  sympan.  c  file  which  TopSPIN  generates  for  a  given 
specification.  For  readability,  we  have  tidied  up  the  code  examples  in  the  following 
sections  to  some  extent. 
11.2.1  Enumeration 
Figure  11.2  shows  the  rep  function  which  TopSPIN  generates  given  a  specification 
of  a  6-process  version  of  Peterson's  mutual  exclusion  protocol  (see  Section  4.3  and 
Appendix  A.  1.1).  Note  that  TopSPIN  would,  by  default,  choose  a  more  efficient  rep- 
resentative  computation  strategy  for  this  example,  as  we  show  in  Section  11.2.2. 
Recall  the  process  of  enumeration  using  a  stabiliser  chain,  described  in  Sec- 
tion  9.2.2.  The  symmetry  group  for  G  in  this  example  is  S6,  and  GAP  has  been  used 
to  construct  a  stabiliser  chain  for  G.  The  chain  has  length  six,  so  there  are  five  sets  of 
coset  representatives.  The  coset  representatives  are  stored  using  a  2-dimensional  ar- 
ray,  cos  et_reps.  An  array,  part  i  al_images,  is  used  to  store  images  of  the  state 
s  under  consecutive  coset  representatives.  The  element  partial_images  [41 
is  the  image  of  s  under  an  element  of  coset-reps  [41,  and  for  0<i<4, 11.2:  COMPUTING  REPRESENTATIVES  200 
State*  rep(State*  s) 
int  J; 
memcpy(min,  a,  voize); 
do  ( 
memcpy(last-min,  min,  voize); 
for(J-0;  J<15,  J++)  ( 
memcpy(tmp,  min,  voize); 
applyPermToState(tmp,  minimising_set(JI); 
if(memcmp(tmp,  min,  vsize)<D) 
memcpy(min,  tmp,  veize); 
while(memcmp(min,  laE3t-min,  vsize)1.0); 
return  min; 
Figure  11.3:  Representative  computation  for  6  process  Peterson  mutual  exclusion  pro- 
tocol,  using  a  minimising  set. 
partial_images  Ul  is  the  image  of  partial_images  (i  +  11  under  an  ele- 
ment  of  coset_reps  Ul.  The  final  image  of  s  under  an  element  of  G  is  stored  in 
partial_images  [01,  and  is  compared  with  the  smallest  state  in  the  orbit  so  far, 
min  (a  global  variable),  using  the  C  function  memcmp.  1  If  partial_images  [01 
is  found  to  be  smaller  than  min  then  the  value  of  min  is  overwritten  with  this  new 
minimum,  using  the  memcpy  function. 
The  code  shown  in  Figure  11.2  is  essentially  an  implementation  of  Algo- 
rithm  5,  Section  9.2.2,  for  the  6-process  Peterson  mutual  exclusion  example. 
11.2.2  Minimising  sets 
As  noted  above,  TopSPIN  would  not  use  enumeration  for  the  Peterson  mutual  ex- 
clusion  example  by  default.  Rather,  a  minimising  set  for  G  would  be  computed 
using  the  techniques  described  in  Section  9.2.3.  Figure  11.3  shows  the  code  for  rep 
which  is  generated  in  this  case.  The  function  is  essentially  an  implementation  of 
Algoritl-un  7,  Section  9.2.3.  The  (global)  variables  min,  last-min  and  tmp  are  SPIN 
state  vectors.  The  minimising  set  is  stored  as  an  array,  minimising_set,  and  the 
algorithm  proceeds  by  iterating  over  this  array  and  minimising  the  state  min,  until 
min  does  not  change.  For  this  example  the  group  is  S6  and  the  minimising  set  has 
size  15,  as  predicted  by  the  formula  for  minimising  set  size  given  in  the  proof  of 
Theorem  17  (Section  9.2.3). 
11.2.3  Local  search 
The  code  generated  when  the  local  search  strategy  (see  Section  9.2.4)  is  chosen,  ei- 
ther  automatically  by  TopSPIN  or  manually  for  experimental  purposes,  is  similar 
to  that  generated  when  a  minimising  set  is  used.  Figure  11.4  shows  the  code  gen- 
erated  for  the  rep  function  when  local  search  is  applied  to  the  Peterson  mutual 
exclusion  example  with  six  processes.  The  key  differences  between  Figure  11.3  and 
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State*  rep(State*  9) 
int  J; 
memcpy(min,  a,  vsize); 
do  ( 
memcpy(last-min,  min,  vsize); 
for(J-0,  J<5,  J++)  f 
memcpy(tmp,  last 
- 
min,  vsize); 
applyPermToState(tmp,  genB[jl); 
if(memcmp(tmp,  min,  vsize)<O) 
memcpy(min,  tmp,  veize); 
while(memcmp(min,  last-min,  vsize)1-0); 
return  min; 
Figure  IIA:  Representative  computation  using  local  search. 
Figure  11.4  are  that  a  generating  set  gens  for  G  is  used,  rather  than  a  minimis- 
ing  set,  and  that  on  each  iteration  of  the  inner  loop  a  permutation  is  applied  to 
last-min,  rather  than  min.  This  ensures  that  the  inner  loop  computes  the  small- 
est  image  of  last-min  under  the  generators  of  G.  If  this  image  is  smaller  than 
last-min  then  local  search  continues.  Otherwise  this  local  minimum  is  returned 
as  a  representative. 
11.2.4  Applying  a  composite  strategy 
If  TopSPIN  computes  a  decomposition  for  G  as  a  disjoint  or  wreath  product  of  sub- 
groups  (using  the  techniques  of  Sections  9.3  and  9.4  and  the  recursive  classification 
algorithm  described  in  Section  9.6)  then  the  rep  function  consists  of  multiple  sec- 
tions  of  code,  one  for  each  factor  of  the  product. 
Consider  a  configuration  of  the  resource  allocator  specification  (see  Sec- 
tion  4.4  and  Appendix  A.  2)  consisting  of  three  processes  with  priority  level  0, 
and  four  with  priority  level  1.  This  is  the  specification  denoted  '34'  in  Section  8.4. 
The  symmetry  group  associated  with  this  example  decomposes  a  disjoint  product 
HI  9  H2  where  HI  and  H2  are  isomorphic  to  S3  and  S4  respectively.  These  groups 
can  be  handled  using  minimising  sets  of  size  3  and  6.  Figure  11.5  shows  the  code 
for  rep  generated  by  ToPSPIN. 
11.2.5  The  segmented  strategy 
If  the  segnmited  strategy  is  chosen  then  the  function  rep  is  generated  as  for  the 
fast  strategy,  but  the  return  statement  is  prefixed  by  a  function  call  of  the  form 
segment  (min).  The  code  which  is  common  to  thefast  strategy  corresponds  to  the 
line  A  :=f  (ctrl(s))  in  Algorithm  11,  Section  10.2.2.  The  segment  call  corresponds 
to  the  remainder  of  Algorithm  11.  We  give  a  high-level  explanation  of  how  the 
segment  function  is  implemented. 
Before  search,  a  variable  of  a  proctype  is  classed  as  setisitive  if  it  has  type  pid 
or  clwn,  or  if  it  is  an  array  indexed  by  values  of  type  pid,  otherwise  it  is  classed  as 11.2:  COMPUTING  REPRESENTATIVES  202 
State*  rep(state*  s) 
int  J; 
memcpy(min,  a,  vaize); 
do  ( 
memcpy(last-min,  min,  vsize); 
for(J-0;  J<3;  J++)  ( 
memcpy(tmp,  min,  VBize); 
applyPermToState(tmp,  minimising_set_l[jl); 
if  (memcmp(tTnp,  min,  vsize)  <0) 
memcpy(min,  tmp,  vaize); 
while(memcmp(min,  last-min,  vaize)1=0); 
do  j 
memcpy(last-min,  min,  vsize); 
for(J=O;  J<6;  J++)  ( 
memcpy(tmp,  min,  veize) 
applyPermToState(tmp,  minimising_set_2[jl); 
if(memcmp(tmp,  min,  vsize)<O) 
memcpy(min,  tmp,  vsize); 
while(memcmp(min,  laE;  t-min,  vsize)!  =O); 
return  min; 
Figure  11.5:  Representative  computation  for  a  resource  auocator  specification  which 
has  an  associated  disjoint  product  group  H,  *  H2,  using  two  minimising  sets. 
insensitive.  In  order  to  handle  user-defined  (possibly  nested)  records,  and  arbitrary 
arrays,  distinct  fields  of  a  record  variable  are  regarded  as  separate  variables.  Sim- 
ilarly,  distinct  elements  of  an  array  which  is  not  indexed  by  values  of  type  pid  are 
treated  as  separate  variables.  A  field  of  a  buffered  channel  is  classed  as  sensitive  or 
insensitive  in  an  analogous  way. 
The  segment  function  has  a  single  state-vector  parameter  s.  A  partition 
seg(s)  of  process  identifiers  and  static  channel  names  is  constructed  from  s  as  fol- 
lows.  Process  identifiers  i  and  j  are  in  the  same  partition  if  proctype  (i)  =  proctype  (j), 
and  the  insensitive  variables  of  i  and  j  are  equal  at  s.  Buffered  channels  c  and  d  are 
in  the  same  partition  if  signature(c)  =  signature(d),  c  and  d  have  the  same  length  at 
s,  and  the  insensitive  fields  of  c  and  d  are  equal  at  s.  Synchronous  channels  have  no 
state,  and  thus  need  not  be  included  in  the  partition. 
GAP  is  used  to  compute  the  subgroup  H=  stabc;  (seg(s)),  and  returns  a 
set  of  coset  representatives  for  efficient  enumeration  of  H  (see  Section  11.2.1).  The 
minimum  image  of  s  under  H  is  computed  using  these  coset  representatives  us- 
ing  a  routine  similar  to  that  shown  in  Figure  11.2,  Section  11.2.1.  As  mentioned 
in  Section  10.3,  we  optimise  the  performance  of  the  segment  function  by  caching 
partition-stabiliser  pairs.  When  a  partition  is  computed,  before  calling  on  GAP  to 
compute  the  associated  stabiliser,  a  lookup  is  made  to  a  table  of  stabilisers,  indexed 
by  partitions.  If  the  partition  has  been  encountered  before  then  there  is  no  need 
to  re-compute  the  stabiliser.  Experimental  results  in  Section  11.3  show  that  explo- 
ration  of  a  large  state-space  may  result  in  only  a  few  distinct  partitions. 11.3:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  203 
The  segmented  strategy  is  the  only  strategy  which  requires  communication 
with  GAP  during  search.  Due  to  the  technical  difficulty  of  calling  external  processes 
from  aC  program,  the  current  implementation  of  TopSPIN  provides  a  GAP  function, 
Veri  fy  ()  ,  which  starts  the  sympan  executable  as  a  slave  process.  Unfortunately,  it 
is  not  possible  (to  our  knowledge)  to  pass  command-line  arguments  to  Sympan  this 
way,  so  parameters  such  as  the  maximum  search  depth  must  be  changed  manually 
in  sympan.  c,  which  requires  some  expert  knowledge.  Communication  between 
sympan  and  GAP  takes  place  via  a  text  stream,  using  a  simple  bespoke  protocol. 
11.3  Experimental  Results 
We  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  our  symmetry  reduction  techniques  by  apply- 
ing  TopSPIN  to  a  selection  of  Promela  specifications.  We  categorise  these  specifica- 
tions  into  families  in  Section  11.3.1.  In  Section  11.3.2  we  discuss  the  type  of  symme- 
try  associated  with  each  family,  which  determines  the  strategy  chosen  by  TopSPIN 
when  the  fast  option  is  selected.  In  Section  11.3.3  we  discuss  the  experimental  re- 
sults. 
11.3.1  Specification  families  and  configurations 
We  consider  each  of  the  specification  families  used  for  experiments  with  Symm- 
Extractor  in  Section  8.4,  and  use  the  notation  introduced  in  Section  8.4.1  to  denote 
configurations  of  these  families.  In  order  to  fully  illustrate  TopSPIN  we  use  two 
additional  families  of  Promela  specifications:  an  email  system,  and  a  loadbalancer 
which  forwards  requests  from  a  pool  of  clients  to  a  pool  of  servers  in  a  fair  manner. 
The  email  example  is  adapted  from  [211.  A  configuration  of  the  system  con- 
sists  of  n  clietit  processes,  which  communicate  by  sending  messages  to  a  mailer  pro- 
cess  via  a  iietwork  channel  component.  The  client  components  are  instantiations  of 
the  same  parameterised  process  and  thus  behave  identically,  so  there  is  full  sym- 
metry  between  clients.  Components  in  a  Promela  specification  of  the  system  use 
reference  variables  to  keep  track  of  the  sender  and  recipient  of  a  given  message.  An 
email  configuration  with  it  clients  is  denoted  n. 
Components  of  a  configuration  in  the  loadbalancer  family  are  a  set  of  m  server 
and  n  client  processes  with  associated  communication  channels,  and  a  loadbalancer 
process  (with  a  dedicated  input  channel).  The  load  of  a  server  is  the  number  of 
messages  queued  on  its  input  channel.  Client  processes  send  requests  to  the  load- 
balancer,  and  if  any  of  the  server  channels  are  not  full,  the  loadbalancer  forwards  a 
request  nondeterministically  to  one  of  the  least  loaded  server  queues.  Each  request 
contains  a  reference  to  the  input  channel  of  its  associated  client  process,  and  the 
server  designated  by  the  loadbalancer  uses  this  channel  to  service  the  request.  A 
loadbalancer  configuration  with  m  server  and  n  client  processes  is  denoted  m-n. 11.3:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  204 
For  purposes  of  comparison,  we  have  slightly  modified  some  specifications 
in  order  to  be  able  to  verify  reasonably  large  examples  withow  symmetry  reduction. 
11.3.2  Symmetry  groups  associated  with  each  family 
The  simple  mutex,  Peterson,  Peterson  without  atomicity  and  entail  specifications  all  ex- 
hibit  groups  which  are  isomorphic  to  S,  where  n  is  the  configuration  size.  For  the 
mutual  exclusion  examples,  the  group  actually  is  Sn  -  there  is  full  symmetry  be- 
tween  the  competing  processes,  and  no  channels.  The  symmetry  group  associated 
with  an  entail  it  specification  consists  of  all  permutations  of  the  n  client  processes 
which  simultaneously  permute  their  corresponding  input  channels.  For  configura- 
tions  in  each  of  these  families,  TopSPIN  automatically  classifies  the  associated  sym- 
metry  group,  and  computes  a  minimising  set  (see  Section  9.2-3).  The  resulting  code 
for  representative  computation  is  similar  to  the  example  given  in  Figure  11.3,  Sec- 
tion  11.2.2. 
Given  a  resource  allocator  configuration  denoted  ao-al  -ak-1  i  the  corre- 
sponding  symmetry  group  is  a  disjoint  product  HI  *  H2  9  ...  *  Hk,  where  Hi  ý'-  S,,  i_l 
for  each  0  :ýi<k.  The  group  Hi  consists  of  all  permutations  of  client  processes 
with  priority  level  ai-i  which  simultaneously  permute  the  client  communication 
channels.  TopSPIN  automatically  computes  this  disjoint  product  decomposition  and 
identifies  a  minimising  set  for  each  factor  of  the  product.  Code  for  representative 
computation  is  produced  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  example  given  in  Figure  11.5, 
Section  11.2.4. 
The  symmetry  group  associated  with  an  m-n  loadbalancer  configuration  is 
also  a  disjoint  product.  The  group  has  the  form  Hi  *  H2,  where  Hi  ý---  S.  and 
H2  2ýý  Sn  permute  the  server  and  client  components  respectively  (simultaneously 
permuting  their  corresponding  input  channels).  Once  again,  TopSPIN  outputs  code 
for  representative  computation  by  computing  a  minimising  set  for  each  factor  of 
this  product. 
We  consider  three-tiered  architecture  specifications  which  are  balanced  -  that 
is,  there  are  in  server  components,  and  a  block  of  it  client  components  connected 
to  each  server  component  (for  some  m,?  z  >  0).  Given  a  configuration  n-n-...  -11 
in  the  three-tiered  family,  the  associated  symmetry  group  decomposes  as  an  inner 
wreath  product  HIK,  where  H  '--'  Sn  and  K  S,  The  wreath  product  contains 
in  copies  of  H,  each  of  which  permutes  client  processes  and  channels  within  one 
of  the  blocks.  The  group  K  permutes  the  in  server  components.  An  element  of  K 
which  maps  server  i  to  server  j  also  maps  the  block  of  clients  connected  to  server  i  to 
the  block  of  clients  connected  to  server  j.  TopSPIN  uses  the  techniques  of  Section  9.4 
to  automatically  compute  this  wreath  product  decomposition,  and  then  computes 
distinct  minimising  sets  for  each  copy  of  H  and  a  minimising  set  for  K.  Code  for 
the  resulting  composite  strategy  is  again  similar  to  the  example  given  in  Figure  11.5, 11.3:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  205 
Section  11.2.4. 
For  configurations  in  the  hypercube  family,  we  manually  specify  generators 
for  a  group  of  symmetries.  This  is  due  to  the  inability  of  SymmExtractor  to  auto- 
matically  detect  the  complete  group  of  symmetries  for  these  examples,  as  discussed 
in  Section  8.4.2.  The  hypercube  examples  exhibit  fairly  large  groups,  which  camiot 
be  decomposed  as  disjoint/wreath  products,  and  for  which  no  minimising  set  can 
be  found  by  our  methods.  Using  thefast  strategy,  TopSPIN  selects  local  search  (see 
Section  9.2.4)  to  handle  this  type  of  symmetry,  and  outputs  code  for  representative 
computation  similar  to  the  example  given  in  Figure  11.4,  Section  11.2.3. 
11.3.3  Results  and  discussion 
Figure  11.6  contains  experimental  results  for  various  configurations  of  the  above 
families.  For  each  configuration,  we  give  the  number  of  model  states  without  sym- 
metry  reduction  (orig),  with  memory  optimal  symmetry  reduction  using  the  enu- 
meration  strategy  (red),  and  with  symmetry  reduction  using  thefast  strategy  (fast). 
When  the  number  of  model  states  is  the  same  using  the  enumeration  andfast  strate- 
gies,  '='appears  in  the  fast  column.  State-space  sizes  which  are  larger  than  106  are 
given  to  the  nearest  hundred-thousand,  with  the  exception  of  the  Peterson  without 
atomicity  4  configuration  (as  discussed  below).  The  use  of  state  compression  (see 
Section  2.6.2)  is  indicated  by  the  number  of  states  in  italics.  This  option  was  se- 
lected  for  three  configurations  to  allow  verification  without  symmetry  reduction. 
Verification  times  (in  seconds)  are  given  for  the  enumeration  strategy  with 
and  without  the  group-theoretic  optimisations  of  Section  9.2.2  (basic  and  enum 
respectively),  for  thefast  (fast)  option,  as  well  as  for  the  case  where  symmetry  re- 
duction  is  not  applied  (orig).  The  size  of  the  symmetry  group  (I  G  J)  and  the  time,  in 
seconds,  taken  by  GAP  to  classify  this  group  (classify  time)  are  also  given. 
Verification  attempts  which  exceed  available  resources,  or  do  not  terminate 
within  15  hours,  are  indicated  by'-.  All  experiments  are  performed  on  a  PC  with  a 
2.4GHz  Intel  Xeon  processor,  3Gb  of  available  main  memory,  running  SPIN  version 
4.2.3  .2  For  the  email  7  and  loadbalancer  3-7,4-6  and  5-7  configurations,  the  size  of  the 
reduced  state-space  was  computed  using  the  segmented  strategy,  for  which  timing 
information  is  given  in  Figure  11.6  and  discussed  below. 
For  all  specification  families  except  the  hypercube  family,  the  application  of 
symmetry  reduction  allows  the  verification  of  larger  configurations  -  even  using 
state  compression,  memory  requirements  were  quickly  exceeded  when  symmetry 
reduction  was  not  applied.  In  all  cases,  the  enumeration  strategy  without  optimi- 
sations  is  significantly  slower  than  the  optimised  enumeration  strategy,  which  is  in 
turn  slower  than  the  strategy  chosen  by  TopSPIN. 
2.  An  ard-dve  of  the  Promela  specifications  used  for  the  experiments  is  available  online  (see  Sec- 
tion  1.2). 11.3:  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  206 
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Figure  11.6:  Experimental  results  for  symmetry  reduction  with  TopSPIN.  For  each  con- 
figuration,  state-space  sizes  are  given  for  verification  without  symmetry  reduction 
(states  orig),  with  full  symmetry  reduction  (states  red)  and  using  the  fast  strategy 
(states  fast).  Time  for  verification  (in  seconds)  is  also  given  in  each  case.  The  columns 
time  basic  and  time  enum  refer  to  full  symmetry  reduction  without  and  with  com- 
putational  group-theoretic  optimisations.  The  size  of  the  group  G  and  the  time  (in 
seconds)  taken  to  classify  the  structure  of  G  (classify  time)  are  also  shown  for  each 
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Processes  in  the  simple  mutex  configurations  do  not  hold  references  to  one 
another,  so  the  fast  strategy  provides  exact  symmetry  reduction,  as  expected.  In 
contrast,  the  difference  between  the  fast  and  enumeration  strategies  is  especially 
marked  for  the  simple  mutex  10  configuration,  where  the  symmetry  group  is  much 
larger  than  even  the  unreduced  state-space.  Configurations  in  all  the  other  fami- 
lies  consist  of  processes  which  do  hold  references  to  one  another,  in  which  case  the 
fast  strategy  does  not  promise  exact  symmetry  reduction  even  when  the  associated 
symmetry  group  can  be  classified  appropriately  (see  Section  10.1.2).  However,  for 
the  Peterson,  resource  allocator  and  three-tiered  architecture  specifications,  exact  sym- 
metry  reduction  is  obtained  using  thefast  strategy  (at  least  for  the  configurations  to 
which  we  could  feasibly  apply  the  enumeration  strategy). 
Exact  symmetry  reduction  using  thefast  strategy  is  not  obtained  for  the  email 
or  loadbalancer  configurations,  or  for  the  Peterson  without  atomicity  4  configuration. 
Nevertheless,  a  large  factor  of  reduction  is  gained  by  exploiting  symmetry  in  this 
way,  and  verification  is  fast.  The  difference  in  model  sizes  using  thefast  and  enu- 
meration  strategies  for  the  Peterson  without  atomicity  4  configuration  is  small. 
As  discussed  above,  TopSPIN  uses  local  search  when  the  fast  strategy  is  ap- 
plied  to  the  hypercube  specifications.  This  requires  storage  of  more  states  than  the 
enumeration  strategy,  but  is  considerably  faster  and  still  results  in  a  greatly  reduced 
state-space. 
Figure  11.7  shows  the  time  taken  for  symmetry  reduction  using  the  seg- 
mented  strategy,  applied  to  the  email  and  loadbalancer  configurations.  The  (reduced) 
model  sizes  are  given  in  the  states  red  column  of  Figure  11.6.  The  email  and  load- 
balancer  configurations  are  suitable  for  the  segmented  strategy  since  thefast  strategy 
does  not  provide  optimal  symmetry  reduction,  and  the  symmetry  group  associ- 
ated  with  each  configuration  can  be  classified  using  the  techniques  of  Chapter  9. 
Using  the  polynomial  time  COP  strategy  obtained  via  this  classification,  together 
with  the  techniques  of  Chapter  10,  we  obtain  exact  symmetry  reduction  more  effi- 
ciently  than  via  enumeration.  Indeed,  for  larger  configurations  in  each  family,  the 
segmented  strategy  allows  us  to  feasibly  construct  a  memory-optimal  reduced  state- 
space,  which  was  not  possible  using  straightforward  enumeration.  Recall  that  the 
segmented  strategy  works  by  applying  a  polynomial  time  COP  strategy  to  a  state, 
computing  a  partition  associated  with  the  resulting  state,  and  enumerating  the  sta- 
biliser  of  this  partition  to  find  the  unique  representative.  Since  many  different  states 
may  exhibit  the  same  partition,  TopSPIN  stores  a  table  of  stabiliser  subgroups,  in- 
dexed  by  partitions,  as  discussed  in  Section  11.2.5.  Figure  11.7  records  the  number 
of  distinct  partitions  which  were  computed  for  each  entail  and  loadbalancer  configu- 
ration.  Note  that  for  all  configurations  this  number  is  much  smaller  than  the  num- 
ber  of  reduced  model  states. 11.4:  EXTENDING  TopSPIN  208 
Configuration  time  segmented  no.  ýpartiýtions 
email 
3  0.2  5 
4  4  7 
5  71  9 
6  1600  11 
7  50970  13 
loadbalancer 
2-6  28  94 
2-7  266  259 
3-6  271  330 
3-7  2722  451 
4-6  2378  884 
4-7  29779  1296 
Figure  11.7:  Results  for  the  segmented  strategy  applied  to  email  and  loadbalancer  config- 
urations. 
11.4  Extending  TopSPIN 
The  main  limiting  feature  of  TopSPIN  is  that  it  does  not  allow  symmetry-reduced 
verification  of  LTL  properties.  The  symmetry  group  derived  by  SymmExtractor  is, 
by  construction,  an  invariance  group  for  a  temporal  property  embedded  in  a  spec- 
ification  as  a  never  claim.  This  is  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  never  claim  is  just  a 
Promela  process.  If  a  is  a  static  channel  diagram  automorphism  under  wl-dch  a 
given  property  0  is  not  invariant  then  a  will  not  preserve  the  structure  of  the  never 
claim  for  0,  and  so  a  will  be  (correctly)  judged  as  invalid  by  SymmExtractor. 
A  solution  to  the  problem  of  combining  symmetry  reduction  with  LTL  model 
checking  in  SPIN  is  presented  in  [13].  The  next  step  in  the  development  of  TopSPIN 
is  to  implement  this  solution  for  the  general  kinds  of  symmetry  supported  by 
TopSPIN.  TI-ds  will  involve  adapting  the  nested  depth-first  search  algorithm  which 
SPIN  uses  to  check  LTL  properties,  so  that  only  representative  states  are  considered. 
In  Section  11.2.5  we  explained  that  use  of  the  segmented  strategy  requires 
communication  between  sympan  and  GAP  during  search,  and  currently  relies  on 
GAP  being  the  master  process,  starting  symp  an  as  a  slave  process.  It  should  be  pos- 
sible  to  change  this  so  that  sympan  starts  GAP,  which  would  be  more  natural,  and 
would  avoid  the  current  problem  of  passing  command-line  arguments  to  sympan. 
There  is  some  overhead  associated  with  passing  data  between  GAP  and 
sympan  using  a  text  stream  during  a  verification  run.  We  could  remove  this  over- 
head  by  implementing  C  versions  of  the  small  number  of  GAP  functions  which  are 
used  by  the  segmented  strategy,  in  particular  the  algorithms  associated  with  comput- 
ing  setwise  stabilisers.  However,  the  GAP  implementation  has  been  refined  over  a 
number  of  years  by  experts  in  computational  group  theory,  and  reportedly  includes 
many  optimisations  (some  based  on  randomisation)  which  are  not  documented  in 
the  literature.  For  this  reason,  it  is  likely  that  any  savings  in  communication  over- 11.4:  EXTENDING  TopSPIN  209 
head  would  be  lost  to  a  reduction  in  efficiency.  As  a  proof-of-concept,  we  imple- 
mented  the  Schreier-Sims  algorithm  (a  fundamental  algorithm  on  which  most  tech- 
niques  for  computing  with  permutation  groups  are  based)  in  C,  from  a  description 
given  in  [19].  While  our  implementation  produced  correct  results,  it  was  signifi- 
cantly  slower  than  GAP. 
The  segmetited  strategy  introduces  the  challenge  of  managing  communica- 
tion  between  sympan  and  GAP  via  a  simple  protocol.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
describe  the  control  aspects  of  this  protocol  using  Promela,  and  improve  our  con- 
fidence  in  TopSPIN  by  eliminating  any  potential  deadlocks  in  the  protocol  which 
SPIN  may  find. 
Summary 
We  have  described  TopSPiN,  a  computational  group-theoretic  symmetry  reduction 
package  for  the  SPIN  model  checker.  TopSPIN  provides  automatic  symmetry  detec- 
tion  using  SymmExtractor,  and  also  allows  the  user  to  manually  specify  symme- 
try.  For  efficient  symmetry  reduction  (and  to  allow  experimental  comparison  with 
naive  approaches),  TopSPIN  provides  a  variety  of  strategies  for  representative  com- 
putation,  based  on  the  techniques  of  Chapters  9  and  10. 
We  have  given  an  overview  of  the  tool,  and  discussed  each  of  the  symme- 
try  reduction  strategies  in  some  detail,  providing  examples  of  the  C  code  which 
TopSPIN  generates  for  representative  computation.  We  have  provided  experimen- 
tal  results  for  a  variety  of  Promela  specifications  which  illustrate  the  practical  effec- 
tiveness  of  our  computational  group-theoretic  symmetry  reduction  methods;  both 
over  verification  without  symmetry,  and  symmetry-reduced  verification  using  ba- 
sic  enumeration.  In  addition,  we  have  discussed  some  directions  for  future  devel- 
opment  of  TopSPIN,  the  most  important  of  which  is  to  provide  support  for  LTL 
model  checking. Chapter  12 
Conclusions  and  Open  Problems 
The  original  contribution  of  this  thesis  can  be  divided  into  two  parts:  techniques 
for  automatic  symmetry  detection  in  model  checking,  and  methods  for  efficiently 
exploiting  arbitrary  symmetry  groups  in  explicit-state  model  checking.  The  goal 
of  these  methods  is  to  combat  the  state-space  explosion  problem,  which  limits  the 
application  of  model  checking  to  relatively  small  systems.  We  have  presented  in- 
depth  theoretical  results  in  each  area,  and  backed  up  our  theory  with  robust  soft- 
ware  tools  and  convincing  experimental  results. 
Having  provided  an  overview  of  model  checking  and  a  detailed  survey  of 
symmetry  reduction  techniques  in  Chapters  2  and  3  respectively,  we  illustrated 
some  problems  with  existing  symmetry  detection  and  reduction  techniques  in 
Chapter  4  via  a  selection  of  example  Promela  specifications.  In  order  to  analyse 
symmetry  in  the  models  associated  with  these  specifications  we  introduced  the 
SPIN-to-GRAPE  tool. 
We  identified  two  major  problems  with  existing  techniques  for  identify- 
ing  symmetry,  namely  the  necessity  for  the  user  to  annotate  a  specification  with 
symmetry-related  keywords  (or  to  use  an  appropriately  restricted  specification  lan- 
guage),  and  the  limitation  of  being  able  to  identify  only  fun  symmetry  groups.  To 
overcome  these  restrictions  we  proposed  a  method  for  automatic  symmetry  detec- 
tion  based  on  static  chamiel  diagram  analysis,  in  Chapter  7.  This  method  was  moti- 
vated  by  a  correspondence  between  Kripke  structure  automorphisms  and  chartnel 
diagram  automorphisms,  which  we  investigated  for  specific  examples  in  Chapter  5. 
To  present  our  results  rigourously  without  obscuring  them  in  the  complexity  of 
Promela  we  introduced  a  smaller  language,  Promela-Lite,  in  Chapter  6.  We  have 
used  the  techniques  of  Chapter  7  to  develop  SymmExtractor,  an  automatic  symme- 
try  detection  tool  for  Promela,  described  in  Chapter  8.  Experimental  results  show 
that  SymmExtractor  is  mostly  efficient,  using  group-theoretic  optimisations  to  deal 
with  certain  difficult  input  specifications.  We  have  assessed  the  usability  of  Symm- 
Extractor  by  applying  the  tool  to  a  set  of  example  specifications  written  as  solutions 
to  a  student  assessed  exercise.  The  study  reveals  some  ways  in  which  the  tool  could 
be  improved,  and  provides  a  case  study  in  formal  methods  evaluation. 12.1:  OUTSTANDING  IMPLEMENTATION  ISSUES  211 
Our  symmetry  detection  methods  allow  identification  of  groups  which  are 
more  complex  than  full  symmetry  groups.  This  leads  to  the  constructive  orbit  prob- 
lem  (COP),  which  involves  computing  orbit  representatives  with  respect  to  arbitrary 
symmetry  groups.  In  Chapter  9  we  presented  an  optimised  method  for  enumerat- 
ing  small  groups,  and  a  generalisation  of  techniques  for  dealing  with  full  symme- 
try  groups  by  sorting,  based  on  minimising  sets.  The  minimising  sets  approach  al- 
lows  us  to  automatically  and  efficiently  handle  a  large  class  of  commonly  occurring 
groups  which  are  isomorphic  to  symmetric  groups.  We  have  extended  the  applica- 
tion  of  techniques  for  handling  disjoint/wreath  product  groups  by  presenting  al- 
gorithms  to  automatically  determine  disjoint/wreath  product  decompositions  for 
arbitrary  groups.  To  deal  with  large  groups  which  cannot  be  classified  using  min- 
imising  sets  or  decomposed  as  products  we  have  proposed  an  approximate  tech- 
nique  for  computing  representatives  based  on  local  search.  The  results  of  Chap- 
ter  9  are  based  on  a  simple  model  of  computation  where  components  do  not  hold 
references  to  one  another.  For  many  practical  systems  this  is  not  the  case.  In  Chap- 
ter  10  we  introduced  the  constructive  orbit  problem  with  references,  and  showed  that 
any  algorithm  for  solving  the  COP  can  be  extended  to  solve  the  COPR.  However, 
this  extension  comes  at  the  expense  of  polynomial  time  complexity.  In  Chapter  11 
we  presented  TopSPIN,  a  symmetry  reduction  package  for  the  SPIN  model  checker 
which  uses  SymmExtractor  for  automatic  symmetry  detection,  and  provides  a  vari- 
ety  of  symmetry  reduction  strategies  based  on  teclu-dques  from  Chapters  9  and  10. 
Using  several  families  of  Promela  specifications,  we  have  presented  experimental 
results  which  show  the  effectiveness  of  our  techniques. 
Throughout  the  thesis  we  have  suggested  improvements  to  each  of  our  soft- 
ware  tools,  and  have  identified  a  number  of  areas  for  further  theoretical  investi- 
gation.  We  now  summarise  these  implementation  and  research  issues  in  the  hope 
that  they  may  lead  to  further  research  and  development  on  symmetry  reduction 
techniques  for  model  checking. 
12.1  Outstanding  Implementation  Issues 
W-dle  we  have  emphasised  the  importance  of  implementing  our  ideas,  there  are 
several  features  and  optimisations  which  we  have  not  had  time  to  incorporate  in 
our  tool  set. 
In  Sections  7.6.1,7.6.2  and  7.6.3  we  proposed  straightforward  extensions  to 
our  symmetry  detection  techniques  for:  allowing  certain  relational  operations  with 
pid  arguments;  supporting  arithmetic  expressions  which  involve  pid  variables,  and 
capturing  symmetry  between  global  variables  respectively.  The  user  study  of  Sec- 
tion  8.5  showed  that  these  extensions  (particularly  support  for  global  variable  sym- 
metry  and  arithmetic  expressions  over  pid  variables)  would  improve  the  usabil- 12.2:  RESEARCH  PROBLEMS  ARISING  FROM  THE  THESIS  212 
ity  of  SymmExtractor.  The  additional  functionality  should  be  relatively  straightfor- 
ward  to  implement. 
As  discussed  in  Section  11.4,  our  symmetry  reduction  package  TopSPIN  does 
not  currently  support  the  verification  of  LTL  properties.  This  is  not  a  research  issue: 
the  problem  of  combining  symmetry  reduction  with  LTL  verification  has  already 
been  investigated  [13].  Nevertheless,  for  TopSPIN  to  be  of  interest  to  the  SPIN  COM- 
munity  as  a  whole,  facilities  for  LTL  model  checking  under  symmetry  should  be 
implemented. 
The  segmented  strategy  (see  Section  11.2.5)  could  also  be  improved.  Currently 
if  this  strategy  is  chosen  it  is  necessary  to  launch  the  sympan  executable  from 
within  the  GAP  system.  This  is  somewhat  counter-intuitive,  and  poses  problems 
with  passing  command-line  arguments  (e.  g.  to  set  the  maximum  search  depth)  to 
sympan.  n-ie  performance  of  this  strategy  could  potentiallybe  improved  by  linking 
sympan  with  compiled  GAP  code,  rather  than  requiring  sympan  to  communicate 
with  GAP  using  a  text  stream  during  a  model  checking  run. 
12.2  Research  Problems  Arising  from  the  Thesis 
In  Section  7.5  we  observed  that  although  the  symmetry  detection  techniques  of 
Chapter  7  are  motivated  by  the  concept  of  a  static  channel  diagram  -  in  turn  mo- 
tivated  by  the  cliannel  diagram  concept,  presented  in  Chapter  5  and  inspired  by 
[157]  -  there  is  nothing  fundamentally  important  about  the  static  channel  diagram 
definition.  By  introducing  the  structure  Y(P),  we  showed  that  the  main  results 
of  the  chapter  (contained  in  Sections  7.3  and  7.4)  hold  when  Aut(SCV(P))  is  re- 
placed  with  any  subgroup  G  of  Aut('Y(P)).  In  defence  of  static  channel  diagrams, 
we  showed  that  they  do  provide  an  upper  bound  for  the  largest  valid  subgroup 
of  Aut('Y(P))  (see  Theorem  15,  Section  7.5).  An  interesting  question  for  future  re- 
search  is  whether  there  exists  a  structure  F(P)  (say)  which  can  be  extracted  from 
P  in  polynomial  time,  such  that  Aut(I'(P))  is  exactly  the  largest  valid  subgroup 
of  Aut(IF(P)).  Such  a  structure  would  eliminate  the  need  for  Algorithm  4  in  Sec- 
tion  7.4,  which  computes  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  Aut(SCD(P)).  Experimen- 
tal  results  with  SymmExtractor  (see  Section  8.4)  show  that  this  algorithm  is  the 
bottleneck  for  our  automatic  symmetry  detection  method.  Although  the  random 
conjugates  optimisation  described  in  Section  8.3.3  can,  in  some  cases,  reduce  this 
bottleneck,  the  desired  structure  F(P)  would  remove  it  completely. 
We  showed  in  Section  7.6.4  (using  a  contrived  example)  that  the  notion  of  va- 
lidity  used  by  SymmExtractor  could  potentially  be  relaxed.  The  current  test  for  de- 
ciding  whether  a  static  channel  diagram  automorphism  is  valid  for  an  input  speci- 
fication  is  somewhat  conservative,  but  is  correspondingly  efficient.  While  we  have 
found  that  our  notion  of  validity  is  usually  acceptable  in  practice,  applying  Symm- 12.2:  RESEARCH  PROBLEMS  ARISING  FROM  THE  THESIS  213 
Extractor  to  the  hypercube  example  (see  Sections  4.6  and  8.4.2)  identified  a  situ- 
ation  where  the  group  of  automorphisms,  computed  by  SymmExtractor  is  signifi- 
cantly  smaller  than  the  group  of  automorphisms  computed  using  SPIN-tO-GRAPE. 
This  practical  example  suggests  that  a  less  restrictive  notion  of  validity  is  worth 
investigation. 
The  main  research  challenge  identified  by  the  user  study  of  Section  8.5  is 
to  find  techniques  to  automatically  determine  the  relationship  between  numeric 
identifiers  passed  as  parameters  to  processes  by  the  user,  and  the  run-time  _pid 
values  wl-ddi  SPIN  assigns  to  processes.  This  is  a  Promela-specific  issue,  arising  due 
to  the  need  to  index  into  arrays  using  process  identifiers,  but  an  elegant  solution 
would  greatly  improve  the  practical  usability  of  SymmExtractor. 
In  Section  9.3  we  presented  two  approaches  to  computing  disjoint  prod- 
uct  decompositions  for  arbitrary  permutation  groups,  motivated  by  the  fact  that, 
given  such  a  decomposition,  we  can  compute  equivalence  class  representatives  un- 
der  the  whole  group  by  applying  the  factors  of  this  decomposition  separately.  The 
sound  and  incomplete  approach  described  in  Section  9.3.1  works  extremely  well 
for  groups  which  have  been  computed  automatically  using  a  graph  automorphism. 
program,  so  this  approach  is  implemented  in  TopSPIN.  We  illustrated  the  fact  that 
the  approach  is  not  complete  using  a  simple  example.  From  a  group-theoretic  per- 
spective,  it  is  desirable  to  have  a  sound  and  complete  solution  to  this  problem.  We 
presented  one  such  solution  in  Section  9.3.2,  but  showed  that,  in  the  worst  case, 
it  has  exponential  time  complexity.  An  area  for  future  research  would  be  to  fur- 
ther  analyse  the  complexity  of  this  problem,  aiming  to  find  a  polynomial  time  al- 
gorithm.  Since  the  sound,  incomplete  approach  used  by  TopSPIN  in  Solving  this 
problem  works  well  in  practice,  tl-ds  open  problem  may  be  of  more  interest  to  the 
computational  group  theory  community  than  to  the  model  checking  community. 
Similarly,  a  topic  for  future  research  includes  determining  the  exact  complexity  of 
the  wreath  product  decomposition  problem  which  we  investigated  in  Section  9.4. 
We  provided  counter-examples  in  Section  9.5  showing  that  the  composi- 
tional  approach  to  computing  orbit  representatives  with  respect  to  disjoint/wreath 
products  does  not  directly  extend  to  direct/semi-direct  products.  As  noted  in  Sec- 
tion  9.5  these  counter-examples  do  not  mean  that  the  structure  of  direct/  semi-direct 
product  groups  cannot  be  exploited  in  some  other  way  to  compute  representatives 
efficiently,  and  this  would  be  a  potential  direction  for  future  work.  The  family  of 
hypercube  automorpl-dsm  groups  provide  motivation:  the  group  K,  x  S,  is  a  semi- 
direct  product,  and  &  in  turn  is  a  direct  product  of  n  groups  of  order  2. 
A  recent  approach  to  symmetry  breaking  in  constraint  programming  re- 
quires  a  solution  to  a  problem  related  to  the  COP  [105].  During  search,  symmetry 
breaking  is  performed  by  backtracking  when  the  partial  assignment  of  variables 
at  a  given  node  is  determined  not  to  be  lexicographically  least  in  its  orbit  under  a 
symmetry  group  G.  The  approach  relies  on  a  variant  of  an  algorithm  for  finding 12.3:  THE  FUTURE  214 
the  smallest  image  of  a  set  under  a  permutation  group  [121].  This  problem  can  be 
shown  to  be  polynomial  time  equivalent  to  the  COP,  and  the  smallest  image  algo- 
rithm  can  be  used  to  solve  arbitrary  COP  instances.  Though  the  algorithm  is  not 
polynomial  time,  it  exploits  the  structure  of  G  in  order  to  perform  better  than  basic 
enumeration.  The  smallest  image  algorithm  is  general,  and  does  not  rely  on  spe- 
cific  features  like  minimising  sets  or  disjoint  decompositions  as  ours  does.  There- 
fore  we  expect  our  techniques  will  be  more  efficient  for  these  special  cases  (and 
indeed  preliminary  experiments  using  GAP  confirm  this).  Nevertheless,  a  poten- 
tially  beneficial  area  for  future  work  would  be  to  replace  basic  enumeration  with 
the  smallest  image  algorithm.  In  particular  the  approach  to  symmetry  reduction  us- 
ing  segmeittatioti,  presented  in  Chapter  10  to  deal  with  systems  where  components 
hold  references  to  one  another,  relies  on  an  enumeration  phase  during  represen- 
tative  computation.  It  may  be  possible  to  significantly  speed  up  this  technique  by 
using  the  smallest  image  algorithm  instead  of  this  enumeration  step. 
12.3  The  Future 
We  conclude  with  three  open  problems  which  have  proved  to  be  beyond  the  scope 
of  this  thesis,  but  which  we  believe  are  important  to  the  applicability  and  effective- 
ness  of  symmetry  reduction  techniques  for  practical  model  checking.  These  are:  ex- 
ploiting  partial  symmetries,  over-exploiting  symmetry,  and  using  parallel  processing 
technology  for  efficient  representative  computation. 
Partial  symmetry  reduction 
The  importance  of  techniques  for  the  exploitation  of  partial  symmetry  (in  the  con- 
text  of  hardware  verification)  is  neatly  summarised  in  [51]: 
In  conversations  we  have  had  with  industrial  hardware  engineers,  it 
comes  out  that  while  symmetry  reduction  is  often  applicable  due  to 
thepresence  of  manysimilar  subcomponents,  there  are  also  many  in- 
stances  where  it  is  not  -  quite  -  applicable.  7hat  is,  the  systems  are 
not  genuinely  symmetric  but  "approximately"  symmetric,  for  exam- 
ple,  because  of  one  different  component  or  slight  differences  among 
all  components.  This  Emits  thescope  of  utility  ofsymmetry  reduction 
techniques. 
Our  experience  concurs  with  this  statement.  Although  we  have  shown  the 
effectiveness  of  our  symmetry  reduction  techniques  using  a  number  of  convincing 
examples,  we  have  had  to  eliminate  many  more  promising-looking  case-studies 
which  turned  out  to  be  almost,  but  not  quite,  symmetric. 12.3:  THE  FUTURE  215 
We  surveyed  several  approaches  to  handling  partial  symmetry  in  Sec- 
tion  3.7.  The  main  drawback  of  the  notion  of  virtual  symmetry  presented  in  [52] 
is  the  problem  of  deriving,  at  the  specification  level,  a  group  of  virtual  symme- 
tries  for  a  Kripke  structure.  In  addition,  virtual  symmetry  reduction  techniques 
still  require  the  property  under  consideration  to  be  invariant  under  the  group  of 
virtual  symmetries.  Methods  for  exploiting  partial  symmetry  using  guarded  anno- 
tated  quotient  structures  1165]  are  potentially  more  promising,  being  able  to  handle 
asymmetric  properties  as  well  as  asymmetric  models.  Still,  there  is  little  indication 
of  how  general  partial  symmetries  can  be  detected  at  the  source  level.  General,  ef- 
ficient  techniques  for  automatic  partial  symmetry  detection  would  greatly  increase 
the  applicability  of  symmetry  reduction  in  model  checking. 
Ovcr-exploiting  symmetry 
When  model  checking  a  very  large  state-space,  it  may  be  acceptable  to  use  an  uii- 
sou?  zd  reduction  technique  which  efficiently  covers  a  large  portion  of  reachable 
states,  but  does  not  provide  100%  coverage.  This  is  exemplified  by  the  supertrace 
method  provided  by  SPIN,  which  reduces  the  storage  requirement  for  a  state  to  a 
single  bit  at  the  expense  of  complete  verification  [871.  This  kind  of  reduction  tech- 
nique  is  useful  when  we  are  interested  in  finding  errors  in  a  system,  rather  than 
proving  absence  of  errors. 
In  a  symmetry  reduction  context,  it  may  be  possible  to  provide  more  effi- 
cient  verification  either  by  exploiting  a  super-group  of  Kripke  structure  automor- 
phisms,  or  by  computing  representatives  in  such  a  way  that  several  orbits  are  rep- 
resented  by  a  single  state.  Suppose  that  we  have  a  group  G  :!  ý  Aut(M),  but  can- 
not  find  an  efficient  reduction  strategy  for  G.  If  we  can  find  a  group  G',  with  an 
efficient  reduction  strategy,  such  that  Gc  G',  then  performing  symmetry  reduc- 
tion  with  respect  to  G'  will  give  at  least  the  factor  of  reduction  obtained using  G. 
However,  if  Aut(M)  C  G'  (or  Aut(M)  and  G'  are  incomparable)  this  approach 
exploits  more  symmetry  than  actually  exists  in  the  model.  Nevertheless,  the  ap- 
proach  may  quickly  discover  counter-examples  to  the  property  being  checked.  This 
is  valuable  if  unreduced  verification  exhausts  available  resources  before  finding  a 
counter-example,  but  sound  symmetry  reduction  is  too  time-consuming  to  be  fea- 
sible.  The  idea  of  using  a  representative  computation  function  which  maps  several 
states  to  the  same  representative  follows  a  similar  philosophy. 
Parallel  symmetry  reduction 
If  we  want  to  achieve  sound,  complete  symmetry  reduction  under  a  model  of  com- 
putation  with  references  then,  with  current  techniques,  we  may  have  to  resort  to 
enumeration  of  large  groups.  Recall  that  the  segmented  approach  to  representative 
computation,  presented  in  Chapter  10,  improves  basic  enumeration  by  exploiting 
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Given  a  group  G  and  state  s,  computing  Mill  [SIG  by  enumerating  G  is  inher- 
ently  parallelisable.  If  we  have  n  processing  units  then  we  can  split  G  into  n  equally- 
sized  disjoint  subsets  X1,  X2,. 
.., 
X,  Processing  unit  i  can  be  used  to  independently 
compute  si  =  mittla(s)  :  it  E  XJ  (1  <i<  n),  thus  the  si  can  be  computed  in 
parallel.  It  is  clear  that  Mill[SIG  =  Mil?  JS1iS2i 
...  oSn}. 
It  seems  natural  to  extend 
the  eimmeratiott  and  segmewed  strategies  in  TopSPIN  to  run  on  multiple  processing 
units,  using  a  parallel  programming  system  for  C  such  as  Sieve  [120,147].  Further 
research  effort  would  be  required  to  improve  more  sophisticated  representative 
computation  algorithms  via  parallel  technology.  Note  that  parallel  approaches  to 
model  checking  (see  e.  g.  [146])  do  not  remove  the  need  for  symmetry  reduction 
teclu-iiques.  Distributing  a  task  over  a  number  of  processing  units  promises,  in  the 
best  case,  a  linear  reduction  in  verification  time  and  a  linear  increase  in  available 
memory  On  the  other  hand,  symmetry  reduction  using  a  large  group  may  offer  an 
exponential  state-space  reduction,  so  it  is  sensible  to  utilise  parallel  technology  for 
this  purpose. 
12.4  Summary 
We  have  summarised  the  results  of  the  thesis,  and  outlined  areas  for  further  re- 
search  and  development  of  the  thesis  topics.  In  addition,  we  have  proposed  three 
areas  for  future  research  into  symmetry  reduction  for  model  checking. 
The  techniques  we  have  developed  in  this  work  are  useful  for  the  verifica- 
tion  of  genuinely  symmetric  systems  with  large  state-spaces,  using  standard  com- 
puting  platforms.  We  hope  that  the  next  generation  of  symmetry  reduction  tech- 
niques  will  be  able  to  use  parallel  processing  technology  to  over-exploit  partially 
symmetric  systems  with  very  large  state-spaces. Appendix  A 
Example  Specifications 
This  appendix  is  comprised  of  Promela  and  SMC  specifications,  together  with  sys- 
tem  description  files  for  SYmmSpin  specifications,  used  as  examples  throughout 
the  thesis.  These  examples  are  also  available  online  (see  Section  1.2). 
A.  1  Peterson's  Mutual  Exclusion  Protocol 
We  give  various  specifications  of  Peterson's  mutual  exclusion  protocol.  See  Sec- 
tion  4.3  for  a  discussion  of  these  specifications. 
A.  1.1  SymmSpin  specification 
System  description 
This  description  indicates  to  SymmSpin  where  scalarset  types  appear  in  the 
Promela.  specification  below. 
conBt  N3 
scalar  PID[N] 
proctype  :  system:  ( 
bytes  flag[PIDI; 
PID  turn  [byte]  ; 
proctype  user(PID) 
PID  i; 
PID  J; 
Prom  ela  specification 
#define  N3 
#define  PID  byte 
byte  flag[N]; 
PID  turn[N]i 
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proctype  user  (PID  i)  ( 
PID  j-N; 
byte  k; 
bool  ok; 
do  k-1; 
do  ::  k<N 
flag  (i)  .  k; 
turn  [k]  -  i; 
again:  atomic  ( 
ok  -  true; 
j-0; 
do  jN  -> 
if  j  I=  i 
ok  -  ok  &&  (flag[j]  <  k) 
else  ->  skip 
fi; 
J++ 
else  ->  break 
od; 
if  ok  11  turn[k]  I=  i 
else  j=N;  goto  again 
fi; 
j-N; 
k++ 
else  ->  break 
od; 
atomic  (  inCR++;  assert(inCR  ==  1)  );  inCR--; 
flag(il  -  0; 
od; 
/*  initialize  flags  and  start  the  processes  */ 
init  ( 
atomic( 
byte  i-0; 
do  i<N  ->  flag(i)  =  0; 
turn(i]  =  N;  run  user(i); 
i++ 
else  break 
od; 
A.  1.2  Simpler,  equivalent  Promela  specification 
byte  flag(41  01 
pid  turn(31  4; 
byte  inCR  -0 
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byte  k; 
bool  ok; 
do  k=1; 
do  ::  k<3 
flag[_pid]  =  k; 
turn[k] 
_pid; 
again:  atomic 
ok  ((_pid=.  I)ll(_pidi-1  flag[ll<k))&& 
((_pid==2)11(_pidi=2  flag[21<k))&& 
((_pid==3)11(_pid!  =3  &&  flag[33<k)); 
if  ok  11  turn[k]  I. 
_pid 
else  ->  goto  again 
fi 
k++ 
else  break 
od; 
atomic  (  inCR++;  assert(inCR  -  1)  );  inCR--; 
flag[-pid]  .  0; 
od; 
/*  start  the  processes  */ 
init  ( 
atomic( 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
A.  1.3  SMC  specification 
Program 
Module  process 
flag[process]=O; 
k[procesel-0; 
pc[process]=I; 
inCR[proce8s].  O; 
turnl[process].  O; 
turn2[procesel-0; 
turn3[process].  O; 
p  of  process; 
P:  i 
pc[p]-=l  ->  k[p]-l,  pctpl=2; 
pc[pl=-2  &  k(p]  <3  ->  pc[p]-3, 
pc[pl=-3  ->  flag[p].  k[p],  pC[pl-4; 
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turni[pl=l,  pc[p]=S; 
pc[p]..  4  &  k(p]..  2  ALL(q  of  process-  turn2[q]=O), 
turn2  (p]  =1,  pc  [p]  =5; 
pC[pl=-4  &  k[pl==3  ALL(q  of  process:  turn3[q]=O), 
turn3[pl=l,  pc[p]=S; 
pc[pl-=5  &  k[pl.  =l  &  (ALL(q  of  process:  p==q  I  (pl=q  &  flag[ql<k[pl)) 
turnl[pl==O)  ->  pc[pl=6; 
pclpl=-5  &  k[pl--2  &  (ALL(q  of  process:  p==q  I  (pl=q  &  flag[ql<k[pl)) 
turn2[p]=-O)  ->  pc[pl=6; 
pclpl--5  &  k[pl.  -3  &  (ALL(q  of  process:  p==q  I  (pl=q  &  flag[ql<klpl)) 
turn3[pl==O)  ->  pc[pl=6; 
PCEPI--5  &  klpl-=l  &  (I(ALL(q  of  process:  p==q  I  (pl=q  &  flag[ql<k[pl)) 
I  turni[p].  =O))  ->  pc[pl=5; 
pc[pl--5  &  k[pl-=2  &  MALL(q  of  process:  p==q  I  (pl=q  &  flag[q)<k[pl)) 
I  turn2[pl==O))  ->  pc[pl=5; 
pclpj=.  5  &  k[pl==3  &  MALL(q  of  process:  p==q  I  (pl=q  &  flag[ql<klp))) 
I  turn3[pl==O))  ->  pclpl-5; 
pc[p]-6  ->  klpj=k[pl+l,  pc[pl=2; 
pc[pl=-2  &  (I(k[pl<3))  ->  pc[pl=7; 
pc[pl=.  7  ALL(q  of  process.  -  inCR[ql=inCR[q]  +  1),  pc[pl-8; 
pc[pl==B  ALL(q  of  process:  inCR[q]=inCR[q]  -  1),  pc[pl=9; 
pc[pl-=9  flag[pl-0,  pc[pl=l; 
A.  1.4  More  realistic  Promela  specification 
byte  flag[41  -  0, 
pid  turn[31  -  0; 
byte  inCR  -0 
proctype  usero  f 
byte  k, 
bool  checked[41  -  false; 
bool  ok  -  false; 
do  k-1; 
do  ::  k<3 
flag[_pid]  -  k; 
turn[k] 
_pid; 
again-  atomic 
ok  -  true;  checked[_pid]=true 
do  Ook  11  checked[ll&&checked[21&&checked[31) 
atomic  f 
do  checked(l]  checked[l]  =  false; 
checked[21  checked[2]  -  false; 
checked[31  checked[31  =  false; 
else  ->  break; 
od; 
break 
dstep 
Ichecked[l]  ->  ok  =  ok  &&  flagIll<k; 
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dstep  ( 
ichecked[21  ok  =  ok  &&  flag[21<k; 
checked[21=true 
dstep 
Ichecked[3]  ok  =  ok  &&  flag[3]<k; 
checked[31.  true 
od; 
if  atomic  ok  11  turn[k]  I= 
_pid  ->  ok  -  false 
atomic  else  ->  ok  -  false;  goto  again 
fi; 
k++ 
else  ->  break 
od; 
atomic  (  inCR++;  assert(inCR  -  1)  );  inCR--; 
flag[_pid]  -  0; 
od; 
/*  start  the  processes  */ 
init  ( 
atomic( 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
A.  2  Resource  Allocator 
This  section  includes  Promela  and  SMC  specifications  of  a  resource  allocator  sys- 
tem,  which  is  described  in  Section  4.4. 
A.  2.1  Promela  specification 
mtype  =  frequest,  confirmation,  finished); 
chan  linki  -  Ill  of  (mtype); 
chan  link2  =  Ell  of  Imtype); 
chan  link3  m  (1)  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink4  -  Ill  of  (mtype); 
chan  linkS  =  Ell  of  (mtype); 
chan  link6  =  [11  of  {mtype), 
chan  link7  =  Ell  of  (mtype); 
chan  nullchan  =  [01  of  (mtype); 
pid  resource_user  =  0; 
byte  priorities[81; 
hidden  byte  priority-level; 
proctype  client(chan  link) 
do  ::  linktrequest; A.  2:  RESOURCE  ALLOCATOR  722 
atomic  (  link?  confirmation;  resource_UBer  =  _pid 
); 
atomic  I  reBource_user  =  0;  linkifinished  ) 
od 
proctype  resource_allocatoro  I 
chan  client_chan  -  nullchan; 
do  atomic  f 
(linkl?  [recluestllllink2?  [requeBtjlllink3?  [requestliI 
link4?  [requestllllink5?  [requestllllink6?  [requestllI 
link7?  [requestl); 
priority_level  =  2; 
do  priorities[ll==priority_ýlevel  &&  linkl?  [request] 
client-chan  =  linkl;  break 
priorities[21==priority_level  &&  link2?  (request) 
client-chan  =  link2;  break 
priorities[31==priority_level  &&  link3?  [requeBtl 
client-chan  =  link3;  break 
priorities[41==priority_level  &&  link4?  [request] 
client-chan  =  link4;  break 
priorities[53-priority_ýlevel  &&  link5?  Crequest] 
client-chan  =  link5;  break 
priorities[61==priority-level  &&  link6?  frequest] 
client-chan  =  link6;  break 
priorities[71==priority_level  &&  link7?  [request] 
client-chan  =  link7;  break 
else  ->  priority_level-- 
od; 
client-Chan?  request; 
client_chaniconfirmation; 
d.  step  (  client-chan?  finished;  client-chan  =  nullchan 
od 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  client(linkl); 
run  client(link2); 
run  client(link3); 
run  client(link4); 
run  client(link5); 
run  client(link6); 
run  client(link7), 
run  resource_allocatoro; 
priorities[l)  -  0; 
priorities[21  -  0; 
prioritieB[3]  -  1; 
priorities[41  -  1; 
prioritieB[51  =  1; 
prioritieB(61  -  2; 
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A.  2.2  SMC  specification 
Program 
Module  clientO  -  2; 
Module  clientl  -  3; 
Module  client2  -  2; 
Module  resourceallocator 
linkO[client01  -  0; 
linkl[clientl)  -  0; 
link2[client2)  -  0; 
resourceuser[)  -  0; 
dO  of  clientD; 
dl  of  clientl; 
d2  of  client2; 
cO  of  cliento:  j 
linkO[cOl  0  ->  linkO[cO]  -  1; 
linkO[cO]  2&  resourceuser(I  ==  0 
resourceuserl)  -  resourceuEser(]  + 
link0tcOl  -2&  resourceuser[I  --  I 
resourceuser[I  =  resourceuBer[I-1,  linkO(cOl  -  3; 
cl  of  clienti:  I 
linki[cil  0  ->  linkl[cll  -  1; 
linkl[cl)  2&  resourceuser[I  -0 
resourceusert)  -  resourceuser[]+l; 
linkl[cll  ..  2&  resourceuser(I  .-I 
resourceuser(I  -  resourceuser[I-1,  linkltcll  -  3; 
c2  of  client2:  j 
link2[c2l  0  ->  link2[c2l  -  1; 
link2tc2l  2&  resourceuserl]  .0 
resourceuser[I  -  resourceuserl]+l; 
link2lc2l  ..  2&  resourceusert)  --  1 
resourceuseril  -  reeourceuser[I-1,  link2[c2l  -  3; 
r  of  resourceallocator: 
link2  [c2)  --  1  ->  link2  [c2)  -  2, 
link2[c2)  --  3  ->  link2[c2)  -  0; 
linkltcll  -.  2&  ALL(d2:  link2[d2].  =0)  ->  linkl[cll  .  2, 
linkl[cll  -.  3  ->  linkl[cll  -  0, 
link01c0)  -.  1&  ALL(d2:  link2[d2)--0)  &  ALL(d1:  linkl(dil.  -0) 
linkO(c01  -  2; 
linkotcol  --  3  ->  linkO(c01  -  0; A.  2:  RESOURCE  ALLOCATOR  224 
A.  2.3  Promela  specification  with  sharing 
mtype  .  (request,  confirmation,  finished); 
chan  linkl  -  Ell  of  (mtype); 
chan  link2  -  (1)  of  (mtype); 
chan  link3  -  Ell  of  (mtype); 
chan  link4  -  Ill  of  (mtype), 
chan  linkS  -  [11  of  jmtype); 
chan  link6  -  (13  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink7  -  Ell  of  (mtype); 
chan  nullchan  -  101  of  {mtype); 
pid  resource_user  -  0; 
byte  priorities[91; 
hidden  byte  priority_level 
proctype  client(chan  link) 
do  linkirequest; 
atomic  link?  confirmation;  resource-user  -  _pid 
atomic  resource  user  =  0; 
if 
_pid==3 
&&  link4?  [request]  link4?  request; 
link4lconfirmation; 
link4?  finished 
_pid==4 
&&  link5?  [requeBtl  link5?  request; 
linkSiconfirmation; 
link5?  finiBhed 
_pid=-5 
&&  link3?  [request]  link3?  request, 
link3iconfirmation; 
link3?  finished 
::  else  ->  skip 
fi; 
linkifinished 
od 
proctype  resource_allocatoro  ( 
chan  client_chan  -  nullchan; 
do  atomic  ( 
(linkl?  [requestlillink2?  Erequestlillink3?  [requestllI 
link4?  lrequei3t]lllinkS?  [requestllllink6?  [recluestliI 
link77[requestl); 
priority_level  -  2; 
do  prioritiesfil.  -priority_level  &&  linkl?  Crequest] 
client-chan  -  linkl;  break 
priorities[21-=priority_level  &&  link2?  Erequest) 
client-chan  -  link2;  break 
priorities[31--priorityjevel  &&  link3?  lrequest] 
client-chan  -  link3;  break 
priorities[43--priority_ýIevel  &&  link4?  Erecluest] 
client-chan  -  link4;  break 
priorities[51.  =priority-level  &&  link5?  (request) 
client-chan  -  link5;  break 
prioritiee[61--priority_level  &&  link6?  [request] 
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priorities[71.  =priority_level  &&  link7?  [request] 
client_chan  =  link7;  break 
else  ->  priority_level-- 
od; 
client-chan?  request; 
client_chaniconfirmation; 
d, 
_step 
(  client_chan?  finished;  client_chan  =  nullchan 
od 
init  f 
atomic 
run  client(linkl); 
run  client(link2); 
run  client(link3); 
run  client(link4); 
run  client(link5); 
run  client(link6); 
run  client(link7); 
run  resource_allocatoro, 
priorities[l]  -  0; 
priorities[2]  -  0; 
priorities[3]  -  1; 
priorities[41  -  1; 
priorities[S]  -  1; 
priorities[61  -  2; 
priorities[71  -  2; 
A.  3  Three-tiered  Architecture 
The  following  specification  models  a  system  with  a  three-tiered  architecture,  which 
is  discussed  in  Section  4.5. 
mtype  -  frequest,  response,  query,  result); 
chan  db 
- 
link  -  [01  of  (mtype,  chan), 
chan  c1-se-1  -  [01  of  (mtype,  chan), 
chan  cl_se_2  -  [01  of  imtype,  chan); 
chan  cl_se 
-3- 
[01  of  Imtype,  chan); 
chan  cli  -  [0]  of  {mtype); 
chan  c12  .  10)  of  Imtypel; 
chan  c13  -  [01  of  imtype), 
chan  c14  -  (0)  of  (mtype)i 
chan  c15  -  [01  of  imtype), 
chan  c16  -  [0]  of  fmtype); 
chan  c17  -  [01  of  (mtype), 
chan  c18  -  [0]  of  (mtype); 
chan  sel  -  [01  of  {mtype); 
chan  se2  -  [01  of  (mtype); 
chan  se3  -  [01  of  Imtype); 
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proctype  client(chan  in;  chan  link) 
do  ::  linkirequeBt,  in; 
in?  response 
od 
proctype  server(chan  in;  chan  c-link) 
chan  current-client=null; 
do  ::  c-link?  request,  current-client; 
dbý_linklquery,  in; 
in?  result; 
current-clientireBponse; 
current-client=null 
od 
proctype  database(chan  link) 
chan  current_server-null; 
do  ::  link?  query,  current_server; 
current-serverlresult; 
current-server=null 
od 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  database(db. 
_link); 
run  server(sel,  cl-se 
- 
1); 
run  server(se2,  cl_sq_2); 
run  server(se3,  cl_se 
- 
3); 
run  client(cli,  cl_sq_l); 
run  client(cl2.  cl-se 
- 
1); 
run  client(cl3,  cl-se-1); 
run  client(cl4,  cl_se_2); 
run  client(cl5,  cl_se_2); 
run  client(cl6,  cl-se_2); 
run  client(Cl7,  cl_se_3); 
run  client(clS,  cl_se_3) 
A.  4  Message  Routing  in  a  Hypercube 
The  specifications  below  model  message  passing  in  a  hypercube  network,  and  are 
discussed  in  Sections  4.6  and  8.4.1  respectively. 
A.  4.1  Original  Promela  specification 
/*  Determines  whether  position  i  of  byte  bv  is  set  to  1 
#define  IS_I(bv,  i)  (bv&(l<<i)) 
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chan  linkl  -  Ell  of  (mtype); 
chan  link2  -  Ell  of  fmtype); 
chan  link3  -  (1)  of  imtype); 
chan  link4  -  (13  of  (mtype); 
chan  link5  -  Ell  of  (mtype), 
chan  link6  -  Ell  of  fmtype), 
chan  link7  -  (1)  of  {mtype), 
chan  link8  -  Ill  of  imtype); 
pid  dest  -  0; 
pid  current  - 
inline  choose_destinationo 
if 
_pidt-1 
dest  -2 
_pidl-2 
dest  -2 
_pidl-3 
dest  -3 
_pidl-4 
dest  -4 
_pidl-5 
dest  -5 
_pidl-6 
dest  -6 
_pidl-7 
dest  -7 
_pidl-8 
dest  -8 
fi 
inline  choose_next-dimensiono 
if 
IS_1(((_pid-l)^(dest-1)),  O)  chosen_ditnension  =0 
IS-1(((_pid-l)^(dest-1)),  l)  chosen_dimension  =1 
IS_I(((_pid-l)^(dest-1)),  2)  chosen_dimension  =2 
assert(chosen_dimension<3); 
proctype  node(chan  in;  Chan  outO;  Chan  outl;  Chan  out2)  ( 
byte  chosen_dimension  -  4; 
loop: 
atomic 
in?  packet;  current  -  _pid;  if  dest.. 
_Pid  ->  choose-destinationo 
else  ->  skip 
fi 
atomic  choose_next-dimensiono; 
if  chosen_dimension  0  outOlpacket 
chosen_dimension  I  outlipacket 
chosen_dimension  2  out2lpacket 
fi; 
chosen_dimension  -  4; 
current  -  0; 
goto  loop 
init  ( 
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run  node(linkl,  link2,  link3,  link5); 
run  node(link2,  linkl,  link4,  link6); 
run  node(link3,  link4,  linkl,  link7); 
run  node(link4,  link3,  link2,  link8); 
run  node(link5,  link6,  link7,  linkl); 
run  node(link6,  link5,  link8,  link2); 
run  node(link7,  link8,  link5,  link3); 
run  node(link8,  link7,  link6,  link4); 
if 
linklipacket;  dest  -I 
link2lpacket;  dest  -2 
link3lpacket;  dest  -3 
link4lpacket;  dest  -4 
link5lpacket;  dest  =5 
link6lpacket;  dest  -6 
link7tpacket;  dest  -7 
link8lpacket;  dest  -8 
fi 
A.  4.2  Re-modelled  specification  which  does  not  involve  arithmetic  onpid 
variables 
mtype  -  fpacket); 
chan  linkl  -  Ill  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink2  -  Ill  of  (mtype), 
chan  link3  .  (11  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink4  -  Ill  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink5  -  (1)  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink6  -  Ill  of  (mtype); 
chan  1ink7  -  (1]  of  {mtype); 
chan  1ink8  -  [1)  of  jmtype); 
pid  dest  -  0; 
pid  current  -0 
inline  choose_destinationo 
if 
_pidl-I 
dest  -1 
_pid1.2 
dest  -2 
_pidi-3 
dest  -3 
_pidl-4 
dest  -4 
_pidl-5 
dest  -5 
_pidl-6 
dest  -6 
_pidl-7 
dest  -7 
_pidl-8 
dest  =8 
fi 
inline  choose_next-dimensiono  ( 
if 
_pid--l 
&&  dest--2  if  chosen_dimension  =0  fi 
_pid.  -i  &&  dest-3  if  chosen_dimension  -I  fi 
_Pid--l 
&&  dest--4 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  -1  fi 
_pid--l 
&&  dest-5  if  :t  chosen_dimension  -2  fi 
_pid=-l 
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if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid-=l 
&&  dest--7  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -Iz:  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid==l 
&&  dest-8  -> 
if  chosen_dimension  =0 
chosen_dimension  =I 
chosen_dimension  =2 
fi 
_Pid--2 
dest-l  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0  fi 
_pid==2 
dest-3 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  =I  fi 
_Pid--2 
dest--4  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =1  fi 
_Pid--2 
dest=.  S 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid==2 
dest--6  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid-=2 
dest--7 
if  chosen_dimension  =0 
chosen_dimension  =I 
chosen_dimension  =2 
fi 
_pid==2 
&&  dest-8 
if  ::  chosen 
- 
dimension  -1::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid=. 
3  &&  dest-l  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =1  fi 
_pid--3 
&&  dest-2 
if  ::  choBen_dimension  =0::  chosen_dimension  =I  fi 
_Pid--3 
&&  dest-4  if  chosen_dimension  =0  fi 
_pid=-3 
&&  dest-5 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -  chosen_dimension  -2  fi 
_Pid=-3 
&&  dest-6  -> 
if  chosen_dimension  -0 
chosen_dimension  -1 
chosen_dimension  =2 
fi 
_Pid==3 
&&  dest-7  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid==3 
&&  dest-8 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid-4 
&&  dest--l  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0  chosen_dimension  =1  fi 
_Pid=-4 
&&  dest-2  if  chosen_dimension  -I  fi 
_pid.  =4  &&  dest-3  if  chosen_dimension  =0  fi 
_pid-=4 
&&  dest--5 
if  chosen_dimension  -0 
chosen_dimension  =I 
chosen_dimension  =2 
fi 
_pid.  -4  &&  dest-6 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -I  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid-=4 
&&  dest-7  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid=-4 
&&  dest-.  8  if  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid--S 
&&  dest-l  if  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid--S 
&&  dest-2 
if  ::  chosen_dimenBion  -0  chosen_dimenBion  =2  fi 
_pid.. 
5  &&  deBt==3  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -I  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid-=5 
&&  dest-4  -> 
if  chosen_dimension  -0 
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:.  -  chosen_dimension  -2 
fi 
_pid.. 
5  &&  dest-.  6  if  chosen 
- 
dimension  =0  fi 
_Pid--5 
&&  dest--7  if  chosen_dimension  =I  fi 
_pid--5 
&&  dest-.  8 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0  chosen_dimension  =I  fi 
_Pid--6 
&&  dest-1  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid--6 
&&  dest--2  if  ::  chosen_dimension  -2  fi 
_Pid--6 
&&  dest-3 
if  chosen_dimension  -0 
chosen_dimension  -1 
chosen_dimension  -2 
fi 
_Pid--6 
&&  dest=-4  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -1::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid--6 
&&  dest-5  if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0  fi 
_Pid--6 
&&  dest--7 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  -1  fi 
_Pid--6 
&&  dest-8  if  ::  chosen_dimenBion  -I  fi 
_Pid--7 
&&  destp-1 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -I::  chosen_dimension  -2  fi 
_Pid--7 
&&  dest-2  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0 
t:  chosen_dimension  -1 
::  chosen_dimension  -2 
fi 
_pid--7 
&&  dest-3  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid--7 
&&  dest.  -4 
if  ::  chosen 
- 
dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid--7 
&&  dest--5  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =1  fi 
_Pid=-7 
&&  dest-6 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -0::  chosen_dimension  -1  fi 
_pid.  -7  dest-8  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0  fi 
_Pid--8 
dest--l 
if  chosen_dimension  =0 
chosen_dimension  -1 
chosen_dimension  -2 
fi 
_Pid--8 
&&  dest--2 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  -I  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_pid.. 
8  &&  dest-3  -> 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
S: 
_pid--8 
&&  dest--4  if  ::  chosen_dimension  =2  fi 
_Pid--8 
&&  dest-5 
if  ::  chosen_dimension  =0::  chosen_dimension  -1  fi 
_Pid--8 
&&  dest..  6  if  chosen_dimension  -I  fi 
_pid--8 
&&  dest--7  if  chosen_dimension  =0  fi 
fi; 
assert(chosen_dimension<3) 
proctype  node(chan  in,  chan  outO;  chan  outl;  chan  out2)  ( 
byte  chosen_dimension  - 
loop: 
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in?  packet; 
current  -  _pid; 
if  dest---Pid  ->  choose 
_destinationo 
else  ->  skip 
fi 
atomic 
choose_next-dimensiono; 
if  chosen_dimension  0  outO!  packet 
chosen_dimension  1  outlipacket 
chosen_dimension  2  out2lpacket 
fi; 
chosen_dimension  -  4; 
current  -0 
goto  loop 
init  I 
atomic 
run  node(linkl,  link2,  link3,  link5); 
run  node(link2,  linkl,  link4,  link6); 
run  node(link3,  link4,  linkl,  link7); 
run  node(link4,  link3,  link2,  link8); 
run  node(links,  link6,  link7,  linki); 
run  node(link6,  link5,  link8,  link2); 
run  node(link7,  link8,  link5,  link3); 
run  node(link8,  link7,  link6,  link4); 
if  linklipacket;  dest  =I 
link2lpacket;  dest  =2 
link3lpacket;  dest  -3 
link4lpacket;  deBt  -4 
linkSipacket;  dest  -5 
:t  link6lpacket;  dest  =6 
link7lpacket;  dest  -7 
linkSipacket;  dest  -8 
fi 
A.  5  Telephony 
The  following  Promela  code  provides  part  of  an  example  telephone  specification 
which  cannot  be  handled  by  SymmExtractor,  and  a  re-modelled  version  which  can. 
They  are  discussed  in  some  detail  in  Section  8.5.4. 
A.  5.1  Original  telephone  specification 
mtype  -(  alert,  answer,  cutoff,  ack  ). 
chan  link12  -  [0)  of  (  mtype  ); 
chan  link21  -  (0)  of  (  mtype  ), A.  5:  TELEPHONY  232 
bool  idle_st[21  -  true; 
bool  dial_st[21; 
bool  calling-st[2); 
bool  ringing_et[21; 
bool  talking_st(21; 
bool  finish_st[21, 
proctype  user(chan  in,  out;  byte  id)  ( 
mtype  response; 
bit  is-caller; 
idle: 
assert(idle_st[id]  &&  Idial_st(id)  &&  !  calling_st[id]  && 
Iringing-stEid)  &&  Italking_st[idl); 
is-Caller  =  0; 
do  ::  atomic  ( 
idle_st[id]  -  0; 
dial-stlid) 
goto  dial 
in?  alert 
outlack; 
atomic  ( 
idle_st  [id]  =  0; 
ringing-stfid]  -1 
goto  ringing 
od; 
dial: 
assert(lidle_sttid]  &&  dial 
- 
st[id]  &&  Icalling_st[id]  && 
Iringing_st[id]  &&  Italking_st[idl); 
do  outlalert; 
in?  response; 
if  ::  response  -  ack 
atomic  ( 
dial_st[id]  =  0, 
calling-st[id] 
is-caller 
goto  calling 
1:  response  -  alert 
atomic  ( 
dial-st  lid]  =  0; 
talking-st(id]  -I 
goto  talk 
fi 
atomic 
dial-st[id)  -  0; 
finish-st(id] 
goto  finish 
od, 
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init  ( 
atomic 
run  user(link2l,  linkl2,  O); 
run  user(linkl2,  link2l,  l); 
A.  5.2  Telephone  specification  after  re-modelling 
mtype  -(  alert,  answer,  cutoff,  ack  )I 
chan  link12  -  [0]  of  mtype 
chan  link21  -  (0)  of  mtype 
bool  idle_st[31  -  true; 
bool  dial-st(3]; 
bool  calling_st(31; 
bool  ringing-st[3]; 
bool  talking_st(33; 
bool  finish_Bt[31; 
proctype  user(chan  in,  out)  I 
mtype  response; 
bit  is-caller; 
idle: 
assert(idle_stt_pid]  &&  Idial_st[_pid)  &&  Icalling_st[_pid] 
Iringing-st(_pid]  &&  italking-stl_pid]); 
is-Saller  -  0; 
do  ::  atomic  ( 
idle_stl_pid]  -  0; 
dial-Bt[-Pid]  -1 
goto  dial 
in?  alert 
outlack; 
atomic  ( 
idle_st[_pid]  -  0; 
ringing-eti_pid]  -1 
goto  ringing 
od; 
dial: 
assert(lidle_st(_pid]  &&  dial_st[_pidi  &&  Icalling-stf_pid]  && 
Iringing-st(_pid]  &&  italking_st[_pidl); 
do  ::  outialert; 
in?  response; 
if  ::  response  --  ack 
atomic  ( 
dial-st[-Pid]  -  0; 
calling_stl_pid]  -1 
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goto  calling 
:t  response  --  alert 
atomic  j 
dial-stl-pid]  -  0; 
talking_st(_pid] 
goto  talk 
fi 
atomic 
dial_et(_pid]  -  0; 
finish_st[_pid]  -I 
goto  finish; 
od; 
etc. 
init  j 
atomic 
run  user(link2l,  linkl2); 
run  user(link22,  link2l); 
A.  6  Railway  Signalling  System 
The  Promela  code  below  provides  full  versions  of  a  specification  railway  signalling 
system  which  is  discussed  in  Section  8.5.4. 
A.  6.1  Original  railway  signalling  system 
mtype  -  (approaches,  leaves,  lower,  raise,  atgate,  faraway,  up,  down); 
chan  control 
- 
link  101  of  (mtype,  byte); 
chan  gate_link  181  [01  of  (mtype)j 
Tntype  bar[81  -  down; 
bool  on_shared_track[2]  -  false; 
bool  shared_track_open  -  false 
proctype  train(byte  current_gate,  id) 
mtype  position  -  atgate; 
control-linklapproaches,  current-gate; 
do  ::  atomic  ( 
position--faraway 
if  ::  current_gate--3  ->  current-gate  -  0;  assert(id=.  O) 
current_gate.  -7  ->  current-gate  -  4;  assert(id..  l) 
else  ->  current_gate++; 
fil 
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od 
atomic  j 
(bartcurrent_gatel-up  &&  position==atgate) 
if  (current_gate=.  (id*4))  ->  on_shared_track[id]  =  true 
else  ->  skip 
fil 
position  -  faraway;  control-linkileaves,  current_gate; 
if  (current_gate..  (id*4+1))  ->  on_shared_track[id]  =  false 
else  ->  skip 
fi 
proctype  controllero  ( 
mtype  message; 
byte  current_gate; 
do  ::  control-link?  message,  current-gate 
if  atomic  j 
message.  -approaches 
gate_link(current-gate]lraise 
atomic 
mes  sage-  leaves 
gate_link(current-gate]llower 
fi 
od 
proctype  gate(byte  id)  ( 
mtype  message; 
do  :  -.  gate_link[idl?  message 
if  atomic  j 
message.  -lower 
bar[id]  .  down 
atomic 
Tnessage.  -raise  bar[id]  -  up 
od 
fi 
proctype  shared, 
_gate(byte 
id) 
mtype  message; 
do  :.  -  gate_link(id]?  message 
if  ::  atomic  ( 
message-.  lower 
bar[id]  -  down; 
assert(shared_track_open); 
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message.  -raise 
lock:  if  atomic  f 
((Ion_shared_track[Ol)  (Ion_shared_track[l]) 
(Ishared_track_open)) 
shared_track_open  =  true;  bar[id]  =  up 
else  ->  goto  lock 
fi 
fi 
od 
init  f 
atomic 
run  controllero, 
run  sharedgate(O);  run  gate(l),  run  gate(2);  run  gate(3); 
run  shared_gate(4);  run  gate(S);  run  gate(6);  run  gate(7); 
run  train(2,  O)i  run  train(6,1); 
A.  6.2  Railway  signalling  system  after  re-modelling 
mtype  -  (approaches,  leaves,  lower,  raise,  atgate,  faraway,  up,  down), 
chan  control-link  [01  of  (mtype,  pid); 
chan  gate_link-2  (01  of  (mtype); 
chan  gate_link 
-3 
[0)  of  fmtype); 
chan  gate_link_4  [01  of  (mtypel; 
chan  gate_link 
-5 
[0]  of  (mtype), 
chan  gate_link-6  [01  of  (mtype); 
chan  gate_link'7  [0)  of  imtype); 
chan  gate_link 
-8 
[0)  of  imtype); 
chan  gate_link-9  [0)  of  imtype); 
mtype  bar(12)  -  down, 
bool  on-ahared_track[121  -  false; 
bool  shared  track_open  =  false 
proctype  train(pid  current-gate) 
mtype  position  =  atgate; 
control_linklapproaches,  current'gate; 
do  atomic  j 
position-faraway 
if  current_gate==2->  current-gate  =3 
current_gate-=3->  current_gate  -4 
current_gate==4->  current-gate  5 
:1  current_gate==S  ->  current-gate  2;  assert(_pid==10) 
::  current_gate=-6  ->  current_gate  7 
1:  current_gate==7  ->  current_gate  8 
current_gate.  =8  ->  current_gate  9 
current_gate==9  ->  current_gate  6;  assert(_pid==Il) 
fi; 
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atomic  j 
(bar[current_gatel.  -up  &&  position=-atgate) 
if  ((_pid.  -lo  &&  current_gate=-2)11 
(_pid--Il  &&  current_gate=.  6)) 
on_shared_trackt_pid)  -  true 
else  ->  skip 
fi; 
position  -  faraway;  control-linkileaves,  current-gate; 
if  ((_pid--10  &&  current_gate--3)11 
(-Pid=-Il  &&  current-gate--7)) 
on  shared 
- 
track[_pid]  =  false 
el;  e  -ý,  skip 
fi 
od 
inline  send(id,  msg) 
if 
id--2  gate_link_21msg 
id--3  gate_link_31msg 
id--4  gate_link_41msg 
id--5  gate_link-Simsg 
id--6  gate_link-6imsg 
id--7  gate_link-7!  msg 
id--8  gate_link_81MBg 
id--9  gate_link-91meg 
fi 
proctype  controllero 
mtype  message; 
pid  current-gate; 
do  ::  control_link?  message,  currentý_gate 
if  atomic  ( 
message--approaches 
send(current_gate.  raise) 
atomic 
message-.  leaves 
send(current_gate,  lower) 
fi 
od 
proctype  gate(chan  link) 
mtype  message; 
do  ::  link7message  -ý- 
if  atomic  message-.  lower  bar[_pid]  =  down 
atomic  message.  -raise  barl_pid]  =  up 
fi 
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proctype  sharecý_gate(chan  link)  ( 
mtype  message; 
do  link?  message 
if  atomic 
message--lower  ->  bar[_pid]  -  down; 
assert(shared_track_open);  shared,  _track_open  -  false 
message.  -raise 
lock:  if  atomic  I 
((Ion_shared_track[101)  &&  (Ion_shared_trackE111) 
&&  (Ishared_track_open))  -> 
shared_track_open  -  true;  bar[_pid]  -  up 
else  ->  goto  lock 
fi 
od 
fi 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  controllero;  run  sharedgate(gate  link_2), 
run  gate(gate_link_3);  run  gate(gate_link_4); 
run  gate(gate_link_5);  run  sharecLgate(gate_link_6); 
run  gate(gate_link_7);  run  gate(gate_link-8); 
run  gate(gate_link_9);  run  train(4);  run  train(8); Appendix  B 
Proofs  Omitted  from  the  Text 
B.  1  Proof  of  the  Promela-Lite  Progress  Theorem  (Theorem  11, 
Section  6.3.5) 
The  proof  of  Theorem  11  relies  on  the  following  lemma: 
Lemma17  LctP,  M  ands  beasin  thestatementof  Theorem  11.  Letu  bean  update 
appearing  in  a  statement  of  proctype  p,  and  suppose  proctype(i)  =p-Ifuls'skip' 
or'x  -  el  then  execpi  (s,  u)  is  wefl-defined. 
Proof  If  u  is  'skip'  then  the  definition  of  execp,  i(s,  u)  places  no  conditions  on  s,  and 
execpj(s,  u)  =  s. 
Let  r  be  the  typing  environment  comprised  of  entries  for  the  global  variables 
and  static  channels  of  P,  proctypes  appearing  before  p  in  P,  and  the  local  variables 
of  p.  If  u  has  the  form  'x  -  e',  where  x  is  an  identifier  and  e  an  expression  then,  since 
r  ý-  u  OF,  x  is  not  a  static  channel  name,  and  both  x  and  e  have  type  T  where  T  is 
a  well-formed  type  which  is  not  the  type  of  a  proctype  (rule  T-ASSIGN).  Thus  x  is 
the  name  of  a  global  variable  or  a  local  variable  of  p. 
If  x  is  the  name  of  a  global  variable  then  we  must  have  (x  =  a)  Es  for  some 
aE  lit(T).  Therefore,  according  to  Figure  6.5,  execpXs,  u)  =  (s  \f  (x  =  affl  Uf  (x 
eva1p,  j(e))},  which  is  clearly  well-defined. 
On  the  other  hand  if  x  is  the  name  of  a  local  variable  then  (p[i].  x  =  a)  Es 
for  some  aE  lit(T),  and  we  have  execpj(s,  u)  =  (s  \  J(p[i].  x  =  a)})  Uf  (p[i].  x 
evalp,  i(e)}.  Again,  this  is  a  well-defined  state.  The  result  follows.  0 
Proof  of  Theorem  11  Let  r  be  the  typing  environment  as  defined  in  the  proof  of 
Lemma  17,  and  let  (stnint)  denote  the  Promela-Lite  statement  atomic  {g->u, 
U2;  ...  U1  }- 
Suppose  ul  has  the  form  skip  or  x-e.  Then  by  Lemma  17,  execO(til)  is 
well-defined. 
Suppose  u1  has  the  form  xIF.  Then  x  has  type  chan  {-T}  in  r,  so  x  is  either 
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17  ý-  U1  OK  can  be  inferred,  thus  rule  T-UPDATE  cannot  be  used  to  infer  that  F  ý- 
(stmnt)  oK  Thus  IF  ý-  (StMt)  OK  Must  follow  from  rule  T-SEND.  Therefore  the  guard 
g  musthave  the  form  W  &&nfull(x),  orjustnfull(x)  (see  Section  6.2).  Since, 
by  hypothesis,  s  Hr,  ig,  we  must  haves  [--p,  i  nfull  W.  Suppose  x  is  a  static  chan- 
nel  name,  so  that  (x  =  [a,,  42,  ..., 
d,  *@  E  s,  where  0  :ým<  cap(x).  The  conditions 
on  s  required  by  the  rule  for  execp,  i(s,  ul)  are  satisfied.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  result- 
ing  state  is  well-formed.  If  x  is  a  local  variable  of  p  then  (p[il.  x  =  c)  E  s,  where  c  is  a 
static  channel  name  or  null.  However,  s  F-pj  nfull  (x)  <*  s  J--pj  nfull  (null), 
and  we  cannot  have  s  Hpi  nf  ull  (null)  (see  page  121).  Thus  c  is  a  static  channel 
name,  and  execpj  (s,  u  1)  =  execpj  (s,  c!  "j),  which  is  well-defined  by  the  above  argu- 
ment. 
Suppose  ul  has  the  form  x?  Y.  Then  by  a  similar  argument  (using  the  fact 
that  the  xi  must  be  distinct,  and  that  no  xi  is  a  static  channel  name),  execp,  i  (s,  ul)  is 
well-defined. 
We  have  shown  that  execpj(s,  uj)  is  well-defined.  Suppose  that  execp,  i(... 
execp,  i(execp,  i(s,  Ul),  U2)i.  --,,  Uj)  is  well-defined  for  some  1  <-  j<1.  The  type  rules 
for  statements  (T-UPDATE,  T-SEND  and  T-RECV)  ensure  that  uj+l  has  the  form 
sk  ip  or  x=a.  By  Lemma  17,  execp,  i  (execpi  ( 
...  execpj  (execpj  (s,  U  1)  1  U2)  i---,  Uj),  Uj  +  1) 
is  well-defined.  Since  execpj(s,  uj)  is  well-defined,  it  follows  by  induction  that 
execp,  i(  ...  execpj(execp,  j  (S. 
-UOiU2)  ...  Al)  =  eXeCpi(S,  U1;  U2;  ...  ;  ul)  is  well-defined. 
M 
B.  2  Proof  of  Lemmas  1  and  2  (Section  7.3.2) 
The  proof  of  Lemma  1  depends  on  the  following  two  sub-lemmas: 
Lemma18  Let  it  E  Aut(SCD(P))  and  let  e  bean  expression  in  P  with  e:  int.  7hen 
evalp,  i(s,  e)  =  cvaIp,,,  (j)(a(s),  a(e)). 
Proof  The  Promela-Lite  syntax  (Figure  6-3)  and  type  system  (Figure  6.5)  restrict  the 
form  of  expressions  with  type  int  to  simple  expressions  of  the  form: 
1.  a,  where  aEZ 
2.  x,  where  x  is  a  local  or  global  variable  of  type  hit 
3.  len(null) 
4.  len  (c),  where  cis  a  static  channel  name 
5.  len  W,  where  x  is  a  local  variable  of  type  chaii 
or  an  arithmetic  combination  of  the  above.  Since  a  only  acts  on  static  channel  names 
and  values  of  type  pid,  if  e  is  a  simple  expression  of  one  of  the  first  three  forms 
above,  clearly  a(e)  =e  and  evalpj(s,  e)  =  evalp,,  (j)(a(s),  a(e))  =  evalp,  gj)(ft(s),  e). 
If  e  has  the  form  1  en  W  where  c  is  a  static  channel,  and  (c  =  [di,  d2, 
---, 
41)  E 
s  then  a(e)  has  the  form  len(a(c)),  (a(c)  =E  a(s),  and B.  2:  PROOFS  OMITTED  FROM  CHAPTER  7  241 
evalp,  j  (s,  e)  =  evalp,  &  (j)  (ei  (s),  a  (e))  =  m.  If  e  has  the  form  1  en  W  where  x  is  a 
local  variable  of  P  and  (x  =  c)  E  s,  with  ca  static  channel  name  or  null, 
then  evalpj(s,  e)  =  evalpj(s,  len  (c)  ).  By  the  above  argument,  evalpj(s,  len  (C) 
evalp,,,  (j)  (a  (s),  1  en  (a  (c))  )=  evalpA(i)  (a  (s),  a  (e)). 
If  e  is  an  arithmetic  combination  of  simple  expressions,  then  clearly  by  in- 
duction  the  result  holds.  M 
Lemma  19  Let  e  be  an  expression  with  e:  pid  or  e:  chan  IT}.  7hen 
evalp,  &(j)(a(s),  a(e))  =  ei(evalpi(s,  e)). 
Proof  The  form  of  expressions  of  type  pid  are  restricted  to:  a  where  aE  lit(pid)  and 
a  occurs  in  a  pid  context,  _pid,  or  x  where  x  is  a  global/local  variable  with  type 
pid. 
Suppose  e  has  the  form  a  where  aE  lit(pid)  and  a  occurs  in  a  pid  context. 
Then  a(e)  =  a(a).  We  have  eva1P,,  (0(&(s),  a(e))  =  evalp,,  ý(j)(a(s),  a(a))  =  a(a)  = 
a(evalp,  j(s,  a))  =  a(evalp,  j(s,  e)). 
If  e  has  the  form 
_pid 
then  evalpa(i)(a(s),  a(e))  =  evalM(j)(Cc(s),  _pid)  = 
a  (i)  =a  (evalpj  (s, 
_p 
i  d))  =a  (evalpj  (s,  e)). 
Now  suppose  e  has  the  form  x  where  x  is  a  global  variable  with  x:  pid. 
Suppose  that  (x  =  a)  E  s,  so  that  (x  =  a(a))  E  a(s).  Then  evalpt(i)(a(s),  tt(e))  = 
evalp,  a(i)(it(s),  x)  =  &(a)  =  a(evalpi(s,  x))  =  a(evalpj(s,  e)).  The  cases  where  x  is  a 
local  variable  with  x:  pid  is  similar. 
The  form  of  expressions  of  type  chan  IT}  is  restricted  to:  c  where  c  is  a  static 
channel  name;  null,  and  x  where  x  is  a  local  variable  with  type  chan{T}. 
If  e  has  the  form  null  then  evalp,  &(j)(a(s),  a(e))  =  evalpA(j)(a(s),  null) 
null  =  a(null)  =  a(evalpj(s,  e)). 
The  arguments  for  the  cases  where  e  is  a  static  channel  name,  or  e  is  a  lo- 
cal/global  variable  with  type  chanfT},  are  analogous  to  those  where  e  is  a  pid  lit- 
eral,  or  e  is  a  local/global  variable  with  type  pid.  0 
Proof  of  Lemma  1 
Base  cases:  Suppose  g  has  the  form  el==e2.  By  type  rule  T-EQ  we  must  have  el  :T 
and  e2:  T  for  some  type  T. 
"  If  T=  itit  then  by  Lemma  18  evall,,  i(s,  ej)  =  evalp,,,  (j)(&(s),  a(ej))  for 
jE  11,2}.  We  have  s  ý--pj  el==e2  -ý*  eval;,,  i(s,  el)  =  evalp,  i(s,  e2) 
evalp,,  (j)(ix(s),  &(ej))  =  evalp,,  t(j)(a(s),  &(e2))  '#>  tt(S)  [--p,,,  (i)  a(ej)==A(e2). 
"  If  T=  Pid  then  by  Lemma  19  evalpgj)(a(s),  ix(ej))  =  &(evalpj(s,  ej)  for 
jE  11,2}.  We  have  s  1--p,  i  el==e2  ý-*  evalpi(s,  el)  =  evalp,  i(s,  e2)  4* 
a(evalp,  i(s,  effl  =  a(evalp,  j(s,  e2))  4*  evalP,  (i)(a(s),  &(ej))  =  evalp,.  (j)(it(s), B.  2:  PROOFS  OMITTED  FROM  CHAPTER  7  242 
a(e2))  4*  a(s)  ý=,,,,  (j)  a(ej)==a(e2). 
If  T=  cluzn  IT}  the  result  follows  similarly  using  Lemma  19. 
This  completes  the  argument  for  the  case  where  g  has  the  form  el  =  =e2,  and  the  case 
where  g  has  the  form  el  I  =e2  is  similar. 
If  g  has  the  form  el  <  e2  then  the  type  system  requires  that  el  :  int  and 
e2  :  int  (rule  T-REQ.  We  have  s  ý=pj  el  <  e2  4*  evalpj(s,  el)  <  evalp,  i(s,  e2). 
and  a(s)  ý=p,,,  (j)  a(el)  <  a(e2)  -ý*  eval  PAO 
(a(s),  a(effl  <  evalp,  &(j)(a(s),  a(e2)).  By 
Lemma  18,  evalp,  i(s,  el)  =  eva1p4(j)(t%(s),  a(ej))  and  evalp,  i(s,  e2)  =  evalp,,,  (j)(a(s), 
ci(e2)).  Therefore  evalpi(s,  el)  <  evalp,  i(s,  el)  <*  evalp4(j)(a(s),  a(effl  <  evalp,,,  (j) 
(a(s),  a(e2)),  i.  e-  S 
[--pi  el  <  e2  'ý*  Ci(S)  Pp,,,  (i)  a(el)  <  a(e2).  The  cases  el  <=  e2, 
el  >  e2  and  el  >=  e2  are  similar. 
Suppose  g  has  the  form  nf  ull(c)  where  cis  a  static  channel  name.  Suppose 
(c  =  [fij,  a2,.  -., 
irkj)  Es  forsomeO  :5k  <-  cap(c).  Then  (a(c)  =E 
ci(s).  Thens  ý--pjnfull(c)  #>  cap(c)  >k  4-*  a(s)  ý--p,,,  (j)  nfull(a(c)). 
Ifghas  theformnfull(x)  where  xisa  localvariable  of  pwithx:  chanIT} 
then  suppose  (p[i].  x  =  null)  E  s.  Then  (p[a(i)].  x  =  null)  E  a(s),  and  we  have 
s  ýLpj  nfuli(x)  and  ei(s)  ý'-p,,,  (j)  nfuli(x).  Suppose  instead  (p[i].  x  =  c)  Es 
where  c  is  a  static  channel  name.  Then  (p[a(i)j.  x  =  a(c))  E  a(s).  We  have  S  [:  --pi 
nf  ull(x)  -ý*  s  [--pi  nf  ull(c)  ý#>  a(s)  ý=p4(j)  nf  ull(ci(c))  (by  the  above  argument 
for  static  channels)  4*  a(s)  ý=p,,,  (j)  nf  ull(x). 
The  cases  nempty(c)  and  nempty(x)  where  c  is  a  static  channel  name  and 
xa  local  variable  with  x:  clian  IT}  are  similar. 
Inductive  step: 
Suppose  the  result  holds  for  all  guards  of  length  less  than  ni  for  some  m>1. 
Let  gi,  g2  be  guards  with  length  less  than  m. 
If  g  has  the  form  ig,  then  s  ý=pj  g  4*  s  K-pi  gi  <*  a(s)  V=p,,,  (i)  a(gj)  (by 
inductive  hypothesis)  -ý*  a(s)  ý=p4y)  !  a(gi)  <*  a(s)  a(g).  If  g  has  the  form 
(gl)  the  result  follows  similarly. 
If  g  has  the  form  gi  &&  g2  then  s  ý=pj  g  <*  s  1--pi  gi  and  s  Pp,  i  g2,4* 
a(s)  ý=p,,  (j)  a(gj)  and  a(s)  ý=p,,,  (j)  a(g2)  (by  inductive  hypothesis)  <*  tt(s)  ý=p,,,  (j) 
4(91)  &&  a(92)  't*  it(S)  ý=p, 
cqj)  a(g).  If  g  has  the  form  g,  g2  the  result  follows 
similarly.  M 
The  proof  of  Lemma  2  uses  the  following  sub-lemma: 
Lemma  20  Let  u  be  an  update  of  P,  aE  Aut(SCD  (P))  and  sa  state  such  that 
exec,,  j  (s,  u)  is  well-defined.  Then  execp,,,  (j)  (a  (s),  a  (u))  =a  (execpj  (s,  u)). 
Proof  If  u  is  skip  the  result  is  immediate. 
Suppose  u  has  the  form  x=e,  and  let  var(x)  be  defined  as  in  Figure  6.7. 
Define  a  (var(x))  =x  if  var(x)  =  x,  and  a  (var(x))  =  p[a(i)].  x  if  var(x)  =  p[i].  x. B.  2:  PROOFS  OMITTED  FROM  CHAPTER  7  243 
If  x:  int  then  suppose  (var(x)  =  a)  E  s.  Then  &((var(x)  =  a))  =  (var(x)  = 
a)  E  a(s)  also.  Suppose  evalpi(s,  e)  =  b.  Then  eva1p,  (i)(a(s),  Ci(e))  =  bbyLemma  18. 
We  have  a((var(x)  =  b))  =  (var(x)  =  b),  and  so 
execp,  et(j)(a(s), 
'x  =  tt(e))  =  (it  (s)  \{  (var  (x)  =  a)  })  UI  (var  (X)  =  b)  } 
=  a((s\f(var(x)=a)})Ul(var(x)=b)}) 
=  a(execpi(s,  'x  =  e). 
If  x:  pid,  then  suppose  (var(x)  =  a)  E  s.  Then  a((x  =  a))  =  (a(var(x))  = 
tt(a))  E  a(s)  also.  Suppose  evalp,  i(s,  e)  =  b.  Then  eva1p,,,  (j)(tt(s),  a(e))  =  a(b)  by 
Lemma  19.  We  have  a  ((var  (x)  =  b))  =  (a  (var  (x))  =  cz  (b)),  and  so 
execp,,,  (i)(ci(s),  'x  =  it(e)')  =  (a(s)  \  f(a(var(x))  =  a(affl) 
f(a(var(x))  =  a(b))} 
it  ((s  \f  (var(x)  =  affl  Uf  (var(x) 
a(execp,  i(s,  'x  =  e). 
The  argument  is  similar  if  x:  chan  IT). 
Suppose  u  has  the  form  xI  el,  e2,  ek,  and  suppose  x  is  a  static  chan- 
nel  name,  with  x:  chaitjTj,  T2,...,  Tk}  so  that  ej  :  Tj  (1  <j  :5  k).  Suppose 
(x  =  [a,,  d2,.  -  -, 
4,1)  Es  for  some  m<  cap(x).  Then  a  ((x  =  [tTI,  42,...,  41))  = 
(a(x)  [dj',  d2,...,  dm*])  E  a(s).  For  1<j  :5k,  let  bi  denote  evalpi(s,  ej),  and 
let  dj  by  if  Tj  =  bit,  and  dj  =  a(bj)  otherwise.  Using  Lemmas  18  and  19,  we 
have  dj  =  evaIp,,,  (j)(a(s),  a(ej)).  Thus  (dj,  d21.  -.,  dk)  =  (bl,  b2,  -,., 
bk)a  (using  the 
notationof  Section  7.2.2).  Then  execp,.  (j)(a(s),  'a(x)  !  ci(ej),  a(e2),...,  a(ek)')  = 
lr2,  ---, 
d.  *al)  })  U  (a(s)  \  1('t(x)  =  Pla  a2 
(it  (x)  =  [a  I  e,  d2*', 
..., 
(di,  d2/ 
--., 
dk) 
d,  eil)})  U  (tý  (S)  \1  (04  W  tr?,  ...  Im 
tý((S  \I  (X  = 
I  (x  =  [iTl,  a-2,  (bi,  b2,. 
.  ., 
bk) 
=  &(execp,  j(s,  lxlej,  e2,...,  ekl)). 
If  x  is  a  local  variable  of  p  then  suppose  (x  =  C)  E  s,  where  c  is  a  static  chan- 
nel  name.  Therefore  (x  =  a(c))  E  a(s),  and  execP,,  (0(a(s),  'x!  a(el),  a(e2),...,  a(e0l) 
execp,  &(i)(a(s),  'tt(c)!  a(el),  it(e2)1...,  a(ek)')  &(execPXs,  'clej,  e2j,...,  ek))  (bY 
the  above  argument)  =  a(execpj(s,  'x  lei,  e2,...,  el)) 
Suppose  u  has  the  form  X?  Xl,  X2....  Xk,  and  suppose  x  is  a  static  chan- 
nel  name,  with  x:  cluzn  f  T1,  T2,. 
.  ., 
Tk}  so  that  xj  :  Tj  (1  <j:!  ý  k).  Suppose B.  2:  PROOFS  OMUTED  FROM  CHAPTER  7  244 
(x  =  [(al,  l,  al,  2,...,  alk),  X2.,. 
--I 
dn*,  ])  Es  for  some  m<  cap(x),  and  (var(xj) 
bj)  Es  (1  <j  :  ý,  k).  Define  dij  =  aij  if  Tj  =  ffit,  a,  nd  dij  LX(alj)  otherwise 
(1  <j  :5  k).  Then  (dj,  j, 
dl,  2,.  dik)  =  (al,  j,  al,  2,  ...  I  alk)l  (using  the  notation  of 
Section  7.2.2),  and  a((var(xj)  alj))  =  (oz(var(xj)  =  d1j)  (1  <j:!  ý  k).  Similarly, 
define  dj  =  by  if  xj  :  bit,  and  dj  =  a(bj)  otherwise.  Then  a((var(xj)  =  bj))  = 
(a(var(xj))  dj).  We  have  a((x  ==  (a(x)  = 
E  a(s),  and  a((var(xj)  =  bj))  =  (a(var(xj))  = 
dj)  E  a(s)  (1  j  :5  k).  Then  execp,  &(i)(ty(S)t'a(X)?  Xl,  X21...,  x  1)  =  k 
=  (ci(s)  \  f(it(x)  = 
(a(var(xl))  =  dl),  (a(Var(X2))  =  d2)i 
...  , 
(it(var(Xk))  =  dk)})  U 
f(a(x)  =  [d2',...,  (a(var(xl))  =  dl,  l),  (tt(var(X2))  =  dl,  2), 
..., 
(a(var(Xk))  "  dlk)} 
=  (a(s)  \  J(ci(x)  =  [(al,  l,  al,  2  a  lk)',  d2,. 
a((var(xi)  =  bl)),  a((var(X2)  =  b2)),.....  a((var(Xk)  =  bk))})  U 
f(ci(x)  ==  aj,  j)),  ix((var(X2)  =  al,  2)), 
...,  it((var(Xk)  =  alk))} 
=a  ((s  \f  (x  =  [(al,  l,  al,  2,...,  alk), 
(var(xl)  =  bl),  (var(X2) 
= 
b2), 
..., 
(var(Xk) 
= 
bk)})  U 
J(x  =  [d2*,...,  (var(xi)  =  a,,,  ),  (var(X2) 
=  al,  2),..., 
(var(Xk) 
=  alk)}) 
ci  (execp,  i  (s,  1  X?  XloX21  I 
If  x  is  a  local  variable  of  p  then  suppose  (x  =  C)  E  s,  where  c  is  a  static 
I  channel  name.  Therefore  (x  =  a(c))  E  a(s),  and  execpa(j)(a(s)j'X?  X1iX2,,  Xk) 
execp,  a(j)(a(s)o'1t(C)?  X1,  X2.  ...  oXki)  =  a(execpi(s/  C?  Xlt  XL  -  Xk))  (by  the  above  ar- 
gument)  =  &(execpj(s,  'X?  X1,  X21  ...  OXkM-  M 
Proof  of  Lemma  2  As  defined  on  page  121,  execp,,,  (i)(it(s),  L%(Ul);  t%(U2);  ...  ;  It  (Uk)) 
=  execp,,,  (i)  ( 
...  execP,  a(i)(execpA(j) 
(tt  (s),  a  (Ul))# 
ly 
(U2)) 
...  i  it  (Uk)) 
=  execp,,  %(i) 
( 
...  execp,,  (i)  (it  (execpi  (s,  u  1)), 
&  (U2)) 
...  I  Ci  (Uk)) 
(by  Lemma  20) 
execp,,  (i)  ( 
...  a(execpj(execpj(s..  Ul)#  U2))  ...  itt(Uk)) 
(by  Lemma  20) 
a  (execp,  i  (...  execp,  i(execpi(s.  U1).,  U2)  ---.  -  Uk)) 
(by  repeated  application  of  Lemma  20) 
u(execpj(sUI;  U2;  ...  ;  uk))-  M B.  3:  PROOFS  OMITTED  FROM  CHAPTER  9  245 
B.  3  Proofs  of  Lemmas  8-  10  (Section  9.3.2) 
Proof  of  Lemma  8  Let  01  be  the  set  of  orbits  of  Hi,  for  iE  11,2}.  Clearly  any  xE 
moved(G)  belongs  to  moved(Hi)  or  moved(H2),  and  moved(Hi)  =  UOj.  In  addition, 
moved  (Hj)  n  moved  (H2)  =  0,  so  101,02}  is  a  partition  of  0.  For  iE  11,2},  every 
xE  moved(Hi)  must  belong  to  a  non-trivial  orbit  of  Hi,  thus  moved(Hi)  9  UOj.  But 
clearly  if  x  belongs  to  a  non-trivial  orbit  of  Hi,  i.  e.  xE  Oi,  then  xE  moved(Hi),  so 
moved(Hi)  =  UOi.  Let  a=  C402  E  G,  where  ai  (=-  Hi  (i  E  11,2}).  Then  ft",  OMd(H,  ) 
aj,  so  Gmotvd(Hi)  C  Hi.  Clearly  Hi  9  G""'d(H,  ) 
=  GOi.  The  result  follows.  0 
Proof  of  Lemma  9  Since  U01  and  U02  are  disjoint,  we  have  moved(GOI)  n 
moved(G02)  =  0.  Let  Cz  E  G.  Then  a  can  be  written  as  a  product  of  disjoint,  mu- 
tually  commutative  permutations,  each  acting  on  a  distinct  orbit  of  G.  Therefore 
C4  =  C41  L12,  where  iti  acts  on  the  orbits  of  Oi,  i.  e.  ai  E  GOi  for  iE  11,2}.  We  have 
shown  that  G=  GC71  GO2.  The  result  follows  0 
Proof  of  Lemma  10  Suppose,  without  loss  of  generality,  that  f1i  E  01.  If  Qi  V-  01 
then  we  must  have  Qj  E  02.  Since  f1i  and  nj  are  dependent,  stab*  ([1j)r4  C:  G4,  so  G 
there  exists  aEG  such  that  ani  0  id,  ani  34  id,  and  arl,  V-  (stabý(nj))R. 
The  permutation  a  can  be  expressed  in  as  a  product  aiAlajA2,  where  ai  only 
acts  on  fli,  Al  acts  on  01  \  jnj},  aj  only  acts  on  r1j,  and  02  acts  on  02  \  Inj}.  Now 
G  GO,  *  G02,  so  every  element  -r  of  G  can  be  expressed  uniquely  as  a  product 
'Y  7172  where  71  E  GO',  72  E  GO2,  and  lyl,  -r2  E  G.  For  the  element  a,  we  have 
71  aip,  and  'Y2  "  &jA2-  It  follows  that  &jP2  E  G.  Therefore  (aiA1ajP2)  (ajP2)  -1  E 
G,  i.  e.  aiplajA2P2  -1  EG  (using  the  inverse  rule),  i.  e.  aip,  =  6,  say,  belongs  to  G.  -1aj 
Clearly  6n,  =  &'Oi,  but  JE  stab*  (nj).  It  follows  that  an,  E  stab*G(ni)R.  This  is  a  G 
contradiction.  It  follows  that  f1j  E  01.0 Appendix  C 
SymmExtractor  and 
TopSPIN 
In  Appendix  C.  1  we  survey  the  features  of  Promela  which  are  not  part  of  Promela- 
Lite,  discussing  whether  or  not  they  are  supported  by  SymmExtractor.  We  provide 
a  brief  guide  to  the  installation  and  use  of  TopSPIN  (which  incorporates  Symm- 
Extractor)  in  Appendix  C.  2.  In  Appendix  C.  2.3  we  present  a  set  of  modelling  guide- 
lines  to  aid  the  construction  of  Promela  specifications  for  use  with  SymmExtractor 
and  TopSPIN.  These  guidelines  are  based  on  findings  of  the  user  study  of  Sec- 
tion  8.5. 
CA  Promela  vs.  Promela-Lite  in  the  Context  of  SymmExtractor 
Promela  features  which  are  not  part  of  Promela-Lite  but  are  supported  by  Symm- 
Extractor  are  discussed  in  Appendix  C.  M.  In  Appendix  C.  1.2  we  discuss  features 
of  Promela  which  are  not  currently  supported  by  SymmExtractor  but  could  be  han- 
dled  relatively  easily.  In  Appendix  C.  1.3  we  list  Promela  features  which  cannot  be 
handled  by  simple  extensions  to  the  theory  of  Chapter  7,  and  would  require  addi- 
tional  research  effort  to  be  supported  by  our  implementation. 
CIA  Supported  omissions 
All  of  the  Promela  features  discussed  in  the  following  categories  are  supported  by 
SymmExtractor  despite  not  being  part  of  Promela-Lite.  In  most  cases  it  is  obvious 
that  the  teclu-dques  presented  in  Chapters  6  and  7  could  be  extended  in  a  trivial  (if 
laborious)  manner  to  handle  the  features.  We  provide  a  brief  justification  for  cer- 
tain  more  complex  cases  and  note  some  features  which  are  supported  by  Symm- 
Extractor  but  not  TopSPIN. 
Types  and  variables 
SymmExtractor  supports  the  following  Promela/non-Promela-Lite  features  which 
relate  to  types  and  variables: 
*  Primitive  data  types  bit,  bool,  mtype,  byte  and  short 
o  Arrays  indexed  using  the  byte  type CA:  PROMELA  VS.  PROMELA-LITE  247 
"  User-defined  record  types 
"  Boolean  literals  true  and  f  alse 
"  Local  variables  (in  addition  to  parameters) 
"  The  built-in  '_'  variable  for  the  receipt  of  'don't  care'  (scratch)  message 
fields. 
Arrays  which  are  indexed  using  the  pid  data  type  are  also  supported.  These 
are  slightly  more  complex:  a  static  channel  diagram  automorphism  acting  on  a  state 
of  a  specification  should  permute  the  positions  of  elements  of  a  pid-indexed  array 
in  the  obvious  way.  Also,  an  expression  of  the  form  A  [d]  in  a  specification  P,  where 
A  is  a  pid-indexed  array  and  da  literal  pid  value,  should  be  replaced  with  the  ex- 
pression  A[a(d))  in  a(P),  where  it  E  Aut(SCD(P)).  'It  is  clear  that  the  results  of 
Chapter  7  could  be  extended  to  handle  arrays  with  pid  index  type.  As  discussed  in 
Section  8.1.1,  an  array  should  be  indexed  using  either  byte  or  pid,  but  not  both. 
Promela  allows  the  declaration  of  synchronous  channels,  which  are  not  part 
of  Promela-Lite.  Formally  extending  the  Promela-Lite  semantics  and  the  results  of 
Chapter  7  to  take  into  account  synchronous  channels  would  be  straightforward, 
but  laborious.  They  are  supported  by  SymmExtractor. 
Control  structures  and  expressions 
SymmExtractor  supports  the  full  range  of  Promela  control  structures,  together  with 
some  forms  of  expression  which  are  not  included  in  Promela-Lite: 
"  Separation  of  statements  using  ;  or  -> 
"  Conditional  if  fi  constructs 
"  Nested  do.  .  od  constructs  (Promela-Lite  specifications  include  a  single, 
mandatory,  top-level  do.  .  od  construct) 
Label  definitions,  and  statements  of  the  form  goto  (label) 
"  break,  else,  unless,  provided  and  timeout 
"  Condition  expressions  of  the  form  ((boolean-expr)  ->  (expr)  (expr 
"  Expressions  as  statements 
"  Receive  poll  expressions. 
A  Promela  specification  which  uses  these  language  features  can  be  trans- 
lated  into  a  less  elegant  but  equivalent  Promela-Lite  specification,  via  the  introduc- 
tion  of  an  explicit  program  counter  variable.  ,t,  -I 
To  manage  the  complexity  of  a  specification,  Promela  allows  the  inclusion 
of  inline  macros,  similar  to  procedures  in  an  imperative  language.  Macro  invoca- 
tions  are  expanded  by  SPIN  using  textual  replacement  before  verification.  Symm- 
Extractor  deals  with  inline  macros  similarly. 
Promela-Lite  includes  the  atomic  keyword,  but  the  type  system  of  Sec- 
tion  6.2  ensures  that  the  statements  within  an  atomic  statement  cannot  block.  In 
Promela  it  is  possible,  and  permissible,  for  blocking  to  occur  within  an  atomic CA:  PROMELA  VS.  PROMELA-LUE  248 
sequence.  The  semantics  for  this  are  rather  complex,  but  are  clearly  orthogonal  to 
symmetry-related  issues.  Therefore,  unrestricted  atomic  blocks  are  supported  by 
SymmExtractor. 
Handling  d_step  blocks  is  more  complex.  Recall  from  Section  2.4.1  that 
a  d_step  block  must  not  involve  non-determinism.  This  cannot  be  statically 
checked,  so  the  verifier  generated  by  SPIN  for  a  given  specification  checks  for  non- 
determinism  within  d_step  blocks  during  search.  If  non-deterministic  choice  is 
possible  in  a  d_step  block  then  the  first  executable  choice  is  taken  by  the  verifier, 
and  a  warning  generated.  This  means  that  options  to  if  ..  fi  and  do.  .  od  state- 
ments  are  not,  in  general,  commutative  within  a  d_step  block.  For  this  reason, 
when  checking  whether  P  =-  a(P)  as  described  in  Section  8.3.2,  SymmExtractor 
does  not  sort  the  options  of  if  fi  and  do.  .  od  statements  which  occur  within 
d_stepblocks. 
I 
Opera  tors 
The  following  Promela  operators  are  not  part  of  Promela-Lite,  but  are  supported 
by  SymmExtractor: 
empty  and  f  ul  1 
"  Non-destructive  channel  read  operator 
"  Bitwise,  modulo  and  division  operators 
"  eval  operator  (and  receipt  of  messages  corresponding  to  literal  values). 
Simulation  features 
The  Promela.  keywords  printf,  STDIN,  show  and  priority  can  be  used  to  aid 
simulation  of  a  specification,  but  have  no  effect  on  verification.  SymmExtractor  ig- 
nores  the  use  of  these  keywords  in  a  Promela  specification.  ' 
Reasoning  mechanisms 
SymmExtractor  supports  property  specification  using  assert  statements,  never 
claims,  accept/progress  labels,  and  trace/notrace  constructs  (see  [921  for  de- 
tails  of  these). 
Since  never  claims  and  trace/notrace  constructs  are  Promela  processes  they 
can  be  handled  by  the  existing  theory  of  Chapter  7.  Furthermore,  a  group  of  valid 
static  channel  diagram  automorphisms  is,  by  default,  an  invariance  group  for  the 
property  represented  by  a  never  claim  or  trace/notrace  construct  (see  Section  11.4). 
Note  that  the  TopSPIN  symmetry  reduction  package  is  currently  limited  to 
the  verification  of  simple  safety  properties  expressed  via  assertions,  as  discussed 
in  Section  11.4.  It  does  not  support  never  claims,  accept/progress  labels  or 
trace/notrace  constructs. cl:  rROMELA  vs.  rROMELA-LITE  249 
Miscellaneous 
Unlike  Promela,  Promela-Lite  does  not  include  syntax  for  comments.  Symm- 
Extractor  allows  specification  to  include  Promela  style  comments,  which  obviously 
has  no  effect  on  symmetry. 
The  hidden  keyword  can  be  used  to  tell  SPIN  to  exclude  a  global  variable 
from  the  state-vector  (see  Section  2.4.1).  The  value  of  a  hidden  variable  x  at  a  given 
state  s  during  search  depends  only  on  the  previously  visited  state,  not  on  the  state 
s  itself.  Thus,  in  general,  no  assumptions  can  be  made  about  the  value  of  x  at  s, 
unless  x  is  known  to  be  a  constant,  and  hidden  variables  are  intended  to  be  used  as 
"'scratch"  variables  witl-dn  atomic  statements  [921.  SymmExtractor  supports  use  of 
the  hidden  keyword  (by  ignoring  its  occurrence)  and,  like  SPIN,  places  the  respon- 
sibility  of  its  correct  usage  on  the  user. 
A  global  variable  can  be  prefixed  with  the  local  keyword  to  tell  the  SPIN 
partial-order  reduction  algorithm  that  the  variable  is  accessed  by  a  single  process 
as  if  it  were  local  to  that  process.  Since  this  keyword  has  no  relation  to  symmetry  it 
is  allowed,  and  ignored,  by  SymmExtractor.  II 
Promela  includes  keywords  xr  and  xs,  which  stand  for  exclusive  receive  and 
exclusive  setid  respectively.  A  process  can  include  a  declaration  xr  (tiame),  where 
(tiame)  is  the  name  of  a  previously  declared  channel,  to  indicate  that  only  this 
process  can  receive  messages  on  the  channel.  The  xs  keyword  is  used  similarly. 
Providing  SPIN  with  this  information  can  lead  to  more  efficient  partial-order  reduc- 
tion.  It  is  not  possible  to  check,  statically,  whether  xs  and  xr  are  used  correctly, 
but  incorrect  uses  are  flagged  by  SPIN  during  verification.  These  keywords  do  not 
affect  the  presence  of  symmetry  in  the  model  associated  with  a  specification,  so  are 
supported  by  SymmExtractor.  However,  there  is  a  problem  with  exploiting  xs  /xr 
information  in  conjunction  with  symmetry  reduction.  Let  P  be  a  Promela  specifi- 
cation  with  associated  model  M,  and  ca  channel  in  P.  Suppose  c  is  marked  xs  by 
process  1,  and  there  is  some  valid  aE  Au  t  (SCD  (P))  with  a  (1)  =2  and  a  (c)  =  c. 
Assume  that  there  is  exactly  one  transition  (s,  t)  in  M,  which  involves  process  1 
sending  on  c.  Then  the  transition  (a  (s),  a  (t))  involves  process  2  sending  on  c,  vio- 
lating  the  xs  assertion  on  c.  Clearly  this  is  the  only  such  transition.  When  model 
checking  without  symmetry  reduction,  both  (s,  t)  and  (it  (s),  a  (t))  win  be  consid- 
ered,  and  the  xs  violation  detected.  However,  with  symmetry  reduction  only  one  of 
these  pairs  of  transition  will  be  considered,  so  this  violation  of  the  xs  assertion  will 
not  be  detected.  An  analogous  argument  can  be  given  for  xr.  Therefore  TopSPIN 
should  not  strictly  be  applied  to  specifications  which  use  xs  and  xr  assertions. 
C1.2  Omissions  which  could  be  supported 
Our  implementation  requires  Promela  processes  to  be  instantiated  Using  run  state- 
ments  within  an  init  process.  However,  Promela  also  allows  multiple  copies  of CA:  PROMELA  VS.  PROMELA-LITE  250 
a  given  proctype  to  be  instantiated  by  prefixing  the  proctype  keyword  with 
active  [k],  where  k>0  is  the  number  of  processes  of  the  proctype  to  be  in- 
stantiated.  Use  of  this  keyword  changes  the  way  in  which  run-time  process  iden- 
tifiers  are  assigned  by  SPIN,  thus  changes  the  way  a  static  channel  diagram  is  con- 
structed.  With  some  effort,  our  implementation  could  be  modified  to  accommodate 
this  method  of  instantiating  processes. 
Promela  supports  an  unsigned  numeric  type.  A  declaration  of  the  form 
unsigned  x:  y  declares  an  integer  variable  x  which  takes  non-negative  values 
which  can  be  represented  using  y  bits.  Clearli  the  Use  of  this  data  type  will  have  no 
effect  on  our  symmetry  detection/reduction  techniques.  However,  SymmExtractor 
is  integrated  with  an  enhanced  Promela  type  checker  (see  Section  8.2),  which  does 
not  currently  support  the  unsigned  data  type.  A  temporary  fix  for  this  omission  is 
to  replace  each  occurrence  of  the  unsigned  keyýword  with  one  of  the  other  numeric 
types  during  symmetry  detection. 
Though  not  strictly  part  of  the  Promela  language,  SPIN  supports  Promela 
specifications  which  include  C-style  #def  ine  macros.  SyTmExtractor  could  easily 
be  extended  to  handle  tl-ds  kind  of  macro  by  applying  the  C  pre-processor  to  a 
specification  before  parsing. 
SymmExtractor  does  not  allow  channel  InItialisers  to  be  associated  with 
channels  which  are  declared  locally  to  a  proctype.  This  is  to  simplify  the  identifica- 
tion  of  channels  for  inclusion  in  the  static  channel  diagram.  In  a  specification  where 
processes  are  created  dynamically,  local  channel  initialisers  result  in  dynamic  in- 
stantiation  of  channels,  which  does  not  fit  comfortably  with  the  static  channel  dia- 
gram  concept.  However,  since  SymmExtractor  requires  a  fixed  number  of  running 
processes,  it  would  be  possible  to  extend  SymmExtractor  to  allow  locally  initialised 
channels. 
For  simplicity,  SymmExtractor  does  not  currently  support  arrays  of  chan- 
nels.  Further  implementation  work  could  remove  this  restriction. 
C.  1.3  Omissions  which  cannot  currently  be  supported 
As  noted  above,  it  is hard  to  see  how  a  specification  where  processes  are  created  dy- 
namically  fits  in  with  the  static  cliatinel  diagram  concept  on  which  SymmExtractor  is 
based.  This  is  not  to  say  that  specifications  with  dynamic  process  creation  do  not  ex- 
hibit  symmetry:  indeed,  SPIN-to-GRAPE  can  be  used  to  check  that  the  "Agents  and 
Servers"  specification  of  [921,  which  involves  dynamic  process  creation,  exhibits 
a  non-trivial  automorphism  group.  Extending  our  techniques  to  identify  symme- 
try  with  a  dynamically  changing  pool  of  processes  will  require  further  theoretical 
work,  perhaps  building  on  techniques  for  this  problem  developed  for  the  dSPIN 
model  checker  [99]  (see  Section  3.9.4).  For  the  time  being,  specifications  which  in- 
volve  dynamic  process  creation  can  be  re-modelled  using  the  approach  described 
in  Appendix  C.  2.3. C.  2:  TopSPIN  INSTALLATION  AND  USER  GUIDE  251 
Package  URL  Version 
Java  runtime  environment  http:  //java.  sun.  com/  1.5.006 
JUnit  library  (j  unit.  jar)  http:  //junit.  org/  3.8.1 
GAP  System  http:  //gap-system.  org/  4.4.6 
SPIN  model  checker  http:  //spinroot.  com/  4.2.6 
GNU  C  Compiler  (gcc)  -T  http:  //gcc.  gnu.  org/ 
Figure  CA:  TopSPIN  prerequisites. 
Promela  provides  alternative  channel  operators'!  !'  (sorted  send)  and  '?  V 
(random  receive).  Sending  data  on  a  buffered  channel  using'  I  !  'causes  messages  to 
be  queued  on  the  channel  in  sorted  order.  Messages  can  be  retrieved  from  the  buffer 
hi  a  random  order  using  '?  V.  These  operators  provide  a  useful  alternative  to  FIFO 
channel  semantics.  They  also  aid  state-space  reduction:  storing  channel  contents  in 
a  sorted  manner  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of  state  canonicalisation.  However,  storing 
pid  messages  in  a  sorted  queue  imposes  an  ordering  on  the  set  lit(pid).  It  is  not 
immediately  clear  whether  this  ordering  has  an  effect  on  symmetry,  so  for  the  time 
being  SymmExtractor  does  not  support  the  'I  !'  and  '?  V  operators. 
Recent  versions  Of  SPIN  allow  C  code  to  be  embedded  in  a  Promela  specifi- 
cation,  and  certain  variables  from  the  C  part  of  the  specification  to  be  included  in 
the  SPIN  state-vector.  Automatic  symmetry  detection  for  this  mix  of  C  and  Promela 
is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  but  is  certainly  an  interesting  area  for  further 
research. 
C.  2  TbpSPIN  Installation  and  User  Guide 
We  provide  instructions  on  how  to  obtain  and  configure  TopSPIN,  together  with 
details  of  the  third-party  packages  required  by  the  tool,  in  Appendix  C.  2.1.  In  Ap- 
pendix  C.  2.2  we  provide  a  brief  guide  to  the  use  of  TopSPIN.  Some  modelling  guide- 
lines  are  given  in  Appendix  C.  2.3. 
C.  2.1  Installing  and  configuring  Top  SPIN 
Prerequisites 
TopSPIN  is  written  in  Java  and  GAP,  interfaces  with  the  GAP  and  SPIN  packages,  and 
produces  C  code  which  must  then  be  compiled.  The  Java  implementation  requires 
the  JUnit  library.  Figure  CA  summarises  the  packages  which  must  be  installed  be- 
fore  TopSPIN  can  be  used,  providing  URLs  for  each.  The  version  of  each  package 
wl-dch  we  have  used  for  development  of  TbpSPIN  is  also  given. 
In  addition,  TopSPIN  uses  a  prototype  extension  of  saucy  which  has  been 
extended  to  handle  directed  graphs.  TI-ds  functionality  will  eventually  be  available C.  2:  ToPSPIN  INSTALLATION  AND  USER  GUIDE  252 
from  the  saucy  website  [1601.  For  the  time  being,  a  source  distribution  of  saucy  with 
the  required  extended  functionality  is  provided  with  TopSPIN-1 
Downloading  the  software 
The  TopSPIN  release  distribution  is  available  online  as  an  archive  from  the  Software 
page  at  the  following  URL: 
http:  //www.  dcs.  gla.  ac.  uk/people/personal/ally/thesis/ 
The  files  are  compressed  using  the  Linux  utilities  gzip  and  tar,  and  should 
be  extracted  using  standard  tools.  After  extraction,  move  the  TopSPIN  folder 
and  its  contents  to  a  suitable  location  (e.  g.  C:  \Program  Files\TopSPIN  under 
Windows),  and  navigate  to  this  folder.  TI-te  folder  should  contain  TopS  PIN.  j  ar, 
together  with  the  sub-folders  lib,  saucy,  Common  and  TempFiles.  Copy  the 
junit.  j  ar  file  into  the  lib  folder. 
Setting  up  a  GAP  workspace 
In  order  to  start  GAP  efficiently,  TbpSPIN  requires  a  GAP  workspace  to  be  set  up.  Full 
details  of  GAP  workspaces  are  available  online  [63].  Essentially,  a  workspace  is  an 
image  of  a  GAP  session  with  a  selection  of  libraries  and  files  already  loaded  and 
ready  to  be  executed.  In  our  case,  the  workspace  consists  of  the  GAP  files  used  for 
automatic  symmetry  detection  and  classification. 
Navigate  into  the  Common  folder.  Start  GAP  and  type: 
Read("WorkspaceGenerator.  gap'l); 
foUowed  by: 
SaveWorkspace(Ilgapworkspacell); 
Ensure  that  these  commands  are  typed  exactly  as  shown.  Entering  the  second  com- 
mand  should  result  in  true  being  printed  to  the  console.  Exit  GAP  by  typing  quit; 
(ensuring  that  the  semi-colon  is  included  in  this  command). 
Compiling  saucy 
Navigate  into  the  saucy  folder,  and  type  make.  Assuming  that  gcc  is  correctly 
installed,  this  is  all  that  should  be  required  to  compile  the  saucy  program. 
Setting  up  a  configuration  file 
TbpSPIN  uses  a  textual  configuration  file,  corif  ig.  txt  to  locate  GAP,  saucy,  var- 
ious  common  files  and  a  folder  for  temporary  files,  during  execution.  Symmetry 
detection  and  reduction  options  are  also  specified  in  tl-ds  file. 
The  structure  of  corif  ig.  txt  is  summarised  in  Figure  C.  2.  Example  con- 
figuration  files  for  Windows  and  Linux  systems  are  given  in  Figures  C.  3  and  CA 
1.  Permission  for  including  the  saucy  distribution  with  TopSPIN  has  been  granted  by  Paul  Darga, 
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Line  Description  Default 
gap  path  to  GAP  n/a 
saucy  path  to  saucy  n/a 
tempfiles  path  to  TopSPINTempFiles  folder  n/a 
common  path  to  TopSPIN  Common  folder  n/a 
timebound  bound,  in  seconds,  for  largest 
valid  subgroup  computation 
no  bound 
conjugates  number  of  random  conjugates  to  be  used  0 
transpositions  boolean  indicating  whether  permutations 
should  be  applied  as  transpositions 
true 
stabiliserchain  boolean  indicating  whether  to  use  a 
stabiliser  chain  for  enumeration 
true 
strategy  symmetry  reduction  strategy  fast 
symmetryfile  path  to  file  containing 
s  mmetry  group  generators 
n/a 
Figure  C.  2:  Structure  of  a  TbpSPIN  configuration  file. 
gap=C:  \gap4r4\bin\gap.  bat 
saucymC:  \Documents  and  Settings\Ally  D\TopSPIN\saucy\saucy.  exe 
tempfiles-C:  \Documents  and  Settings\Ally  D\TopSPIN\TempFiles\ 
common=C:  \Documents  and  Settings\Ally  D\TopSPIN\Common\ 
timebound=0 
conjugates.  0 
transpositions-true 
stabiliserchain=true 
strategy-fast 
Figure  C.  3:  A  TbpSPIN  configuration  file  for  Windows. 
respectively.  Users  should  create  their  own  configuration  file  based  on  their  spe- 
cific  setup  and  symmetry  reduction  needs.  The  configuration  options  related  to 
symmetry  detection  and  reduction  are  described  in  Appendix  C-2-2. 
C.  2.2  Using  SymmExtractor  and  TopSPIN 
The  TopSPIN  jar  file  can  be  executed  to:  typecheck  a  specification  to  see  if  it  is  suit- 
able  for  symmetry  reduction;  detect  symmetries  of  a  specification  (i.  e.  run  Symm- 
Extractor),  or  add  symmetry  reduction  algorithms  to  the  C  code  generated  by  SPIN 
for  a  given  specification.  Note  that  in  all  cases  the  conf  ig.  txt  file  must  be  in 
the  current  directory.  We  use  TOPSPINPATH  to  denote  the  TopSPIN  folder  (e.  g. 
C:  \Program  Files\TopSPIN)  and  SPECIFICATION  the  Promela  specification 
to  which  TopSPIN  is  being  applied  (e.  g.  loadbalancer.  p). 
Typechecking  a  specification 
To  typecheck  a  spedfication,  type: 
java  -jar  TOPSPINPATH/TopSPIN.  jar  check  SPECIFICATION 
Detecting  symmetry 
To  apply  SymmExtractor  to  find  symmetries  associated  with  a  specification,  type: C.  2:  TopSPIN  INSTALLATION  AND  USER  GUIDE  254 
gap.  /users/grad/ally/Scripte/gap 
saucy-/usere/grad/ally/TopSPIN/Baucy/saucy 
ternpfiles-/usere/grad/ally/TopSPIN/TempFiles/, 
common.  /users/grad/ally/TopSPIN/Common/ 
timebound-10 
conjugates-4 
transpositions-true 
stabiliserchain-true 
strategy-enumerate 
Figure  CA:  A  TbpSPIN  configuration  file  for  Linux. 
java  -jar  TOPSPINPATH/TopSPIN.  jar  detect  SPECIFICATION 
For  certain  specifications,  the  search  for  the  largest  valid  subgroup  of  symmetries 
for  a  given  specification  may  be  time-consuming.  A  bound  of  x  seconds  for  this 
search  can  be  specified  by  adding  the  line: 
timeboundmx 
to  conf  ig.  txt.  If  no  bound  is  required  then  add  the  line  timebound=  0  to  the  file. 
To  specify  that  x  ': 2!  0  random  conjugates  should  be  used  for  symmetry  detection 
(see  Section  8.3.3),  add  the  line: 
conjugates-x 
Using  the  TopSPIN  strategies 
Assuming  that  a  specification  exhibits  a  non-trivial  group  of  static  channel  diagram 
automorphisms,  TopSPIN  can  be  used  to  generate  a  verifier  with  symmetry  reduc- 
tion  algorithms  by  typing: 
java  -jar  TOPSPINPATH/TopSPIN.  jar-SPECIFICATION 
All  being  well,  this  should  generate  files  called  sympan.  c  and  group.  o. 
The  sympan.  c  file  can  then  be  compiled  to  an  executable  using  gcc: 
gcc  -o  sympan  -DSAFETY  -DNOFAIR  syrnpan.  c  group.  o 
Other  SPIN  compile-time  options  can  be  included  as  usual:  the  -DSAPETY  and 
-DNOFAIR  options  are  merely  examples.  Except  when  the  segmented  strategy  is 
used,  verification  using  the  resulting  sympan  executable  is  performed  as  with  the 
pan  executable  produced  normally  using  SPIN.  The  special  case  of  the  segmented 
strategy  is  described  below. 
To  specify  which  of  the  enumeration,  localsearch,  fast  or  segmented  strate- 
gies  should  be  used,  adjust  the  strategy  line  of  conf  ig.  txt  accordingly.  The 
usetransposit  ions  and  uses  tabili  serchain  options  can  be  set  to  true  or 
false  depending  on  whether  efficient  application  of  transpositions  and  efficient  enu- 
meration  using  a  stabiliser  chain,  respectively,  is  desired. 
Symmetry  can  be  specified  manually  via  a  line  of  the  form: 
symmetryfile=FILENAME 
where  FILENAME  is  the  name  of  a  file  containing  generators  for  a  group  which 
acts  on  processes  identifiers  and  static  channel  names.  Examples  of  such  files  are 
available  online  (see  Section  1.2)  in  the  archive  of  files  used  for  experiments  with C.  2:  TopSPIN  INSTALLATION  AND  USER  GUIDE  255 
TopSPIN. 
If  the  segnicitted  strategy  is  selected  then  it  is  necessary  to  execute  sympan 
from  wiffiin  GAP.  To  do  this,  copy  the  sympan  executable  to  the  TopSPIN  Common 
directory;  navigate  to  this  directory;  start  GAP,  and  type: 
Read(I'Verify.  gap'l); 
followed  by: 
Verify(I'sympan"); 
C.  2.3  Modelling  guidelines 
The  user  study  of  Section  8.5  has  identified  some  common  specification  features 
which  can  render  a  model  asymmetric,  as  well  as  some  limitations  of  Symm- 
Extractor  wl-dch  require  further  research  and  implementation  work.  We  present 
some  modelling  guidelines  to  help  users  avoid  unnecessary  loss  of  symmetry,  and 
work  around  the  existing  limitations  of  SymmExtractor  and  TopSPIN. 
Avoiding  symmetzy  breaking  features 
TopSPIN  is  capable  of  exploiting  total  symmetries  associated  with  Promela,  specifi- 
cations.  For  the  tool  to  work  effectively  it  is important  to  ensure  that  symmetry  is 
not  destroyed  by  an  unnecessarily  asymmetric  specification  style. 
Ensure  that  processes  in  a  specification  are  started  simultaneously.  TopSPIN 
requires  that  all  run  statements  are  enclosed  in  an  atomic  block,  within  the 
init  process.  This  ensures  that  all  processes  are  instantiated  together.  Without  the 
atomic  block  the  processes  would  be  instantiated  in  afixed  order, 
I 
which  would 
destroy  any  symmetry  between  processes. 
Do  not  configure  processes  asymmetrically,  unless  faithful  modelling  de- 
pends  on  this.  For  example,  when  modelling  a  telephone  network  where  individual 
user  processes  transition  between  local  states  idle,  dial,  calling,  ringing  and  talk  (say), 
ensure  that  all  user  processes  start  in  the  same  local  state,  unless  there  is  a  good 
reason  for  doing  otherwise.  An  asymmetric  initial  configuration  may  significantly 
reduce  the  size  of  the  symmetry  group  associated  with  a.  specification,  leading  to 
less  effective  symmetry  reduction. 
Working  within  the  limits  of  the  tools 
. 
TopSPIN  and  SymmExtractor  aim  to  cope  with  as  much  of  the  Promela.  language  as 
possible.  However,  there  are  currently  various  features  of  the  language  which  are 
not  supported.  In  our  experience,  it  is  generally  possible  to  re-model  a  specifica- 
tion  so  that  it  falls  into  the  set  of  specifications  accepted  by  the  tools.  We  provide 
here  a  few  re-modclling  guidelines  regarding:  the  use  of  statement  separators;  dy- 
namic  process  creation,  and  the  use  of  built-in  process  identifiers  over  user-defined 
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proctype  Po  ( 
/*  body  */ 
proctype  00 
run  PO; 
Figure  C.  5:  Skeleton  Promela  specification  with  dynamic  process  creation. 
Due  to  limitations  with  the  automatic  parser  generator  used  in  the  devel- 
opment  of  TopSPIN,  the  tool  follows  strictly  the  use  of  statement  and  declaration 
separators  defined  in  the  Promela  grammar  [92].  The  grammar  states  that  sepa- 
rators  should  be  used  as  such,  rather  than  as  statement/declaration  terminators. 
SPIN  relaxes  this  restriction,  allowing  separators  to  be  used  optionally  as  termina- 
tors.  When  using  an  existing  Promela  specification  with  TbpSPIN  it  is  usual  to  have 
to  modify  the  way  in  which  semi-colons  are  used,  to  some  extent.  In  particular,  a 
semi-colon  must  follow  the  closing  brace  of  an  atomic  block  if  the  block  forms  part 
of  a  list  of  statements. 
Dynamic  process  creation  is  not  supported  by  TopSPIN.  If  a  specification  re- 
lies  on  dynamic  process  creation  then  it  may  be  possible  to  re-model  the  processes 
as  shown  in  Figures  C.  5  and  C.  6.  Figure  C.  5  shows  a  specification  which  instanti- 
ates  copies  of  proctype  P  dynamically.  Assuming  that  3  is  an  upper  bound  for  the 
number  of  instances  of  P  which  should  be  running  at  any  time,  Figure  C.  6  shows 
an  alternative  way  of  expressing  the  specification.  The  proctype  P  now  includes  a 
channel  parameter,  and  an  instance  of  P  waits  until  it  can  receive  on  this  channel 
before  executing  its  body.  Its  body  is  identical  to  the  original,  except  that  it  includes 
a  final  goto  statement  after  whdch  it  returns  to  its  initial  configuration.  2  The  init 
process  instantiates  three  copies  of  P,  each  with  a  distinct  synchronous  channel.  In- 
stead  of  instantiating  a  copy  of  P,  the  proctype  Q  now  offers  the  literal  value  1  to 
all  channels  on  which  instances  of  P  may  be  listening.  The  example  of  Figures  C.  5 
and  C.  6  can  be  adapted  to  handle  multiple  process  types,  with  any  fixed  upper 
bound  for  each  process  type. 
For  symmetry  to  be  detected,  it  is  important  for  proctypes  to  use  their  built- 
in 
_pid 
variable  rather  than  a  user-defined  process  identifier.  This  is  illustrated 
in  Figures  C.  7  and  C.  8.  Processes  in  Figure  C.  7  are  parameterised  by  a  byte  identi- 
fier,  which  they  use  to  index  the  st  array.  SymmExtractor  is  not  yet  sophisticated 
enough  to  work  out  the  correspondence  between  the  id  parameter  and  the  built-in 
identifier  for  each  process.  However,  the  specification  can  be  converted  into  a  form 
2.  This  goto  statement  should  really  be  part  of  anatomic  block  which  also  resets  any  local  variables 
of  the  proctype  to  their  initial  values. C2.  -  TOpSm.  4  INSTALLATION  AND  USER  GUIDE  257 
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which  SymmExtractor  can  handle,  as  shown  in  Figure  CA  The  disadvantage  here 
6  that  p"tion  0  of  the  array  at  6-  un-used,  meaning  that  an  array  of  size  three 
rather  than  two  Is  requimd,  increasing  the  state-vector  size  by  one  byte.  On  the 
other  hand,  eliminating  the  id  variables  reduces  the  state-vector  by  two  bytes,  so 
the  w-modelling  works  well  for  this  example. C.  2:  TopSPIN  INSTALLATION  AND  USER  GUIDE  258 
mtype  -  {N,  T,  C) 
mtype  st[2].  N 
proctype  user(byte  id) 
do 
d_step  stlidl==N  ->  st[id]=T 
dstep  st[idl==T  &&  st[O]I=C  &&  st[lll=C  ->  st[id]=C 
dstep  st[idl==C  ->  st(id]=N 
od 
init  ( 
atomic 
run  user(O); 
run  user(l); 
Figure  C.  7:  Promela  specification  which  uses  user-defined  process  identifiers. 
mtype  =  (N,  T,  C)  mtype  st[31=N; 
proctype  usero 
do 
dstep  E3t[_pidl==N  ->  st[_pid]=T 
dj3tep  st[_pidl==T  &&  st[ll!  =C  &&  st[21!  =C  ->  st[_pid]=C 
dstep  st[_pid]-=C  ->  st[_pid]=N 
od 
init  I 
atomic 
run  usero; 
run  usero; 
Figure  C.  8:  Re-modelled  specification  which  uses  the 
_pid  variable. Appendix  D 
Ethics  Consent  Form  and  Information  Sheet 
The  following  two  pages  contain  copies  of  the  consent  form  and  information  sheet 
for  the  user  study  described  in  Section  8.5.2.  The  forms  included  here  are  those 
given  to  students  from  session  2005/2006,  and  are  adapted  from  a  standard  exam- 
ple  [143].  The  forms  given  to  students  from  session  2004/2005  are  very  similar. 260 
Participant  Consent  Form:  Symmetry  in  Promela  Models 
The  aim  of  this  experiment  is  to  investigate  structural  symmetry  arising  in  typical  Promela 
models  of  distributed  systems. 
The  experiment  will  involve  allowing  the  experimenter  to  analyse  your  assessed  exercise 
submission  for  Modelling  Reactive  Systems  4,  after  it  has  been  formally  assessed.  The 
analysis  is  concerned  with  the  structure  of  the  state  space  underlying  your  solutions,  not  with 
the  semantic  correctness  of  the  solutions. 
All  results  will  be  held  in  strict  confidence,  ensuring  the  privacy  of  all  participants.  No 
personal  participant  information  will  be  stored  within  the  data.  Data  will  be  stored  online  in  a 
password  protected  computer  account. 
A  feedback  email  message  will  be  sent  to  all  participants,  after  the  data  has  been  analysed. 
Your  participation  in  this  experiment  will  have  no  effect  on  your  marks  for  any  subject  at  this, 
or  any  other  university. 
Please  note  that  it  is  the  Promela  language,  not  you,  that  is  being  evaluated.  You  may  0 
withdraw  from  the  experiment  at  any  time  without  prejudice,  and  any  data  already  recorded 
will  be  discarded. 
IT  you  have  any  further  questions  regarding  this  experiment,  please  contact: 
Alastair  Donaldson 
Computing  Science  Department 
Lilybank  Gardens 
ally@dcs.  gla.  ac.  uk 
I  have  read  the  information  sheet,  and  agree  to  voluntarily  take  part  in  this  experiment: 
Name:  Email: 
Signature:  Date: 
This  studv  adheres  to  the  BPS  ethical  guidelines,  and  has  been  approved  by  the  FIAIS  ethics 
committee  of  The  University  of  Glasgow  (ref.,  FIMS00203).  RVIsfyou  arefree  to  discuss 
yourparticipation  in  this  study  with  the  researcher  (contactab7e  on  330  4236  ext.  0049),  if 
you  wouldlike  to  speak  to  someone  not  involved  in  the  studyyou  may  contact  the  chairs  of 
the  FIMS  Ethics  Commillee:  (s.  gat-rods.  schweinberget)@psy.  gla.  ac.  uk 261 
Information  Sheet:  Symmetry  in  Promela  Models 
The  aim  of  this  experiment  is  to  investigate  structural  symmetry  arising  in  typical  Promela 
models  of  distributed  systems. 
The  experiment  will  involve  allowing  the  experimenter  to  analyse  your  assessed  exercise 
submission  for  Modelling  Reactive  Systems  4,  after  it  has  been  formally  assessed. 
Verification  of  systems  using  the  SPTN  model  checker  is  limited,  since  a  moderate  si7cd 
ge  state  space;  too  large  to  exhaustively  search  Promela  model  may  give  rise  to  a  very  larg 
using  a  top  of  the  range  platform.  If  a  model  exhibits  structural  replication,  or  symmepy  (e.  g. 
many  clients  communicating  with  a  single  server),  then  it  may  be  possible  to  verify  properties 
of  the  system  without  resorting  to  exhaustive  search. 
During  our  research  we  have  developed  techniques  for  automatically  detecting  and  exploiting 
symmetries  of  Promela  models.  Our  techniques  are  limited  by  certain  assumptions  about  the 
way  users  typically  model  systems  with  Promela.  This  study  aims  to  assess  the  validity  of 
these  assumptions.  We  plan  to  exhaustively  analyse  your  Promela  programs  to  work  out  all 
symmetries  of  the  underlying  state  space,  and  compare  these  symmetries  with  those  detected 
by  our  more  efficient  methods.  Additionally,  if  symmetries  exist,  we  will  look  at  the 
reduction  in  search  time  and  space  gained  by  exploiting  these  symmetries. 
All  results  will  be  held  in  strict  confidence,  ensuring  the  privacy  of  all  participants.  No 
personal  participant  information  will  be  stored  within  the  data.  Data  will  be  stored  online  in  a 
password  protected  computer  account. 
A  feedback  email  message  will  be  sent  to  all  participants,  after  the  data  has  been  analysed. 
Your  participation  in  this  experiment  will  have  no  effect  on  your  marks  for  any  subject  at  this, 
or  any  other  university. 
Please  note  that  it  is  the  Promela  language,  not  you,  that  is  being  evaluated.  You  may 
withdraw  from  the  experiment  at  any  time  without  prejudice,  and  any  data  already  recorded 
will  be  discarded. 
If  you  have  any  further  questions  regarding  this  experiment,  please  contact: 
Alastair  Donaldson 
Computing  Science  Department 
Lilybank  Gardens 
ally@dcs.  gla.  ac.  uk 
This  sluctv  adheres  to  the  BPS  ethical  guidelines,  and  has  heen  approved  hy  the  FIMS  ethics 
commillee  of  The  University  of  G7asgow  (ref.  -  FIVS00203).  nilstyou  arefiree  to  discuss 
yourparticipation  in  this  stu4y  with  the  researcher  (contactable  on  330  4236  ext.  0049),  if 
you  would  like  to  speak  to  someone  not  involved  in  the  studyyou  may  contact  the  chairs  of  the 
FIMS  Ethics  Commillee:  (s.  garrods.  schweinherger)Cap5ýv.  gla.  ac.  uk Acronyms 
*  BNF  Bakus-Naur  form 
"  COP  Constructive  orbit  problem 
"  COPR  Constructive  orbit  problem  wiffi  references 
"  CTL  Computation  tree  logic 
"  CTL*  Extended  computation  tree  logic 
"  ETCH  Enhanced  type  checker 
"  GAP  Groups,  algorithms  and  programming 
"  GRAPE  Graph  algorithms  using  permutation  groups 
"  LTL  Linear  temporal  logic 
"  MRS  Modelling  reactive  systems  course 
*  nauty  No  automorphisms,  yes 
"  SMC  Symmetry-based  model  checker 
"  SymmSpin  Symmetric  SPIN 
"  SPIN  Simple  Promela  interpreter 
"  SPIN-to-GRAPE  A  tool  for  analysing  symmetry  in  Promela  specifications 
"  TopSPIN  A  symmetry  reduction  package  for  SPIN Mathematical  Notation 
0H9K  Disjoint  product  of  H  and  K 
0HýK  Wreath  product  of  H  and  K 
0HxK  Direct  product  of  H  and  K 
0HxK  Semi-direct  product  of  H  and  K 
*H<GH  is  a  subgroup  of  G 
0H4GH  is  a  normal  subgroup  of  G 
*  moved(H)  Set  of  points  permuted  by  H 
*  moved(a)  Set  of  points  permutedby  element  ci 
0  aP  Conjugate  A-1cip  of  a  by 
0  C,,  Cyclic  group  of  order  n 
*  S,  Symmetric  group  of  degree  ii,  or  isomorphic  subgroup  of  the 
group  associated  with  an  n-dimensional  hypercube 
0  stabG(x)  Stabiliser  of  the  point  x  in  G 
0  stabG(X)  Setwise  stabiliser  of  X  in  G 
0  stab*G(X)  Pointwise  stabiliser  of  X  in  G 
0  stabG(X)  Stabiliser  of  partition  X  in  G 
0  [SIG  Orbit  of  states  under  G 
0  orbG  (i)  Orbit  of  component  identifier  i  under  G 
0  rl  An  orbit 
00A  set  of  orbits 
0  GIn  Restriction  of  G  to  act  on  orbit  11 
0  GC7  Restriction  of  G  to  act  on  the  union  of  0 
*M  Kripke  structure 
*P  High  level  specification  (e.  g.  in  Promela,  Promela-Lite  or  SMC) 
*  CV(P)  Channel  diagram  associated  with  P 
*  SCV(P)  Static  channel  diagram  associated  with  P 
*  Aut(CD(P))  Group  of  channel  diagram  automorphisms 
9  Aut(SCD(P))  Group  of  static  channel  diagram  automorpl-dsms Bibliography 
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